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LABOUR, CAPITAL AND THE STATE IN THE ST HELENA BAY FISHERIES 
C.1856-C.1956 
This thesis deals with the history of the St Helena Bay inshore 
fish er i es, 1856-1956. Fishing has long been neglected by s o cial 
and ec o nomic h i storians and the myths propagated by c ompany and 
popu l ar writers still hold sway. The thesis challenges these by 
s it uating commercial fishing at St Helena Bay i n the c onte x t o f 
c hanging regional, national and international economies an d 
sh o wi ng h o w i t was shaped and conditioned by the struggle f o r 
o wnership of the marine resource between labour and capital, 
med i ated by the state. 
Th e thes i s is organised chronologically into three ep o chs. I n 
ea c h the focus moves from macro to micro, tracing the p ro cesses 
of class formation, capital accumulation and state i nter v ention. 
The first epoch (c.1856-c.1914) examines the merchant fisher i es, 
the second (c.1914-c.1939) the crayfish canning industry and the 
third ( c.1939-c.195~) secondary industrialisation. 
It is argued that the common property nature of the marine 
resource and non-identity between labour and production time in 
fishing created obstacles to capitalist production, discouraging 
i nvestment and allowing petty-commodity production to f lo urish. 
The latter mediated the vagaries of production through a share 
system of co-adventuring which enabled owners to avoid paying a 
fixed wage. This system's impact on the nature and c onsciousness 
of fishing labour is examined as is its vulnerability to capture 
by other capitals through insecure land tenure and credit. 
Fishing capital, in both its merch~nt and productive guises was 
dependent on articulation with petty-commodity production to 
provide it with commodities or raw material and bear the cost of 
reproducing labour. Articulation was hampered at St Helena Bay 
both by the persistence of merchant capital and the rent and 
l abour interests of Sandveld agriculture. The origins and effect 
of this situation on the fisheries is detailed and discussed, 
highlighting the importance of agricultural capital's political 
influence with the colonial and pr~vincial state in blocking ot 
subverting the development of productive capital. 
The advent of the interventionist central state in the 1930s 
undermined merchant and farmer domi~ance of the fisheries and 
cleared the way for the articulation of petty-commodity primary 
production with secondary industry during and after the Second 
World War. This articulation was facilitated by the central state 
restricting access to the marine ·resource and investing heavily 
in marine research and infrastructure to roll-back the natural 
constraints on fishing and create the conditions for the 
establishment of a stable capitalist production regime. 
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A "CALL or THI BLOOD" OR "MIN'S LIVES"? 
PISHING AND HISTORY 
MYTH AND HISTORY 
Fishing, and more particularly the figure of the fisherman, has a 
long and enduring resonance within the western cultural 
tradition. Even before the mythical New Testament Christ, "the 
fisher of men", fishing and its practitioners have enjoyed a 
unique status in the eyes of those not so engaged~ As a form of 
the oldest of all human economic pursuits (hunting), it still 
retains the essence of the chase notwithstanding the modern 
application of fossil fuels, sonar and radar. Linked to this i s 
fishing's dependence on the sea, which by its sheer vastness, 
depth and innate hostility to human beings remains the last 
vestige of an unbridled nature~ To be a fisherman is thus to be 
one of the "last hunters", still wresting a living from a 
potentially lethal natural environment in the "space age" of late 
capitalism! Since the Industrial Revolution, those classes whose 
very genesis and continued existence was predicated on 
transforming nature and eradicating the pre-capitalist social 
formations and modes of production it sustained, have evidenced a 
remarkable sentiment for and idealisation of the nature, 
societies and modes of production they were so rapidly 
D. Profunr, & G Swift (eds) The Hagie Wheel (London, 1985) and P. 
Thompson, T. Wailey & T. Lummis Living the Fishing (London, 1983), pp. 1-5. 
2 J. Coote (ed) The Faber Book of the Sea (London, 1989); H. Rediker 
Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea (Cambridge, 1989), pp.1-5 and R. 
Carson The Sea (London, 1991). For South Africa see C. Von Bonde So Great Thy 
Sea: A Study of the Oceans (Cape Town, 1956) and W.L. Speight Swept by Wind 
and Wave (Cape Town, n.d.). 
J P. J. Edwards & J. Marshall #Sources of Conflict and Comnunity in the 
Trawling Industries of Hull and Grimsby between the Warsw, Oral History, 5, 1, 
1977, p. 5 and P. Thompson et al, Living the Fishing, p. 1. 
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destroying~ The fact that fishing industrialised relatively late 
and in many cases not at all, has made the fisherman a visible 
and seemingly enduring symbol of a bygone age when people 
interacted directly with nature free from the strictures of the 
capitalist work ethic in a perpetual struggle for survival. The 
fisherman - like the peasant - is envied this communion and the 
supposed freedom accorded him by his work, the rewards of which 
are deemed all the richer for being so hard won~ 
In South Africa too, fishermen have acquired a novelty value on a 
par with "Bushmen" and other "primitives" whose lives appear or 
remain inextricably intertwined with nature~ This association, 
in the case of fishing, sustains a thriving local tourist, 
coffee-table publishing and amateur art industry, dedicated to 
faithfully reproducing in curios, postcards, books, paintings and 
photographs the essent~ally timeless nature of fishing and, 
· "a romantic essence of the fisherman, presented not as a 
workman dependent by his technique and his gains on a 
definite society, but rather as the theme of· an eternal 
condition, in which man is far away and exposed to the perils 
of the sea, and woman weeping and praying at home" 7 • · 
It is this "romantic essence", packaged in innumerable ways which 
explains why on any given weekend thousands of locals and 
tourists flock to fishing ports on the Cape Peninsula and Table 
4 A. Bermingham Landscape and Ideology (London, 1986) and E. Hobsbawm & 
T. Ranger (eds) The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, 1988). 
5 Rudyard Kipling Captains Courageous and Ernest Hemingway The Old Han & 
the Sea are probably the two best known examples. For more recent literary 
evocations see Peter Hatthiessen Hen's Lives (London, 1988) and Paul Watkins 
Calm at Sunset, Calm at Dawn (London, 1990). 
b For the changing image of the #primitive# in South Africa see K. 
Tomaselli et al Hyth, Race & Power (Cape Town, 1986) and J.H. Coetzee White 
Writing (Cape Town, 1988). 
7 R. Barthes Mythologies (London, 1983), p.95. 
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Bay Harbour seeking recreation on the quayside amidst the stench 
of fish, moored fishing boats and bemused fishermen~ None of 
these people would dream of making a similar excursion to Epping 
Industria, buying postcards of factories, posing for pQotographs 
with factory workers or donning T-shirts emblazoned with the logo 
"I ate at Gunners Circle"! The only comparable examples are from 
other primary industries - agriculture and mining - romanticised 
in like fashion through the Wine Route and Gold Reef City~ The 
power and all pervasiveness of popular culture's representation 
of fishing 
proportions 
and its practitioners has 
and remains one of the 
attained mythical 
nearest latter-day 
approximations to the pastoral idiom of the British Industrial 
Revolution 10 • 
Myth, according to Raymond Barthes, is a form of "depoliticised 
speech" which transforms historical reality into a "natural 
image" through an act of linguistic distortion and violence: 
"[M]yth is constituted by the loss of the historical 
quality of things: in it things lose the memory that they 
once were made. The world enters language as a dialectical 
relation between activities, between human actions; it 
comes out of myth as a harmonious display of essences. A 
conjuring trick has taken place; it has turned reality 
8 The present "Waterfront" development in the Table Bay docks is the 
latest in a long line of appropriations of coastal production sites for 
recreation\tourism purposes. The list includes Hermanus, Arniston and the 
False Bay coastline, as wel-1 as industrial centres like Hout Bay, "Port Owen" 
at the Berg River nr::,uth, the ill-fated "Club Hykonos" at Langebaan Lagoon and 
a number of 110re recent time-share\holiday resorts planned for the west coast 
near Paternoster. 
9 See for example H. Kenneth Fairest Vineyards (Johannesburg, 1966); D.J. 
Opperman Spirit of the Vine (Cape Town, 1968) C. Jansen Cape Winelands 
(Greyton, 1985) on the wine industry and W. MacDonald The Romance of the 
Golden Rand (London, 1933); A.P. Cartwright Valley of Gold (Cape Town, 1961); 
F. Goldie River of Gold (London, 1969) and E. Rosenthal Goldi Goldi Goldi 
(London, 1970) on gold mining. 
lO R. Williams The Country and the City (London, 1973) and G.E. Hingay 
(ed) The Vanishing Countryman and The Rural Idyll (London, 1989). 
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inside out, it has emptied it of history and has filled it 
with nature, it has removed from things their human meaning 
so as to make them signify a human insignificance" 11 • 
Myth thus presents reality as self-evident fact, eschewing 
explanation and erasing all human agency, dialectics and 
contradictions. As such it is the ideal mode of operation of 
ruling class ideology under capitalism. The bourgeoisie for 
Barthes is "the social class which does not want to be named" and 
in pursuit of ex-nomination on the ideological plane postulates 
the concomitant notions of "eternal man" and "unchangeable 
nature" 12 : 
"The status of the bourgeoisie is particular, historical: man 
as represented by it is universal, eternal. The bourgeoisie 
class has precisely built its power on technical, scientific 
progress, on an unlimited transformation of nature: 
bourgeoisie ideology yields in return an unchangeable 
nature" 13 • 
In South Africa the myths of the dominant class seek to similarly 
"naturalise" the society's colonial heritage and legacy of 
dispossession and bloodshed by erasing history. Informing this 
"depoliticisation" process is the supposedly "natural" phenomenon 
of race. Race is the explanatory mechanism by which white 
domination and black subjugation become "naturalised" as 
immutable and unchanging, an eternal condition14 • This requires an 
act of extreme linguistic violence, producing, what Barthes 
terms, "strong" myths in which the depoliticisation process is 
abrupt and the "political quantum" remains immediate 15 • Using 
11 R. Barthes Mythologies, p.142. 
12 Ibid, pp. 137-142. 
lJ Ibid, pp. 141-142.· 
14 K. Tomaselli et al Hyth Race and Power, pp.3-5. 
15 R. Barthes Mythologies, p.144. 
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Barthes' understanding of myth, it is possible to analyse the 
mythologisation of fishing and fisherman as a point of re-entry 
on the road to historical investigation and explanation which 
myth has so effectively closed. 
Frank Robb, in a coffee-table publication from the mid-1970s, 
evokes the archetypal fishermen as follows: 
"The Cape Coloured fisherman is a small man with a _ 
hardbitten face deep-etched by sea and sun and too often 
further ravaged by shoreside dissipations, with a mordant 
wit admirably expressed in the vivid 'Capey' dialect, and 
with a fish-wife who is a bold flaunting harridan-witch 
with a gift for invective enabling her to hold her own in 
any slanging match" 16. 
This succinct vignette underscores the centrality of race in 
popular representations of fishermen. The mythical Cape fisherman 
is thus inevitably "coloured", a group long believed to be 
"instinctive" fishermen with an innate sea-sense bequeathed them 
by their "Malay" ancestry 17 • Many of the latter were purportedly 
fishermen in the islands of the Malayan archipelago before being 
brought to the Cape by the DutchIB. Once here, they "could not for 
long be kept from Cape seas" as a 
inexorably to fishing 19 • Their 
"Call of the Blood" drew them 
industry, intelligence and 
abstinence from alcohol saw them dominate the fisheries until the 
1880s, easily displacing indigenous inhabitants who "had neither 
16 B. Franck & F. Robb Fishermen of the Cape (Cape Town, 1975), p.65. 
17 R. Lees Fishing for Fortunes (Cape Town, 1969), p.8. 
lB On the pl aces of oci gin 
Their Peasant Economy (London, 
Africa (Cambridge, 1985). 
of Cape slaves see R. Firth Malay Fishermen: 
1946) and N. Worden Slavery in Dutch South 
19 R. Lees Fishing for Fortunes:, p.8 and W. Wardlaw Thompson Sea 
Fisheries of the Cape (Cape Town, 1913), p.39. 
X 
boats nor hooks"~. The corruption of this "Malay" blood-line 
through inter-marriage, however, ended their dominance and 
produced a bastardised "coloured" race in which the genetic 
aptitude for fishing was blunted by a predilection for alcohol21. 
Robb's euphemistically termed "shoreside dissipations" is an 
oblique reference to this, which - together with the "mordant 
wit", "·capey' dialect" and loud, vulgar wife - fills out the 
racial identity of the image in terms of long-held white 
stereotypes of "coloureds"n. 
The myth of decayed "coloured" labour has as its corollary a much 
"weaker" white myth. It is Europeans who rekindle the torch of 
progress in fishing from the 19th Century onwards, following in 
the footsteps of the Phonecians who reputedly first fished the 
waters of the Cape in 610 ec23 • Endowed with the same "sea-sense" 
which brought the settlers to the subcontinent in the 17th 
Century, the white legacy of the blood remained uncorrupted by 
miscegenation and alcohol. This racial purity coupled with a 
~ G.M. Theal Ethnography and Condition of South Africa Before A.D. 1505 
(London, 1919), p.104. Also A.J.H. Goodwin #Prehistoric Fishing Methods in 
South Africa# in Antiquity, 20, 1946 and M. Brooker #Hunting and Fishing 
Methods of the Native Peoples of South Africa as Evidenced in the Records of 
Some Early Travellers# (Unpublished Archaeology Honours dissertation, UCT, 
1971). 
21 R. Lees Fishing for Fortunes, pp.188-189. 
n For popular conceptions of #coloured# identity see J.S. Marais The 
Cape Coloured People (Johannesburg, 1957); A.J. Venter Coloured: A Profile of 
Two Million South Africans (Cape Town, 1974) and R.E. van der Ross Myths and 
Attitudes: An Inside Look at the Coloured People (Cape Town, 1979). 
23 T.T. Jeans & C. Struben The Sea and South ~rica: Being a Short 
Historical Survey of the Influence of the Sea on South Africa (Cape Town, 
n.d.J, pp.1-4; R. Lees Fishing for. Fortunes, p. Sand B. Franck & F. Robb 
Fishermen of the Cape, pp. 1-2. The basis of this claim is a doubtful 
circumnavigation o~ Africa reported 6y Herodotus. Also J. Fredrickse None But 
Ourselves. (Johannesburg,1983), pp.10-12. The #Phoenician Myth# has long served 
as ideological justification for white domination in Africa and its mention 
here is thus 11Dre than coincidental. 
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vigorous Protestant work ethic and the superior technology of the 
European Industrial Revolution made them the "natural" pioneers 
of the modern fishing industry, turning the boundless and 
previously untapped resources of the southern oceans to profit on 
a vast scale in the 20th Century. As whites ascended to being 
industrialists and successful capitalists, the mythical white 
fisherman and hardy pioneer became an artefact of popular 
consciousness and all but faded from memory by the late 1960s ~ . 
About the growing number of Africans entering the fishing after 
1945 there is only silence. Their exclusion is explained by 
passing reference to a lack of genetic "sea-sense" and 
observations such as, "[T]he Bantu ate no fish, possibly because 
they believed it to be connected with the snake, in whose form 
the ancestral spirits were wont to appear"~. Thus, just as whites 
and "coloureds" are drawn to fishing in different ways by the 
prescriptions of the blood, so Africans are repelled. By 
subsuming fishing and fishermen in this way, race "naturalises" 
and depoliticises them - substituting the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of innate racial characteristics for the history of 
slavery, dispossession, segregation and the development of 
capitalism which properly explains both. 
The racial myth of pure blood overlays the more general equation 
of fishing with hunting and fishermen with hunters. The latter 
lends an added timelessness and stasis to the former, reinforcing 
and fixing it within the mythical matrix. Crucial to this is the 
notion that, "Despite the advances in techniques and the increase 
of our knowledge about the sea, the fishermen remains a hunter, 
24 D.F. Halherbe Hans-Die-Skipper (Cape Town, 1935); HJacob Fishes a 
Fortune - The Backbreaking WayH in John Bull, 15 September 1951; HQes van Die 
SeeH supplements in Die Burger of the 1960s and G.D. Scholtz Die Afrikaner en 
die See (Johannesburg, 1969). 
~ R. Lees Fishing for Fortunes, p. 5. Also H. Hofmeyer Garibaldi's Ski-
Boat (London, 1960) for a contrasting view from the Eastern Cape. 
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reaping without sowing and reaching into the largely unknown"~. 
By juxtaposing industry and science with the "oldest and most 
primitive of human occupations", the fishermen is effectively 
excluded from the modern world and trapped in a vacuum where "the 
successful hunting of fish still depends on the experience of the 
fisherman, on his luck, his skill and his intuitive genius for 
being in right the part of a vast sea at the right time"v. Like 
the mythical "Bushman", the fisherman is able to predict the 
weather with an uncanny accuracy, interpret and anticipate the 
behaviour of animals (seabirds, seals, fish) and navigate without 
a compass~. He is a quiet, simple man who - although he has very 
little - wants for nothing save the company and community of 
others like himself, with whom he shares the happiness and peace-
of-heart which only comes from a daily communion with nature. 
This transmogrification of the fisherman into a variant of "man 
the hunter" by urban industrial society, represents all which the 
latter is not and longs for in its idealised imagination. 
Urbanites, by "invoking peasant virtues which they have 
experienced only through train windows on their summer 
holidays"~, remain oblivious to the primitive living conditions, 
long hours, back-breaking work, frequent danger, harsh 
discipline, poor and uncertain earnings and failing health of the 
fisherman, seeing only the postcard image, smelling the sea and 
hearing the lingering cry "tikkie kreef"l It is an image which 
brooks no elucidation or change, as Frantz Fanon, commenting on 
~ Irvin & Johnson South African Fish & Fishing (Cape Town, 1964), p.17. 
V Ibid., pp.17-19. 
~ For the mythical Bushman see K. Tomaselli et al Hyth, Race and Power, 
pp.77-101. For the fisherman as hunter see C.L. Biden Sea-angling Fishes of 
the Cape (London, 1930); D.F. Halherbe Hans-Die-Skipper; F. Robb Sea Hunters 
(London, 1955) and T. Carse Die Bloudam is Hul Oesland (Cape Town, 1960). Also 
L. van der Pos:t. The Hunter arid the Whale (Harmondsworth, 1973) for a different 
marine industry. 
~ T. Nairn The Break-Up of Britain (London, 1981), p. 340. 
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"the reactions of white jazz specialists when ••• new styles such 
as be-bop took definite shape" after 1945, explains: 
"The fact is that in their eyes jazz should only be the 
despairing broken-down nostalgia of an old Negro . who is 
trapped between five glasses of whiskey, the curse of his 
race, and the racial hatred of the white man ••• And it is 
not utopian to suppose that in fifty years time the type 
of jazz howl hiccupped by the a poor misfortunate Negro 
will be upheld only by whites who believe in it as an 
expression of nigger-hood, and who are faithful to this 
arrested image of a type of relationship"~. 
So too the arrested "image" of the fisherman erases the 
historical origins of the fishing labour force, fashioned not by 
choice or a "call of the blood", but by successive defeats at the 
hands of historical capitalism. It is a cruel and bitter irony 
that the fishermen's failure to first resist proletarianisation 
and then make the transition to fully-fledged wage labour, should 
lend credence to their mythologisation as a simple folk, engaged 
in a timeless pursuit untainted be either capitalism or the 
clock. As the losers in the long war to forge a capitalist 
economy in the South Western Cape, fishermen have been 
transformed into the quintessential "eternal men", peopling a 
romanticised "unchanging nature" for the leisure consumption of 
the victors. 
HISTORY AND MYTH 
Rather than challenge the popular mythology of fishing, 
historians · have themselves played a major part in developing, 
expanding and propagating it. The sparse historical writings on 
the fishing industry are of comparatively recent origin, dating, 
for the most part, from the post-Second World War period. Prior 
to 1945, the only histories of the Cape fisheries were those by 
~ F. Fanon •on National Culture• in F. Fanon The Wretched of the Earth 
(Haraondsworth, 1974), pp.195-196. 
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an ex-civil servant, a young Afrikaner historian and the Director 
of Fisheries 31 • The first dealt mainly with the development of a 
trawling industry, the second with the fisheries of the Dutch 
period and the third with the role of science in the fisheries. 
The rapid wartime industrialisation of inshore fishing after 1939 
and a sustained post-war boom based on the exploitation of 
previously ignored pelagic species for canning, fish meal and oil 
extraction, provided the impetus for a proliferation in popular 
histories of the industry. Intoxicated by their own success and 
meteoric rise to wealth and power, the newly rich captains of the 
industry commissioned family cum-company histories at a steady 
rate, dominating both the production of fish and the history of 
fishing for nearly two decades after the war 32 • Thus Ellis 
Silverman penned his memoirs with the aid of his wife and 
published them himself in 195633 , closely followed by the 
Oven stone family who employed a Cape Town public relations 
consultant for the job34 • In the same period, that doyen of 
popular history hacks, Eric Rosenthal, wrote two pot-boilers on 
the Stephan and Irvin families~. The latter was finally published 
in the early 1960s - in abridged form and without acknowledgement 
31 W. Wardlaw Thompson Sea Fisheries of the Cape Colony; C.F.J. Muller 
#Die Geskiedenis van die Visserye aan die Kaap tot aan die Middel van die 
Agtiende Eeu# in Archives Yearbook oE South African History, vol.1, 1942, 
pp.1-100 and C. Von Bonde Die Suid-Afrikaanse Visnywerheid (Johannesburg, 
1944). 
32 The industry's own journal, the South African Shipping News & Fishing 
Industry Review · [SASNFIRJ first appeared in January 1946 and has been in 
existence ever since. In addition to acting as a mouthpiece and trade journal, 
the SASNFIR from its inception carried occasional articles: on the pioneers of 
the shipping and fishing industries. 
33 E. & B. Silverman Memoirs of a Pioneer in the Fish Canning Industry of 
South Africa (Cape Town, 1956). 
34 F. Gill Ovenstones a Story-of ~the Sea (Cape Town, 1958). 
~ E. Rosenthal nThe Stephan tSaga~ and #The ·Irvin and Johnson StoryH 
(Unpublished manuscripts, n.d.). ::11 
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by Irvin & Johnson as part of a promotional campaign to 
encourage greater fish consumption amongst the literate public~. 
Finally, in 1969 the daughter of the chairman of South Africa's 
largest fishing company, Oceana, 
the South African Fish Canners' 
with the financial backing of 
Association, published her 
appropriately titled Fishing for Fortunes as the definitive 
account of the industry's history, a book still referred to by 
government commissions and academics alike~. 
All these accounts share a common concern with the pioneering 
ethic and "progress" of the industry after 1945. They form part 
of a much larger company history genre, glorifying founders, 
lauding successors and dazzling posterity (and potential 
investors) with output, sales and profits~. Richly anecdotal, 
boringly parochial and meticulously uncritical, this work 
constitutes a corpus at once tantalising and frustrating to the 
academic historian. With access to otherwise private archives and 
individuals, it frequently hints at policies and practices behind 
closed doors, but seldom develops or expands on the underlying 
processes. Despite their shoddy scholarship and concern with 
trivia, "t~xts such as these are important in that they reproduce 
the conformist society that shapes them"~. They reflect their 
producer's and reader•s · own conceptions of the past, for whom 
free enterprise is an article of faith and history an act of 
obeisance. Thus hard work, determination and technology triumph 
over all obstacles erected by either the state or labour. The 
individual is the basic unit of analysis and the collective 
~ Irvin & Johnson South African Fish & Fishing. 
~ R. Lees Fishing for Fortunes. 
~ For some perceptive comments on this genre see S. Lindqvis:t HDig Where 
You Stana· · in Oral History, 7, 2, 1979. 
~ D. Haarhof The Wild South-West (Johannesburg, 1991), p.3. 
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(whether as union or bureaucracy) is an impediment to the 
individualism which is the dynamo of the system. In seeking to 
legitimate the post-war status quo in the fisheries, the fishing 
company histories also amplified the twin themes of pioneering 
white industrialists and the decayed "coloured" fishermen. Whites 
were pioneers and industrialists because they were innately 
gifted, dynamic and hard working. "Coloureds", on the other hand, 
were labourers because they were lazy, drowned their genetic 
inheritance in a wine bottle and were simply unable to adapt or 
keep pace with the rapidly developing industry. As a result the 
companies had to exercise a benign paternalism over their 
fishermen, employing and housing them and their families and 
ensuring that access to liquor was strictly controlled. 
The hegemony of the company histories is underlined by the fact 
that no historical theses on the fishing industry were written 
during the 1950s and 1960s. What academic work was done was 
minimal, written by industry insiders and largely confined to the 
field of economics~. Even ~fter the long boom evaporated in the 
early 1970s and fishing companies lost their separate identities 
by being integrated into new monopoly capital formations, the 
earlier histories continued to hold sway. They were supported by 
newspapers, magazines, popular writers and an emerging tourist 
industry, which tirelessly . reproduced parochial vignettes of 
fishermen and idealised accounts of fishing villages for the 
~ L.P.D. Gertenbach •nie Suid-Arrikaanse Visserywese: 'n Ekonomiese en 
Statistiese Oorsig• (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 
1944\46); F.R.L. Baard •n1e Ontwikkeling van die Visbedryf in die Republiek 
van Suid-Arrika en Suidwes Arrikaw (Unpublished , HCoDD thesis, UNISA, 1968); 
F.R.L. Baard w•n Kritiese Beskouing van die Ontwikkeling van die Bestuur en 
Organisasie van die Visnywerheid in die Republiek · van Suid-Arrika en Suidwes 
Arrika• (Unpublished DComm thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 1971). 
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white middle-class market 41 • The industry now became a case study 
for academics looking to test particular theories mainly 
concerned with resource management 42 • Heavily statistical, this 
work was primarily concerned with plotting catch and production 
figures to test different hypotheses concerning overfishing, 
maximum sustainable yield and the success or otherwise of state 
management strategies. Although not historical, it culled 
liberally from the existing corpus of company histories when 
necessary. Of the two historical theses written at this time, one 
dealt with the period 1890-1910 and the other with the crayfish 
canning industry before 1947 43 • Based on a minimum of primary 
research, both relied on a range of uncritically used newspaper, 
government and company history sources, producing precis rather 
than analyses of the official view. 
Despite the blossoming of revisionist historiography in South 
Africa since the early 1970s, the new marxist and social 
41 For the more obvious literary manifestations see the copious work of 
Lawrence G Green, Jose Burman, Arderne Tredgold and other popular writers on 
the Cape Peninsula and South Western Cape. In the coffee table genre two of 
the more explicit treatments of the subject are by B. Franck & F. Robb 
Fishermen of the Cape and J. Schrauwen (ed) West Coast: A Circle of Seasons 
(Cape Town, 1991). Newspaper and magazine coverage is less systematic, but 
nonetheless considerable and most Cape Town artists seem to have painted at 
least one fisherman or fishing village in their career. 
42 See for example P.S. Stohr #The Fisheries Development Corporation and 
its Influence on the South African Fishing Industry# (Unpublished PhD thesis, 
UCT, 1977) and G.A. Boyle #Government Regulation and the Fisheries: An 
Analysis of Principles and a Case Study of the SA\SWA Industry• (Unpublished 
Honours dissertation, UCT, 1980). There has also been a prolific growth in 
research on the scientific and legal aspects of the industry since 1970. 
43 J. De Jongh #Die Ontwikkeling van die Seevisserye aan die Kaapkolonie 
1890-1910• (Unpublished Honours dissertation, UCT, 1974) and S.C. Townell ·The 
Crawfish Industry of the Cape West Coast 1874-1947• (Unpublished Honours 
dissertation, UCT, 1977). 
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historians paid scant attention to the fishing industry«. This is 
all the more surprising given the growing number of innovative 
anthropological and historical studies of fishing abroad~. The 
local fishing industry - despite its importance to the South 
Western Cape economy - came a poor second to the urban metropolis 
of Cape Town as far as historical research was concerned and 
fishing labour remained as invisible to the revisionists as it 
was patronised and despised by earlier writers. It was only in 
the 1980s that historians began to look at the industry from the 
perspective of the new school and anthropology. Quinlan and 
Kirkaldy the former as anthropologist, the latter as 
anthropologist cum-historian - produced in-depth studies of the 
Kalk Bay fishing community in the tradition of West, Whisson and 
Kaplinsky%. Although both moved considerably beyond the latter in 
their analyses, they were unable to integrate Kalk Bay into the 
broader context of the Cape Town, regional or national economy 
because of their limited research focus. Similar problems beset 
the efforts of van Sittert and Grant in their respective 
« R. Hoorsom Fishing: Exploiting the Sea (London, 1984) is the sole 
exception to this rule. For the rest of Africa see E. Vercruijsse The 
Penetration of Capitalism: A West African Case Study (London, 1984) and J. 
McCracken #Fishing and the Colonial Economy: The Case of Halawi# Journal of 
African History, 28, 3, 1987. 
~ The most influential historical works in this regard have been P. 
Thompson et al Living the Fishing and T. Lumm.is Occ;upation & Society: The East 
Anglian Fishermen 1880-1914 . (Cambridge, 1985). In anthropology, the work of 
Raoul Andersen, Cato Wadel and others in the Institute of Social & Economic 
Research at the Memorial University of Newfoundland has been another important 
shaping influence. See, for example, the two edited works; R. Anderse~ & C. 
Wadel (eds) North Atlantic Fishermen·: Anthropological Essays on Hodern Fishing 
(St Johns, 1972) and R. Andersen (ed) North Atlantic Maritime Cultures: 
Anthropological Essays on Changing Adaptations (The Hague, 1979). 
% H.G. Whisson & R.H. Kaplinsky Suspended Sentence: A Study of the Kalk 
Bay Fishermen (Johannesburg, 1969); H.B. West Divided Community (Cape Town, 
1971); T. (juinlan #Line Fishing in Kalk Bay: An Account of a Marginal 
Livelihood in a Developing Industrial Environment• (Unpublished Honours 
dissertation, UCT, 1980) and A. Kirkaldy w•The Sea is in Our Blood': Comnunity 
& Craft in Kalk Bay c.1880-1939# (Unpublished HA thesis, UCT, 1988). 
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histories of the Hout and Rogge Bay fisheries 47 • Influenced by the 
work of Paul Thompson and others who used oral testimony to 
recover and reconstruct the history of British fishing, both 
consciously attempted "histories from below", producing some 
useful insights on capital and class formation, but again without 
transcending their local study focus to develop and explore the 
external linkages which they identified. 
Thus, despite a smattering of "alternative" scholarship in the 
1980s, fishing - even within the orbit of one of the country's 
largest port cities - still remains largely outside the ambit of 
present historical enquiry. The inadequacy of the history of the 
industry and its "contamination" by myth, leaves the field wide 
open for further enquiry. This is underscored by the fact that 
the archival records of both the provincial state and Department 
of Commerce and Industries have been virtually untapped and 
contain a wealth of primary data, including substantial 
correspondence from fishermen and others directly involved in the 
fishing. This material, together with the collection of oral 
testimony during fieldwork, makes a fundamental revision of the 
received wisdom about the Cape fisheries possible. 
Given the paucity and limitations of the existing work, a broad 
periodisation of the fishing industry is urgently required as a 
guide to future research. Rather than a simple chronology, the 
fisheries need to be located firmly in the context of an emerging 
capitalist economy, to reveal class formation, state intervention 
and South Africa's changing position in the world economy ?s the 
key benchmarks of a contradictory and dialectical development 
process. At the same time, the macro project dare not lose sight 
47 L. van Sittert ,,.Gebrei in die Ambag': Farmers:, Fis:h & Fishermen in 
the Hout Bay Valley c1880-1956w (Unpublished Honours dissertation, UCT, 1985) 
and D. Gr~t #Bokkoms, Boycott & the Bo Kaap: The Decline of the Rogge Bay 
Fishing Industry between 1890 and 1920# (Unpublished Honours dissertation, 
UCT, 1986\7). 
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of the richly textured and often corrective insights to be 
gleaned from a close scrutiny of the world at the grassroots. The 
notion that people make their own history, albeit not in a world 
of their own choosing, is particularly apt to the fisheries, 
where petty-commodity production survived until well into the 
20th Century and acted as a powerful countervailing force to the 
proletarianising effects of capitalism and the designs of the 
state. The present study aims to mesh these two perspectives by 
weaving together an analysis of capital, state and labour into a 
composite tapestry which readmits fishermen to history, not as 
"ocean hunters", but members of the South Western Cape's rural 
working class and shows that commercial fishing emerged not as a 
sideshow to the development of the regional economy, subject to 
the laws of nature rather than the market, but as an integral 
part of the mainstream. In so doing, it confirms, questions and 
even extends some of the basic premises of the new school about 
the development of capitalism in South Africa. 
LABOUR, CAPITAL AND THE STATE 
The history of fishing in the Cape has been shaped by spe~ific 
macro processes which have given it a unique character. The first 
of these was the absence of any large-scale pre-colonial 
fisheries or indigenous seafaring tradition. Commercial fishing, 
when it emerged, did so under the aegis of colonialism and in 
response to the demands of Cape Town, Western Cape agriculture, 
the Mauritian and Natal sugar plantations and the Kimberley and 
Rand mines tor cheap food. This in turn determined the 
development or rather underdevelopment of the fisheries within 
the primary commodity-producing colonial economy based on 
agrarian and later mining production. Fishing attracted limited 
capital investment, was . always secondary and subject to the needs 
of agriculture and mining, and was a low priority for the state. 
These factors relegated it to a marginal activity in the Cape, 
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confined to the physical, economic and social periphery of the 
society. This marginalisation in turn shaped the micro processes 
of class and capital formation 
determining the nature of 
within the fisheries, as well 
state intervention and form 
as 
of 
integration with the wider regional, national and 
economies. 
international 
The fishing labour force which emerged in the Cape countryside 
did so over a period of centuries and was marked by a distinct 
fluidity and lack of cohesion. The notion that fishermen were 
self-selected by a "call of the blood" or the innate abilities of 
their race thus imposes an order and logic on a process which was 
inherently disorderly and uneven. Fishing took place either at 
the coast or along the lower reaches of major rivers. These areas 
were at once geographically peripheral (ie on the outer edge of 
the land) and also economically and socially marginal. Poor soil, 
lack of fresh water and exposure ta the elements made them both 
inhospitable for human habitation and unsuited to either pastoral 
or agrarian production. For this reason they were of very limited 
economic importance to agriculture, sparsely populated and only 
superficially policed by the state. A barrier of isolation thus 
separated the coast from the interior, creating a frontier zone 
between land and sea. As Greg Denning has argued, "The beach 
itself is a ••• marginal space, where neither otherness nor 
familiarity hold sway, where there is much invention and a 
blending of the old and the new"~. Such "marginal spaces" under 
colonialism were havens for marginal people displaced from the 
dominant economy of the rural hinterland by the twin processes of 
dispossession and the development of capitalism. With the closing 
of the north-western frontier in the 1740s, growing numbers of 
ex-slaves, dispossessed Khoi, failed farmers, evicted tenants and 
~ 
p.42. 
G. Denning ~Th'-=e~_Bo...;...;;.un'-'--ty,,__:~_An~_E_t_hn~o~g_r_aLp_h_i_c~H~i_s_t_o_ry~ (Melbourne, 1991), 
xxii 
bywoners, new immigrants and fugitives from colonial and military 
justice moved onto the beaches of the west coast49 • Here t h ey 
sought to escape proletarianisation by clinging to the remnants 
of their earlier economic independence or trying to regain it 
outside of wage labour. By the first half of the 19th Century 
numbers of scattered sguatter\subsistence communities emerged 
and, as John Marincowitz observes, it was possible for a squatter 
to 
"[S]ettle on public land, act as small-scale cultivator, 
petty-pastoralist, transport rider, day-labourer, harvest 
gang-worker, woodcutter, fish catcher, and perhaps trader i n 
leather-work or wagon repairer. The numbers of people who 
settled on public land in the commercial wheat-growing areas, 
and on the peripheries of these areas, increased after 
emancipation throughout the 1840s"~. 
The uncertainties of fishing (weather and resource) made a range 
of other economic pursuits a basic necessity - the most common of 
which was seasonal farm labour during harvest time. Fishing's 
inter-dependence with agriculture was further reinforced by the 
latter's demand for cheap rantsoenvis (ration fish) as food for 
slaves or farm labour. Production at the coast employed 
rudimentary fishing technology (beach seine nets and rowing 
boats) and was informally organised by boat and net owners. 
Relations of production, however, were egalitarian and based on 
the share system. This recognised the independence of the 
individual producer (co-adventurer), remunerated fishermen and 
owner according to contribution (skill and labour power versus 
boat\net\gear) 
labour. The 
and allowed both control over the product of 
share system gave fishing the resilience and 
49 J.N.C. Harincowitz HRural Production and Labour in the Western Cape, 
1838 to 1888, with Special Reference to the Wheat Growing Districts# 
(Unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of London, 1985), pp.40-46. 
~ Ibid., p.45. 
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flexibility needed to cope with the seasonal nature of the 
resource and agricultural employment. Thus, by the last quarter 
of the 19th Century fishing labour had emerged as independent if 
transitory members of the rural underclass, occupying a tenuous 
niche on the underbelly of the dominant agrarian economy and 
dependent on the latter for both markets and seasonal wage 
labour. This labour pool continued to be supplemented by waves of 
migration, particularly in the 1900s (Italian immigrants) and 
1930s (the Depression), as well as an ongoing interchange between 
fishing and farming. As a way station between the farm and the 
city the population of the coastal fishing hamlets acted as a 
barometer of class stratification, capital 
proletarianisation in the countryside until the 
formation and 
late 1940s when 
the sea frontier was finally colonised and closed by fishing 
capital in conjunction with the state. Capital penetration, 
however, had been underway for almost a century before, but found 
its path blocked both by the nature of fishing and resistance of 
the petty-commodity economy to outside control. 
Historically fishing has been unattractive to capital by virtue 
of the often extreme non-identity between labour and production 
time 51• "Natural factors" - the vagaries of the weather and a 
seasonal, highly volatile and little understood resource 
con~pire to subvert the establishment of a stable production 
cycle resulting in a lower rate of profit, the inefficient use of 
constant capital, problems in the circulation and realisation of 
value and a dependence on seasonal labour. For this reason 
production resided, until the mid-19th Century, in the hands of 
petty-commodity producers supplying local urban or rural markets. 
The commercialisation of Western Cape agriculture in the second 
half of the 19th Century, however, created expanded opportunities 
51 S.A. Hann & J.M. Dickinson #Obstacles to the Development of a 
Capitalist Agriculture# Journal of Peasant Studies, 5, 4, July 1978. 
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for merchant capital penetration of the countryside~. This was 
facilitated by the lack of adequate road infrastructure and 
development of a seaborne grain trade along the west and southern 
Cape coasts. Cape Town-based merchants monopolised the trade with 
their fleets of cutters and strategically sited coastal land. On 
the west coast the merchant "empire" of Stephan Brothers rivalled 
that of the Barrys along the southern coast. In addition to gra i n 
buying, usury and land speculation, Stephan Brothers established 
commercial fisheries on its coastal land-holdings to supply the 
Mauritian market with dried snoek. Through its ownership of land, 
boats and gear the firm restructured the share system, abolishing 
fishing leases, appropriating the whole product of labour ( the 
catch) in return for a token subsistence allowance ("eetvis"), 
credit and free housing, and extending the formal contract to all 
fishing labour. These efforts met with sustained resistance from 
, the fishermen to both the loss of control over the product of 
labour and the restrictions on movement imposed by the contract. 
Large-scale desertion from the 1880s onwards, the decline of the 
snoek resource in the 1890s and the construction of railways in 
the 1900s undermined the Stephan "empire" and merchant 
fisheries. Both the seaborne grain trade and fisheries collapsed 
after 1902, the former through competition with the railway and 
the latter because of its isolation from the Cape Town market and 
inability to compete with local petty-commodity fisheries for the 
scattered rural rantsoenvis market. 
The 1900s, however, saw · the emergence of a crayfish canning 
industry in Cape Town, supplying the Parisian market with a 
crustacean used locally for bait and regarded as "a poor man's 
food". The industry expanded rapidly up the west coast after the 
failure of the American lobster fishery in 190S and by 1910 there 
~ R. Ross wThe Origins of Capitalist Agriculture in the Cape Colony: A 
Surveyw in W. Beinart, P. Delius & S. Trapido (eds) Putting a Plough to the 
Ground (Johannesburg, 1986), pp.64-66. 
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were factories at Saldanha and St Helena Bays. Ten years later 
Lamberts Bay and Port Nolloth had been industrialised and by 1930 
Hondeklip and Thorn Bays and Luderitz in the newly-acquired 
mandate territory of South West Africa were all canning factory 
sites. The spread of canning production, however, encountered 
determined resistance from the petty-commodity economy, 
particularly at Saldanha and St Helena Bay's where it competed 
with the latter for inshore fish. As a result crayfish fishing 
remained highly seasonal (dependent as much on the availability 
of labour as crayfish), organised on the basis of the share 
system and co-existent with rantsoenvis and other petty-commodity 
production at many factory centres. The canning companies' 
provision of free housing and debt-bondage succeeded in part in 
subjugating petty commodity to factory production within a piece-
work system in which the individual producer's independence was 
purely nominal, -but even then it existed alongside more 
independent forms of petty-commodity production based on land and 
serving 
failure 
markets outside factory control. The canning industry's 
to oust petty-commodity production or. generalise the 
piece-work system 
south of Lamberts 
to the coast as a whole raised crayfish prices 
Bay, fostered cut-throat competition in the 
industry and destablised prices in France, leading to the closure 
of the French market in 1934. The French quota crisis compelled 
the state to intervene directly in the inshore fisheries for the 
first time and by the late 1930s state involvement and control 
was seen as essential to the industry's future growth and 
development. 
Given the salience of "natural" constraints to secure capitalist 
production in fishing, a high level of (state) capital investment 
was necessary to lessen the effects of "natural factors" through 
the provision of infrastructure (harbours) and research (marine 
biology) to make fishing profitable for private capital. In South 
Africa, state involvement, until the late 1930s, focussed almost 
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exclusively on deep-sea fishing, informed by the British model 
and using available infrastructure (port facilities, railway 
links) to provision the emerging urban centres of the interior 
with fresh fish. In 1895 the Cape colonial state appointed its 
own marine biologist and purchased a steam trawler to prospect 
the Agulhas Bank and other off-shore areas for suitable trawling 
grounds. By the time the survey was abandoned in 1906, due to a 
lack of funds, several prolific deep water grounds had been 
proved and a nascent trawling industry established centred on 
Cape Town and controlled by metropolitan (Scottish) fishing 
capital. With the advent of Union in 1910 responsibility for 
marine fisheries was vested in 
maritime provinces (Natal and the 
the provincial states 
Cape) which were charged 
of the 
with 
the "protection" rather than development of the marine resource. 
The development impetus continued to come from the central state 
and in 1920 the Fisheries Survey was revived under the control of 
the Department of Mines and Industries. The director of the 
Survey served as advisor to the provincial states, but the 
Survey's main focus remained the prospecting of new deep water 
grounds for the trawling industry. It was only after the Pact 
victory of 1924 that this slowly began to change. The 1934 French 
quota crisis and mounting concern about "poor whiteism" in the 
inshore fisheries finally galvanised Pretoria into action and it 
passed_ legislation to control crayfish exports (1934-1935) and 
take over responsibility for marine fisheries from the provincial 
states (1936-1940). Central state spending on infrastructure and 
research for the inshore fisheries also increased gradually after 
the mid-1930a. In addition, the consciously modernising central 
state had, by 1940, committed itself to the economic development 
of the inshore fisheries by organising the independent petty-
commodity producers into co-operatives and integrating them into 
the national market. Yet opposition from the trawling interests 
which monoP.olised the national fresh fish market, resistance from 
the petty-commodity producers enjoying a boom period during the 
C 
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war and the emergent wartime crayfish cum-pelagic processing 
industry's demand for cheap industrial raw material, forced 
Pretoria to change tack. It abandoned co-operation and sought 
instead to develop the inshore fisheries by articulating petty-
commodity primary production with the secondary industrial 
production of canned fish and by-products. Massive state spending 
on infrastructure, research and investment in private companies 
as well as the assumption of de jure ownership of the marine 
resource turned this into a reality after 194S, creating both a 
modern industry and the means to control it so as to minimise the 
inherent volatility of the marine resource. Marine research set 
the parameters of control and quotas, closed seasons, boat and 
factory licenses, sanctuaries and size limits, implemented them, 
"conserving" the resource not for posterity, but to make it more 
predictable and thus available for stable exploitation by 
capital. By the mid-19SOs, fishing capital, securely based in 
both the crayfish and pelagic production and increasingly 
integrated with national capital, telt sufficiently confident to 
take over primary production from the petty-commodity producers. 
In so doing, however, it retained the essential elements of the 
piece-work system intact, reflecting both the ongoing resistance 
of petty producers to control by capital and the extent to which 
the modern industry remained hostage to the "natural factors" 
shaping and conditioning production in the fishing. 
The modern fishing industry in the Cape is thus the result of 
very specific historical processes rather than a generic path of 
"progress" or the arrested development of a hunting mode whose 
origins are obscured in "The mists of early history where facts 
have merged into legend"~. The "natural factors" governing 
production and the nature of the colonial economy conserved 
petty-commodity production in the fishing longer than elsewhere 
~ Irvin & Johnson South African Fish and Fishing, p.27. 
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and gave it a resilience to both the vagaries of the resource and 
subsequent attempts to establish capitalist production in the 
fisheries. Fishing capital in its merchant and petty-industrial 
forms proved unable to either destroy or co-opt petty-commodity 
production as the necessary pre-requisite for its own successful 
accumulation and it took massive state intervention at a number 
of levels to achieve this and create a "modern" industry in the 
inshore fisheries. In so doing, however, Pretoria was forced to 
accommodate the petty-commodity economy until fishing capital was 
sufficiently well established to transform it entirely into an 
effective piece-work system. The fact that the legacy of petty-
commodity production remains visible today is the reason why the 
inshore fisheries have been so readily appropriated by the 
tourist industry, writers of "home-spun literature", newspapers 
and kitsch artists as an artefact of an earlier, more simple and 
contented life for the consumption of alienated urbanites. In 
this way, a particular form of proletarianisation is mistaken for 
its absence, underdevelopment is confused with pre-
industrialisation and poverty is idealised and romanticised as 
the epitome of "the simple life". 
WHY ST HELENA BAY? 
St Helena Bay is a key case study for charting the above 
processes because of its historical importance as a centre of 
commercial fishing, it~ location on the margins of two 
agricultural districts and the limited academic attention it has 
attracted in the past. With the exception of a single 
predecessor, only a geographer, philologist and urban planner 
have deemed the Bay worthy of study, relying more on their own 
fieldwork than archival sources to reconstruct its history~. It 
~ The only systematic historical study of St Helena Bay is A.P. Roux 
•saldanhabaai, St Helenabaai en Dasseneiland 1652-1806· (Unpublished HA 
thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 1975). The geographer is P.D.K. Hagen •st 
Helenabasi: 'n Geografiese Studie• (Unpublished HA thesis, University of 
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thus remains largely terra incognita to historians. In the 
century 1856-1956 St Helena Bay was successively the mainstay of 
the snoek export trade (c.1855-c.1914), a centre of the crayfish 
canning industry (c.1914-c.1939) and the heart of the pelagic 
canning and by-products industry (c.1939-c.1956). It thus 
remained central to the development of the inshore fisheries 
through successive epochs, giving it special value as a micro-
study. Lastly, its rural location makes it typical of the Cape as 
a whole in a way which existing studies of inshore fisheries, 
linked to the urban metropolis of Cape Town are not. It is 
possible to generalise and compare the St Helena Bay example to 
other fisheries on the west coast, South West Africa and 
elsewhere, something not possible with Kalk, Hout or Rogge Bays 
without lengthy qualification. Its all-round representativeness 
thus makes it a valuable addition to the revisionist work of the 
past decade, capable of suggesting and opening up new routes of 
enquiry not only for those concerned with the fisheries, but for 
all aspects of the South Western Cape economy. The thesis itself 









Pelagic Canning & By-Products 
In each, the "big picture" is refracted through the lens of St 
Helena Bay as the focus moves from a broad consideration of 
trends and developments in the world, national and regional 
economies to a more detailed analysis of their specific impact at 
the Bay, amplifying and examining the linkages which exist. The 
Stellenbosch, 1951); the philologist L.R. Helberg HDie Taal van die Velddrifse 
Vissersw (Unpublished MA thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 1950) and 
HAfrikaanse VisserstaalH (Unpublished D.Lit thesis, University of 
Stellenbosch, 1957); and the urban planner K. Cadle wThe Response of a 
Coloured Fishing Comrrunity to Their Marine Resource BaseH (Unpublished HA 
thesis, UCT, 1983). 
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three central themes of the thesis, state, capital and labour, 
are explored and developed within the framework provided by this 
periodisation and determined by the macro-micro shift. 
I 
Part I of the thesis deals with the period c.1856-c.1914 and 
defines St Helena Bay's role within the regional and global 
economy. It seeks to dispel the notion that the Bay was isolated 
or separated from its agricultural hinterland or the attentions 
of capital by showing how it was integrated through the agency of 
merchant capital into both the colonial (grain shipment and 
rantsoenvis) and international (salted snoek export) markets. The 
effects of this integration on the existing squatter and 
subsistence fisheries are examined, with specific reference to 
relations of production. The old share system was retained and 
adapted to suit merchant needs. The tightening of the labour 
supply as a result of the mineral revolution in the interior 
forced merchant capital to further extend its control over labour 
with the assistance of the colonial state, abolishing fishing 
leases in Malmesbury and extending the contract to cover all 
fishing labour. The moral economy of petty-commodity production, 
however, provided a base for sustained resistance to merchant 
attempts to arrest and control labour. Desertion and theft of 
fish, as the two most common forms of resistance, are suggestive 
of the nature and consciousness of fishing labour as independent 
producers concerned with the individual's right to control of his 
own labour power and the product thereof. Desertion was also 
fuelled by the decline of the snoek resource in the 1890s and 
this, together with colonial state indifference, the South 
African War and the construction of railways plunged merchant 
capital into a protracted crisis in the 1900s. 
This crisis was largely confined to the Malmesbury coast of the 
Bay. The Piketberg fisheries were located on land rented from 
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Sandveld agriculture and were outside of merchant control. They 
depended on beach seining to supply farmers in the rural 
hinterland with cheap rantsoenvis to feed farm labour. This trade 
was, however, also threatened in the 1900s, both by the decline 
of the snoek resource and arrival of Italian immigrant fishermen 
from Cape Town with decked cutters and set nets. The latter 
blockaded the beaches and cut off the fish supply to the 
sedentary seine fisheries along the coast. An alliance of 
Sandveld farmers, trek seine fishery owners and tenant fishermen 
on the Piketberg side of the Bay opposed the set net and its 
foreign adherents. Stephan Brothers, after initially resisting 
the newcomers and their more mobile technology, brokered the 
balkanisation of the Bay by the colonial state in 1909 in an 
effort to accommodate them. In return for the establishment of an 
Exclusive Trek Seine Fishing Zone (ETSFZ) on the Piketberg side 
of the Bay, the Malmesbury coast was thrown open to set net 
fishing and many Italians settled permanently along the southern 
shores of the Bay. In this way Stephan Brothers was able to 
diversify into crayfish canning for the French market after 1909, 
relying on the Italian fishermen to supply it with raw material. 
The legislative balkanisation of the Bay thus attempted to 
accommodate both the petty-commodity fishing economy and the new 
manufacturing industry, creating a growing economic divide which 
became a brake on the latter's development by 1914 and a source 
of increasing conflict at the Bay after 1920. 
I I 
Part II of the thesis looks at the period c.1914-c.1939 and the 
early industrialisation of 
World War sparked a crayfish 
the Bay fishing economy. The First 
canning boom in the Cape, led by 
high export prices in Europe. The boom both reinforced the Bay's 
new position in global economy as a supplier of canned ~rustacean 
to the Parisian bourgeoisie and exacerbated tensions within the 
local fishery. The Berg River trek seine fishermen, confined to a 
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much-reduced fishing range after 1909, attempted to extend their 
control over the riverine resource during the war at the expense 
of a growing number of poor whites dependent for subsistence on 
set netting in the river's backwaters. The seine fishermen were 
themselves under pressure from Italian and other crayfish 
fishermen by the early 1920s as the wartime boom exhausted the 
local crayfish beds. As the crayfish frontier shifted rapidly 
north up the west coast after the war, the provincial state 
abandoned the closed season, declared the southern waters of the 
Bay a crayfish sanctuary in 1927 and closed it to all fishing. 
Stephan Brothers' land and trade interests precluded relocation 
and kept it tied to the Bay and a worked-out resource. Its 
position was further undermined by the steady fall of prices in 
France after 1922. Caught between the hammer of lower prices and 
the anvil of rising production costs, the firm looked to 
motorisation to lower production costs and the formation of the 
South African Lobster Canners' Association (SALCA) to maintain 
prices. Motorisation, the reorientation of fishing effort to the 
north and sporadic factory closures marginalised many crayfish 
fishermen throughout the 1920s, resulting in increased poaching 
in the ETSFZ. This conflict underscored the token nature of the 
provincial state's fisheries administration which was unable to 
reconcile the competing demands for resource access from the two 
groups of fishermen. The colonial state's 1909 balkanisation of 
the Bay, inherited by a provincial state with no fisheries budget 
or police force, was thus rapidly undermined by the motor 
revolution of the 1920s and its already crumbling edifice was 
finally demolished by the hammer blow of the Depression. 
The Depression slowed the movement of commodities and brought 
prices sharply lower across the globe. Crayfish canners, through 
the SALCA, were initially assured of a minimum price in France, 
but in 1931 the Association collapsed under mounting Japanese 
competition on the French market and the spiralling output of the 
xxxiii 
big Union canners and South West African industry. Ensuing price 
wars, opposition from French producers and a declining balance o f 
trade with the Union, persuaded the French government {o impose a 
quota on crayfish imports in 1934. For Stephan Brothers, 
dependent on the maintenance of a minimum price in France, the 
Depression induced a profound profitability crisis. Its only 
alternative was to squeeze its fishermen by lowering the price of 
crayfish some 50% between 1929-1932 and ceasing production when 
the French quota was imposed. The crisis in the west coast 
crayfish fishery, coupled with declining catches of key 
bait\rantsoenvis species, a shrunken rantsoenvis trade, falling 
seasonal labour demand in agriculture and population increase at 
the Bay, also created a generalised subsistence crisis in the 
west coast fishing communities. The latter was marked by 
intensified conflict over the ETSFZ, culminating in the 1934 
invasion of Saldanha Bay fishermen using a new type of seine net 
(lampara) worked by boat rather than from the beach. Unemployed 
as a result of the Saldanha factory closures, the invaders 
exploited a loop-hole in the ETSFZ legislation and the range 
afforded them by their motor boats to fish in St Helena Bay. The 
superior productivity of the lampara decimated the Piketberg trek 
seine fisheries, cutting fish off from the beach and driving 
rantsoenvis prices down to an all-time low. The political crisis 
in ·France and the resultant poverty, conflict and "poor whiteism" 
on the west coast, compelled the central state to intervene 
directly in the inshore fisheries for the first time. In 1934 it 
passed legislation to control crayfish exports and in 1936 took 
over responsibility for all marine fisheries from the provincial 
state. Pretoria was committed to developing and modernising the 
inshore fisheries, supporting the lampara fishermen in the 1934-
1935 conflict at the Bay and refusing to resuscitate the crippled 
Berg River trek seine economy in its aftermath. It was also 
opposed to the old SALCA policy of production quotas and a 
minimum price, accusing the Association of protecting inefficient 
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producers and advocating rationalisation of the canning industry. 
For both Stephan Brothers and the trek seine fishermen, central 
state control marked the end of an era. The old dual economy of 
trek seine and crayfish fishing was conditioned by the provincial 
state's relative weakness and inability to either impose or 
finance its will on the periphery. This allowed local farmers, 
fishery owners and canners considerable room to advance and 
pursue their own agendas. Pretoria, however, operated under no 
such constraints and saw Stephan Brothers and the Bay trek seine 
fishery as the epitome of 
producer and poor whites 
all it opposed 
clinging to a 
an inefficient 
backward fishing 
technology. The firm thus had no option but to try and survive on 
its shrunken state quota allocation by depressing the price of 
crayfish paid to its fishermen with the aid of debt-bondage and 
free housing. The Piketberg trek seine fisheries, however, had 
been destroyed by the 1934-19 35 conflict, creating widespread 
poverty and state pressure on local landowners to desist from 
"farming poor whites". With the provincial state vanquished, the 
ETSFZ gone, Stephan Brothers a spent force and Sandveld 
agriculture in retreat, many of the fishery-owners at the river 
invested in motorised craft and lampara nets. In this way they 
were able both to consolidate their own position and retain their 
share of the regional rantsoen and fresh fish markets through the 
increasing use of motor lorries to transport fish to the rural 
towns and the Cape Town ~arket. It was these independent lampara 
fishery owners at Berg River who came into their own with the 
outbreak ot the Second World War in 1939. 
III 
Part III deals with the early modern period, c.1939-c.1956. The 
onset of war in 1939 had the familiar effect of disrupting trade 
and creating new opportunities for local producers in the 
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manufacture of import substitutes. This trend was further 
encouraged by South Africa's commitment to the Allied war effort 
and mobilisation of troops. In addition, the trawling industry's 
historical monopoly over the urban fresh fish market was loosened 
by the requisitioning of 50% of the trawler fleet for seaward 
defence purposes. With the demand for fish booming, the trawling 
fleet under-strength, state price controls confined to the urban 
areas and Saldanha Bay subject to curfew, the Berg River f i shery 
owners were uniquely placed to reap the rewards of their pre-war 
adoption of motorisation and the lampara net. By exploiting price 
differentials on the various regional markets they were able to 
clear their debts and reinvest in production. Their new-found 
wealth also trickled down to labour at the river through the 
share system in a tight labour market created by high levels of 
enlistment. British Ministry of Food contracts, local military 
buying and a sharp decline in canned fish imports after 1942 
stimulated the canning of new varieties of fish by crayfish 
canners and other processors. This development focussed on Berg 
River and in 1943 two outside companies bought land at the river, 
constructed housing and tried to compel their tenants to sell 
fish to them at lower than market prices. Fishing capital, 
however, was not the only outside interest with designs on the 
product of labour by 1944. The central state was also committed 
to canalising inshore production through co-operative societies 
onto the national market as a means of developing the inshore 
fisheries and "uplifting" the fishermen socially. 
By 1940 Pretoria had consolidated its control over the fishing 
with the passing of the Crawfish Export Act and Sea Fisheries 
Act. Four years later it unveiled additional legislation to 
establish a development corporation with power to organise and 
develop the inshore fisheries along co-operative lines, competing 
with the trawling industry for a share of the national fresh fish 
market. The opposition of trawling and organised capital, fearful 
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of creeping state socialism and competition, however, forced the 
state to embark on a fundamentally different development path 
tied not to co-operation and fresh fish production, but secondary 
industrialisation with inshore fish as raw material for canning 
and by-products manufacture. After 1945 it pursued this direct i on 
with a purpose, investing more than t500 000 in private 
companies, constructing infrastructure, financing scientific 
research and allocating exploitation rights to a select group of 
companies through crayfish export quotas and pelagic processing 
licences. At the same time, the nascent wartime industry was 
rationalised to meet international competition with the aid of 
the state and public share issues. Plant, machinery and 
technicians were imported from California and ownership rapidly 
centralised in the hands of a few large financial groups under 
the aegis of mining and finance capital. By 1955 South Africa 
boasted the largest fishing industry in the southern hemisphere 
and one of the ten biggest in the world, supplying both the local 
demand for canned fish, fish meal and fish oil and earning a 
further tlO million per annum in foreign exchange. 
The industry centred on St Helena Bay and in the decade after the 
war no fewer than five new processing factories opened along the 
Bay's southern shores. By 1955 this "Cannery Row" had a reduction 
capacity in excess of 150 tons of fish per hour and was capable 
of proc~ssing 432 000 tons of inshore fish per annum. The 
fact-0ries looked to the existing private boat owners to supply 
their raw material needs and this enormous industrial appetite 
reorientated the Bay fishing economy away from the regional 
rantsoenvis and fresh fish markets to supplying the factories. 
The fleet expanded rapidly with financial assistance from the 




1951. In 1950 the price per ton was fixed at l4 and 
be distributed amongst owner and 
catches climbed, the fishermen's 
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accordingly and Velddrift became a boom town, erasing the pre-war 
memories of poverty and destitution almost over-night. The post-
war boom, however, obscured the ephemeral nature of this new 
prosperity, the extent to which labour's real share of .the catch 
declined and the exclusion of the majority of "coloured" 
fishermen through formal 
beneficiaries were the 
and informal discrimination. The chief 
new boat owning petty-bourgeoisie and 
skilled labour (skippers) and it was they who organised and led 
the Bay's petty-commodity producers after 1951 against 
encroachment by outsiders and fishing capital on the primary 
sector (fishing). By 1955 capital was facing mounting competition 
internationally from Japan and Peru and sought to improve the 
efficiency of the fleet through the vertical integration of 
primary with secondary production under its direct control. 
Record low catches in 1956 decimated the ranks of the private 
boat owners and created an over-supply of both skilled and 
unskilled labour which provided capital with the opportunity to 
fundamentally reorganise the Bay fishery. Fleet ownership passed 
rapidly into company hands and the fleet was thinned out, 
increasing the size of the average boat (length, hold capacity) 
and incorporating a range of new fishing technologies (echo-
sounders, synthetic nets, puretic power blocks, fish pumps). The 
share system, however, was retained. The resultant surge in 
fishing production, together with diversification into other 
areas (Namibia, Chile) and fisheries (tuna), restored the 
industry's profitability and prepared the ground for a renewed 
boom period in the 1960s. The rationalisation of fishi~g and 
factory production after 1956, however, shifted the centre of 
gravity away from St Helena Bay where a shrinking fleet, the 
closure of a number of processing plants and the inadequacies of 
the natural harbour at Berg River, relegated the Bay to a 
secondary position behind Walvis Bay. As a result, large numbers 
of skippers and fishermen moved north, the population of the Bay 
xxxviii 
declined and the development promise of the post-war boom 
evaporated. The opening of the river mouth and construction of a 
new harbour at Sandy Point in the 1960s gave the Bay fishing 
economy a new lease on life, but only as a permanent periphery of 
the national economy. 
The history of the St Helena Bay fisheries thus refutes both the 
popular mythology of fishing and fishermen and the sanguine 
racism of the company accounts. It was the process of capitalist 
development withln a primary commodity producing colonial 
economy, rather than a "call of the blood" or "progress", which 
shaped both class formation and capital accumulation on the 
coastal periphery. This, together with the disjuncture between 
labour and production time inherent in fishing, gave the Cape 
fisheries their unique form (petty-commodity production) and 
determined their underdevelopment on the structural periphery of 
the emerging national economy. The predominantly rural nature of 
the fisheries further reinforced their marginalisation and 
subjugation to the labour and rantsoenvis needs of agriculture, 
placing an additional obstacle in the way of capital penetration 
and effectively conserving petty-commodity production until the 
1930s. Merchant capital's inability to defeat this alliance 
between Sandveld agriculture, tenant fishermen and the provincial 
state slowed and distorted the Bay's industrialisation and 
required the direct intervention of the central state. Pretoria 
was, however, also forced to incorporate rather than dissolve the 
petty-commodity economy. The articulation of petty-commodity 
primary production with secondary industry after 1945 laid the 
basis .for the large-scale industrialisation of the inshore 
fisheries at the Bay and the final dissolution of the petty-
commodity mode in the mid-1950s. Paradoxically, it is the very 
endurance of petty-commodity production historically which lends 
weight to the mythologisation of fishing in the popular mind, 
giving fishing labour an ambiguity which readily suggests stasis. 
xxxix 
The thesis shows that the very opposite was in fact true and that 
the historical fishermen - unlike his mythical counterpart - was 
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1: DEFINING THI PERIPHERY 
St Helena Bay's location as a historical, geographic and economic 
periphery of the South Western Cape is integral to any 
understanding of the origins of the west coast fishery and more 
particularly the history of the Bay itself. A periphery is by 
definition a boundary and the area furthest away from the centre. 
Otto Mentzel described ~t Helena Bay in the 1780s as, "the last 
Bay on the West Coast to be reckoned among the possessions of the 
Dutch East India Company and the most remote from the Cape"~ The 
Bay's peripheral (boundary) status was underlined by his 
subsequent elaboration of its location: 
"Beyond the North-west side of this bay, or rather coast 
line, there stretches a mountain chain in a slanting and 
South-easterly direction. This range can with justice be 
regarded as the boundary between the Dutch settlement and 
Kaffirland ••• for no fixed frontier has yet been proclaimed 
••• Having reached the mountains to the N.E. of St Helena Bay 
we have come to the non plus ultra in so far as the N.W. of 
the Cape settlement is concerned"%. 
~emoteness, isolation and a lack of human habitation remain 
recurring images in traveller and other accounts of the area long 
after the north western frontier was extended to the Orange River 
and beyond, however. St Helena Bay thus remained a periphery even 
after it ceased to be the boundary between European civilisation 
and the unknown. The reason was that the historical periphery 
overlaid a geographical periphery, separating land and sea. 
Mentzel again illumines the nature of this periphery in his 
account: 
"Accurately described it [St Helena Bay) is neither a bay nor 
1 o. Mentzel A Geographical and Topographical Description of the Cape of 
Good Hope, Part 1 (Cape Town, 1921), p.78. 
2 Ibid., pp.78-79. 
2 
a roadstead, nor a harbour, but rather a gulf or a bend in 
the land where the sea penetrates for some miles. The open 
sea laps the coast on the North and the No~th-west, and 
this locality is exposed to the full blast of the 
dangerous winter winds. To the south and east of this bay 
there is a sandy plain that is not easily traversed. The 
Berg River ••• zigzags North through the sandr wastes and 
flows into the southern basin of St Helena Bay" • 
The featureless Bay fronting a sandy coastal plain which was once 
the bed of a shallow sea creates an indistinct, but recognisable 
• boundary between land and sea and as such a periphery of a 
different kind. The nature of the physical periphery created a 
third economic periphery. Mentzel compared the Bay's immediate 
hinterland to "the land of Goshen in the Arabian desert 
everything is sandy and almost uninhabitable"~ Poor soil, 
exposure to wind, low rainfall and a lack of water discouraged 
settlement, stunted agricultural activity and made St Helena Bay 
the periphery of the Western Cape wheatlands. This convergence of 
historical, geographic and economic peripheries fashioned an 
internal frontier within the colonial economy, an area peripheral 
to the main and resistant to control or penetration by the 
latter. Behind this barrier of isolation from the centre, older 
forms of social organisation remained intact or re-emerged after 
being vanquished elsewhere. The peculiar nature of society and 
production, laden with vestiges of proto- and even pre-capitalist 
forms, shaped and conditioned relations and interactions with the 
centre. Thus, the dominant classes on the periphery increasingly 
required the continued underdevelopment of the area as a 
necessary pre-condition for their own continued accumulation. 
3 Ibid., p.78. 
4 O.F. Mentzel A Geographical and Topographical Description of the Cape 
o~ Good Hope, Part III (Cape Town, 1944), p.75. 
3 
1.1 ST HELENA BAY AS PERIPHERY 
St Helena Bay is a backwater of South African history, warranting 
only passing mention as the site of the first recorded European 
landfall on the subcontinent by Portuguese seafarer, Vasco da 
Gama; on St Helena's day 1497~ When the VOC established a way 
station at the Cape it chose Table Bay 150 kilometers to the 
south with its safe anchorage, permanent fresh water supply and 
Khoikhoi pastoralists willing to barter sheep and cattle. The 
colony expanded rapidly eastward in the 18th Century and the arid 
western coastal plain or Sandveld attracted few settlers and 
limited Company interest~ The VOC was primarily concerned with 
security in the west and the danger of the coast as an invasion 
route for rival colonial powers~ Initial hopes of finding 
mythical mountains of copper and lost cities of gold yielded only 
semi-desert and roving bands of pastoralists cum-hunter-
gatherers~ The latter w~re gradually thinned out by conquest and 
disease after 1700 and the north-western frontier fixed along the 
Oliphants River in the 1740s! Inside this boundary, a patchwork 
5 See for example A.J. Boeseken, D.W. Kruger & A. Kieser Drie Eeue: Die --------Verhaal van Ons Vaderland (Cape Town, 1952), p.6; E.A. Walker A History of 
Southern Africa (London, 1964), p.15 and C.F.J. Huller 500 Years: A History of 
South Africa (Cape Town, 1981), p.10. 
b W.J. Talbot Swartland and Sandveld (Cape Town, 1949), pp.1-3 for a 
geomorphological definition of the Sandveld and P.D.K. Hagen "St Helenabaai: 
'n Geografiese Studie", pp.4-5 for very different socio-economic boundaries. 
It is the latter which are used here. 
7 A.P. Rowe "Saldanhabaai, St Helenabaai en Dasseneiland" and J. Burman 
and S. Lsv.t.n The Saldanha Bay Story (Cape Town, 1974) for early European 
contact with the Cape west coast. 
8 G. Waterhouse (ed) Simon van der Stel's Journal of His Expedition to 
Namaqualand 1685-6 (London, 1932) and J.H. Smalberger Aspects of the History 
of Copper Mining in Namaqualand 1846-1931 (Cape Town, 1975), pp.11-17. 
9 N.G. Penn "The Frontier in the Western Cape 1700-1740" (Unpublished 
paper presented at a Spatial Archaeology Research Workshop, UCT, 1984); N.G. 
Penn "Pastoralists and Pastorali.sm in the Northern Cape Frontier Zone during 
the Eighteenth Century" in South African Archaeological Society Goodwin 
Series, 5, 1986. 
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quilt of grazing licences and loan farms was super-imposed on the 
old cattle walks and hunting grounds of the Khoisan, but settler 
agriculture struggled to gain a foothold on the coastal plain 10. 
The Sandveld thus remained an area of marginal mixed farming and 
seasonal grazing concentrated along the alluvial flood plain of 
the Berg River 11 • 
The British takeover of the Cape in 1806 sparked renewed interest 
in the west coast, particularly Saldanha Bay - in the words of 
Barrow, "a spacious, secure and commodious sheet of inland sea 
water, for the reception of shipping can scarcely perhaps be 
equalled anywhere in the world" 12 • A lack of fresh water thwarted 
these plans, however. With the collapse of the Greenland whale 
fishery in the first half of the 18th Century, northern whaling 
effort shifted to the southern oceans and by the late 18th 
Century European and American whalers were working the Cape west 
coast on a regular basis 13 • Attempts to establish a local whale 
fishery failed, however, as the inshore whale population of the 
colony declined in the 1830s, undermining the industry 14 • In the 
1840s the discovery of huge guano deposits on the inshore islands 
lO W.A. Burger Piket Teen 'n Berg (Cape Town, 1975), p.24 for a 
description of the loan farm system in the Sandveld. 
11 A discussion of early Sandveld settlers and agriculture can be found 
in W.A. Burger Piket Teen 'n Berg, pp.1-39 and H.H.D. Smith Boerepioniers van 
die Sandveld (Pretoria, 1985). 
12 J. Barrow Travels in the Interior of Southern Africa, vol.1 (New York, 
1968), p.361. 
13 P.B. Best & G.J.B. Ross #Catches of Right Whales from Shore-Based 
Establishments in Southern Africa, 1792-1975,. in Report of the International 
Whaling Commission, 10, 1986 and P.B. Best & G.J.B. Rosa HWhales and Whaling# 
in A.I.L. Payne et al Oceans of Life off Southern Africa (Cape Town, 1989). 
14 Ibid. Also A.J. · Boesken "Die Nederlandse Kommissarisse en die 18de 
Eeuse Samelewing aan die Kaap" in Archives Yearbook for South African History, 
vol.7, 1943; K.H. Jeffereys The Heiw:,randua of Coaaisauary J.A. De Hist 1802 
(Cape Town, 1920) and W.W. Bird State of the Cape of Good Hope in 1822 
(London, 1823). 
s 
off the west coast touched off a foreign guano rush which 
similarly decimated this resource in a matter of a few years15. 
Finally, in the 1850s finds of copper in Namagualand stimulated 
the development of mining and led to the opening of Port Nolloth 
and Hondeklip Bay as ports servicing the nascent mining 
industry 16 • St Helena Bay, however, possessed none of the natural 
attributes or guano deposits which made Saldanha Bay so 
attractive and was too far removed from the centre of copper 
production to garner any of the related trade. The Bay's exposure 
to winter gales, the silting up of the mouth of the Berg River 
and the Sandveld's location on the northern limits of the winter 
rainfall region thus still consigned it to the periphery of the 
19th Century colonial economy. 
The Sandveld was unsuited to either viticulture or grain 
production and offered only poor grazing for livestock 17 • While 
the Swartland to the south and Piketberge in the east became the 
"Granary of the Colony", frequent droughts, low yields and 
isolation from the Cape Town market ensured that Sandveld farmers 
remained relatively poor and outside of the commercial networks 
which tied their more prosperous neighbours into the colonial and 
expanding world economy 18 • In 1855 the area was incorporated into 
the newly-created district of Piketberg, with its own magistrate 
and Divisional Council. Although represented on the latter, the 
15 B. Horrell Narrative of a Voyage to the South and West Coast of Africa 
(London, 1844); . T.E. Eden The Search for Nitre and the True Nature of Guano 
(London, 1846); L.G. Green Panther Head (London, 1955) and J. Burman & s. 
~evin The Saldanha Bay Story. 
16 J.M. Smalberger Aspects of the History of Copper Mining in Namaqualand 
1846-1931 and O'Kiep Copper Company Namaqualand Copper: 100 Years of Progress, 
1852-1952 (Cape Town, 1952). 
17 See for example the observations of J. Barrow Travels in the Interior 
of Southsrn Africa, vol.2 (New York, 1968), pp.365-371 and H. Lichtenstein 
Travels in Southern Africa (Cape Town, 192~), pp.56-68 • . 
18 M.H.D. Smith Boerepioniers van die Sandveld. 
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Sandveld failed to benefit from the public works schemes 
initiated by the new body to link the more fertile eastern region 
of the district with the Cape Town market 19 • As late as 1875 the 
Cape Colony official handbook said of Piketberg district: 
"There is, however, a large portion still uncultivated, 
and in parts of the flats and the Zandveld the occupiers 
are a poor and ignorant class, as backward as any who are 
to be found in the extreme border districts. From the want 
of roads they have been to great degree isolated from 
their neighbours, and are not yet much affected by the 
spirit of enterprise and industry which elsewhere 
prevails"w. 
Peripheral as it was to agricultural production in the district, 
the Sandveld did provide access to the Cape Town market via the 
Berg River and sea coast and thus became the transit route for 
the agricultural surplus of commercial farmers in the interior. 
Cape Town was the only market for grain in the colony until the 
last quarter of the 19th Century and all roads out of the 
wheatlands led, albeit by diverse routes, to Table Bay 21 • Because 
of the distances involved and the poor stat~ of the roads, 
farmers in the western districts of the colony relied on 
travelling traders or "smouse" for essential items and a means to 
market for their produce. As the commercialisation of agriculture 
intensified during the 19th Century, so the scope for merchant 
capital broadened and Cape Town merchants developed a burgeoning 
19 W.A. Burger Piket Teen 'n Berg, pp.117-140 and Cape of Good Report of 
the Select Committee on the Berg River and Tarka Bridge 1862 [A.2-'62]. 
W J. Noble Descriptive Handbook of the Cape Colony (Cape Town, 1875), 
p.65. 
n -J.N.C. Harincowitz ·Rural Production and Labour in the Western Cape, 
1838 to 1888, with Special Reference to the Wheat Growing Districts•, pp.18-
24. 
7 
grain trade along the colony's seaboardn. 
Initial attempts to ship grain from the mouth of the Berg River 
in the late 18th Century were frustrated by voe mo~opoly 
interests, but, by the 1830s, merchant brigs and cutters were 
plying a growing trade in grain and other commodities from Port 
Beaufort, Mossel Bay and Knysna on the east coast to Hondeklip 
Bay, Lamberts Bay, St Helena Bay and Saldanha Bay in the west23. 
These coastal entrepots served as seasonal centres of trade and 
provided farmers with the opportunity to acquire much-needed 
supplies. The Sandveld coastline at St Helena Bay and the lower 
reaches of the Berg River thus became important markets for the 
farmers of the interior. Wheat, oats, rye, barley, butter, hides, 
eggs, wool and tallow all found their way fr7 m the Piketberg 
hinterland to the Cape Town market via Soldaten Pas on the St 
Helena Bay coast, the Berg River Mouth and Elands Bay24• This 
seaborne trade grew rapidly through the 1850s, amounting to an 
estimated 15-20 000 muids of grain annually as well as an 
increasing importation of goods~. So important had the river 
route become by 1858 that local farmers petitioned the House of 
n R. Ross HThe Origins of Capitalist Agriculture in the Cape Colony: A 
SurveyH in W. Beinart, P. Delius & S. Trapido (eds) Putting a Plough to the 
Ground, pp.64-66 and Cape of Good Hope Report of the Select Committee on the 
Berg River 1858, [S.C.3\1858], p.4. 
23 C.F.J. Huller Johannes Frederik Kirsten Oor die Toestand van die 
Kaapkolonie in 1795: 'n Kritiese Studie (Pretoria, 1960), pp.38-40; A.P. Roux 
"Saldanhabaai, St Helenabaai en Dasseneiland", pp.122-132; J.N.C. Harincowitz 
HRural Production and Labour in the Western Cape, 1838 to 1888, with Special 
Reference to the Wheat Growing Districts", pp.21-22 and R. Ross "The Cape of 
Good Hope and the World Economy, 1652-1835" in R. Elphick & H. Giliomee (eds) 
The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1840 (Cape Town, 1990), pp.268-269. 
24 Cape Archives; 1 \HBY, 6\2\5, 
Colonial Secretary, 31 July 1861 
Commissioner to the Colonial Secretary, 
Halmesbury Civil Commissioner to the 
and 1\HBY, 6\2\6, Halmesbury Civil 
21 November 1866. 
~ Report of the Select Committee on the Berg River, 1858, Evidence of 
J.C. Stephan, p.10. 
8 
Assembly to dam the river a mile and a half from its mouth to 
provide a year round supply of fresh water and improved 
navigation for the transshipment of wheat2b. In 1860 the Piketberg 
Agricultural Society reported that wheat to the value qf l20 000 
was shipped from the mouth of the Berg River and a further l5 000 
worth via Elands Bay by some ten cutters bound for Cape Town 27• In 
1874, the navigability of the Berg River was again the subject of 
Parliamentary enquiry. Captain O.J. May of the Royal Navy 
informed a select committee that by removing the sandbars and 
rocks at the river's mouth, vessels of six feet draught could 
travel all of forty miles inland "affording great facilities of 
water transport to a rich and very productive country"~. The 
productivity of the interior was amply illustrated by May's 
estimates that in 1873 alone 22 500 bags of wheat, 23 077 bags of 
oats and 12 077 bags of rye, barley and tobacco were sent to Cape 
Town and the copper mines in Namaqualand. In addition smaller 
quantities of whale oil, butter, beans, peas, hides, skins and 
eggs were also shipped from the river~. 
The commercialisation of the west coast through the development 
of shipping, trade routes, markets and grain depots also 
facilitated the growth of fishing, closely linked to the food 
needs of the rural hinterland. The sea on the Cape west coast, in 
sharp contrast to the barren Sandveld, is some of the richest in 
the world. St Helena Bay lies on the Atlantic seaboard at the 
2b Ibid., Evidence of J.J. Kotze, pp.1-7. 
V H. van der Herwe Piketberg 1652-1952: Van Riebeeck-Fees Gedenkuitgawe 
(Paarl, 1952), p.20 and W.A. Burger Piket Teen 'n Berg, p.326. 
~ Cape of Good Hope Report of the Select Committee appointed to consider 
and report on the Berg River Survey 1874, [A.15--74], p.iii. 
~ J. Noble Descriptive Handbook of the Cape Colony, p.64. 
9 
heart of the Benguela upwelling current system30 • The topography 
of the Bay enhances the upwelling process, producing verdant 
plankton pastures which sustain vast shoals of pelagic (surface 
swimming) fish such as pilchard, maasbanker and harder (mullet), 
a variety of other inshore species (galjoen, kabeljauw, 
steenbras, stompneus and crayfish) and attendant large predators 
(snoek, seabirds, whales and seals). The environmental contrast 
between harsh land and bountiful sea lies at the heart of the 
human history of the region from pre-colonial times to the 
present. 
1.2 FARMING AND FISHING 
The marine resources of the Cape west coast were intermittently 
exploited by the region's human inhabitants from pre-colonial 
times 31 , but, with the advent of colonialism, exploitation was 
both expanded and intensified. As early as 1658 the VOC stationed 
free-burghers at Saldanha Bay to provide the Company with fish, 
seal meat and skins and penguin eggs as well as advance warning 
of foreign ships~. Centuries of European circumnavigation and 
visits by French sealers had, however, largely denuded the coast 
30 For an excellent layperson's introduction to the west coast upwelling 
system see R. Hoorsom Fishing: Exploiting the Sea, pp.12-15. Hore scientific 
accounts can be found in T.S. Hart & R.I. Currie #The Benguela Current# in 
Discovery Reports 31, 1960; J. Parkington -Landscape and Subsistence changes 
since the last Glacial Haxinum along the Western Cape Coast# in L.G. Straus 
The End of the Paleolithic in the Old World: BAR International Series 284 
(Oxford, 1986) and L.V. Shannon #The Physical Environment- in A.I.L. Payne & 
R.J.H. Crawford (eds) Oceans of Life off Southern Africa. 
31 J. Parkington #Coastal Settlement between the Mouths of the Berg and 
Oliphants Rivers, Cape Province- in South African Archeological Bulletin, 31, 
1976; J. Parkington HSoaqua: Hunter-Fisher-Gatherers of the Oliphants River 
Valley Western Cape• in South African Archaeological Bulletin, 32, 1977 and 
A.H. Hanhire, J.E. Parkington & T.S. Robey -stone Tools and Sandveld 
Settle11ent• in H. Hall et al (ed) . Frontiers: Southern African Archaeology 
Today: BAR International Series 207 (Cambridge, 1984~. 
32 A.P. Roux -saldanhabaai, St Helenabaai en Dasseneiland•; J. Burman & 
P. Levin The Saldanha Bay Story and C.F.J. Huller ·Die Geskiedenis van die 
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of seals and those that remained were soon culled by the 
settlers. Whaling and guano production followed, wreaking similar 
havoc on marine mammal populations and seabird colonies alike. 
With the growth of commercial agriculture and freeing up o~ trade 
under the British, the way was open for the more sustained 
exploitation of the fish resources along the colony's western 
seaboard. This was initially closely tied to the food needs and 
seasonal cycles of colonial agriculture. In 1892 one witness 
before a Select Committee investigating the fisheries quite 
unequivocally asserted that: 
"The colony is greatly indebted to the western province 
farmers for the development of the fishing industry; no one 
has spent so much money on it as we have. We always sell our 
fish a great deal cheaper than in any other part of the 
colony, and we real~y supply the whole of the Paarl and 
farmers about there". 
This statement is revealing for what it says about the 
relationship between farming and fishing. One of the primary 
needs of the colony's emerging agrarian economy during the 19th 
Century was for a supply of cheap food to feed farm labour. Fish 
rapidly became established as the staple ration in this regard _; 
and a sought-after commodity, much in demand throughout the 
coastal farming districts of the colony and far into the 
hinterland. Fish held a number of advantages for the farmer. It 
was plentiful all along the coast and lower reaches of the major 
rivers and thus easy to procure even in isolated rural 
communities. Because of its abundance it was relatively cheap and 
in a sun-dried form evinced a good durability in the hot climate; 
allowing it to be transported . over considerable distances and 
stored for long periods. 
n Cape of Good Hope Report of the Fisheries Conmittee 1892 [G.37-'92], 
Evidence of H.R. Stephan, p.10. 
11 
Lichtenstein, travelling up the west coast in the early years of 
the 19th century, remarked on the importance of fish in 
provisioning the slave population on the farms in the region and 
at Saldanha Bay noted that: 
"As this is a sort of food that the slaves love 
exceedingly, many colonists have fisheries in the bay or 
fetch in cartloads from the owners of the ••• fishing 
huts, the provision for their household. The salted fish 
is sent from thence over the Tulbagh, even as far as the 
Bokkeveld and Goudinie".~ 
Similarly, at St Helena Bay, he reported that: 
"Here, as in Saldanha Bay, such vast quantities of fish 
are taken that the trade to the inland parts in salted and 
dried fish contributes very essentially to the support of 
the inhabitants of the coast"~. 
The obvious importance of "rantsoenvis" to the rural Cape economy 
raises questions of supply. Lichtenstein's observations suggest 
that those farmers living in close proximity to the coast or 
major rivers conducted their own fishing operations or relied on 
those of their fellows to secure their rantsoenvis rieeds. This is 
borne out by the evidence of Carel Stephan, almost half a century 
later, who reported seeing the wagons of some two hundred farmers 
congregated at a well-known fishing spot on the Berg River~. 
Similarly, William van Putten related how, at Lamberts Bay, "Poor 
farmers go down to the strand to catch fish and live from it ••• 
Other farmers again who come down to the beach for bathing 
purposes pµrchase this fish caught by the others"n. Periodic 
~ H. Lichtenstein Travels in Southern Africa, p.45. 
~ Ibid., p.65. 
~ Report of the Select Committee on the Berg River 1858, Evidence of 
J.C. Stephan, p.10. 
n Cape of Good Hope Report of the Select Committee on lamberts Bay 1893 
[A.14-'93], Evidence of J.W. van Putten, p.23. 
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fishing expeditions of this nature continued throughout the 19th 
Century, no doubt timed to coincide with seasons when fish were 
known to be abundant. Such fishing activities probably relied on 
regular farm and family labour and were secondary and subject to 
the demands of agricultural and pastoral production. They were 
both too infrequent and largely confined to providing household 
consumption needs and, as such, cannot account for the extensive 
trade which Lichtenstein indicates existed in the region. This 
trade appears to have depended on people who resided more or less 
permanently along the coast and the lower reaches or at the 
mouths of major rivers and engaged in fishing as independent 
producers. It was these small fisheries which supplied the 
rantsoenvis needs of the farmers of Tulbagh and Goudini, relying 
on itinerant traders, smouse and hawkers for distribution. 
The origins of the fishing communities that sprang up along the 
river courses and sea coast of the St Helena Bay during the 19th 
Century are to be found in the processes of land alienation and 
class differentiation at work in the countryside during this 
period. The effects of subdivision and land shortage · on small 
farmers, ongoing dispossession of the indigenous population and 
the abolition of slavery and ex-slave's apprenticeships all 
contributed to the creation of a rural underclass in the western 
coastal districts of the col6ny~. For these people, the economic 
horizons were extremely limited, caught, as they were, between 
the equally unattractive and uncertain options of regular farm 
labour, wage labour in one of the small towns or migration to 
Cape Town. While failed farmers and bywoners were able to draw on 
the bonds of language and culture binding them to the rural 
propertied class in mediating their position, no such option 
~ R. Ross ·The Origins of Capitalist Agriculture in the Cape Colony: A 
Survey•, pp.66-76 and C. Bundy •vagabond Hollanders and .Runaway Englishmen: 
White Poverty in the Cape before Poor Whiteism• in W. Beinart, P. Delius & S. 
Trapido (eds) Putting a Plough to the Ground. 
13 
existed for the vast majority of those forced off the land in the 
early phase of a developing capitalist agriculture in the region. 
Their numbers were swollen by deserters, maroons and other cast-
offs from the coastal shipping trade, whaling and guano 
industries, a miscellaneous flotsam of seaborne humanity which 
collected in the eddies and backwaters of the coast. For all 
these people the choices were few and stark indeed. The existence 
of tracts of crown and waste land in the region held out the hope 
of a modicum of continued independence for those willing to run 
the risks of uncertain tenure and possible official and farmer 
harassment attached to squatting. 
The marginal nature of such land made total independence from 
wage labour impossible in all but a few good years when the 
returns from small scale production were sufficient to meet 
household needs. Occupants of public land thus alternated between 
a wide range of subsistence strategies and casual farm labour~. 
Because of the seasonal nature of agricultural production, 
squatters could fall back on brief periods of farm labour at day-
wage rates during almost eight months of the year in addition to 
their other subsistence activities. In the Sandveld, where much 
of the waste land was coastal, fishing formed the dominant 
subsistence activity alongside casual farm labour and more or 
le~s permanent fishing hamlets began to emerge. Lichtenstein 
mentioned the existence of "fishing huts" at Saldanha Bay in the 
first decade of the 19th Century. A similar fishing settlement 
emerged at the Berg River mouth around the same time~. The bishop 
of Cape Town, visiting Malmesbury in 1848 reported that "There 
39 J.N.C. Harincowitz HRural Production and Labour in the Western Cape, 
1838-1888, with Special Reference to the Wheat Growing Districts# pp.40-48. 
Labour was in particular demand only during specific periods of the year: 
April to June for riding' dung, June to August for ploughing and November to 
January during harvest for reaping and tramping. 
~ H.H.D. Smith Boerepioniers van die Sandveld, pp.66-67 and W.A. Burger 
Piket Teen 'n Berg, pp.259-260. 
14 
are not many English here, but I find there are a good many about 
Saldanha and St Helena Bays, who do not bear the most respectable 
character" 41 • J.J. Kotze too reported the existence of a number of 
"petty fisheries" as far as fifteen miles upstream from the mouth 
of the Berg River 42 • Further north at Lamberts Bay the nucleus of 
a more permanent fishing community also coalesced at the coast43 • 
Several cases of theft along the lower reaches of the Berg River 
in 1888 focussed official attention on one such community. The 
crimes were attributed to a small group of "squatters" residing 
on unsurveyed crown land at the river mouth. The Civil 
Commissioner of Piketberg complained that "in only a few cases 
convictions have been obtained as it is most difficult to bring 
the crimes home to these persons, they being a gang who club 
together""· This "gang of thieves" view hardly fits the 
individual identities revealed by subsequent investigation45 • The 
squatters' leader was one, Robert Johnston, who lived in a stone 
and clay house with a thatched roof which he had built himself. 
In addition to his wife, Candace, his daughter and her two 
children - a son of about 25 and a daughter of 14 - also resided 
with him. Johnston based his occupancy of the land on the verbal 
permission of a former field cornet given him 25 to 30 years 
previously and confirmed in 1880 by the .then Resident Magistrate. 
41 R. Gray Journals of Two Visitations in 1848 and 1850 by the Right 
Reverend Gray Lord Bishop of Cape Town, Part 1 (London, 1852), p.76. 
42 Report of the Select Committee on the Berg River 1858, Evidence of 
J.J. Kotze, p.2. 
43 Report of the Select Committee on Lamberts Bay 1893, Evidence of J.W. 
van Putten, pp.14-23. 
« Cape Archives; LN~ 1\243, L 367, Civil Conrnissioner Piketberg to the 
Assistant Commissioner of Crown Lands & Public Works, 6 October 1888. 
45 Cap? Archives; LND 
Stephan, n.d. attached to 
Office, 10 October 1888. 
1\234, L 367, Unsigned report by Field Cornet J.C. 
letter from the Surveyor General to the Crown Lands 
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He paid no rent, only house duty, and gathered his wood-fuel 
requirements from government ground. He depended for his 
livelihood on fishing, owning a boat, seine net, tubs and reed 
huts for this purpose. His location at the mouth of the river 
allowed him to work the shoals of harder which schooled in the 
riv~r and inshore waters of the Bay during spring and summer. 
Johnston's seine net could be worked either from the river bank 
or the flat sandy beaches on the coast at those places where tide 
action and the absence of submerged reefs ensured that it would 
not drift or snag. Once fish were sighted on the trek - perhaps 
by one of the children posted as lookout for that purpose - the 
fishermen would gather on the beach and, while one end of the net 
was held fast on the strand, the boat would be rowed round the 
shoal encircling it with the net. With both ends of the seine 
back on the shore and the net laid around the fish, the catch 
would be drawn up onto the beach%. Because of his need for 
labour, Johnston allowed five other men and their families to 
squat with him on the land. His control over this labour force 
was minimal, however, as "[he] does not put the men employed by 
him under any contract, they come and go as they please"~. 
One such "employee" was Nicolas Kordom. Kordom was single and 
about 35 years of age. He claimed to have come to live on the 
land some years previously with Johnston's permission. H~ did no 
other work except fishing and was "under no contract and can 
- leave when he likes"~. In addition to Kordom there was Willem 
Appel alias_ Willem Visagie, his wife, Anna, and 7 children (the 
% For a description of beach seining see C.F.J. Huller HDie Geskiedenis 
van die Visserye aan die Kaap tot aan die Hiddel van die Agtiende Eeu#, pp.42-
43. 
47 Cape Archives; LND 1\234, L 367, Unsigned report by Field Cornet J.C. 
Stephan, n~d. attached to letter from the Surveyor General to the Crown Lands 
Office, 10 October 1888. 
~ Ibid. 
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oldest about 14). Appel, like Kordom, had come to fish for 
Johnston 5 or 6 years previously, but had not worked regularly as 
a fisherman since and was away from home at the time of the field 
cornet's visit. Sam Lucas, his wife, Mietje, and their 3 children 
had also arrived some 5 years earlier. Lucas had worked one 
season for Johnston as a fisherman and had then returned to the 
employ of local merchants, Stephan Brothers, intending to 
relocate to the firm's land as soon as he could find time to 
remove his house. Joseph Linkerhand and his "uncle", Jonas, also 
dated their occupancy of the land from a time some 6 years 
previously when Candace Johnston had given them permission to 
settle there. Joseph was too old for regular labour, although he 
sometimes helped Johnston out when asked and went out to work at 
harvest time. For the most part he depended on his 3 
grandchildren for support. The latter worked where they could but 
were without regular employ. One, Fortuin Linkerhand, was serving 
a prison term for stealing sheep, but his grandfather denied any 
complicity in the matter. Another, Abram, had parents, but 
refused to work for his father. He, like Fortuin, had spent time 
in prison but found it difficult to recall how often or for what 
reason. He did, however, remember being had up for theft. Abram 
lived with a daughter of indeterminate age, Regina, who worked 
for him. He was clearly suspicious of the field cornet's presence 
and prying questions and told the latter with thinly-disguised 
hostility that "the ground is his 'Oude Noois' [meaning the 
Queen] and he pays house duty so will remain as long as he likes. 
[It was furthermore] no business of anyone where he gets food 
from or how he lives"~. Johnston's squatter fishery probably 
operated on a share system, guaranteeing all participants a 
portion of the catch depending on each individual's contribution. 
Thus Johnson, as owner of the boat and net and nominal "skipper", 
would have received a greater number of shares out of recognition 
49 Ibid. 
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of his ownership rights and other skills. The others - Kordom, 
Visagie, Lucas, Linkerhand and their sons and grandsons - would 
have been remunerated for their labour with equal shares as "co-
adventurers" with Johnston~. The families - wives and ~hildren -
doubtless helped in the preparation and drying of the fish and 
all subsisted, in part at least, either directly from the catch 
or indirectly from its sale to local farmers as rantsoenvis. In 
this way, Johnston was able to avoid incurring fixed labour costs 
during times of poor weather, off seasons or fish scarcity. His 
labour force enjoyed access to the means of production as 
independent producers, able to appropriate a portion of the final 
product for their own use as well as the freedom to follow other 
subsistence strategies (farm labour, petty crime) in addition to 
fishing. 
Squatting on the "Cude Nooi's ground" was not always necessary, 
however. Some proprietors of farms in the Sandveld actively 
encouraged the development of fishing settlements on their land. 
Theunis Erasmus Smit was one such farmer who willingly let plots 
of land on his farm, Velddrif, at the mouth of the Berg River, to 
would-be fishermen for an annual rental; nor was he the first 
owner of the farm to do so. From the early years of the 19th 
century, the farm's value was determined not only by the rough 
grazing it offered, but also by the annual rent to be made from a 
growing community of tenant fishermen 51 • J.J. Kotze too had a 
fisherman resident on his farm, Rietvlei, a mile and a half from 
~ For a discussion of the -share 
Zoeteweij #Fishermen's RelllJlleration- in R. 
Economics of Fisheries (Rome, 1957). 
system- internationally see H. 
Turvey & J. Wiseman (eds) The 
51 H.H.D. Smith Boerepioniers van die Sandveld, pp.66-67. Thi~ practice 
was not unique to the west coast. See L van Sittert #Gebrei in die Ambag: 
Farmers, Fish and Fishermen in the Hout Bay Valley c.1880-1956# for the Cape 
Peninsula and Cape of Good Hope Report of the Select Co.mm.ittee on Caledon 
Fishing Industry 1899 [A.27-'99] and Cape of Good Hope Report of the Select 
Co.mm:tttee on the Caledon Fisheries 1904 [A.3-'04] for the southeast coast. 
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the river mouth, who was required to pay a token rental of two 
baskets of fish per month~. These farmers viewed communities of 
tenant fishermen as a means of turning a profit from otherwise 
marginal land. The fishermen were a source of rent, seasonal 
labour, cheap food and possibly even surplus fish for trade in 
the surrounding area. 
Prior to 1856 the owners of coastal or riverine farms in the 
Malmesbury and Piketberg districts enjoyed uninterrupted use of 
their land down to the high water mark and they thus retained the 
exclusive right to grant access to the coast or river to would-be 
fishermen~. In 1856, however, the Civil Commissioner of 
Malmesbury, Captain John Rainer, emboldened by Parliament's new 
land policies, began issuing five year leases to lots of crown 
land, extending 120 feet inland from the highwater mark and 
100 feet in width, for a nominal rental of 
both 
ll per annum~. 
Rainer's motives for doing so were economic and 
philanthropic. He wished to encourage the development of the 
fisheries along the seaboard of his district while simultaneously 
improving the living conditions of the numerous squatter 
fishermen already settled on the coast~. The "fishing lease" 
system received official sanction the following year, on 
condition that the leases were "put up to public competition", a 
register kept and list of contracts forwarded to Cape Town for 
52 Re;;.;....,po""""-'r_t _ o_f~_t_h_e~S~e_l_e_ct~_C_o_.mm.t~_t_te_e~_o_n~t_he~~Be~r-g __ R_i_v_e_r~_1_85~8, Evidence of 
J.J. Kotze, p.2. 
~ Cape of Good Hope Report of the Select Committee on the Petition of 
the Inhabitants of Saldanha and St Helena Bays, in Reference to Fishing Leases 
1882 [A.10-'82], p.iii. 
~ Ibid, p.iii and Appendices E-G, pp. xi-xii. Also Cape Archives; 1\HBY, 
6\2\3, J. Rainer to the Colonial Secretary, 16 December 1856 and 1\HBY, 6\2\4, 
J. Rainer to the Colonial Secretary 24 April 1858. 
~ Ibid. 
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publication in the Government Gazette. In May 18S8 the sale of 
"wines and spirituous liquors" was contractually forbidden on all 
leases~. The latter continued to be issued without reference to 
the local farmer dominated Divisional Council and despite the 
passing of Act No 2 of 1860 which expressly excluded "land on the 
sea coast lying above and within two hundred feet of highwater 
mark" from the definition of "crown land" and made the granting 
of such land subject to the approval of the Legislative Council 
and House of Assembly. Although subsequently repealed, the 
provisions of the Act were reimposed by Act No 14 of 1878 and, in 
the opinion of a later Select Committee, "rendered the issue of 
these Fishing Leases perfectly illegal", adding "that from the 
date of the passing of the Act of 1860, they ought not to have 
been issued"~. The fact that leases were granted until the early 
1880s reflected the confusion engendered in the local bureaucracy 
by the string of land laws passed during the second half of the 
19th Century and the poor communications with Cape Town. The 
degree of autonomy enjoyed by Rainer and his successors can be 
gauged from the Select Committee finding that the Colonial 
Secretary's instructions regarding the fishing leases had been 
"entirely ignored" and "no auction of any leases has taken place, 
and no notice has been published in the Government Gazette" 58 • 
In this fashion, no fewer than 76 leases were granted by 1882, 
earning the Colonial Office a handsome yearly income and opening 
up the coast of the district to fishing between Ysterfontein in 
the south and the mouth of the Berg River~. The lease system gave 
an enormous fillip to individuals anxious to establish a base of 
~ Report of the Select Committee on the Petition of the Inhabitants of 
Saldanha and St Helena Bays, in Reference to Fishing Leases 1882, pp.iii-iv. 
~ Ibid., pp.iv-v. 
58 Ibid., p.iv. 
59 Ibid., Appendix C, pp.ii-viii. 
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independent production on the coast. One observer estimated that 
there were as many as 400 fishermen and their families living 
along the Malmesbury coast by 1861. A decade later, the 
population had risen to around 1000~. Relations between these 
fishing communities and most farmers in the area were ambiguous 
at best. While those renting to fishermen or living inland from 
the coast benefitted from their presence in the form of seasonal 
labour or a regular supply of rantsoenvis, the attitude of many 
coastal landowners was summed up in the word they used to 
describe their unwanted neighbours "squatters". The latter 
visited numerous depredations on the farmers of the coastal 
fringe. The paucity of drinking water and wood fuel on lease-
sites forced the occupants to rely on the wells and brushwood of 
the abutting farms and as one landowner complained, "At 
Paternoster they have cut down the bushes growing at highwater 
mark, and I have lost one of my wells of water there already from 
the sand blowing about after the bushes were cut down" 61 • The 
existence of canteens on some of the leases was another source of 
complaint, subjecting farmers to the rowdy behaviour of 
intoxicated fishermen and giving their own labour easy access to 
alcoho1 62 • The leases were reportedly also a haven for a host of 
~ Cape of Good Hope .Correspondence on the .Subject of Applications for 
certain Pieces of Ground at St Helena Bay, Hertzog (Stockens:trom), and 
Riversdal• 1860 [A.8-'61], pp.3-4, Letter from W.E. Belson to the Colonial 
Secretary, 1 Harch 1860 and Cape Archives; 1\HBY, 6\2\7, Civil Commissioner of 
Halmesbury to the Colonial Secretary, 8 Harch 1871. 
61 Report of the Select 
Saldanha and St Helena Bays, 
J.C. Stephan, p.15. 
Committee on the Petition of the Inhabitants of 
in Reference to Fishing Leases 1882, Evidence of 
62 Cape Archives; 1 \HBY, 6\2\4, Civil Commissioner of Malmesbury to the 
Colonial Secretary, 19 June 1860; 1\HBY, 5\5\1, R. Daly to the Resident 
Magistrate Halmesbury, 16 & 29 November 1861 and 1\HBY, 5\5\4, A.J Lemmerz to 
G.R. Duthie, 25 June 1884. 
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unsavoury characters including "runaway soldiers and sailors"~. 
The combination of economic injury and class fear prompted 
demands for greater state protection. Periodical courts were 
established at various points along the coast and a permanent 
Resident Magistrate stationed at Hopefield in 1896, but the 
propertied class' unease remained. In 1863 the farmers at 
Saldanha Bay complained that the field cornet was all of four 
hours' ride from the Bay and twenty years later they were still 
lamenting their lack of access to the state's coercive apparatus 
in dealing with the squatter problemM. As they intoned: 
"In front of homesteads, between ploughed fields and the 
sea, on all parts hordes of squatters were placed, and 
hardly any redress can be had for the inconveniences 
suffered, by reason of the seat of Magistracy being so far 
away" 65 • 
Denied effective legal redress, most farmers did their utmost to 
prevent the development of fishing communities on or near their 
land. The resurveying of coastal farms was one means of removing 
squatters, by re-establishing the landowner's right to the land 
down to the high-water mark and providing the necessary legal 
authority to evict leaseholdersM. In addition landholders refused 
-~ Report of the Select Committee on the Petition of the Inhabitants of 
Saldanha and St Helena Bays, in Reference to Fiti:hing Leases 1882, Evidence of 
J.C. Stephan, p.17 and Cape Archives; 1\HBY, 5\5\3, Anonymous to G.R. Duthie, 
7 August 1881. 
M Cape Archives; 1\HBY, 6\2\5, Civil Commissioner of Halmesbury to the 
Colonial Secretary, 14 November 1863. 
b5 Cape of Good Hope Petition of the Undersigned Inhabitants and Owners 
of Lands in the Division of Halmesbury, in the Wards of Saldanha and St Helena 
Bays, and in Piketberg 1882 [A.5-'82]. 
M Cape Archives; 1\HBY, 6\2\6 Civil Commissioner of Halmesbury to the 
Colonial Secretary, 11 February 1866, 21 November 1866, 23 July 1868, 16 March 
1868, 3 August 1868 & 24 December 1868; 1\HBY, 6\2\7, Civil Commissioner of 
Halmesbury to the Colonial Secretary, 19 Hay 1870 & 15 Hay 1875 and 1\HBY, 
6\2\9, Report of the Civil Commissioner of Halmesbury, 5 January 1881. 
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to lease their land to fishermen, as the Reverend Belson of the 
See of Cape Town found to his frustration when he attempted to 
acquire land for a church and school to service the fishing 
communities on the Malmesbury coast. In his search for an 
appropriate site, he turned to local farmers, endeavouring "year 
after year ••• by all means in my power, to obtain land from the 
farmers. I have offered to buy, rent or lease, but in vain"hl. 
Despite such passive resistance, the number of leases continued 
to increase as did the coastal squatter population. Landowners 
thus turned their attention ever more forcefully to abolishing 
the lease system itself. As early as 1860, Rainer was confronted 
by a memorial from Saldanha Bay farmers demanding that the 
leasing of coastal land in their vicinity be terminated~. He 
successfully defended his scheme on this occasion, but in 1874 
another petition reached Parliament, alleging that the 
inhabitants and landed proprietors of the area had suffered "a 
great deal of annoyance, inconvenience, mischief and loss" as a 
result of the granting of fishing leases along the coast~. Such 
leases, the petitioners charged, were "too often occupied by 
squatters and other ill-famed characters who breed nothing but 
mischief and annoyance". Even "respectable occupiers" were forced 
to trespass on the adjoining farms in search of water and wood 
and th• petitioners asked that the lease system be abolished and 
they be thereby delivered "from those idlers who wish to live at 
hl Corre•pc:,ndence on the Subject of Applications for certain Pieces of 
Ground at St Helena Bay, Hertzog (Stockenstrom), and Riversdale 1860, pp.3-4, 
Letter from W.E. Belson to the Colonial Secretary, 1 March 1860. 
~ Cape Archives; 1\HBY, 6\2\4, Civil Connissioner of Halmesbury to the 
Colonial Secretary, 19 June 1860. 
69 Cape of Good Hope Petition of the Inhabitants and Landed Proprietors 
at St Helena and Saldanha Bay July 1874 [A.30-'74] and Cape Archives: HA 770, 
113, #Petisie van die Inwoners en Landeigenaars Woonagtig te St Helena en 
Saldanha Baaiw, n.d. 
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their [the petitioners'] expense on their properties" 70 • This 
petition reportedly gained the support of the then Governor, 
Wodehouse, who ordered an end to the lease system, but, as with 
other such directives from Cape Town, this one too appears to 
have been wholly disregarded71 • Eight years later, in March 1882, 
the landowners of the area once again petitioned Cape Town, 
alleging that they were: 
"greatly hampered, damaged and restricted" in their 
farming and other operations of trade, by the promiscuous 
issue of what are commonly called ·Fishing Grant' along 
the Western Coast, and especially in the locality where 
they reside"n. 
The petition was signed by sixty farmers and explicitly queried 
the legality of the leases with reference to the Crown Land Act, 
pointing out that "they were indiscriminately issued to every and 
all comers" in direct contravention of said Act. To protect their 
interests they were forced to take out fishing leases for their 
land abutting the sea coast and felt that "an injustice of a 
great kind was being done them"n. 
A combination of factors appears to have ensured the continuation 
of the lease system and attendant coastal squatting in the face 
70 Petition of the Inhabitants and Landed Proprietors at St Helena and 
Saldanha Bay July 1874. 
71 Report of the Select Committee on the Petition of the Inhabitants of 
Saldanha and St Helena Bays, in Reference to Fishing Leases 1882, Evidence of 
G.R. Duthie, p.11. 
n Petition of the Undersigned Inhabitants and Owners of Lands in the 
Division of Halmesbury, in the Wards of Saldanha and St Helena Bays, and in 
Piketberg 1882 and Cape Archives; HA 784, 34, ·Petition of the Undersigned 
Inhabitants and Owners of Lands in the Division of Halmesbury, in the Wards of 
Saldanha and St Helena Bays, and in Piketberg•, n.d. 
n Petition of the Undersigned Inhabitants and Owners of Lands in the 
Division of Halmesbury, in the Wards of Saldanha and St Helena Bays, and in 
Piketberg 1882. 
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of such opposition. Firstly, the system was a tacit recognition 
by the colonial state of the economic importance of the squatter 
fishing activities for provisioning local agriculture with 
rantsoenvis 74 • The marginal nature of coastal land and seasonal 
nature of the fisheries ensured that the fishing hamlets would 
not develop into bastions of independent production at the 
periphery of a labour-hungry commercial farming district, but 
would rather serve as a labour pool on which local farmers could 
draw during crucial periods of the year such as harvest time for 
both rantsoenvis and extra hands. Secondly, local agriculture was 
divided on the issue as shown by the two counter-petitions from 
farmers opposing that of their fellows in 1882~. Differing 
economic interests underlay this split (land rights versus 
rantsoenvis and labour supply), enabling the colonial state to 
continue generating revenue for itself by encouraging fishing in 
the public interestn. Thus, while squatting and independent 
production was being eroded throughout the commercial farming 
districts of the Cape after 1853, it survived and was even 
actively conserved on the coastal periphery. There it exhibited 
varying degrees of security of tenure on a continuum from illegal 
squatting, through fishing leases to tenancy relationships with 
private landholders. The latter were the most secure and 
predominated on the Piketberg side of the Bay (north of the Berg 
River) as a vital form of supplementary income for the owners of 
marginal agricultural land. The Halmesbury coastline, on the 
74 Report of the Select Committee on the Petition of the Inhabitants of 
Saldanha and St Helena Bays, in Reference to Fishing Leases 1882, Evidence of 
A. de Sm1dt, p.4. 
~ Cape Archives; HA 784, 34, wPetisie van die Land Eigenaars en 
Ingezetenen in die Afdeling St Helena Baai, District Halmesbury*, 30 March 
1882 and wPetisie van gie Land Eigenaars en Ingezetenen in die Afdeling St 
Helena Baai, Halmesburyw, n.d. 
n Cape Archives; 1\HBY, 6\2\4, Halmesbury Civil Commissioner to the 
Colonial Secretary 19 June 1860 and 1\HBY, 6\2\S, Halmesbury Civil 
Commissioner to the Colonial Secretary, 14 November 1863. 
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other hand, was "privatised" by the colonial state and opened up 
to settlement through the lease system. Lease holders, however, 
were subjected to the constant harassment of their propertied 
neighbours attempting to reclaim their ownership rights and 
prevent their property (wells, veld, and the like) from being 
despoiled. Those without the means, good name or inclination to 
lease or rent, opted for illegal occupation of vacant land, 
running the risk of censure from both the state and farmers of 
every stripe. 
The opening up of the Malmesbury coast to fishing and the growth 
of the coastal grain and other shipping trade at St Helena Bay 
also attracted outside interests to the coastal periphery in the 
form of Cape Town merchants. The latter, often acting through 
local agents, facilitated the commercialisation of agriculture in 
the interior by linking farmer to market, but also acquired large 
land interests of their own along the coast through the provision 





and purveyors of the . iron law of 
both Sandveld agriculture and 
the 
the 
subsistence fisheries. Merchant control of the coastal entrepots 
turned the terms of trade against the farmers, depressing prices 
on the west coast in search of greater profits in Cape Town. For 
the fishermen, expanding merchant control of the coast and the 
fishing meant a loss of independence and control over the product 
-of labour. This process intensified with the growth of an export 
trade in salt fish to Mauritius after 1860, culminating in an 
all-out assault on the lease system in the early 1880s as 
competition for labour and marine resources increased. Thus 
merchant capital, in addition to opening up St Helena Bay and the 
Sandveld as a conduit for commodities to and from the interior, 
also integrated it into the expanding colonial and world 
economies as an exporter of agricultural produce to the Cape and 
dried · fish to the Indian Ocean and Natal sugar plantations. This 
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integration was resisted by Sandveld agriculture and the 
subsistence fishermen in an attempt to preserve the periphery and 
their independence against the corrosive proletarianising effects 
of unequal exchange fostered by merchant capital. Their sustained 
resistance, coupled with merchant capital's location at the level 
of exchange rather than production thus had the paradoxical 
effect of redefining rather than abolishing the periphery and 
ensuring its continued existence, in a modified form, on into the 
20th Century. 
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2: THI STIPHAN IMPIRI 
A standard theoretical formulation of merchant capital might read 
something like this: 
"The general features of merchant capital are the same in 
every type of society in which it operates - capitalist or 
non-capitalist. It has no direct control over the labour 
process and is always dependent upon the class which does, 
even where it dominates this class. Secondly, it must 
always engage in unequal exchange to appropriate part of 
the surplus product of society. Thirdly, as capital it is 
driven to accumulate and in this way acts as a medium 
through which the law of value is brought to bear on all 
parts of the economy, particularly the sphere of 
production. The repercussions of these features, however, 
do differ with the nature of society" 1 • 
The specifics of merchant capital's "repercussions" for 19th 
Century Cape colonial society have been largely ignored by 
historians~ What research has been done has focussed on the 
Eastern Cape and urban Cape Town, but merchant capital was also 
at home on the periphery of the colonial economy where it had a 
freer reign and thus a more profound and enduring impact. St 
Helena Bay is a case in point. Distance and the paucity of an 
adequate transport infrastructure created numerous opportunities 
far merchant capital on the western seaboard. These same factors 
also facilitated the process of unequal exchange by providing it 
G. Kay Development and Underdevelopment: A Marxist Analysis (London, 
1982), p.94. 
2 S. Trapido #•Friends of the Natives': Merchants, Peasants and the 
Political and Ideological Structure of Liberalism in the Cape# in S. Harks & 
A. Atmore (eds) Economy & Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa (London, 
1980); S.H. Dubow Land, Labour and Merchant capital in the Pre-Industrial 
Rural Economy of the Cape: The Experience of Graaf Reinet District, 1852-1872 
(Cape Town, 1982); A.S. Habin #The Hsking of Colonial Capitalism: 
Intensification and Expansion in the Economic Geography of the Cape Colony, 
South Africa, 1854-1899# (Unpublished PhD thesis, Simon Fraser University, 
1984) and J.V. Bickford-Smith #Commerce, Class and Ethnicity in Cape Town 1875 
to 1902# (Unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of CSJIJbridge, 1988). 
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with .a captive market uninformed about prices in the Cape. 
Unequal exchange was further promoted by the absence of formal 
credit facilities, enabling merchant capital to tie farmers into 
the exchange network from an early stage, particularly in the 
less prosperous Sandveld. In addition, merchant capital's 
location at the level of exchange rather than production enabled 
it to diversify away from a dependence on grain shipment to other 
fields of exchange, including fishing. Here it exercised control 
through its monopolisation of the means of production (land, 
boats, gear) while leaving the actual production in the hands of 
appointed skippers. Its ability to effect the transformation of 
fishing from subsistence to commodity production was aided by the 
insecurity of tenure characteristic of the fisheries at the Bay. 
As a marginal activity in the hands of a marginal element of the 
rural underclass, the fisheries did not develop into a site of 
rural capital accumulation and thus offered little formal 
resistance to merchant capital. 
Merchant capital, in whatever form or context, however, also 
evinces a fundamental contradiction inherent in its dependence on 
accumulation through exchange and consequent detachment from 
production. As Kay explains: 
"[H]istorically merchant capital has never been able to 
effect [the] transition to capitalism proper itself. Its 
dependence upon the non-capitalist class that is directly 
responsible for their [sic] exploitation of labour leads it 
to support this class at the very moment it is undermining 
it. Its revolutionary edge is always blunted by this 
conservative bias" 3 • 
This "conservative bias" was even more pronounced on the 
periphery, tying merchant capital into a . reliance on the 
underdevelopment of th-e west coast, but at the same time 
isolat~ng it - by virtue of its parasitic accumulation imperative 
J G. Kay Development and Underdevelopment, p.95. 
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and physical location - from agrarian capital in the interior. 
Merchant capital was thus unable to fashion the necessary 
political alliance with the inland farmers to ameliorate the 
worsening labour shortage at the coast after 1880 or control the 
extension of the line of rail into the wheatlands at the turn of 
the century. The railway sounded the death knell for the grain 
trade just as the lure of employment on the mines, railways and 
docks undermined the fishery and left merchant capital holding 
vast tracts of worthless coastline over which the flow of 
commodities from both land and sea had all but dried up. The 
mineral revolution and the South African War thus undermined 
merchant capital on the periphery, but left the basic structure 
of coastal\Sandveld society intact, albeit in a significantly 
altered form. The periphery's integration into the market and the 
establishment of commodity production in the fisheries could not 
be undone. Rather, new circuits of production and exchange needed 
to be established in accordance with the accumulation needs of 
Sandveld agriculture and merchant capital, as well as the 
region's continued location on the periphery of an economy in the 
early throes of industrialisation. 
2.1 THE COMMERCIALISATION OF THE FISHERIES C.1850 - C.1880 
The burgeoning trade in agricultural produce on the western 
seaboard of the colony from the early 19th Century integrated the 
Bay into the colonial economy and opened the door for merchant 
capital penetration of the periphery. By the last quarter of the 
19th Century the west coast farmers' sole road to markat 7 the 
seacoast, was controlled by one merchant house, Stephan Brothers. 
Stephan Brothers built its power on the coastal grain trade, but 
from there it diversified into everything from land speculation 
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to general dealing, shipping and fishingt The original Stephan, 
Johann Daniel, was a native of the Rhineland who took up service 
. with the VOC and came to the Cape as a private in Company employ 
in 1770. He married the daughter of a local Dutch settler and 
produced four offspring before passing away in 1796~ His eldest 
son of the same name chose a career at sea and by 1806 was 
operating a cutter along the west coast, trading grain as far 
north as St Helena Bay. In the 1820s he opened his own general 
dealership in Cape Town and, while he managed the Cape Town 
business, his sons, Johann Daniel and Johan Carel - the latter a 
master mariner like his father - conducted the firm's trad i ng 
voyages to Saldanha, St Helena and Lamberts Bays aboard the 
family's thirty-ton cutter~ By the 1830s the Stephans had 
established a permanent trading presence on the west coast at 
Soldaten Pos on St Helena Bay and traded far into the interior 
with their "smouskar"~ With the death of Johann Daniel junior in 
1855 and his son, Johan Carel, in 1871, the family business 
passed into the hands of Johan Carel's two sons, Johan Carel 
junior and Hendrik Rudolph Stephan. It was they who transformed 
the small trading concern into a merchant monopoly whose reach 
extended from Cape Town 
interior~ 
to Namaqualand and far into the 
4 For the history of Stephan Brothers, such as it exists, see E. 
Rosenthal ·The Stephan Saga• (Unpublished manuscript, n.d.); ·Family Business 
has been in the Cape Fishing Industry for 150 Year,:• in SASNFIR, August 1959; 
HThe Family that made a Coast their Empire: Stephan Brothers (Pty) Ltd• in 
J.R. Shorten (ed) The Golden Jubilee of Greater Cape Town (Cape Town, 1963). 
S E. Rosenthal HThe Stephan Saga•, pp.1-6. 
6 Ibid., pp.6-8. 
7 HFamily Business has been in the Cape Fishing Industry for 150 YearsH 
in SASNFIR, August 1959, pp.53-55. 
B E. Rosenthal ·The Stephan Saga•, p.26 ff. 
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The key to the brothers' success lay in their domination of the 
market from the point of first exchange (farmer to local buyer) 
to the point of final sale (merchant to market). They achieved 
this through the extension of credit, coupled with the rapacious 
acquisition of exclusive rights to coastal farms and shipping 
sites by foreclosure, purchase or leaset The firm began 
acquiring land as a spin-off of their provision of credit to 
local farmers. A prolonged drought or harvest failure brought a 
crop of a different kind, defaulted debts, bankruptcies and 
inevitable foreclosures. The infertile nature of farms on the 
west coast also ensured that there was a steady turnover of 
coastal land on the market, offering further opportunities for 
acquisition. In addition, the rapid alienation of crown land by 
Divisional Councils after 1858 also brought waste and public land 
abutting the seashore onto the market, allowing merchants, alive 
to the chance, to strengthen their hold on the grain trade 10• In 
this way Stephan Brothers was able to set the ruling price along 
the entire west coast, shutting out competition by denying 
trading and landing rights on their property. So successful was 
the firm in their monopolisation of the west coast trade that, by 
the mid-1880s, it reportedly had no fewer than forty trading 
outposts along the seaboard between Cape Town and Port Nolloth, 
controlled by the extende.d family and their agents 11 • 
If the consolidation of their strangle-hold on the west coast 
trade brought new-found prosperity and power to the Stephans, it 
also met with protracted resistance from local farmers. By the 
9 Ibid. 
!O Report of the Select Committee on the Petition of' the Inhabitants: of 
Saldanha and St Helena Bays, in Reference to Fishing Leases 1882, Evidence of 
J.C. Stephan, p.14 and Cape Archives:; 1\HBY, 6\2\7, Halmesbury Civil 
Commissioner to the Colonial Secretary, 21 Hay 1873. 
11 fl.A. Burger Piket Teen 'n Berg, p.263. 
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last quarter of the 19th Century, the firm was a major source of 
credit in the Sandveld and acquired numerous farms in default on 
debt 12 • Foreclosures did little to endear it to farmers, but it 
was the price paid for grain that evoked an enduring and· deep-
seated resentment to the Stephans in the countryside. In 1888, 
the farmers of the Berg Rivet· opposed the proposed sale of a 
piece of crown land near the river mouth, claiming that "this is 
the only safe landing place from where grain can be shipped that 
still belongs to the Government" 13 and warning that "if sold, 
chances are the establishment of a monopoly, the consequences of 
which would be ruinous to the farmers." 14 • The unnamed monopoly 
they feared was none other than Stephan Brothers and in 1893 a 
grain buyer, ousted by the firm from Lamberts Bay, explained the 
reasons for their concern, by relating how produce prices had 
taken a sharp downturn at Lamberts Bay after the Stephans' 
arrival: 
"Mr Stephan gave 10s to 12s in 1888 for corn and from 4s 6d 
to 5s for rye. I came to Cape Town and I discovered that the 
prices here were much higher. I returned and purchased for 
the Milling Company at 17s 6d; then Mr Stephan offered 18s. I 
also sent the price of rye up to 10s the 180 lbs, while Mr 
Stephan had only been giving 5s per 200 lbs." 15 
In his opinion, Stephan Brothers "have most decidedly injured the 
farmer~ by the low price for g~ain"~. The Malmesbury farmers were 
similarly hard done by, claiming in 1903 that the price for grain 
12 H.H.D. Smith Boerepioniers van die Sandveld, p.204 for the examples of 
the farm& •soutkuil• near Aurora and •Nooitgedacht• at Vredenburg. 
13 Cape Archives; LND 1\243, L 367, Petition of J.J. Kotze and 58 others 
to the Coaaissioner of Crown Lands and Public Works, September 1891. 
14 Cape Archives; LND 1\243, L 367, J.J. Kotze to the Commissioner of 
Crown Lands and Public Works, 10 October 1891. 




paid by the firm at Saldanha Bay was 15%-20% lower than that 
ruling at Malmesbury, which had recently been connected to Cape 
Town by rail 17 • Alternative markets were few due to the bad state 
of the roads in the interior and the fact that most of the 
coastal farmers were "obligated" to sell their harvest to the 
firm in repayment of debt 18 • The umbilical cord of exchange tying 
the Stephan's merchant empire to the farmers of the west coast 
was thus both twisted and strained and because of these latent 
tensions and the vagaries of agricultural production, the firm 
did not confine its activities to the grain trade alone. As it 
acquired ownership of an ever larger part of the western 
seaboard, so it turned its attention increasingly to exploiting 
the marine resources of the coast and, in particular, fishing. 
Such diversification was at once the logical outcome of the 
process of seashore land acquisition and part of merchant 
capital's inexorable search for new sites of commodity production 
to dominate and exploit. 
In the second half of the 19th Century, the demand for fish 
spiralled as a result of both an expanding local market and the 
emergence of new markets outside the colony. At home, the growth 
of commercial agriculture in the South Western Cape, the 
emergence of an urban working class in Cape Town, the use of 
indentured Indian labour in Natal, the mineral revolution and 
construction of railways created a burgeoning demand for fish as 
a source of cheap protein to feed labour on the farms, 
17 Cape of Good Hope Report of the Select Committee on the Saldanha Bay 
Harbour Works Bill 1903 [A.S-1903] Evidence of J.J. Kotze, pp.81-83 and 
Evidence of A.J. Stigling, p.89. 
18 Ibid., Evidence of A.J. Stigling, pp.93-96. 
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plantations and mines, as well as workers in the cities19. Abroad, 
the importation of indentured labour to Mauritius and Reunion in 
the wake of the abolition of slavery prompted similar demands 
from plantation owners in the Indian Ocean. The sugar barons 
turned to dried fish to meet their needs and although fish was 
imported from a wide variety of sources, dried sneak was found to 
be best suited to this new demand. As one Cape Town exporter 
explained, "When snoek is plentiful it is comparatively cheap, 
and two ounces of snoek go much further than any other fish, 
because there is no oil in other fish, and snoek is one mass of 
oil and flavours their food better"~. 
The importance of this Mauritian trade to the 19th Century Cape 
fisheries can be gauged from the name - Snoekopolis - given Cape 
Town, the chief export port for Mauritian-bound snoekn. The 
demand emanating from the distant Indian Ocean plantations was 
indeed huge, requiring the annual shipment of literally hundreds 
of tons of salted fish from Cape Town to Port Louis. The fish was 
shipped by merchants with the necessary vessels and diversity of 
interests to make the voyage profitable. They in turn relied on 
fisheries located along the coast from the Cape Peninsula to St 
Helena Bay and even as far away as South West Africa for their 
19 See Cape of Good Hope Report of the Select Committee on Colonial 
Industries 1891 [C.1-'91]; M.M. Irvine •scratching th& Surface: The 
Archaeology of 56 Dorp Street Bo-Kaap• (Unpublished Archaeology Honours 
dissertation, UCT, 1990) and H. Hall ·Fish and the Fisherman: Art, Text and 
Archaeology•, paper presented at Centre for African Studies, Africa Seminar, 
UCT, March 1991. 
~ Report of the Fisheries Committee 1892, Evidence of C. Arnold, p.4. 
21 W. Wardlaw Thompson Sea Fisheries on the Cape Colony, p.89 and B.A. le 
Cordeur •Natal, the Cape and the Indian Ocean, 1846-1880· Journal of African 
History, 7, 2, 1966. 
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supplies~. In 1830 it was noted that "salt fish is becoming an 
article of export, especially to Mauritius"~. The Mauritian 
export trade only really took off, however, after the abolition 
of slavery and ex-slave apprenticeships on the island in 1838. 
Between 1834 and 1907 a total of 450 000 Indian immigrants were 
brought to Mauritius, the majority as indentured labourers on the 
sugar plantations~. It was this influx which prompted the rapid 
increase in both the quantity and value of fish exports from the 
Cape Colony to Mauritius in the second half of the 19th Century. 
TABLE 2.1 Dried, Cured & Salted Fish Exports 
from the Cape Colony to Mauritius, 1840-1899 ~ 
-----------------------------------------------------------------YEARS AVERAGE PER ANNUM 
Tons % Value % Price per % 
> < [ £. ] > < Ton > < 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
1840-1849 593 7 930 £. 13. 8s 
1850-1859 702 + 18.4 9 518 +20.0 £.13.12s + 1. 5 
1860-1869 1 402 + 99.7 16 877 +77.3 £. 12. Os -13.3 
1870-1879 1 666 + 18.8 23 047 +36.6 £.13.16s +15.0 
1880-1889 1 638 1. 7 21 844 - 5.5 . · £.13. 6s - 3.8 
1890-1899 597 -174.4 11 338 -92.7 £. 1 9 • Os +42.9 
~ The Cape Blue Books show annual imports of fish from the South West 
African coast 1857-1884. The two key fishing stations were Walwich [Walvis] 
Bay and Sandwich Harbour, but fish was also imported from Angra Pequena, Great 
Fish Bay, Prince of Wales Bay, Paul de Loando, Poa,no Island, Ichaboe, 
Possession Island and Halifax Island. 
TI Quoted in W. Wardlaw Thompson Sea Fisheries of the Cape Colony, p.23. 
The value of Mauritian fish exports for that year was a paltry £428. 
24 On indentured Indian labour in Hauritius: see H. Tucker A New System of 
Slavery (London, 1974); R. Hallett Africa Since 1875: A Modern History 
(London, 1980); P. Curtin et al African History (Boston, 1978); Cd.1867, Great 
Britain Reports showing the present state of Her Majesty's Colonial 
Possessions. Transmitted with the Blue Books for the year 1865. Part 1: West 
Indies and Mauritius; and Cd.1867, Great Britain Reports showing the present 
state of Her Majesty's Colonial Possessions. Transmitted with the Blue Books 
for the year 1867. Part 1: West Indies and Hauritius. 
~ Own calculations from data contained in Cape of Good Hope Statistical 
Registers 1840-1900. 
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Between 1840 and 1860, the export trade, with the odd exception 
of a year when fish were superabundant, remained under a thousand 
tons per annum, valued at less than l10 000. In the three d~cades 
between 1860 and 1890, however, dried fish exports to Mauritius 
doubled in both quantity and value in response to a surge in the 
number of indentured Indian labourers brought to the island2b. The 
tonnage of fish shipped each year during this period averaged 
between 1 400 and 1 700 tons, but frequently broke the two 
thousand-ton mark. Returns evidenced a similar rise, averaging 
between l16 000 and l23 000 per annum, but with regular annual 
windfalls in excess of l25 000. 
TABLE 2.2 The Rise & Decline of Merchant Fishing 








[ l ] 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
1850 3 19 22 125 ? 
1855 4 32 36 470 ? 
1860 16 43 59 188 3 761 
1865 20 48 68 370 4 961 
1870 32 70 102 520 18 730 
1875 37 75 112 230 10 071 
1880 14 68 82 1 000 11 400 
1885 ? 57 57 905 9 050 
1890 ? 65 65 1 509 13 060 
1900 ? ? ? 168 1 464 
? = Unknown 
2b Reports showing the present state of Her Majesty's Colonial 
Possessions. Transmitted with the Blue Books for the year 1865. Part 1: West 
Indies and Mauritius, pp.118-121. In the seven years from 1854 to 1858, the 
number of Indian males il) Mauritius increased from 70 000 to 120 000 and in 
the period 1859 to 1865 this figure rose a further 47 000 to 167 000. The 
number of dependents went unrecorded. 
2? Own tabulation from the dubious and often incomplete or inaccurate 
data contained in Cape of Good Hope Statistical Registers 1850-1900. 
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The burgeoning export trade led to the rapid growth of new 
fisheries along the southern shores of St Helena Bay. In 1840 the 
Bay was reportedly the site of several small fishing places whose 
catches were "principally for family use, but some is 
occasionally bartered for cattle"~. By 1850, a fleet of 22 
fishing vessels was operating at the Bay, producing 125 tons of 
dried fish for export to Mauritius and a further 149 casks of 
cured fish for local consumption~. The new fisheries depended 
heavily on the Mauritian market. Although snoek fishing was 
combined with rantsoenvis production, profits from the latter 
were too meagre to warrant specialisation. Thus, by the mid-1860s 
fishing effort concentrated on snoek to the exclusion of other 
"coarse" species less suitable for salting and sun-drying~ . The 
Bay was well situated to supply the export demand for snoek. Its 
southern shore was within easy sailing distance of the migratory 
snoek shoals as they passed the coast off Cape Columbine, unlike 
the more sheltered waters of Saldanha Bay which were bypassed by 
the snoek 31 • In addition, the coves and inlets on the Malmesbury 
side of the Bay allowed fishing boats and cutters to lie at 
anchor in relative safety, even during north westerly gales 32 • The 
Bay's appeal as a base for snoek fishing was further enhanced by 
the availability of salt from a pan at Paternoster and existence 
of fresh water at several springs along the coast~. 
~ Cape of Good Hope Statistical Register 1840, p.293. 
~ Cape of Good Hope Statis:tical Regis:ter 1850, p.465. 
~ Report of the Fisheries Committee 1892, Evidence of C. Arnold, pp.3-4. 
31 Cape Archives; 1\HBY, 6\2\5, Halmesbury Civil Colfllfli.ssioner to the 
Colonial Secretary, 9 December 1864. 
~ Report of the Select Committee on the Berg River 1858, Evidence of 
J.C. Stephan, p.8. 
~ Cape of Good Hope Statis:tical Regis:ter 1862, p.FF4. 
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In 1866 the Civil Commissioner of Malmesbury reported that: 
"(A] new fishery has been 
Helena Bay] and extensive 
purpose of curing and 
establishment is chiefly 
established by a Mr Stephan (at St 
buildings have been erected for the 
storing fish. The object of the 
for export trade"~. 
Although Stephan Brothers based its fishing activities on its 
coastal farms, it was nonetheless forced to take out some 42 
fishing leases along the southern shores of the Bay to protect 
its access to the best fishing sites from squatters and lease 
holders~. In addition to Stephan Brothers, 11 lease holders were 
reported to "carry on fishing on their own account" in Malmesbury 
by 1882, including Van Rosenveldt, Ehlers and Williams at St 
Helena Bay~. Direct involvement in the export trade set these men 
apart from the multitude of other subsistence lease-holders and 
squatter fishermen like Johnston. Ehlers, in addition to his 
leases, rented land on an adjoining farm on which he housed the 
48 men who fished for him, kept a canteen and speculated in 
grain. In 1881 he sold an estimated 100 000 snoek "mooitjies" to 
local farmers and sent 300 tons of fish to Cape Town valued at 
i. 3 00037 • Likewise Van Rosenveldt, who claimed to be the first 
person of the coast to establish a snoek fishery, ran a canteen, 
acted as a grain buyer and paid a local farmer for the right to 
draw water from his well. He employed 30 fishermen in his fishery 
~ Cape Archives; 1\HBY, 6\2\6 Halmesbury Civil Commissioner to the 
Colonial Secretary, 21 November 1866. 
~ Report of the Select Committee on the Petition of the Inhabitants of 
Saldanha and St Helena Bays, in Reference to Fishing Leases 1882, Evidence of 
J.C. Stephan, p.14. 
~ Ib~d., Evidence of G.R. Duthie, pp.7-8. 
37 Ibid., Evidence of J.C. Stephan, p.17 and Evidence of G.L. Ehlers, 
pp.18-20. 
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and exported 250 tons of fish to Mauritius via Barry Arnold and 
Co in Cape Town valued at around l2 500~. 
Unlike Robert Johnston, these men appropriated the product of 
labour in full in return for payment. Their ability to do so was 
based on their land rights, ownership of the means of production 
(boats,nets, gear) and diverse trade interests. The latter 
enabled them to subsidise fishing and so assume part of the cost 
of reproducing labour. The fishing, however, was still controlled 
by the skippers. They assembled, organised and managed the crews 
and supervised production at sea. Their semblance of independence 
was circumscribed by owner appointment, the constraint to fish 
for snoek and the threat of dismissal. Ordinary fishermen also 
suffered a decline in status, from independent producer to 
servant, forfeited all claim to the product of labour and lost 
their mobility. Shoreside production was also closely supervised 
to prevent and discourage theft, with contract servants 
("coolies") being substituted for family labour at many fisheries 
and fish being locked away in sheds at night. The reorganisation 
of production was necessitated both by the demands of the market 
and the nature of snoek fishing. Snoek was available all year 
round on the west coast, but became "dry as a piece of wood" and 
infested with parasites from the end of June until early 
November~. Thereafter it gradually improved, attaining prime 
condition from March to June~. A rapacious and fast swimming 
fish, snoek was impo~sible to capture with nets. Instead, each 
fish had to be caught with a hook and line trailed in the wake of 
a boat moving at speed unde~ full sail. Once hooked it was hauled 
~ Ibid., Evidence of J.C. Stephan, p.17 and Evidence of C. van 
Rosenveldt, p.20; 
~ Report of the Fisheries CoJllllittee 1892, Evidence of H.R. Stephan, 
pp.6-13. 
~ Ibid., Appendix D, Reports of J.C. Stephan, A.E. Anderson and J.L. 
HcLachlan, pp.16-19. 
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on board and deftly dispatched with a sharp blow to the head or 
by breaking its neck. Its razor sharp teeth were capable of 
inflicting savage wounds on the uninitiated or inexperienced 
fisherman 41 • Snoek fishing was thus both a labour intensive and 
highly skilled activity and snoek fisherman acquired an 
increasing mobility and group identity as the Mauritian trade 
expanded in the second half of the 19th Century~. One Cape Town 
exporter related how "The men often throw a kabeljauw overboard 
because it interferes with their snoek fishing. They call 
themselves 'Snoekers'" 43 • These "snoekers" were much in demand 
along the western seaboard of the colony from Sandwich Harbour in 
South West Africa to Hout Bay on the Cape Peninsula". 
Because of the growing demand for skilled fishing labour, the St 
Helena Bay fishery owners were faced with the problem of 
retaining fishermen at the Bay. Control over coastal land was a 
necessary, but far from sufficient pre-condition and, in order to 
bind labour to the fisheries, the owners stole a leaf out of 
agriculture's book, imposing a contract, paying in kind rather 
than cash, providing "free" accommodation, extending credit and 
41 C.L. Biden Sea-angling Fishes of the Cape, pp.135-141 and W. Wardlaw 
Thompson Sea Fisheries of the Cape Colony, pp.48-50 for descriptions of snoek 
fishing. 
42 Interviews with Hr Willie and Gert Smeda, 4 July 1986, Laaiplek and Hr 
Ulisse Donaggi, 26 July 1986, Velddrift. In addition to requiring knowledge of 
how to blood a line, cast sinkers, prepare a dollie from shark skin and 
assemble the different components of the gear, the snoek fisherman needed 
physical strength and quick hand-eye co-ordination to prevent personal injury 
or injury to another member of the crew. 
~ Report of the Fisheries Committee 1892, Evidence of C. Schroeder, 
p.16. 
« Ibid., Evidence of David Echardt, Joseph Johnson, Faabie Mathys and 
Doubt Johnstone, pp.24-27. 
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deferring settlement45 • Stephan Brothers, for example, paid their 
fishermen in cash and kind. Married men reportedly received half 
a muid of flour every fortnight plus 3s 6d a week credit and 
single fishermen a bushel of flour and 3s a week%. As Tommy 
Summers remembers, his father, an Englishman, caught snoek for 
Stephan Brothers on the following terms: 
"Kyk hy't [Stephan] so gewerk. As jy ses maande kontrak dan 
teken jy vir ses maande, dan maak jy 'n kontrak. Die pa het 
nou 'n paar seuns miskien in die huis, en die pa. Neu die pa 
kry 'n bushel koring en die ma. Dan kry hulle 'n 'good for', 
seker getal wat jy kan keep. Die broers kry 'n half bushel 
koring in hulle boek. Maar as jy nie see toe gaan nie, dan 
word [laughter], dan word die geld gevat van jou. Maar ek 
meen hulle het dit toe neg nie gedoen nie ••• ek meen hulle 
warn, maar net altyd die mense as hulle nie see toe gaan nie. 
Maar nie gehoor waar hulle dit afgevat het nie. En so het die 
mense nou gelewe al die tyd"u. 
The men were paid per snoek caught and allowed two "eetvis" from 
the daily catch, but payment was deferred until the end of the 
contract season~. They were thus unable to subsist solely on this 
meagre allowance and relied on the credit extended . to them at one 
of the firm's stores to make ends meet 49 • At the end of the 
season a settling of accounts occurred, allowing wide scope for 
manipulation: 
"Normally the pay was 3d a snoek, but in bad times Carel 
[Stephan] would raise it at his own expense to 6d. If things 
deteriorated still further he might even increase it to 9d in 
45 J.N.C. Harincowitz HRural Production and Labour in the Western Cape, 
1838-1888, with Special Reference to the Wheat Growing Districts•, p.106 ff. 
% E. Rosenthal HThe Stephan Saga•, p.37. 
47 Interview with Hr Tonuny Summers, St Helena Bay, 5 July 1986. 
~Ibid.Also E. Rosenthal HThe Stephan saga•, p. 38. 
~ . A. Rosenthal HThe Stephan Saga•, p.38 and _Re_._po~r_t~_of~_th_e~_F_i_s_h_e_r_i_e __ s 
Committee 1892, Evidence of C. Arnold, pp.2-3. 
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the form of a bookkeeping transaction, deducting the 
surplus against the credits his customers had in his 
accounts."~ 
Through "bookkeeping transactions" of this kind, the . firm was 
able to set the price of both basic goods and fish and ensure 
that the fishermen remained in debt and were obligated to 
contract for the following season's fishing 51 • The provision of 
accommodation further reinforced labour's dependence on the 
owner. All fishery owners erected cottages or barracks at their 
fisheries and used these both to draw and coerce labour~. The 
threat of eviction was a powerful means of control over married 
fishermen and free housing figured centrally in the setting of 
allowance and price, depressing both and reinforcing reliance on 
credit. 
These various strands of the relations of production, payment (in 
cash and kind), additional obligations (eetvis and housing) as 
well as conditions and period of service, were gathered up, as 
Tommy Summers indicated, in a written contract witnessed by a 
magistrate and signed by both parties. This contract supplanted 
the earlier informal, verbal agreements between owners and men~. 
Despite its pretence at being the legal representation of an 
agreement between two freely contracting parties, the contract 
was a class-biased document whose main function was to provide 





Case No 25, 
Cape Archives; 1\HBY; F1\1\1, Periodical Court St 
Stephan Brqthers versus Jacobus Papier, 17 October 
52 Cape Archives; 1\HBY, 6\1\5, Resident Magistrate Halmesbury to Certain 
Inhabitants of the Field Cornetcies of St Helena and Saldanha Bays, 30 April 
1881 and 1\HBY, 6\2\10, Report of the Commission on Fisheries, 31 July 1883. 
~ Cape Archives; 1\HBY, 
1883; J.C. Stephan to G.R. 
Periodical Court Vredenburg, 
February 1900 for examples of 
to G.R. Duthie, 24 October 
1883 and 1\HFD, A1\1\1\2, 
versus Adonis Theunis, 2 
5\5\4, A. Bester 
Duthie, 24 October 
Case No.7, The Queen 
surviving contracts. 
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owners with recourse to the colonial state's legal apparatus 
(police, lock-up and periodical court) in controlling labour. 
This it did by transforming the legal status of the fisherman 
from independent producer to servant and making breaking contract 
an offence in terms of the Masters and Servants Act. The 
fishermen's ability to use the contract was also limited by a 
lack of education, illiteracy and a rural court system which 
regulated the labour supply in the interests of employers~. 
The ideological cement of this new status quo was provided by an 
all pervading paternalism, embodied in the provision of housing 
and credit and symbolised by Carel Stephan's reference to his 
labourers as "my kinders". In return Stephan reportedly received 
"the regard of a somewhat terrifying but nonetheless venerated 
parent"~. Such paternalism - buttressed in the firm's case by 
sunrise parades, strictly enforced mealtimes, flag raisings and a 
close watch on church attendance and alcohol consumption~ 
served as thin veneer for the underlying brutality of relations 
of production in the snoek fisheries~. The frailty of paternalism 
led fishery owners to rely increasingly on the colonial state's 
coercive apparatus, as evidenced by the establishment of 
additional periodical courts at Vredenburg (1881) and Laaiplek 
~ Cape Archives; 1\HBY, Fl\1\2, Periodical Court Vredenburg, Case 
No.68, Stephan Brothers versus George Syble, 16 December 1895 and Report of 
the Fisheries Committee 1892, Appendix D, Report of A.E Anderson, p.18. 
~ E. Rosenthal "The Stephan Saga" p.36 ff. Also R. Lees Fishing for 
Fortunes, p.20. Lees describes Carel Stephan in 111Jch the same way, as "Banker, 
magistrate and patriarch, he controlled the fortunes of the west coast and the 
lives of the men he employed". 
~ E. Rosenthal "The Stephan Saga", p.36 ff. 
~ Ibid., p.36. Also Cape Archives; 1\HBY, 5\5\2, Resident Magistrate 
Piketberg to Resident Magistrate Malmesbury, 28 July 1873, 4 August 1873 & 11 
August 1873 and Justice of the Peace St Helena Bay to Resident Magistrate 
Piketberg, 4 August 1873. 
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(1882) to complement the existing court at St Helena Bay (1857)~. 
As the Resident Magistrate of Malmesbury noted: 
"The fishing industry along the coast of this 
Division particularly at Steenberg's Cove, Stump Nose 
Bay and Paternoster where there are several extensive 
fisheries ,' affords employment to a large number of 
hands. The employers of this description of labour 
••• deserve some protection and police assistance in 
dealing with a mixed lot of men of different 
nationalities; the order which prevails at these 
places effects great credit on those in charge of the 
establishments. No doubt the close proximity of the 
Lock-up and a Policeman in uniform, together with the 
presence of the Magistrate of the District and the 
sitting of the Court every alternate month has a 
wholesome effect on the minds of the fishermen and 
coolies employed"~. 
The fishery owners' failure to establish hegemony over the 
"minds" of their labour force unaided was due to their lack of 
control over the production process. The transformation of the 
share system was designed to give them control over the product 
of labour, not labour itself. As a result, fishermen continued to 
enjoy considerable room for manoeuver within the new constraints 
imposed not least of all because of the existence of 
alternative sites of independent production on the leaseholds and 
farms along the lower reaches of the Berg River. They used this 
space to contest the owners' control over production and defend 
their independence-. asserting customary rights and freedoms 
based on a view of themselves as "contracting parties" rather 
than servants. 
~ W.A. Burger Piket Teen 'n Berg, pp.261-262. 
~ Cape Archives; 1\HBY, 6\1\5, Resident Hagist.rate Halmesbury to Certain 
Inhabitants of the Field Cornetcies of St Helena and Saldanha Bays, 30 April 
1881. 
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2.2 CONSOLIDATION AND CONFLICT C.1880 - C.1900 
The importance of the St Helena Bay fisheries to the Mauritian 
export trade in the last quarter of the 19th Century can be 
gauged from the estimate of one Cape Town merchant that: 
"Stephan Brothers, I believe, supply two-thirds of the 
Mauritius demands, and St Helena Bay, Cape Town and Hout's 
Bay supply the other one third. Stephan Brothers' fisheries 
are very extensive; in fact, as regards the fishing, I have 
not seen anything in Europe better than their 
establishments."~ 
Although Stephan Brothers controlled two-thirds of the export 
trade and operated on a scale far larger than its competitors, a 
significant share of the market (approximately 11% according to 
the above estimate) was in the hands of fishery owners like 
Ehlers and Van Rosenveldt, operating from fishing leases. The 
existence of numerous commercial fisheries along a coastline 
which offered only limited sites for the establishment of viable 
fishing operations led to mounting competition for access to the 
shoreline, fish resources, water, fuel and most importantly, 
labour. Competition was heightened in the early 1880s by a 
decline in catches and a growing labour scarcity throughout the 
colonyhl. The expansion of the Cape Peninsula fisheries, a 
burgeoning public works programme and a declining snoek resource 
along the west coast, combined to divert labour to other fishing 
centres or out of fishing altogether. With an open land frontier 
along the Malmesbury coast, Stephan Brothers' ability to create a 
stable labour force disciplined to the demands of the export 
trade were severely limited. Fishermen were able to transfer 
Report of the Fisheries Comm.1ttee 1892, Evidence of C. Schroeder, 
p.20. 
bl Cape of Good Hope, Department of Agriculture Report of Marine 
Biologist 1896, p.7; K. Ward #Employers' Perceptions or the Labour Market in 
the Late 19th Century Western Cape: with reference to the 1893\94 Labour 
Commission• (Paper presented at the •cape Slavery and After• Conrerence, UCT, 
10-11 August 1989) and TABLE 2.1 above. 
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their labour onto a subsistence lease outside the control of the 
owners giving them considerable leeway to contest relations of 
production in the fisheries as a whole. In this context Stephan 
Brothers' continued co-existence with a host of small operators 
spawned by the lease system became intolerable and forced the 
firm to act. 
In so doing, Stephan Brothers was uniquely placed to use its land 
ownership rights against leaseholders in a bid to consolidate its 
control over St Helena Bay. Just six years after establishing its 
first fishery on the Bay the firm backed the 1874 petition 
organised by local farmers calling for the abolition of the lease 
system~. In 1882, Stephan Brothers was again involved in 
marshalling local farmers for a renewed assault on the lease 
system~. On this occasion Parliament determined to act more 
forcefully and appointed a Select Committee to investigate the 
fishing lease system along the Malmesbury coastM. At issue was a 
dispute between Stephan Brothers and Ehlers caused by a 
resurveying of the farmer's recently-acquired farm, Noodhulp, at 
Little Paternoster which included all of Ehlers' buildings within 
its new boundaries~. As a result, Ehlers' fishing lease had not 
been renewed and the firm used the opportunity to launch a 
renewed assault on the lease system as a whole. Although couched 
~ Petition of the Inhabitants and Landed 
Saldanha Bay July 1874 and Cape Archives; HA 
Inwoners en Landeigenaars Woonagtig te St Helena 
Proprietors at St Helena and 
770, 113, HPetisie van die 
en Saldanha BaaiH, n.d. 
~ Petition of the Undersigned Inhabitants and Owners of Lands in the 
Division of Hslmesbury, in the Wards of Saldanha and St Helena Bays, and in 
Piketberg 1882 and Cape Archives; HA 784, 34, HPetition of the Undersigned 
Inhabitants and Owners of Lands in the Division of Hslmesbury, in the Wards of 
Saldanha and St Helena Bays, and in PiketbergH, n.d. 
M Report of the Select Committee on the Petition of the Inhabitants of 
Saldanha and St Helena Bays, in Reference to Fishing Leases 1882, p.vii. 
~ Ibid., Evidence of G.L. Ehlers, pp.19-20. Also Cape Archives; 1\MBY, 
6\2\9, Report of the Civil Commissioner of Halmesbury, 5 January 1881. 
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in anti-squatting rhetoric, 
Ehlers and Van Rosenveldt, 
Paternoster. In so doing 
the firm's primary targets were 
its chief competitors at Little 
it could rely on the support of 
surrounding landowners who had long suffered at the hands of 
leaseholders. 
As Carel Stephan explained, the leases were issued regardless of 
whether the applicants were fishermen or not and as a result a 
large population of squatters had arisen who owned no boats. 
Three or four of the lease-owners adjoining his property fell 
into that category and were the source of "great loss, and a 
great deal of trouble. There could have been many more cases 
before the magistrate if I wanted to have the law enforced"u. The 
existence of "canteens and bottle stores" on some of the lease 
sites only reinforced his conviction that in many instances the 
leases were taken out for the purposes of squatting. Ehlers and 
Van Rosenveldt were cases in point. The latter kept a canteen, 
while the former operated a general business and canteen, all for 
a meagre l3 per annum rent. Stephan, on the other hand, paid 
between four and ten times that amount in quitrent and road 
rates, but could not gain access to the Bay over his own ground67 • 
While he was careful to stress that it was the conduct of Ehlers' 
men in taking "wood out of the veldt and water out of my wells" 
and not the latter's business that he objected to, his intentions 
became clear when he proposed that instead of leasing, Ehlers and 
the other leaseholders be required to rent land from the owners 
of the adjacent farms rather than the colonial state68 • 
U Report of the Select Committee on the Petition of the Inhabitants of 
Saldanha and St Helena Bays, in Reference to Fishing Leases 1882, Evidence of 




Ehlers was not without support in the matter, however, as 
evidenced by the forwarding of two petitions opposing that 
organised by Stephan~. The counter-petitioners were all farmers 
in the Malmesbury district and, as Ehlers explained, "The 
petitioners all say they would not like me to leave Paternoster, 
because then Stephan would get everything entirely into his 
hands, and he would make them pay high prices for fish and 
everything"ro. Because of these divisions in local agriculture, 
the Select Committee - while coming down firmly on the side of 
the coastal farmers - favoured further enquiry over firm action. 
In May 1883 a new commission was duly appointed to "make a 
thorough investigation into the evils of the present system of 
the Fisheries Leases"n. The situation, however, had already been 
resolved in Stephan Brothers' favour. The ' commissioners reported 
that Ehlers had abandoned all claims to his leases at Small 
Paternoster while Van Rosenveldt - still the holder of 14 fishing 
leases at the Bay - was now completely surrounded by Stephan 
Brothers' land through recent purchasesn. Both men had been 
converted into de facto tenants of the firm, Ehlers leasing land 
and Van Rosenveldt water and right of way over Stephan Brothers' 
farms. The commission's recommendation that the leases at 
Paternoster be allowed to lapse upon expiry in 1886 merely gave 
official sanction to the new status quo. In June 1886 Parliament 
ag~eed to the "grant at fair valuation" of all fishing leases 
69 Cape Archives; HA 784, 34, HPetisie van die Land Eigenaars en 
Ingezetenen in die Afdeling St Helena Baai, District Malmesburyw, 30 March 
1882 and wPetisie van die Land Eigenaars en Ingezetenen in die Afdeling St 
Helena Baai, Malmesburyw, n.d. 
· 70 Report of the Select Committee on the Petition of the Inhabitants of 
Saldanha and St Helena Bays, in Reference to Fishing Leases 1882, Evidence of 
G.L. Ehlers, p.19. 
71 Cape Archives; 1\MBY, 6\2\10, Report of the Commission on Fisheries, 
31 July 1883. 
n Ibid. 
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along the Malmesbury coast to their original holdersn. Van 
Rosenveldt does not appear to have taken up the option and the 
lease system had disappeared from the southern shores of St 
Helena Bay by the late 1880sN. 
The abolition of the fishing lease system in Malmesbury gave 
Stephan Brothers an effective monopoly over the export fishery at 
St Helena Bay, denying competitors a toe-hold on the seacoast as 
a base for independent production. The firm now had a free hand 
to evict squatters and competing fishery owners, concentrate 
labour at those points on the coast suited to snoek production 
and tighten its control over the fishermen through the 
generalisation and rigid enforcement of the contract. An 1885 
report revealed the extent to which merchant capital had 
consolidated its control over the Bay fisheries: 
"Messrs. Stephan Bros. started their first operations at a 
small cove known as 'Soldaten Post,' but soon extended them 
to Steenbergs Cove, a spot close by, and finally occupied 
every available spot in St Helena Bay. The magnitude of their 
present undertaking may be estimated when we state that at 
the present time about 80 large fishing boats and over 600 
men are employed at their various establishments"~. 
This consolidation, facilitated by the change in tenure system, 
faced fishing labour with a stark choice, to defend or forego 
their independence. Whereas previously fishing had been, but one 
of several subsistence strategies, Stephan Brothers now sought to 
immobilise labour permanently at the coast, substituting credit 
and accommodation for mobility. For some this was an unacceptable 
n Cape of Good Hope Parliament & House of Assembly Votes & Proceedings 
1886, pp.335-336. 
74 Cape Archives; 1\HBY, 5\5\4, J.C. Stephan to G.R. Duthie, 20 January 
1889. 
~ HColonial FisheriesH in The South African Illustrated News, 9 Hay 
1885, p.222. 
so 
trade-oft 76 • The band of squatters living at the mouth of the Berg 
River in 1888 was one such group. They were most probably 
refugees from the collapse of the lease system, intent on 
clinging to the remnants of their independence. Unlike Johnston -
who had been squatting at the river for several decades - Kordom, 
Visagie, Lucas, Linkerhand and their families had only moved 
there in the early 1880s, at the same time that the fishing 
leases in Malmesbury were in the final stages of dissolution. rhe 
fact that Lucas returned to Stephan Brothers' employ after just 
one season and none of the other family heads, with the exception 
of the aged Joseph Linkerhand, were at home at the height of the 
seine fishing season underscores the difficulties confronting 
independent producers in the face of the growing Stephan monopoly 
at the Bay and by the mid-1890s Johnston and his band had all 
become contract servants of the firm. 
The alternative to an ever-more tenuous squatter existence after 
1886 was either migration or employment with Stephan Brothers. 
While numerous fishermen took the former cou~se throughout the 
next decade and a half - moving onto one of the farms at the 
mouth of the Berg River, into the rural hinterland, or south to 
Cape Town - the majority remained at the Bay. Staying did not 
necessarily imply acceptance of the new status quo and the 
demands of the contract, however, and it is perhaps more useful 
to see the formal contract as the "explicit", class-biased 
· embodiment of relations of production in the fishery. Another 
"implicit" contract was fashioned by the daily lived experience 
of owners and men in the fisheries, informed by a moral economy 
which implied certain obligations on the part of owners as 
regards weekly allowance, price per fish, credit and housing, as 
well as the nature and extent of supervision or control over both 
76 See for example Cape Archives; 1\HFD, A1\1\1\1, Periodical Court 
Vredenburg, Case No.75, Adam Talmakkies versus Henry Kasner, 18 October 1899. 
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production and personal lifen. This moral economy was, in turn, 
shaped by both the memories of earlier independent production and 
information about fish prices, conditions of service and 
employment opportunities in the hinterland and the Cape. It was 
this "implicit" contract and its underpinning moral economy which 
provided fishing labour with the means to contest relations of 
production at the Bay after 1886. On the surface, the fishermen 
were without even the most rudimentary building blocks of a 
cohesive or coherent identity. The most striking feature of the 
fishing labour force, to outside observers, was its ethnic 
diversity, reflecting the wide range of possible entry routes 
into the fisheriesm. Upon arrival at the Bay, this makeshift 
labour force, lacking a common identity, experience or language, 
encountered the formidable array of legal and extra-legal 
mechanisms designed to immobilise and detain them there for as 
long as possible. Subject to the constraints of the contract and 
with an employer willing to criminalise even minor infractions, 
their ability to resist Stephan Brothers would, at first glance, 
n The notion of #expli~it# and #implicit# contract is borrowed from T.D. 
Moodie "The Horal Economy of the Black Hiners' Strike of 1946" in Journal of 
Southern Arrican Studies, 13, 1, 1986, pp.1-2. The notion of moral economy is, 
of course, B.P. Thompson's - see E.P Thompson "The Horal Economy of the 
English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century# in Past & Present, SO, 1971; 
#Patrician Society, Plebeian Culture" in Journal of Social History, 7, 4, 1974 
and #Eighteenth Century Society: Class Struggle Without Class?# in Social 
History, 3, 2, 1978. 
m w. Wardlaw Thompson Sea Fisheries of the Cape Colony, p.36 ff; E. 
Rosenthal #The Stephan Saga", p.84; W.A. Burger Piket Teen 'n Berg, p.261 and 
Cape Archives; 1\HBY, S\5\1, R. Daly to J. Rainer, 29 September 1862 & 1\HBY, 
5\5\2, Resident Magistrate Halmesbury to Certain Inhabitants of the Field 
Cornetcies of St Helena and Saldanha Bays, 30 April 1881. 
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appear limited~. Despite this, the firm's efforts to tighten 
control over labour after 1886 and staunch the flow of fishermen 
out of the fisheries, met with sustained resistance from fishing 
labour, informed by a resilient moral economy whose · strongest 
strands were those of the independent producer, controlling both 
his own labour power and the product of labour. 
It was this moral economy, above all else, which informed the way 
fishermen approached their contractual obligations. As one 
Saldanha Bay merchant lamented in 1892: 
"In my neighbourhood we have many difficulties with 
our fishermen, and I consider it advisable to frame 
laws to remove the grievances of employers, and in 
the interests of the fish industry. Fishermen are 
employed by the owners of fisheries, who supply them 
with boats, gear, tackle, and nets, to fish for them 
for a certain period, and they are paid per fish 
caught by the hook and per share of fish caught by 
the seines or nets; consequently these men do not 
consider themselves the servants of their employers, 
but contracting parties to supply (sell) to the 
owners what they may catch at a certain price and 
shareholders with respect to seine-fish. And on the 
strength of this they quit service as their whims 
prompt, shielding themselves behind the plea that 
they have committed a breach of sale, and not a 
breach of service, for which they cannot be brought 
under the Masters and Servants Act. Now to meet this, 
I would suggest that all fishermen so employed be 
directly brought under the effects of the Masters and 
Servants Act, and considered labourers; also that the 
fact of their delivering fish to their employers at a 
~ Cape Archives; 1\HBY, 5\5\1, . Fredrick Barnard to E.S. Ford, 11 August 
1866; 1\HBY, 5\5\2, Petition of Inhabitants and Landed Proprietors of the 
District of St Helena Bay to the E.S. Ford, July 1875 & L. van Niekerk to E.S. 
Ford, 29 July 1875; 1\HBY, 5\5\3, J. Laubscher et al to E.S. Ford, 22 July 
1879, J.C. Stephan to G.R. Duthie, 6 December 1879, J.C. Stephan et al to G.R. 
Duthie, 15 January 1880 & J.C. Stephan to G.R. Duthie, 2 Hay 1880 and 1\HBY, 
5\5\4, A. Steiner to G.R. Duthie, 10 July 1882 & T. Clementson to G.R. Duthie 
26 August 1885. By the mid-1880s Stephan Brothers and their subordinates not 
only controlled the fisheries, but held appointments as justices of the peace, 
field cornets, issuers of process and special constables with specific 
responsibility for the coastal periphery. 
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certain price should not be considered to constitute a 
sale 11 80 • 
The two most contested relations of production were thus control 
over labour and the product of labour. Resistance to the labour 
demands of the contract most commonly took the form of a 
withholding of labour or, in the more extreme cases, withdrawal 
from the fisheries through desertion during the term of contract 
or while still in debt to the firm81 • Contracts usually terminated 
at the end of June, when the snoek started to lose condition, and 
recommenced in late October. Stephan Brothers relied on debt and 
the threat of prosecution to renegotiate a new period of service 
and compel fisherman to honour the bargain. Jacobus Papier, for 
example, contracted to fish for Stephan Brothers until 18 July 
1892, on which day a settling of accounts took place and Papier 
was found to still be l20 in debt to the firm. The hapless 
fisherman was immediately required to sign a new contract 
beginning 1 October 1892 and warned to either return with the 
money or commence his new period of service. Unable to clear his 
debt and unwilling to continue in the fishing, Papier absconded 
to Hopefield where he was arrested~. By the 1890s increasing 
numbers of fishermen were following Papier's example, 
00 Report of the Fisheries Committee 1892, Appendix D, Report of .A.E. 
Anderson, p.18. 
81 See for example 
Helena Bay, Case No. 13, 
1898 and 1\HFD, A1\1\1\1, 
Brothers versus Silvedora, 
Cape Archives; 1\HFD, B1\1\1, Periodical Court St 
Stephan Brothers versus Willem Kotze, 19 December 
Periodical Court Vredenburg, Case No.BB, Stephan 
20 December 1899. 
~ Cape Archives; 1\HBY, F1\1\1, Periodical Court St Helena Bay, Case 
No.25, Stephan Brothers versus Jacobus Papier, 17 October 1892. Papier's was 
not an isolated case, see 1\HBY, F1\1\2, Periodical Court St Helena Bay, Case 
No.?, J.A. Schickerling versus Sanuel Adams, 15 February 1893; 1\HFD, B1\1\1, 
Case No.?, The Queen versus Thomas Lynham, 17 October 1898; 1\HBY, G1\1\2, 
Periodical Court Vredenburg, Case No.110, W.P. Veer versus Hogamet Saliena, 19 
December 1894; 1\HFD, A1\1\1\2, Case No. 7, The Queen versus Adonis Theunis, 2 
February 1900 and 1\HFD, C1\1\2, Periodical Court Hoedjies Bay, Case No.39, 
Rex versus George Brown, 20 November 1903. 
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disappearing - often in groups - into the wheatlands or to Cape 
Town at the firm's expense and discouraging others from signing~. 
The more brazen among them wrung advances from Stephan Brothers' 
recruiters or managers, only to fail to report to the Bay or 
abscond while still under contract~. Few of these men were 
apprehended and many of those that were served their time only to 
try to do so again. 
The second area in which the firm encountered en~emic resistance 
from fishing labour was the catch. Fishermen controlled 
production at sea and enjoyed unsupervised access to the fish 
prior to landing. They could find a ready market for any fish 
smuggled off the boat in their fish boxes or subsequently removed 
from the drying racks or storage sheds among the multitude of 
hawkers and itinerant traders who circulated between the coast 
and the interior~. For the fishermen - many of whom viewed the 
merchants' appropriation of the catch as theft - such illicit 
trade was both tempting and morally justified~. Stephan Brothers, 
not surprisingly, took a very different view of the matter and 
Carel Stephan spoke for all fishery owners when he said: 
"I would gladly pay 
catching with nets, 
provided it was made 
a licence yearly not only for 
but also for catching snoek, 
penal for any unlicensed person 
~ Report of the Fisheries Committee 1892, Evidence of H.R. Stephan, 
p.11; Cape Archives; 1\HBY, 6\2\12, Report - Labour Market from the Malmesbury 
Civil Commissioner to the Under Colonial Secretary, 9 December 1889 and 1\HFD, 
B1\2\1, Periodical Court St Helena Bay, Criminal Record Book, Entry Nos.35 & 
37, Thomas Blatherwick versus Henry Syble & Johan du Toit versus Henry Syble, 
13 August 1894. 
~ See for example Cape Archives; 1\HBY, 5\5\3, J.C. Stephan to G.R. 
Duthie, 6 January 1881. 
~ Report of the Fisheries Committee 1892, Evidence of H.R. Stephan, p.7. 
Stephan reported that the firm's fisheries were visited by #hundreds of carts 
from the Paarl and elsewhere, and supply the countryw. 
~ See for example Cape Archives; 1\HFD, C1\1\1, Periodical Court 
Hoedjies Bay, Case No.8, Rex versus Willem Rondganger, 20 March 1903. 
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to sell fish, and no person to be allowed to take out any 
licence unless he was bona fide the owner of a fishery, this 
provision not to apply, however, to inland towns or villages. 
Such provision would at once put a stop to theft of fish 
which constantly goes on not only at our own fisheries, but 
at those of others. All fishery owners are aware of the state 
of things, but we are unfortunately powerless to stop it in 
the present state of the law"~. 
Legally powerless though it claimed to be, Stephan Brothers did 
its best to establish ownership over each fish and limit labour's 
unsupervised handling of the product. The firm's fishermen were 
"not allowed to clean fish at sea and throw the refuse overboard, 
and a heavy penalty is provided in our contract with them for any 
infringement of this rule"~. This prohibition was purportedly to 
prevent the pollution of the fishing grounds, but also extended 
the firm's control over the catch out to sea. Once landed, 
ownership was indelibly imprinted on each snoek by chopping its 
head off and any and all headless snoek in circulation were 
automatically assumed to be the property of the firm~. Lastly, 
Stephan Brothers attempted to limit the fishermen's access to the 
local market through a strict enforcement of trespass laws at the 
fisheries and the suggested licensing of all fish traders~. 
~ Report of the Fisheries Committee 1892, Appendix D, Report of J.C. 
Stephan, pp.16-17. 
~ Ibid., Evidence of J.C. Stephan, p.17. 
~ Cape Archives; 1\HFD, B1\1\1, Periodical Court St Helena Bay, Regina 
versus Matthys Hichiel du Pree, 14 August 1899 and 1\HFD, A1\1\1\1, Periodical 
Court Vredenburg, Case No.6, Queen versus Lys Berg, 15 February 1899. H~rder 
and other seine-caught fish were also tied in bunches with different 
combinations of coloured string identifying to which owner they belonged. 
~ Cape Archives; 1\HBY, F1\1\2, Periodical Court St Helena Bay, Case 
No.?, Johan Carel Stephan versus Jan Kotze, 26 April 1895, Case No.62, Stephan 
Brothers versus Adrijana·Hatthys, 16 December 1895 & Case No.67, Stephan 
Brothers versus Bella Pharo, 16 December 1895; 1\HFD, B1\1\1, Sumar:,ns of July 
Afrika, 19 February 1900; 1\HFD, B1\1\2, Case No.4, Rex versus William 
Fredericks, Klaas Pieters, Jan Salonons Jr. and William Salonons, 15 January 
1906 and 1\HFD, Al\1\1\2, Periodical Court Vredenburg, Rex versus John 
Hossesh, 19 August 1903. 
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Despite these measures and the use of the courts, the theft of 
fish continued91 • The paucity of prosecutions is indicative of 
fishing labour's success in asserting their right to a greater 
share in the product of their labour than the meagre eetvis 
allowance granted them by the firm. 
In addition to such overt resistance to the contract, many 
fishermen resorted to less detectable acts of insubordination. 
Here too they had to be careful not to offend the sensibilities 
of their masters which were acutely attuned to detect even the 
smallest sign of impertinence, real or imagined. Henry Syble's 
comment to the firm's manager at Stumpnose Bay - McLachlan - that 
"you meddle with business that you have nothing to do with" was 
enough to earn him a court appearance~. McLachlan's intrusive 
supervision also put him on the receiving end of George Clark's 
caustic tongue. In response to a query about the catch, Clark 
countered, "stront met jou, wat meet ik morgen eten", receiving ll 
or fourteen days hard labour for the indiscretion~. So too Gert 
Joubert whose sole crime was to use the familiar form of the 
personal pronoun "jy" in answering William Stephan 94 • These 
seemingly innocuous encounters are revealing of labour's view of 
the world - one soured by · a lost independence, but still resonant 
91 Cape Archives; 1\MBY, F1\1\2, Periodical Court St Helena Bay, Case 
No.7, Regina vers:us Thomas Don and Klaas Appel, 18 February 1895; 1\HFD, 
B1\1\2, Rex vers:us Jacob Andrews, 13 January 1908; 1\HFD, A1\1\1\1, Periodical 
Court Vredenburg, Case No.20, James Kasner vers:us Siebert Patience, 24 August 
1898 & Case No.6, The Queen vers:us Lys Berg, 15 February 1899 and 1\HFD, 
A1\1\1\2, Case No.44, The Queen vers:us Andries Hitaanie, 6 Hay 1900. 
~ Cape Archives; 1\HFD, A1\1\1\2, Periodical Court Vredenburg, Case 
No.23, Regina versus Henry Syble, 20 March 1901. 
~ Cape Archives; 1\HFD, A1\1\1\2, Periodical Court Vredenburg, Case 
No.83, Regina vers:us George Clark, 21 November 1900. 
94 Cape Archives; 1\HFD, B1\1\1, Periodical Court St Helena Bay, case 
No.22, Stephan Brothers versus Gert Joubert, 17 December 1900 and 1\HFD, 
B1\1\2, Periodical Court St Helena Bay, Case No.35, Rex vers:us William 
Jordaan, 19 November 1906. 
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with the self-assurance of that existence. At the opposite end of 
the continuum, fishermen with a particular axe to grind, 
emboldened by alcohol or simply at their wits' end, resorted to 
overt acts of physical violence against their employers or their 
property. Constand Von Rosenveldt, for example, was lucky to 
escape with his life when attacked with a spar by two of his 
fishermen following an argument and Stephan Brothers' manager at 
Steenberg's Cove had the unwelcome experience of being confronted 
by a fisherman brandishing a gun~. More common were attacks on 
the firm's property - Fritz Verelst poured lamp oil on the thatch 
of a company house and burnt it to the ground; Gert Ehlers 
removed the door, windows and several sheets of galvanised iron 
from another and the Michel brothers vandalised a third with 
stones, destroying doors and walls. James Hayward, after being 
convicted of stealing medicinal brandy from the firm, emptied a 
bucket of "filthy matter" onto a loft of wheat and flour, 
rendering it unfit for sale%. Countless other acts of petty theft 
further added to the merchant's sense of unease and insecurity97 • 
Within the strait-jacket of the contract, labour was thus 
~ Cape Archives; 1\HBY, 5\5\3, Field Cornet J. Laubscher to Halaesbury 
Civil Commissioner, 27 Hay 1879 and 1\HFD, B1\2\1, Periodical Court St Helena 
Bay, Criminal Record Book, Entry No.722, Johannes Reynders versus Fortuin, 16 
August 1886. On the existence of firearms at the coast see 1\HBY, 5\5\3, C. 
von Rosenveldt to G.R. Duthie, 16 November 1879. 
% Cape Archives; 1\HBY, F1\1\2, Periodical Court St Helena Bay, Sworn 
Statements~ Hietjie Lucas and Elizabeth Pharo & Case No 37, Stephan Brothers 
versus Gert Leopold Ehlers, 19 June 1893; 1\HFD, B1\1\1, Periodical Court St 
Helena Bay, Case No.19 Stephan Brothers versus James Hayward, 19 December 
1898; 1\HFD, B1\2\1, Periodical Court St Helena Bay, Criminal Record Book, 
Entry No.3, Rex versus Andries and Felix Hichel, 17 June 1901 and 1\HFD, 
B1\1\1, Case No.3, Rex versus Fredrick Brookes, 18 January 1904. 
~ Cape Archives; 1\HBY, 5\5\2, Frederick Barnard to E.S. Ford, 17 
November 1870; 1\HBY, F1\1\2, Periodical Court St Helena Bay, Case No.30, 
Queen versus Andries Doosen, 18 June 1894, Case No.17, Regina versus James 
Hayward and Gert Danster, 19 December 1898 & Case No.13, Rex versus Thomas 
Baumeister, 17 November 1902 and 1\HFD, C.1\1\2, Case No.SB, The King versus 
Hermanus Vrago.m, .18 January 1907. 
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anything but quiescent. The fact that much of its resistance was 
covert and most effective when it involved breaking contract and 
physically abandoning the west coast, raises questions about 
class consciousness and the extent to which fishermen constituted 
a proletariat by the close of the century. In November 1880, at 
the start of the Basuto War, the Field Cornet of the St Helena 
Bay Ward, Jacob Laubscher, was instructed to levy twenty men from 
his jurisdiction for service at the front. He conveniently 
decided to draw his required complement exclusively from the 
fisheries with near disastrous results. As he related, 
Carel 
"I have ordered out of the fisheries of Messrs 
Stephan Brothers: 10 men, out of Ehlers' 5, and out 
of Rosenveld's 5, making up the total of 20 men. They 
all positively refuse to go, and I find I cannot take 
them with force, as the mob is so large and furious, 
that by attempting to do so would place my own life 
and that of the constable in jeopardy. The cry is, 
shoot us here, but go, we shall not"~. 
Stephan confirmed that~ "The men are determined not to go 
and will meet force by force if it is employed against them. They 
say they have committed no crime and the F.C. has no right to 
take them by · force which he tried to do ordering the Constable to 
take them out of their houses" 99 • This show of solidarity in the 
face of the local representatives of state power is suggestive of 
a developed sense of both community and class consciousness 
amongst the fishermen at the Bay. Such impressions, however, 
belie the extent to which fishing labour was divided against 
itself throughout this period. 
The first fault-line ran between skipper and crew. The former 
occupied an invidious position between owner and men, exercising 
~ Cape Archives; 1\HBY, 5\5\3, J. Laubsher to G.R. Duthie, 21 November 
1880. 
99 Cape Archives; 1\HBY, 5\5\3, J.C. Stephan to G.R. Duthie, 22 November 
1880. 
59 
control over the production process at sea, but within the 
"constraint to produce" imposed by merchant capital 1~ Pleasing 
the merchant often meant antagonising the fishermen and many 
skippers found their every order contested and their authority 
eroded through insubordination. Fishermen frequently mistrusted 
the skipper's judgement and expressed this by refusing to go 
sea when ordered to do so 10~ Those skippers who insisted on 
to 
an 
early start to the day's fishing were also unpopular. Jan 
Solomons, for example, accused one of Stephan Brothers' skippers, 
Johan Waso, of "seeking favour" by going to sea ahead of the 
other boats. The favour sought was clearly not that of Solomons 
and his fellows 1~ Similarly at day's end, the back-breaking task 
of carrying the boat and catch onto the beach was another arena 
of conflict between men and skipperW~ Frans Witbooi succinctly 
summarised the view of many fishermen when he accused his skipper 
of being "more master than the master himself" for telling him to 
hurry up so that the boat could put to sea1~ These various acts 
of insubordination hint at the latent tensions inherent in power 
too G. Sider Culture and Class in Anthropology and History (Cambridge, 
1988), p.36. 
tot Cape Archives; 1\HBY, F1\1\2, Periodical Court St Helena Bay, case 
No.25~Stephan Brothers versus Willem Palpas, 17 June 1895 & Case No.61, 
Stephan Brothers versus Joseph Abrams, 16 December 1895; 1\HFD, B1\1\1, Case 
No.28, Stephan Brothers versus Piet Swarts, 18 October 1897 and 1\HFD, 
A1\1\1\2, Periodical Court Vredenburg, case No.30, Queen versus George Belle 
and John Ludar, 21 April 1900, Case No.48, (}ueen versus Johannes Jager, 20 
June 1900 & Case No.24, Regina versus George Verby, 20 March 1901. 
1~ Cape Archives; 1\HFD, B1\1\1, Periodical Court St Helena Bay, Case No. 
13, Regina versus Johan Carel Waso, 19 June 1899 and 1\HBY, F1\1\2, Periodical 
Court St Helena Bay, Case No.71, Stephan Brothers versus Jozie H. Lowies, 18 
December 1893. 
1\HFD, A1\1\1\1, Periodical Court Vredenburg, 
Kerma HcKraw versus Edward Cottle Snr & Piet 
tOJ Cape Archives; 
Nos. 16 & 17, Donald and 
Frans Pharo, 15 June 1898. 
1~ Cape Archives; 1\HFD, B1\1\1, Periodical Court St Helena Bay, 





relations at sea. The tenuous nature of the skippers' authority 
was also evidenced by their violent aver-reaction to such 
slights. Solomons had the misfortune of making his remark within 
ear-shot of Waso's manager and the skipper felt compelled to fell 
him with a blow to the side of the head. The McKraws, for 
objecting to their skipper, Edward Cattle's, refusal to assist in 
carrying out the boat when they had already brought the fish 
ashore, earned a beating from Cottle assisted by two other 
fishermen during which Kerma McKraw, wielding an axe, was struck 
a blow on the head with a boat tiller by his skipper. Witbooi too 
became embroiled in a fight with the skipper for his sarcasm and 
attempted to throw the latter into the water with the assistance 
of a fellow crewman 1~ 
Violence, however, was, in many respects, endemic to the fishery. 
Legalised violence was perpetrated against fishermen by the 
merchants, brutalising and criminalising the labour force, and it 
is thus hardly surprising that labour's life at sea and in the 
domestic sphere was similarly conditioned. Viotence infused not 
only relations between skippers and crew, but also those between 
fishermen and between men and women. This climate was fostered, 
in part at least, by competition and resultant tensions 
engendered in relations of production by the system of payment 
and "constraint to produce" imposed by merchant capital. The 
income of the individual fisherman was dependent on his ability 
to catch a single fish species in sufficient quantities to 
survive. In this context, 
competition with every other, 
each crew member was in direct 
but conversely depended on his 
fellow crewmen's co-operatlon at sea to compete effectively with 
the crews of rival boats1~ The intra-group rivalry and animosity 
105 See Footnotes Nos. 102-104 above. 
1~ P. Thompson et al Living the Fishing, pp.4-5 on the ways in which 
their work divides fishermen • • 
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created by the linking of individual reward to collective effort 
readily spilled over into violence. Frans Witbooi's skipper, in 
expressing his irritation with his crewman's lack of punctuality, 
was well aware of the detrimental effect this would have on the 
collective effort of the trip. Fredrick du Tait and Goliath Kotze 
also came to words and then blows, over similar neglect of 
collective duty, the latter's refusal to clean his portion of the 
boatW! When Du Tait's skipper failed to summon the whole crew to 
catch eetvis, it was again Du Tait who fell upon him with a stick 
and the promise, "Ik dander ver jou op, Ik slaan jou stukkend dat 
de honderen jou bleed drenk" 1~ 
The tensions, conflicts and humiliations of the labour process 
were also transposed on the domestic life of the fishermen, 
manifesting themselves in the brutalisation of women in the 
home 1~ The trigger for much of this internecine violence was the 
generalised consumption of alcohol. Alcohol was readily 
available, not only from the four licensed canteens at the Bay, 
but from farmers and travelling hawkers who brought illicit 
supplies of wine and brandy to the coast in the hope of trading 
alcohol for fish 1~ The canteens were not only the mustering 
l07 Cape Archives; 1\HFD, B1\1\1, Periodical Court St Helena Bay, Case 
No.7, Queen versus Goliath Kotze, 23 April 1897. 
lOO Cape Archives; 1\HFD, B1\1\1, Periodical Court St Helena Bay, Case 
No.27, Regina versus Frederick du Toit, 18 October 1897. 
1~ s .. for example Cape Archives; 1\HBY, 5\5\2, Fredrick Bernard to the 
Malmesbury Civil Commissioner, 20 August 1874 and 1\HBY, Fl\1\2, Periodical 
Court St Helena Bay, Sworn Statement of Hietjie Lucas, August 1895. 
llO Cape Archives; 1\HBY, 5\5\4, J.C. Stephan to G.R. Duthie, 28 August 
1884 & F. Kasner to G.R. Duthie, 7 November 1888; 1\HFD, B1\1\1, Periodical 
Court St Helena Bay, Case No.15, Regina versus Alexander Ravell, 19 June 1899, 
Case No.16, Regina versus Andreas Jaap, 19 June 1899 & Case No.17, Regina 
versus Mat~hys Hichial du Pree, 14 August 1899 and 1\HFD, A1\1\1\1, Periodical 
Court Vredenburg, Sworn Statement of C.F. Pieterson and Kaffie Broekvas, 4 
June 1898, Case No 15, Regina versus Domingo, 15 June 1898 & Case No.21, 
Regina versus Sam Segul, 24 August 1898. 
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points for crews, but also sites of some of the bloodiest 
violence at the fisheries 111• Skippers and men frequently went to 
sea inebriated and those fishermen who ignored their skipper's 
call to sea were routinely reported as being too drunk · to obey11~ 
Insobriety also figured prominently in the many cases of assault 
and domestic violence at the fisheries. The McKraw brothers and 
Frans Witbooi, for example, were reportedly drunk when 
confronting their respective superiors. Merchant capital's 
response to the widespread consumption of alcohol and the 
resultant violence was ambivalent. While Stephan Brothers 
operated a number of canteens at the coast, it strenuously 
opposed the unlicensed sale of alcohol to labour and regularly 
prosecuted fishermen for being drunk on duty 11~ Other owner-s 
implemented tot systems at sea, supplying their fishermen with a 
contractually stipulated quantity of alcohol each day. The 
deciding factor seems to have been control. Provided they were 
able to monitor and limit consumption to levels that did not 
impede production, the owners were satisfied, seeing alcohol in 
much the same light as the local farmers, as a means of tying 
111 See for example Cape Archives; 1\HFD, B1\2\1, Periodical Court St 
Helena Bay, Entry No.36, J.C. Stephan versus Kapenier Dalla and Klaas Sie1trJns, 
19 December 1887 and 1 \HFD, B1 \1·\2, Periodical Court St Helena Bay, Case No.6, 
Rex versus Adam Andrews, 13 January 1908. 
112 Cape Archives; 1\HBY, F1\1\2, Periodical Court St Helena Bay, Case 
No.66, Stephan Brothers versus Jacob Stevens and Jacob Kordom, 16 December 
1895; 1\HFD, B1\1\2, Case No.18, Rex versus Joseph Jozua, 14 May 1906 and 
1\HBY, 5\5\4, S. Henry to Malmesbury Civil Commissioner, 19 December 1883. 
113 Cape Archives; 1\HBY, 5\5\1 T.E. Smit to J. Rainer, 8 December 1865; 
1\HBY, 5\5\4, A. Steiner to G.R. Duthie, 23 October 1884; E.J. Cordy to G.R. 
Duthie, 1 January 1885; A.J. Lemmerz to Halmesbury Civil Commissioner, 7 
October 1885; A.E. Anderson to G.R. Duthie, 14 October 1885 and A.J. Stigling 
to G.R. Duthie, 19 November 1885; 1\HBY, F1\1\2, Periodical Court St Helena 
Bay, Case No.24, Stephan Brothers versus Fredrick Reinders, 17 June 1895 and 
1\HFD, B1\1\1, Case No.14, Stephan Brothers versus Sam Cortie, 19 December 
1898, Case No.15, Stephan Brothers versus Abram Danster, 19 December 1898, 
Case No.16, Stephan Brothers versus James Hayward, 19 December 1898 & Case 
No.18, Stephan Brothers versus Gert Kotze, 19 December 1898. 
63 
labour to the fisheries 1~ The effects of such abuse on the 
fishermen, their wives and families, was conveniently overlooked. 
The divisions within the labour force, fostered by the productive 
process and aggravated by internecine violence fuelled by 
alcohol, have important implications for the notion of fishermen 
as a proletariat. The absence of collective action was not simply 
a result of the legal and coercive power ranged against them by 
merchant capital, it also reflected their incomplete or partial 
proletarianisation. The one instance of combined resistance to 
the 1880 levy, hardly constituted the act of an emerging 
proletariat. The field cornet's mistake was not to challenge a 
class in the making, but rather to attempt to take the fishermen 
on a Sunday, transgressing the sanctity of the customary day of 
rest at the coast. The very next day all the levies presented 
themselves at the St Helena Bay courthouse for duty in the 
colonial war against the Basuto 11~ Far more common than such 
displays of collective anger were the isolated and individual 
acts of day to day resistance perpetrated by fishermen against 
the owners. The very isolation and individuality of these acts is 
indicative of the degree to which the fishermen remained divided 
by relations of production in the fishery. Their inability to 
transcend these divisions was determined by the extent to which 
they could still aspire to independent producer status. As the 
owners themselves pointed out, the fishermen's defence for 
breaking contract was not a rejection of the contract as the 
symbol of their exploitation as labour, but rather an insistence 
on their rights as "contracting party". Such rights were 
essentially individual, not collective. They assumed the 
individual fisherman's right to fish when and where he pleased 
114 J. Bor "Liquor and Labour at the Cape in the Late Nineteenth Century" 
(Unpublished Honours dissertation, UCT, 1978). 
115 Cape Archives; 1\HBY, 5\5\3, Andre Bester to G.R. Duthie, 2 December 
1880. 
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and to sell his catch (not his labour power) to the highest 
bidder. It was defence of these personal rights which made 
desertion and theft the two most common forms of resistance to 
merchant capital at the St Helena Bay fisheries, protecting, as 
they did, the freedom of the individual fisherman, rather than 
the collective, to mobility and the product of labour. 
2.3 THINGS FALL APART 
The St Helena Bay fisheries depended for their continued 
existence on the bounty of the sea, but, by the early 1890s, 
decades of sustained fishing had seriously depleted that bounty. 
Declining catches, a decrease in the size of the fish caught and 
a roller-coaster ride of alternate years of plenty and famine 






TABLE 2.3: Stephan Brothers' Declining Catches 
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- 21. 7 
- 31.8 
-237.9 
? = Unknown, # = Immature harder (mullet), * = For years 1881-
1884 only. 
Reversing this trend required the extension of fishing out beyond 
the Bay and the adoption of new fishing technology, but merchant 
lib Reports of the Marine Biologist, 1896-1906 and TABLE 2.1 above. 
117 Own calculations based on data contained in Report of the Marine 
Biologist 1896, · p.7 and Cape Provincial Administration, Marine Biological 
Report No.2, 1914, pp.77-80. 
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capital was severely constrained in this by its own internal 
logic and dependence on snoek fishing. Throughout the 1890s and 
up until the First World War, no technological innovation of note 
was introduced by Stephan Brothers. The latter's sole 
contribution was to build ever larger boats capable of venturing 
further out to sea in search of snoek, but the ceiling on such 
innovations of scale had already been reached by 1892 with boats 
averaging 5 tons and capable of venturing sixty miles offshore 11~ 
As Carel Stephan admitted, "larger boats would be too heavy to 
row, and would be dull sailers" 119• Merchant capital was thus 
content to remain within the limits imposed by sail and oar power 
and was sceptical of the viability of deep sea fishing 1~ Such 
reticence to adopt or even experiment with new fishing methods 
was in stark contrast to the unprecedented innovations under way 
in the Cape fisheries during the 1890s. 
Spurred on by the mineral revolution and the development of 
railways linking the burgeoning inland markets to the coastal 
port cities, numerous new fishing methods were introduced to Cape 
waters in the last decade of the 19th Century. In 1890 the 
American schooner "Alice" appeared in Table Bay, catching vast 
quantities of mackerel with a purse seine net 12~ The purse seine 
was initially outlawed from the territorial waters of the Colony, 
but by 1893 the ban had been lifted and a number of these nets 
118 Report of the Fisheries Committee 1892, Appendix D, Report of J.C. 
Stephan, p.17. 
119 Ibid. Also Report of Marine Biologist 1896, pp.1-2. 
120 
pp.6-13. 
Report of the Fi.sheries Committee 1892, Evidence of H.R. Stephan, 
121 Cape of Good Hope House of Assembly Debates 1890, p.208 & pp.305-307 
and Cape of Good Hope, Department of Agriculture Sea Fisheries: The Mackerel 
Purse-Seine Fishery 1897. 
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were in use at Hout and Saldanha Bays 1~ In 1896, following 
sustained agitation from the MLA for Wodehouse, Joseph Orpen, the 
colonial state appointed its own marine biologist and the 
following year purchased a steam trawler to "prospect" deep-sea 
trawling grounds off the Cape coast 1~ This led to the proving of 
the Agulhas Bank (1898) and other prolific grounds at Mossel Bay 
( 1899), East London ( 1901) and Cape Infanta ( 1903) 12~ By 1904 
there were nine steam trawlers operating from the major ports in 
the colony 1~ In addition, an influx of Italian immigrants to the 
Colony during the 1890s led to increasing use of set nets in 
Table Bay and later on the west coast as far as St Helena Bay 12~ 
The stagnation of the St Helena Bay fisheries and their continued 
reliance on the beach seine and hand line in the midst of this 
surge in the forces of production in the colonial fisheries, 
suggests the fundamentally conservative nature of merchant 
capital. This conservatism was not an outmoded adherence to 
particular technologies for their own sake, but rather reflected 
the internal logic of merchant capital and the way in which 
relations of production were structured in the fisheries. 
Merchant capital derived its profit from the commodity trade and 
the most important commodity for west coast merchants was snoek. 
None of the new fishing methods pioneered in the 1890s was 
122 Cape of Good Hope House of Assembly Debates 1893, pp.160-162 & p.243. 
The provision of the Fish Protection Act outlawing purse seining in the 
colony's: territorial waters was repealed in 1893. 
123 Reports of the Marine Biologist 1896-1897 and W. Wardlaw Thompson Sea 
Fisheries of the Cape Colony, pp.64-79. 
124 Reports of the Marine Biologist 1898-1903. 
1~ Report of the Marine Biologist 1904, p.2. 
1~ Reports of the Marine Biologist, 1896-1906; D. Grant HBokkoms, 
and the Bo-KaapH (Unpublished Honours Dissertation, UCT, 1987) 




applicable to snoek fishing. The snoek's speed and preference for 
offshore waters made the trawl, set and purse net unsuited to its 
capture. Success in sneaking thus ~ontinued to depend upon 
putting as many boats and fishermen to sea as possible each day 
in season, to work the shoals with hook and line. In the context 
of a sharp decline in the availability of snoek, beach seining 
became crucial for maintaining this labour-force and retaining 
sufficient fishermen at the Bay to resume snoek fishing when the 
resource improved. Beach seining was ideally suited to merchant 
capital's needs in this regard. It was both labour-intensive and 
sedentary, requiring a limited capital outlay and allowing for 
ease of supervision. In addition, rantsoenvis found a ready 
market with local farmers. The beach seine's sole draw-back was 
its dependence on environmental factors beyond the control of 
either merchants or fishermen and it was here that the set net 
and purse seine were available to merchant capital to offset the 
damaging effects of the general resource scarcity along the 
coast. In 1898 a purse seine was introduced to Stephan Brothers' 
Stumpnose Bay fishery, but was sold the following year because it 
"could not be successfully worked" 1~ Merchant capital, however, 
had nothing but outright hostility towards the set net. 
The set net went by a number ot different names at the Bay, 
depending on the way it was employed, but the basic principle 
remained the same. It hung suspended in the water like an 
inyisible curtain into which the fish swam fast and became 
entangled by their gills. If weighted down to hold a fixed 
position, it was a set net, allowed to float on the tide it 
became a drift net and secured to stakes driven into the bed of 
the river, a stake net 1~ In its latter guise it had long been 
127 Report of the Marine Biologist. 1899, p.22. 
128 Report of the Marine Biologist. 1896, p.9. 
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used by squatter fishermen working the backwaters of the Berg 
River, but, by the late 1890s, had come increasingly into use on 
the sea coast of the Bay. Here it was set across the off-shore 
channels leading to the treks, thus effectively preventing fish 
from coming within reach of the beach seines. The result was a 
, 
sharp decline in the catches of beach seine fishermen and 
stagnation in prices on the rantsoenvis market, both of which cut 
at the very heart of the beleaguered merchant fisheries 1~ The 
reason for merchant capital's failure to adopt the set net, as it 
attempted to do with the purse seine, lies in the extent to which 
the two new nets complemented snoek fishing. The cost of a purse 
seine put it beyond the reach of the individual fisherman, but 
the set net was a more democratic fishing technology, affordable 
to the individual fisherman and capable of being used without a 
boat. The implications for merchant capital were obvious. The set 
net threatened both its ownership of the means of production and 
labour supply and its generalised use promised to undermine 
merchant control over labour and with it the relations of 
production on which the snoek fishery rested. For this reason, 
Stephan Brothers responded to the resource crisis by attempting 
to ban the set net. 
In 1892, a decade after the sitting of the 1882 Select Committee, 
Stephan Brothers was again called on to give evidence before an 
official investigation into the state of the fisheries. The 
picture Hendrik Stephan painted for the colony's legislators in 
1892 was a bleak one: 
"I say the fishing industry is dying out now, 
and we have not got the fishermen now we used 
to have, simply because they don't earn 
enough: they can get 4s. or 5s. a day in the 
129 Ibid., pp.9-10. Also Cape Archives; GBT 1, J.L. HcLachlan to the 
Government Biologist, 20 June 1903. 
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docks, but they can't earn that by 
fishing, and fishing is not an easy 
occupation" 1~ 
Hendrik's gloom was not unfounded and in the last two decades of 
the 19th Century the St Helena Bay fisheries went into protracted 
decline, caused by falling catches of the staple commercial fish 
species, a burgeoning public works programme in the colony wh i ch 
drew labour away from the fisheries and the contraction of the 
Mauritian market without the development of viable local 
alternatives. Attempts by the firm to diversify its flagging west 
coast fishing interests by expanding into crayfish canning also 
failed 13~ Numerous reasons were offered for the dramatic fall-off 
in catches. Conventional wisdom blamed the increase in the steam 
coasting trade and the activities of the American schooner 
"Alice", but more informed sources identified overfish i ng as the 
chief culprit 1~ Carl Stephan, for one, was clear that the 
"catching [of] all that came to hand, whether male or female, 
young or old" led to the drop in catches 1~ He called for 
comprehensive state regulation of the fisheries including the 
imposition of a closed season on snoek fishing, a minimum mesh 
size for seine nets, a ban on the construction of fish kraals and 
a prohibition on the use of the set net 1~ The latter was deemed 
to both frightened the fish and, if made with a small mesh, 
130 Report of the Fisheries Committee 1892, Evidence of H.R. Stephan, 
p.11. 
131 E. Rosenthal HThe Stephan Saga" pp. 76-77 and Cape of Good Hope Report 
of the Select Committee on the Petition of Stephan Brothers 1890 [A.29-'90]. 
132 Report of the Fisheries Committee 1892, Evidence of H.R. Stephan, 
pp.6-13 & Appendix D Reports of J.C. Stephan and J.L. HcLachlan, pp.16-19 and 
Reports of the Marine Biologist, 1896-1906. 
133 Report of the Fisheries Committee 1892, Appendix D Report of J.C. 
Stephan, pp.16-17 and Reports of Marine Biologist, 1896-1897. 
134 Report of the Fisheries Committee 1892, Appendix D , Report of J.C. 
Stephan, pp.16-17. 
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destroy 135 undersized fish. The fact that no minimum mesh size was 
advocated for such nets, as with the trek seine, was indicative 
· of the depth of merchant hostility to the new technology. The 
colonial state, however, was ambivalent towards the set net. On 
the one hand, it styled itself as a modernising agent; harnessing 
science to the development of a vast, untapped resource capable 
of rivalling the mineral discoveries of the interior. On the 
other, it tried to limit the conflict generated by modernisation 
by shielding the inshore fisheries from the new fishing 
techno 1 ogy 1~ This broad contradiction manifested itself in 
microcosm at St Helena Bay, in the colonial state's attempts to 
simultaneously protect the merchant fisheries from the ravages of 
the set net without unduly prejudicing or discouraging the 
activities of the set netters. The newly appointed marine 
biologist, Gilchrist, posed the problem as follows: 
135 Ibid. 
"[Set] nets can be used in the open sea and 
in any depth, being buoyed up by floats and 
stretching in a straight line, often long 
distances. It is a mode of fishing not 
deve 1 oped in the Colony, but · when 
legitimately used is worthy of all 
encouragement. The nets above described, as 
drifting in the river, are a step in this 
direction, and if such nets could be used in 
the open sea it would be a decided gain to 
the fishing industry. But it has been 
generally recognised that such nets must not 
be allowed to interfere with the proper 
working of seine nets, and there can be no 
hesitation in condemning their use for the 
blocking up of a bay where i number of seine 
l36 Cape of Good Hope House of Assembly Debates: 1890, p.298 & pp.305-307; 
Report of the Fisheries Co.mm.tttee 1892, Appendix D, Reports of J.C. Stephan, 
A.E. Anderson and J.L. HcLachlan, pp.16-19; Report of the Marine Biologist 
1900, Appendix V, #Report of the Select Colllllittee on the Fishing Industry•, 
pp.303-362 and Reports of the Marine Biologist, 1896-1907. 
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boats can fish, or the blocking up of 
the main channel of a river and 
preventing the coming in of the 
fish" 1~ 
Despite his ambivalence and realisation of the se~ net's 
productive potential, Gilchrist drafted regulations in May 1897 
prohibiting the use of stake, set or drift nets within two miles 
in front of any trek or in any way detrimental to seine fishing. 
In addition, the use of such nets within the main channels of the 
Berg River was also banned and a maximum penalty of l5 or one 
month hard labour imposed for offenders1~ The legislation, 
however, embodied the colonial state's fundamental ambivalence 
towards the new net. As Gilchrist explained, "Some difficulty was 
experienced in framing the regulation ••• in such a way as to 
give legitimate scope for both seine and drift net fishermen and 







the set net 
(outside of two miles in front of any trek) was arbitrary and in 
the absence of any clear definition of what constit~ted a trek or 
how the two mile limit was to be determined by fishermen working 
at sea, frequently after sunset, the "latitude of interpretation" 
granted was wide indeed. Gilchrist hoped that the legislation 
could be "more definitely determined after further experience of 
its practical working" 1~ 
Prac-tical concerns also tempered enthusiasm for other 
conservation measures such as a closed season on snoek. Merchants 
feared that new restrictions on fishing an already scarce snoek 
137 Report of the Marine Biologist 1896, p.10. 
138 Report of the Marine Biologist 1896, pp.18-20 and Cape of Good Hope 
Government Gazette, Proclamation 81, 27 March 1897. 
139 Report of the Marine Biologist 1896, p.19. 
140 Ibid. 
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resource might further threaten the labour supply. As Hendrik 
Stephan explained, "A fisherman will not take trouble to get bait 
and so on when he can get snoek so much more easily" 14t Attempts 
at stricter enforcement of the Masters and Servants legislation 
in the face of increasing desertions had little effect in 
stemming the outflow of labour during the 1890s. Stephan Brothers 
were also severely hamstrung in this regard by their dependence 
on the Mauritian market and constraints on expanding their share 
of the local market. The Mauritian economy was itself in a 
depression during the last decade of the century 1~ Increasing 
competition from the emerging European sugar-beet industry and 
devastating hurricanes in the early 1890s forced the island's 
sugar barons to resort to cheaper local varieties of fish in 
preference to imported snoek1~ As the export trade contracted, 
Cape merchants look~d to the local market to take up the slack. 
The growth of the mining economy and the construction of a 
railway linking the coast and the Reef prompted the increasing 
railage of fish to Kimberley and Johannesburg and growing 
agitation for the development of a deep-sea trawling industry in 
the Colony 1~ For Stephan Brothers and other west coast fishery 
owners, however, their location far distant from the Cape Town 
railhead kept them dependent on the rural rantsoenvis trade and 
Cape Town as alternative markets. The former, while extensive, 
141 Report of the Fisheries Committee 1892, Evidence of H.R. Stephan, 
p.11. 
1~ P. Richardson HThe Natal Sugar Industry in the Nineteenth CenturyH in 
W. Beinart, P. Delius & S. Trapido (eds) Putting a Plough to the Ground. 
143 R. Hallett Africa Since 1875, p.700 and W. Wardlaw Thompson Sea 
Fisheries of the Cape Colony, p.84. 
l« See Report of the Select Committee on Colonial Industries 1891; Report 
of the Fisheries Committee 1892 and Report of the Marine Biologist 1897, 
pp.10-11 & 14-15 for the increasing trade with the interior. Also Cape of Good 
Hope, Department of Agriculture Hei.,randum on the Development of Sea Fisheries 
1895 [G.61-'95] for a summary of the debate on the viability and need for a 
deep-sea trawling industry in the colony. 
73 
was both seasonal and unremunerative, whereas prices on the 
latter were extremely volatile and returns uncertain, as Hendrik 
Stephan noted: 
"Cape Town is a peculiar market. As 
soon as fish is plentiful, nobody 
seems to care for it; it is only when 
fish is scarce, and it is a luxury, 
that it sells well. As soon as it 
comes into season, it won't sell. 
When the boats get few snoek, they 
etch 9d.,but when the snoek are 
plentiful they will hardly fetch 
2d" 14~ 
The export trade allowed the firm to stockpile dried fish and 
only sell when the market was favourable. The Cape Town market, 
on the other hand, was for fresh fish which, in the absence of 
any stable industrial demand, had to be sold immediately on the 
open market leaving merchants vulnerable to oversupply and widely 
fluctuating prices 1~ As Hendrik Stephan put it, "The fact of the 
matter is the fishing industry is dying out for the want of a 
[local] market. If the supply is small, the fish command a good 
price; but as soon as there is a good supply, they fetch 
nothing"!~ Trapped between the hammer of supply and demand and 
the anvil of a declining resource and shrinking labour supply, 
Stephan Brothers ability to reverse the slide into crisis was 
limited. Events in the first decade of the 20th Century further 
exacerbated this crisis and severely weakened merchant capital 
dominance of the St Helena Bay fisheries by 1910. 
The South African War of 1899-1902 wrought widespread disruption 
on the west coast. Agricultural production and rural trade were 
1~ Report of the Fisheries Committee 1892, Evidence of H.R. Stephan, p.7. 
1% Ibid., Evidence of C. Arnold, p.4 & H.R. Stephan, p.11 
stockpiling of dried fish. 
147 Ibid., Evidence of H.R. Stephan, p.10. 
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on the 
severely curtailed by the imposition of martial law, the St 
Helena Bay fisheries were visited by raiding Boer commandos, 
fishing boats were , scuttled by British forces as a war measure 
and fishermen lured away by the lucrative opportunities offered 
as transport riders and camp followers in the army 1~ The war, 
coupled with the continued scarcity of snoek on the west coast, 
thus further eroded Stephan Brothers' position i n the Mauritian 
market. One observer reported in 1903 that, 
"For the last two or three years, shoals of 
snoek which frequented Cape waters and were 
such a popular export, have unaccountably 
left the shores. The stagnation in the fish 
trade at Malmesbury and Piquetberg is due to 
a like cause, viz; the disappearance of the 
fish that made the trade"~! 
By 1907, control over the Mauritian trade had shifted into the 
hands of Cape Town fish merchants who organised annual snoeking 
expeditions to Walvis Bay. The depleted local resource never 
regained its export importance, being consumed almost entirely by 
local demand 1~ The Cape Town merchants were able to monopolise 
the Mauritian trade by combining the export of dried fish with 
wholesaling fresh fish to the expanding local and interior 
markets, an option not open to Stephan Brothers. The firm's St 
Helena Bay base left it isolated from and unable to effectively 
148 W. Wardlaw Thompson Sea Fisheries of the Cape Colony, p.84; W.A. 
Burger Piket Teen 'n Berg, pp.264-65 & 327; E. Rosenthal #The Stephan Saga#, 
p.78 ff; Report of the Marine Biologist 1901 and Cape Archives; 11HFD, 
A1\1\1\2, Periodical Court Vredenburg, Case No.45, 21 October 1903, Rex versus 
Piet Walters. 
rn f A.R.E. Burton Cape Colony or the 
Also W. Wardlaw Thompson . Sea Fisheries of 
Reports of the Marine Biologist, 1901-1902. 
Settler (Cape Town, 1903), p.28. 
the Cape Colony, pp.84-85 and 
1~ Union of South Africa Select Committee on the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill 1944 [S.C.4-'44] Appendix H, p.xxxix, #Henr,randum by the 
South African Frozen Rock Lobster Association on the export salt snoek trade 
and snoek catches generally#. 
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exploit the new opportunities opened up by industrialisation, 
urbanisation and rail. If anything, the coming of the railway 
dealt Stephan Brothers another body blow by destroying the 
coastal grain trade and its monopoly over it. Under impetus of 
war, first Malmesbury and then Piketberg were connected to Cape 
Town by a branch line pushed into the western coastal districts 
between 1899 and 1902. By 1911 the line had reached Graafwater in 
the Clanwilliam district15~ The railway gave the coast a wide 
berth passing instead through the heart of the South Western Cape 
wheatlands which had previously depended on Stephan Brothers' 
cutters and steamers to reach the Cape Town market. The firm was 
unable to compete with the railway which was faster, more 
efficient, cheaper and more accessible than its fleet. Commercial 
farmers were now able to bring more land under cultivation, save 
on transport costs and expect a better price for their produce. 
In a matter of a few years the farming communities of the west 
coast hinterland literally turned their backs on the old road to 
market in favour of the new 1~ Stephan Brothers protested, but 
the broader process was irreversible and the firm was left with a 
much reduced trade from the poorer coastal farmers, too far 
removed from the line of rail to benefit. The 70 miles of 
coastline that had served as base for the Stephan empire's grain 
and fish trade remained, but even this was under threat from 
developments internal to the firm by 1900. In that year Carel 
Stephan died, leaving the usufruct of his huge estate to his 
brother, Hendrik. The latter outlived him by a mere six years, 
passing away in 1906. To Hendrik's twenty-two year old son, Henry 
Stephan, a Cambridge University law graduate, fell the task· of 
unravelling his father's tangled legal legacy. In a process 
!51 W.A. Burger Piket Teen 'n Berg, p.327; J. Burman & S. Levin The 
Saldanha Bay Story, pp.113-120 and J. Burman Early Railways at the Cape (Cape 
Town, 1984). 
152 Report of the Select Committee on the Saldanha Bay Harbour Works Bill 
1903 for farmers evidence in this regard. 
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lasting all of a decade, Henry was forced to dispose of vast 
tracts of the firm's land (75 000 morgen in all), trimming 
operations down to a scale more appropriate to the lean days of 
the Cape Colony's last years 1~ 
While the collapse of the west coast merchant fishery was due to 
factors - both environmental and macro economic - beyond merchant 
capital's control, Stephan Brothers' response was determined by 
the specifics of its own accumulation imperative. The latter was 
inextricably intertwined with the maintenance of the west coast 
as a periphery of the regional economy and the firm thus sought 
to block the development of a railhead at Saldanha Bay, secure 
its fishing labour needs through the contract and ban new fishing 
technology inimical to its monopolisation of the means of 
production in the fishery. On the latter issue it enjoyed the 
support of Sandveld agriculture whose rentier interests in the 
Piketberg trek seine fisheries were similarly threatened by the 
set net. The collapse of the coastal grain trade, decline of the 
snoek resource and internal crises within Stephan Brothers 
itself, however, made the development of new areas of commodity 
production essential to merchant capital's continued survival. 
With profits shrinking and legal and other costs associated with 
the settling of Carel Stephan's will mounting, the issue of 
future direction became ever more pressing. As Cape Town 
merchants consolidated their hold over the urban market, took 
control of the Indian Ocean export trade and expanded along the 
line of rail into the interior, the comparative advantages of 
west coast merchant capital were transformed into crippling 
. disadvantages. Isolated from the Cape Town market and without the 
raw material for export to Mauritius, Stephan Brothers looked to 
the rich crayfish beds of the Bay to resuscitate the empire and 
revive its fortunes. Crayfish production, 
153 E. Rosenthal HThe Stephan SagaH, p.87 ff. 
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however, was geared to 
a very different (European) market and required a complex 
manufacturing process to add value before exchange. For these 
reasons, relations of production at the Bay had to be 
restructured in accordance with the new demands of crayfish 
fishing and factory production. Implicit in this was the 
incorporation of the set net and its practitioners by merchant-
cum-productive capital, thus setting the scene for a protracted 
interregnum marked by a bitter conflict between Stephan Brothers 
and Sandveld agriculture. The resolution of this conflict was to 
determine the nature of the St Helena Bay fisheries until the 
mid-1930s. 
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3: TH! EMPIRE STRIKES BACK 
The set net conflict at St Helena Bay was not unique. By the turn 
of the century inshore fishermen at Mossel and Kalk Bay were 
attempting to ban the new steam trawlers from their fishing 
grounds, just as their Table Bay counterparts had done with the 
"Alice" in 1890t Elsewhere in the British empire, on the Gold 
Coast of West Africa, the introduction of the larger adii net and 
Mfantse canoe in the 1890s also met with sustained resistance 
from petty-commodity fishermen on remarkably similar grounds to 
that in the Cape~ Vercruijsse, in his study of the Ghanaian 
fishing industry, rejects the notion that the adii net disrupted 
a traditional fishing economy in symbiosis with the marine 
environment, asserting that: 
"A more fruitful starting point ••• is the concept of 
correspondence between the level of the productive forces 
and the relations of production. There is good reason to 
assume that at the turn of the century the Gold Coast 
fishing industry was characterised by such a close 
correspondence. Furthermore, it cannot be denied that the 
productive potential of the adii net, used in 6onjunction 
with the larger Mfantse canoe, threatened the 
correspondence and, by undermining the existing production 
relations, gradually led to their dislocation from the 
productive forces ••• [T)he fierce resistance to the 
adoption of the adii and twuwii nets was due to the 
- undermining of existing relations of production by new 
labour processes which incorporated a higher level of 
productivity, and to the insertion into canoe fishing of 
social relations of exploitation that were alien to the 
petty-commodity mode of production"3 • 
1 Cape of Good Hope House of Assembly Debates 1890, p.298 & pp.305-307; 
Report of the Marine Biologist 1900, Appendix V, wReport of the Select 
Committee on the Fishing Industryw, pp.303-362 and Reports of the Marine 
Biologist 1896-1907. 
2 E. Vercruijsse The Penetration of Capitalism: A West African Case Study 
(London, 1984), pp.112-128. 
3 Ibid., pp.113-114. 
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Vercruijsse's analysis can be usefully applied to the St Helena 
Bay conflict. Here the set net also threatened to disrupt the 
petty-commodity mode of production on which merchant capital and 
Sandveld farmers depended, the former for snoek and the latter 
for rent and labour. They thus acted in unison to ban it from the 
Bay in the same way as the chiefs in the Gold Coast attempted to 
outlaw the adii net in areas under their jurisdiction. The latter 
were constrained by their subjugation to the colonial 
administration under indirect rule, unlike merchant and agrarian 
capital in the Cape, which exerted considerable influence over 
the colonial state and used this power to have the set net 
legislatively restrictedt 
With the continued stagnation of the snoek fishery in the 1900s, 
merchant capital looked increasingly to diversify into crayfish 
production, requiring a significant reorganisation of the 
relations of production. Unlike the snoek and seine fisheries, 
there was no local market for crayfish other than the canning 
factories. The latter thus tried to set the price of the raw 
material and impose a more intense production regime on the 
fishermen, without the benefit of supplementary earnings through 
eetvis and illicit fish trading. Few fishermen were willing to 
forego ·the vestiges of their independence in seining for lower 
earnings and a greater dependence on credit and free housing 
associated with crayfish fishing. Having struggled for more than 
a decade to subjugate the labour force to the contract, merchant 
capital now looked to the set net and its Italian practitioners 
to achieve what it failed to do and dissolve the remnants of 
labour's control over the means of production and product of 
labour. Sandveld agriculture, however, remained implacably 
opposed to the set net, fearing it would destroy the symbiotic 
4 Ibid., pp.118-120 for the Gold Coast colonial state's approach to the 
adii\Hfantse conflict. 
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relationship between fishing and farming, important to rural 
accumulation on the Piketberg coast. The colonial state, in 
seeking to mediate the burgeoning conflict, "territorialised" it 
in the same way as the Gold Coast administration and with the 
same intention of promoting the new technology at the expense of 
the old. The resulting balkanisation of the Bay, however, proved 
more enduring 
anticipated, 
than either Cape Town or Stephan Brothers 
reflecting both the economic and political weakness 
of merchant-cum-productive capital on the periphery, as well as 
the resilience of the petty-commodity mode in alliance with 
Sandveld agriculture. As a result, the dissolution of petty-
commodity production was uneven, incomplete and confined to the 
Malmesbury coast, setting the scene for a future conflict to 
generalise the process to the fisheries of Piketberg district. 
3.1 "COLONIALS" VERSUS "ITALIANS": THE SET NET WAR 
The set net was used to fish the backwaters bf the Berg River 
long before merchant capital's outcry alerted the colonial state 
to its presence. An "unwritten law" 
being used to the detriment of beach 
of custom prevented it from 
seining~ By 1896, however, 
this "unwritten law" was being openly flaunted, as Gilchrist 
reported: 
"The nets of which the fishermen complain are in principle 
similar to these latter [stake nets], being gill nets and 
capable of being fixed by wooden stakes in the same way. 
They are, however, longer and deeper and of a somewhat 
wider mesh. They are not used on the flats, but are set 
across the main channel of the river, where they may be 
left overnight. They may also be used without being fixed, 
5 Report of the Marine Biologist 1896, p.10. Also S. Forman The Raft 
FishernEn: Tradition and Change in the Brazilian Peasant Economy (Bloomington, 
1970); J • . Cordell HThe Lunar Tide Fishing Cycle in Northeastern Brazil" in 
Ethnology, 13, 4, 1974 and J.M. Acheson -variations in Traditional Inshore 
Fishing Rights in Maine Lobstering Comnunities- in R. Andersen (ed) North 
Atlantic Maritime Cultures for comparative perspectives from the Americas. 
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being allowed to drift up and down the river with the tide. 
Outside of the river, in the Bay, they are set across the 
entrance to the small bays where the fish come to shore and 
be captured with the usual seines."6 
The transgressors were not local fishermen, but transient 
foreigners, Gilchrist identifying a "few Italian fishermen" as 
the chief culprits: Numerous 
the west coast fisheries in the 
Italians had found their way into 
19th Century. Many were skil l ed 
sailors and boat builders and had been assimilated into the local 
fishing communities by the turn of the century~ The new 
arrivals, however, were distinguished by their inability to speak 
the lingua franca and lack of ties to the Bay. They were Cape 
Town based, owning large 
ranging between Cape Point 
half- and full-decked cutters and 
and Elands Bay in search of fish~ 
Some had originally been recruited in Sicily by the fledgling 
Cape Town canning industry to catch crayfish in Table Bay. Others 
were recent immigrants, forced out of their homeland by drought 
and poverty. With the collapse of the canning industry, many went 
fishing on their own account, but by the turn of the century they 
encountered increasing opposition to their set netting activ i ties 
from the fishermen of Table Bay. This opposition and the 
independence and mobility afforded them by their ownership of 
decked sea-going craft forced them out along the coast in search 
of new fishing grounds and led them inexorably to St Helena Bay. 
There they encountered not only the commercial fisheries of 
6 Ibid: p.9. 
7 Ibid: p.10. 
B See for example E. Rosenthal HThe Stephan SagaH, 
Boerepioniers van die Sandveld, p.203 and R.C. Knott-Craig 
of Velddrift" in Cape Times, 15 October 1938. 
p.84; M.H.D. Smith 
"The Boat Builders 
9 D. Grant "Bokkoms:, Boycott and the Bo-KaapH; P. Corgatelli "Tapes and 
Testiroony" and Cape of Good Hope, Table Bay Harbour Board Report of the 
Fishing Industry Commission, August 1904, pp.9-17. 
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Stephan Brothers, but flourishing tenant fisheries on private 
farms near the mouth of the Berg River. 
The merchant fisheries aver shadowed, but never ful 1 y · di sp 1 aced 
the squatter or petty fisheries at the Bay. The latter remained, 
nestled along the less hospitable parts of the Malmesbury coast 
and the lower reaches of the Berg River and coast in the 
neighbouring Piketberg district. Piketberg was not opened up t o 
merchant capital in the way Malmesbury was. The influence of men 
such as Theunis Smit - "Grondbaron van die Sandveld" - who had 
vested rent interests in the squatter fisheries of the distric t 
and the unsuitability of the coast for commercial fishing saw to 
that. The Piketberg coastline lacked the natural coves and inlets 
which attracted would-be fishery owners to the Bay's southern 
shore. It was exposed to the full fury of north-westerly gales, 
making it impossible to establish safe anchorages or construct 
jetties for the off-loading of fish and the transhipment of 
grain 10 • The only haven for fishing boats and cutters was inside 
the mouth of the Berg River where local agriculture jealously 
guarded its labour and rentier interests against encroachment by 
merchant capital. By 1902 there were at least twelve independent 
boat owners operating from Velddrift and Laaiplek farms near the 
mouth of the river 11 • 
These and other farms were also home to numerous tenant fishermen 
who owned no boats, but worked the river for subsistence, crewed 
for boat owners and engaged in seasonal labour in the surrounding 
!O Union of South Africa, Department of Hines and Industries Fishing 
Harbours Report Part III Saldanha Bay, Halmesbury District, to Lamberts Bay 
Clanwilliarn District, l926 for a survey of the nature and attendant 
difficulties of fishing the Piketberg coastline. 
11 Cape Archives; AGR 371, 1417C, H.B. Keytel to the Attorney General 
forwarding the Petition of Various Owners and Managers of Fishing Industries 
at St Helena Bay, 27 February 1902. 
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countryside 12 • These people were tied to the landlords through 
rent obligations and constituted a sizable labour force outside 
merchant capital control. The dominant fishing technology at the 
river was the beach seine and the chief market the rantsoenvis 
trade with the agricultural interior In addition, the Piketberg 
fishermen worked the river's backwaters on their own account and 
engaged in winter snoek fishing from tent camps established along 
the southern shores of the Bay 13 • The tenant fisheries' co-
existence with merchant capital was conditioned by a number of 
factors. The former provided only limited competition to Stephan 
Brothers in the rantsoenvis trade and their small scale and 
meagre capital resources prevented them from exporting or drawing 
labour away from the merchant fisheries in large numbers. The 
riverine fisheries' close links to Sandveld agriculture further 
circumscribed their potential to develop into alternative bases 
of capital accumulation. The one area in which they did compete 
with merchant capital, however, was for fish. 
\
\ Competition in beach seining was governed by the "unwritten law" 
of custom, explained by one of Stephan Brothers managers as 
1 follows: 
I 
"The old rules and regulations also the mutual understanding 
among the local fishermen is very good, that no fishermen are 
to hinder one another while occupying a Trek nor to enter the 
fishing ground until the occupier is finished with Trekking 
and leaves the Trek then any other fishermen may enter the 
same" 14 • 
\\ 
Such understanding was essential because there were no fewer than 
42 beach seines at Berg River and a further 20 on the Malmesbury 
12 Fishing Harbours Report, Part III, 1926, p.62. 
13 Ibid., pp.58-59. 
14 Cape Archives; AGR 371, 1417 C, T. Blatherwick to the Assistant 
Resident Magistrate Hopef1eld, forwarding Report by J.L. Mclachlan on 
different fishing nets in use at St Helena Bay, 29 Hay 1902. 
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coast of the Bay 15 • As the resource crisis deepened in the 1890s, 
however, this unwritten law broke down and tenant fishermen found 
common cause with merchants in opposing the depredations visited 
on both by the Italians set netters. Complaints against the 
Italians were legion. They frightened and broke up the shoals, 
preventing the fish from coming onto the treks where they were 
accessible to the beach seines. One man using a set net could 
prevent any number of seine fishermen from making a cat c h - an 
especially sore point in view of the prevailing fish scarcity 16 • 
In this context and backed by the 1897 regulations, seine 
fishermen conducted a concerted campaign of prosecution against 
the Italians after 1900 who were contesting the "legitimate 
scope" allowed the set net by the 1897 legislation. The aim of 
both the Italians and the so-called "Colonials" or local 
fishermen was to force the colonial state to define the inbuilt 
"latitude of interpretation" more clearly in their favour. In the 
process, the state's ability to confine the conflict to the court 
room and within the bounds of the regulations was gradually 
undermined, giving rise to a virtual state of . war between local 
fishermen and Italians after 1900. 
15 Ibid. Also PAN 83, K 59\5, J. Gilchrist to the Acting Under Secretary 
for Agriculture, 16 February 1908. 
16 Report of the Marine Biologist 1897, pp.18-20. 
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TABLE 3.1 The War Against the Set Net 
St Helena Bay 1900-1908ff 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Year Accused Convicted Withdrawn Fines 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
1900 13 6 7 l14.17s 
1901 
1902 9 7 2 l17. Os 
1903 1 1 l 5. Os 
1904 2 2 llO. Os 
1905 1 1 
1906 8 5 3 l17. Os 
1907 1 1 l 5. Os 
1908 3 1 2 l 5. Os 
TOTAL 38 23 15 l73.17s 
The primary cause for this failure was a lack of effective 
policing. There were only two policemen at St Helena Bay, one at 
Steenbergs Cove on the Malmesbury side and the other at Berg 
River Mouth in Piketberg district. Neither had boats and thus 
relied on telescopes, field glasses and the use of private craft 
to apprehend offenders 18 • Gilchrist's appointment of fishery 
officers at the Bay in 1896 was also of little practical effect 
as these were honorary posts and the incumbents had no "authority 
17 Cape Archives; 1\HBY, F1\1\2, Periodical Court St Helena Bay, Criminal 
Cases - Records of Proceedings [1893-1895]; 1\HBY, G1\1\2, Periodical Court 
Vredenburg, Criminal Cases Records of Proceedings [1892-1897]; 1\HFD, 
1\2\1\1- 1\2\1\2, Magistrate of Hopefield, Criminal Record Books [1892-1916]; 
1\HFD, A1\1\1\1-A1\1\1\3, Periodical Court Vredenburg, Criminal Cases 
Records of Proceedings [1896-1945]; 1\HFD, A1\2\1-A1\2\3, Periodical Court 
Vredenburg, Criminal Record Books [1881-1919]; 1\HFD, B1\1\1-B1\1\2, 
Periodical Court St Helena Bay, Criminal Cases - Records of Proceedings [1897-
1908]; 1\HFD, Bl\2\1, Periodical Court St Helena Bay, Criminal Record Book 
[1885-1906]; 1\HFD, C1\1\1-C1\1\2, Periodical Court Hoedjies Bay, Criminal 
Cases - Records of Proceedings [1901-1907] and 1\HFD, C1\2\1, Periodical Court 
Hoedjies Bay, Criminal Record Book [1901-1908]. 
18 Cape of Good Hope; PAN 83, K 59\5, Civil Connissioner Piketberg to the 
Acting Under Secretary for Agriculture, 10 July 1908. 
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/ 
to . prosecute for the infringement of the law" 19 • As a result, 
local fishermen played an important role in alerting the police 
to offences and conveying them to sea to apprehend the guilty 
parties. The implementation of the regulations at the Bay was 
thus tainted from the outset with a perceived bias in favour of 
the seine fishermen, antagonising the Italians and prompting the 
seine fishers to take the law into their own hands by seizing set 
nets and laying charges against the owners~. Public policing 
created additional problems for the state in the ensuing court 
cases, as the Hopefield Magistrate complained: 
"There is so much jealousy among the different classes of 
fishermen and so much feeling has been displayed that it 
would be difficult to obtain a conviction upon their 
evidence. There is always a taint of bias about the 
evidence of interested parties" 21 • 
The key evidence in securing a conviction was the distance from 
the shore where the illegal act occurred. The protected area 
extended two miles out to sea in front of any recognised trek, 
but, as Gilchrist complained, seine fishermen understood this to 
include two miles on either side as well and acted accordinglyn. 
The Magistrate of Piketberg reportedly also shared their somewhat 
broader interpretation of the legislationn. A sympathetic 
19 Report of the Marine Biologist. 1900, p.22. 
~ Cape Archives; PAN 83, K 59\5, B. HcHillan to the Secretary for 
Agriculture, 15 February 1908 & Civil Commissioner of Piketberg to the Acting 
Under Secretary of Agriculture, 10 July 1908 and PAN 69, K 59\5, Report by 
Trooper A. Roll on Complaint by W.A. Kotze, 9 October 1908 & Assistar1t 
Resident Hagist.rate Hopefield to the Resident Hagist.rate Halmesbury, 12 
November 1908. 
21 Cape Archives; PAN 69, K59\3, Assist.ant Resident Hagist.rate Hopefield 
to the Resident Magistrate Halmesbury, 12 November 1908. 
n Cape Archives; PAN 83, K 59\5, Government Biologist to the Acting 
Chief Clerk to the Secretary for Agriculture, 11 January 1906. 
n Cape Archives; PAN 83, K 59\5, Civil Conaissioner Piketberg to the 
Acting Under Secretary for Agriculture, 10 July 1908. 
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magistr-ate, policeman on boar-d and careful measur-ement of 
distance from the shore, were, however, no guarantee of a 
conviction because of 
magistrates. 
the inherent bias assumed by all 
Even when a conviction was secured, sentencing frequently 
transformed this into a pyrrhic victory and the lack of 
sufficient deterrent remained a recurring complaint for seine 
fishermen 24• Few Italians were caught in the act of setting or 
retrieving their- nets and those that were often got off with a 
caution from the court3 • Nor did any Italians serve prison 
sentences because of the token nature of the alternative cash 
fines imposed. 
complained that: 
In 1902 the fishery officer at Steenbergs Cove 
"On several occasions these Foreigners have been caught in 
the act, brought before the Magistrate convicted and fined 
the maximum penalty of i5 which they cheerfully paid, 
considering it a mere trifle in comparison with the lar-ge 
profits they are making out of their illegitimate trade and 
immediately afterwards commenced the same old ga~e again"u. 
As a result, the St Helena Bay fishery owners and fishermen kept 
up pressure on the colonial state for more stringent penalties. 
In 1902 the maximum fine was increased to i20 or 3 months hard 
24 Cape Archives; AGR 371, 1417C, H.B. Keytel to the Attorney General, 
forwarding the Petition of Boatowners and Managers of the several Fisheries 
established along the Coast of St Helena, Hoedjles and Saldanha Bays in the 
Districts of Piketberg and Malmesbury, 27 February 1902. 
3 Cape Archives; PAN 69, K 59\3, Handwritten Memorandum signed G. 
Ailing, 24 August 1908. 
26 Ca~ Archives; AGR 371, 
Resident Magistrate Hopefield, 29 
1417 C, T. Blatherwick 
May 1902. 
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to the Assistant 
labour 27 • Calls for the confiscation of gear and a proposal from 
the Hopefield magistrate that the fines be shared with informers 
were, however, rejected28 • By 1906 the stakes were upped again 
with renewed calls for a maximum fine of t. 5 0 plus the 
confiscation of all gear~. The legislation's 1 ack .of teeth 
compounded the initial problems of policing and evidence and 
created a growing disillusionment with due process among the Bay 
seine fishermen. The Italians exacerbated this by doing their 
utmost to frustrate the legal process. Speaking neither English 
nor Dutch and doubting the impartiality of local law agents, they 
hired Vredenburg, Saldanha Bay and Hopefield agents to defend 
their cases~. The latter excelled in foiling quick convictions 
through aggressive cross examination and by casting doubt on the 
prosecution's evidence 31 • In addition, fish and money were used as 
bribes to forestall prosecutions and persuade key witnesses to 
change their storyTI. 
27 Cape Archives; AGR 371, 1417C, H.B. Keytel to the Attorney General, 
forwarding the Petition of Boatowners and Managers of ·the several Fisheries 
established along the Coast of St Helena, Hoedjies and Saldanha Bays in the 
Districts of Piketberg and Malmesbury, 27 February 1902 and Cape of Good Hope 
Government Gazette, Proclamation No.142 of 1902, 12 August 1902. 
28 Cape Archives; PAN 83, K 59\5, Acting Chief Clerk to the Secretary for 
Agriculture to Messrs van der Bijl and de Villiers, 22 January 1906 and AGR 
371, 1417C, Assistant Resident Magistrate Hopefield to the Civil Commissioner 
Malmesbury, 5 June 1902. 
~ Cape Archives; PAN 83, K 59\5, van der Bijl & de Villiers to the 
Minister for Agriculture forwarding the Petition of 316 Fishermen residing at 
or near Saldanha and St .Helena Bays, 9 January· 1906. 
~ G.H. O'Connell of Vredenburg, H.J. Schickerling of Saldanha Bay and 
J.W. Stigling of Hopefield were the three law agents nr:,st frequently used. 
31 See for example Cape Archives; 1\HFD, 5\1\2\8, Assistant Resident 
Magistrate Hopefield to the Resident Magistrate Malmesbury, 8 October 1906, 
complaining about O'Connell's tactics. 
32 _Cape Archives; 1\HFD, B1\1\1, Periodical Court St Helena Bay, Case 
No.7, Rex versus Nicola Borass, 16 March 1903 and 1\HFD, B1\1\2, Periodical 
Court St Helena Bay, Case No.1, Rex versus Hermanus van Schalkwyk, 13 January 
1908. 
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Ultimately this war of position, fought out within the 
legislative parameters laid down by the colonial state, was both 
inconclusive and disruptive. The seizure of nets and pro~onged 
legal wrangles, often involving whole crews as witnesses, wasted 
precious fishing time without any visible i mprovement in 
conditions on the beach for seine fishermen. The situation had 
become desperate by 1906, as the fishery officer at Stompneus Bay 
reported: 
"Local fishermen have absolutely no chance to trek with 
their seines. Formerly four seines were in use at 
Stompneus Bay, and all kinds of trek fish were caught in 
great abundance; now only one is in use, whereby only 500 
medium bokkums [immature mullet] were caught this season. 
The fishing grounds along this part of the coast of St 
Helena Bay are practically blockaded for miles by the set 
nets"n 
Disillusioned with their ability to lift the blockade by way of 
the courts, local fishermen turned increasingly to extra-l egal 
methods. Stephan Brothers had initially attempted to deny the 
Italians mooring rights at the Bay and its example was followed 
by the fishermen who engaged in acts of sabotage and intimidation 
against the foreigners~. These focussed on seizing or damaging 
the hated set nets and the Italians alleged that threats of 
assault were also made against them~. They were, however, more 
than equal to the challenge and seine fishery owners claimed in 
TI Report of the Marine Biologist 1906, pp.17-18. 
~ . Cape Archives; GBT 
Secretary for Agriculture, 
Secretary for Agriculture, 
Biologist, 13 August 1906 
September 1906. 
16, Civil Commissioner Malmesbury to the Under 
28 December 1899; J. Gilchrist to the Under 
3 January 1900; Surveyor General to the Marine 
& Government Biologist to Stephan Brothers, 15 
~ Cape Archives; 1\HFD, 81\1\2, Periodical Court St Helena Bay, Case 
No.1, Rex versus Hermanus van Schalkwyk, 13 January 1908 and PAN 83, K 59\5, 
B. McMillan to the Secretary for Agriculture, 15 February 1908. 
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turn, that their nets were regularly damaged by set netters~. In 
addition, the Italians enjoyed a reputation for being quick with 
their knives, a notoriety enhanced by a number of violent 
assaults which intimidated the localsTI. Thus, for example, Joseph 
Griffith's attempt to seize Edward Nardine's set net failed, 
because, Griffith explained, "We tried to take away the net as 
evidence, but he and his mates prevented us"~. After a similar 
heated confrontation at sea, the local policeman at Berg River 
admitted that, "it is a very dangerous game going trapping these 
people [Italians] at night"~. This was confirmed by his superior 
who reported that the Italians are "most aggressive and have been 
heard to threaten the lives of any Policeman approaching them 
when contravening the Fishing Laws", adding that, "my life was 
threatened by some of the very low class Italians who live in the 
neighbourhood of the St Helena Bay and endeavour to obtain a 
livelihood by illegal means"~. One of his men had also been 
"dangerously assaulted" by said foreigners 41 • In 1907 the 
Magistrate of Malmesbury recommended an additional constable at 
~ Cape Archives; AGR 371, 1417C, H.B. Keytel to the· Attorney General, 
forwarding the Petition of Boatowners and Managers of the several Fisheries 
established along the Coast of St Helena, Hoedjies and Saldanha Bays in the 
Districts of Piketberg and Malmesbury, 27 February 1902. 
37 R. Lees Fishing for Fortunes, p.110; Cape Archives; 1\HFD, B1\1\1, 
Periodical Court St Helena Bay, Preparatory Examination, Rex versus Dominico 
Pollicardo and Paolo Patroni, 14 July 1902; 1\HFD, B1\1\2, Preparatory 
Examination, Rex versus Joseph Babriani, 16 January 1905 and PAN 83, K 59\5, 
van der Bijl & de Viliiers to the Minister for Agriculture forwarding the 
Petition of 316 Fishermen residing at or near Saldanha and St Helena Bays, 9 
January 1906. 
~ Cape Archives; 1\HFD, B1\1\1, Periodical Court St Helena Bay, Case 
No.9, Rex versus Edward Nardine, 18 March 1902. 
39 Cape Archives; 1\HFD, B1\1\2, Periodical Court St Helena Bay, Case 
No.14, Rex versus Dominico Poggi, 19 March 1906. 
4o Cape Archives; CO 8354, X 9458, Inspector J.T. White Cape Mounted 
Police [CMP] to the Commander CMP, 27 April 1906. 
41 Ibid. 
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the Bay, noting that "a policeman boarding the fishing-cutters at 
night, alone and unarmed, runs more than the ordinary risk"~. 
John Griffith's own experience of the risk, coupled with economic 
desperation, drove him to more extreme measures in 1906. As he 
explained, "there were a lot of fish [in Britannia Bay] and the 
fish would not land. We looked after the fish the whole day" o . 
That evening as he and his crew were gathering firewood on the 
beach, they saw Angelo Joenta's cutter enter the Bay. Griffith, 
who honed his marksmanship shooting seabirds, promptly fetched 
his shotgun and fired a single shot at the cutter, passing just 
over Joenta's head and peppering the sail. The terrified Italians 
took refuge below deck, losing an oar overboard in their haste 
and allowing the cutter to drift onto the rocks and damage its 
hull 44 • The Italians' group solidarity, reputation and transience, 
however, made them difficult targets and attention focussed on 
locally resident transgressors. Chief among these was Hermanus 
van Schalkwyk, 
Slippers Bay. 
cutter owner and set net fisherman resident at 
Van Schalkwyk was convicted of illegal set net 
fishing on no fewer than six out of seven court appearances 
between 1900 and 1908. Unable to legally deter him from his 
nefarious practices, the seine fishermen resorted to more direct 
methods. In November 1907 Joseph Galwitch and his crew discovered 
Van Schalkwyk's set net on a trek. As Floris Binneman, one of 
Galwitch's crew related: 
"While we were pulling up the net 
Schalkwyk] came from the other side and 
net and started pulling it in. And when 
he called upon the people in Qis boat to 
the accused [Van 
caught hold of the 
they came together 
give him a knife. 
42 Cape Archives; PAN 83, K 59\5, Secretary to the Law Department to the 
Acting Chief Clerk to the Secretary for Agriculture, 21 January 1907. 
43 Cape Archives; 1\HFD, B 1\1\2, Periodical Court St Helena Bay, Case 
No.1, The King versus John Griffith, 19 March 1906. 
« Ibid. 
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The accused would not loosen the net and Dirk Wall cut the 
net in the middle through and he pulled the piece of the net 
that was over into his boat. And the accused became so angry 
and wanted to throw me with a knife. The accused then took 
our oar out of our boat"~. 
Van Schalkwyk denied threatening Binneman with a knife, claiming 
he only wanted to use it to unsnag the net. As for seizing an 
oar, he alleged this was self-defence as one of Galwitch's crew 
was attempting to hit him with it 46 • Van Schalkwyk had another 
close encounter with hostile oars the following month when no 
fewer than five seine boats drove him from a trek. As he 
explained, "I saw the boats come right behind me. We rowed fast 
and they rowed fast also behind us. As they came past us we had 
to duck our heads their oars came right over us. There was one 
boat on each side of me and three boats behind me "47 • Harried in 
this fashion for more than two hours, Van Schalkwyk also had to 
fight off attempts by the seine fishermen to seize the set nets 
from his boat, preventing him from fishing that night~. The 
escalating tension, fuelled by the failure of the fishery 
regulations, declining trek seine catches and increasing recourse 
by both parties to sabotage and intimidation, alerted the 
colonial state to the fact that "feeling is running high against 
the Italians" and the possibility of "murder in these waters and 
very soon " 49 • As one report put it, "the present unfortunate 
~ Cape Archives; 1\HFD, B1\1\2, Periodical Court St Helena Bay, Case 
No.1, Rer versus Hermanus van Schalkwyk, 13 January 1908. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Cape Archives; 1\HFD, B1\1\2, Periodical Court St Helena Bay, Case 
No.4, Rex versus Charles & Jaapie Constable, 13 January 1908. 
~ Ibid. 
49 Ibid. Also Cape Archives; PAN 83, K 59\5, G.H. O'Connell to the Marine 
Biologist, 23 December 1907 and PAN 69, K 59\3, G. Williams and J. Daneel to 
the Under Secretary for Agriculture, 3 August 1909. 
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position ••• if continued, would inevitably give rise to constant 
friction, with a possibility of bloodshed, between otherwise l aw 
abiding and respectable people"~. Having failed to deter the 
Italians from transgressing the regulations through increased 
fines and without the funds to step-up policing, the colon i al 
state looked to a more radical solution - the division of the Bay 
between set net and trek seine 51 • 
Developments between 1906 and 1909 ratcheted up the level of 
conflict even further as a marked down-turn in the availabil ity 
of fish adversely affected the catches and income of both 
and Italians. The seine fishermen employed longer hauling 
locals 
lines 
on their seines and fought over access to treks, while the 
Italians resorted to "keering" and ghost nets in a bid to offset 
the effects of the scarcity 52 • In addition, the seiners pressured 
the colonial state to once again raise the penalties for offences 
50 Cape Archives; PAN 69, K 59\3, G. Williams and J. Daneel to the Under 
Secretary for Agriculture, 3 August 1909. 
51 Cape Archives; PAN 83, K 59\5, J. Gilchrist to the Acting Chief Clerk 
to the Secretary for Agriculture, 11 January 1906; Government Biologist to the 
Acting Chief Clerk to the Secretary for Agriculture, 13 February 1907 & 
Secretary to the Law Department to the Chief Clerk to the Secretary for 
Agriculture, 5 March 1907 on the funds shortage. 
52 Cape Archives; 1\HFD; Bl\1\2, Periodical Court St Helena Bay, Case 
No.43, Rex versus Joseph Novella, 15 November 1905; PAN 69, K 59\3, Alleged 
Diminution of Fish Supply on Piketberg Coast. Protection of Fish in Berg 
River, Enquiry held at Roode Baai on 21st-24th November 1913, Joint Report by 
Mr F. Shaw RM of Piketberg and Mr F. Wrensch, RM of Malmesbury, pp.2; PAN 69, 
K 59\3, Alleged Diminution of Fish on the Coast of Malmesbury, Report by 
Resident Magistrate Malmesbury, November 1913, pp.6-7 & Detached Assistant 
Magistrate Hopefield to the Magistrate Malmesbury forwarding Report from 
Sergeant Baker, 29 August 1913. "Keeringn involved driving the fish into the 
set net by beating on the water with oars or rattling tins filled with stones 
beneath the surface. White "ghostH nets were also used to scare the fish into 
the set nets. 
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under the 
blockade 53 • 
fishery regulations as a deterrent against the set net 
In February 1907 a meeting took place in Cape Town 
between the Minister of Agriculture, set net representatives, the 
seine fishermen and Stephan Brothers in an attempt to resolve the 
impasse, but the colonial state's promise of an in situ 
investigation fell through due to financial constraints 54 • Many of 
the Italians had settled along the southern shores of the Bay by 
1906 and were thus more vulnerable to local censure than 
previously ~ . For this reason too, they reacted to the call for 
heavier fines and confiscation of gear in more direct fashion, 
utilising the existing legislation to cripple the seine 
fisheries. In the second half of 1907 the Italians began 
reporting the trek seiners at the Berg River for having mesh 
below the minimum size laid down in the regulations 56 • The po lice 
responded by measuring all seines on the river and warning owners 
with illegal mesh~. Unused to such harassment, the seine 
fishermen ignored the warnings, claiming the undersized mesh was 
due to natural shrinkage in the cotton net fibre and denying 
q 




Archives; PAN 83, K 59\5, van der Bijl and de Villiers to the 
Agriculture forwarding the Petition of 316 Fisherrren Carrying on 
at Saldanha Bay, St Helena Bay, Berg River and along the 
Coast, 10 January 1906. 
~ Cape Archives; GBT 16, Stephan Brothers to the Minister of 
Agriculture, 19 December 1906; G.H. O'Connell to the Marine Biologist, 5 
February 1907; Petition of the Boat Owners and Fisherrren Residing on the Banks 
· of the Great Berg River, Piketberg District, 23 February 1907; Governrrent 
Biologist to G.H. O'Connell, 16 February 1907; Governrrent Biologist to the 
Acting Chief Clerk to the Secretary for Agriculture, 24 April 1907 & 
Governrrent Biologist to G.H. O'Connell, 4 May 1907. 
~ Cape Archives; GBT 1, J.L. Mclachlan to the Governrrent 
June 1903 and PAN 83, K 59\5, J. Gilchrist to the Acting Under 
Agriculture, 16 February 1908. 
Biologist, 20 
Secretary for 
56 Cape Archives; PAN 83, K 
23 December 1907 &. Telegram 
Agriculture, 20 January 1908. 
59\5, G.H. O'Connell to 
from Redrrr:,nd Orpen 
the Marine Biologist, 
to the Departrrent of 
~ Cape Archives; PAN 83, K 59\5, Chas T. Quincey to the Officer 
Commanding #V# Division CMP, 20 January 1908. 
95 
allegations that the nets destroyed immature fish~. After two 
months' grace the police acted, seizing the seine of W.A. Kotze, 
a prominent farmer and boat owner, at midnight on the river~. 
This confiscation set the trend and by the end of Janu~ry 1908 
the seine fishermen's activities had been brought to a virtual 
standstill by prosecutions and the threat of heavy fines~. Out of 
42 seines on the river only four were found without illegal mesh. 
Of the 38 banned from fishing, 28 belonged to "a poor class of 
fisherman" without the t70-80 needed to replace illegal mesh61. 
The loss of their sole means of livelihood at the height of the 
summer trek season spelt hardship and even ruin for many seine 
fishermen. 
In desperation, they sent a deputation to Cape Town pleading for 
a reprieve~. The gist of their case was that the illegal meshes 
had been used for years without any complaint and thus 
constituted a "technical illegality" of small consequence 
~ Cape Archives; PAN 83, K 59\5, Petition from Residents of Roode Baai, 
Velddrift and De Plaat, Piketberg District, n.d. 
59 Cape Archives; PAN 83, K 59\5, Chas T. Quincey to the Officer 
Commanding •v• Division CHP, 20 January 1908, Acting Under Secretary for 
Agriculture to the Civil Commissioner Halmesbury, 11 December 1907; Resident 
Magistrate Piketberg to the Acting Under Secretary for Agriculture, 19 
December 1907 & the Acting .Under Secretary for Agriculture to the Under 
Colonial Secretary, 30 December 1907. 
~ Cape Archives; PAN 83, K 59\5, Telegram from Rednx:,nd Orpen to the 
Agricultural Department, 20 January 1908 & Petition from Residents of Roode 
Baai, Velddrift and De Plaat, Piketberg District, n.d. 
61 Cape Archives; PAN 83, K 59\5, J. Gilchrist to the Acting Under 
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compared to the devastation caused by the set net~. The sudden 
publicity and spate of prosecutions was rather a concerted effort 
by the Italians to destroy them. Styling themselves "Local South 
African born Europeans", the Berg River fishermen claimed that 
outlawing their nets would both jeopardise the rantsoenvis supply 
to agriculture and drive them and their families to the "brink of 
starvation" 64 • The implications for the state were clearly spelt 
out: an increase in internecine violence at the Bay and the 
possibility of a large, indigent population at the river 
dependent on state relief aid for surviva1 65 • Under pressure, the 
colonial state dispatched Gilchrist and the Chief Clerk of the 
Department of Agriculture to the river in February 1908 to 
investigate. After hearing the views of the different parties, 
both agreed that "in view of the extreme hardship involved in the 
sudden stoppage of their employment" the trek seine fishermen 
should be granted a limited stay of prosecution at least until 
the end of the trek season~. This was duly granted and at the end 
of February all prosecutions of trek seine fishermen for 
undersized mesh were waived until 31 August 19086!. Investigations 
in May, however, revealed that the seine fishermen had done 
nothing about replacing their nets, but were "waiting to see what 
~ Cape Archives; PAN 83, K 59\5, Telegram from Redrrcnd Orpen to the 
Department of Agriculture, 20 January 1908. 
64 Ibid. 
6S Ibid. 
~ Cape Archives; PAN 83, K 59\5, B. McMillan to the Secretary for 
Agriculture, 15 February 1908 & J. Gilchrist to the Acting Under Secretary for 
Agriculture, 16 February 1908. 
67 Cape Archives; PAN 83, K 59\5, ; Acting Under Secretary for 
Agriculture to the Under Colonial Secretary, 17 February 1908 and Cape of Good 
Hope Government Gazette, Proclamation 80 of 1908, 20 February 1908. 
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Parliament would do for them"~. As the snoek season ended and the 
August deadline neared, so they revived their agitation, asking 
for immunity from prosecution for a further two years until their 
existing nets were used up 69 • In early August the Minister of 
Agriculture relented and granted a final extension until the end 
'(' of May 1909 '' . 
The trek seine fishermen's ability to manipulate the regulations 
in this way, gave them a distinct advantage over their Italian 
rivals. Without merchant or farmer patronage and denied 
independent access to local political power by their forei g n 
status, the Italians were forced to rely on the exertions o f 
their chief spokesman, Vredenburg law agent, O'Connell, to put 
their case. The latter did his best to generate support for their 
position in Cape Town, but with little success. In early 1907 he 
accompanied a delegation of set netters to an interview with 
Gilchrist, but later wrote to the latter complaining that the 
promised in situ investigation had not taken plac~ 71• The state's 
plea of poverty was still ringing in O'Connell's ears when, in 
February 1908, Gilchrist and the Chief Clerk were hastily 
dispatched to the Bay following a visit to the Department of 
Agriculture by a delegation of trek seine fishermen accompanied 
by their local MP, J.A.C. Graaf. Even O'Connell's attempts to use 
~ Cape Archives; PAN 83, K 59\5, Civil Commissioner Piketberg to the 
Acting ·under Secretary for Agriculture, 10 July 1908 & Civil Commissioner 
Malmesbury to the Acting Under Secretary for Agriculture, 9 July 1908. 
69 Cape Archives; PAN 
(Petition No.60 of 1908), 
83, K 59\5, Petition of G. 
n.d., [Translation]. 
Visser and 127 others 
?O Cape Archives; PAN 69, K 59\3, P.J. du Toit to J.A.C. Graaff MLC, 8 
August 1908. 
71 Cape Archives; GBT 16, Petition from Set Net Fishermen to the 
Secretary for Agriculture, February 1906, G.H. O'Connell to the Secretary for 
Agriculture, 13 -November 1906, G.H. O'Connell to the Marine Biologist, 5 
February 1907 & Government Biologist to G.H. O'Connell, 4 May 1907 and PAN 83, 
K 59\5, G.H. O'Connell to the Marine Biologist, 23 December 1907. 
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the legislation to his clients' advantage by prosecuting seine 
netters for undersized mesh was defeated by Government 
proclamation. At the root of the Italians' woes was the two-mi l e 
l i mit, because, as O'Connell explained, "It is impossible for 
them [the Italians] to go out for a distance of two miles i n 
their small dinghies - if a sudden squall were to arise everyone 
would lose his life or if a whale, which is frequent in these 
"?'l 
waters, were to strike the dinghy" ''. For this reason they had no 
cho i ce but to break the law and fish the inshore waters o f t he 
Bay, running the risk of constant harassment, gear seizures, 
threats, physical violence and prosecution. O'Connell t hu s 
appealed to the Government "to relieve that hard-working body o f 
fishermen - the Italians" from the constraint of the tw o -m ile 
rul i ng by allowing them to set their nets alongside treks and o n 
Tl 
or over inshore reefs in the bay '" . 
The colonial state also favoured redefining the regulations by 
1908, but in a very different way to that desired by the set 
netters. While the latter wanted the two-mile limit relaxed, the 
state, hounded by the seine fishermen and parliamentarians like 
Graaff, fearful of a fatal confrontation and without the funds 
for stepped-up policing, sought to separate the warring parties 
even further in the hope of containing the burgeoning conflict 
through the courts. Opinion was divided on how best to do this. 
Elements within the Department of Agriculture advocated 
apportioning the Bay between the two groups of fishermen and 
appointing a fishery officer to adjudicate disputes 74• This 
argument was informed by a strong modernising ethos and 
realisation that "the Italians are also an important economic 
?2 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Cape Archives; PAN 83, K 59\5, B. McMillan to the Secretary for 
Agriculture, 15 February 1908. 
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asset in that they can be relied on to exploit fishing grounds 
and render more constant and regular supply of 
71': 
fish" '"' . The 
modernisers were opposed by officials on the ground sympathetic 
to the seine fishermen and highly sceptical of such notions.· As 
the Civil Commissioner of Piketberg retorted: 
"I fear it [balkanisation] would not work unless they were 
miles apart or unless there were a fast official steamer 
to see that no encroachments took place. The cutters wil l 
go to the places where most fish are to be had and paper 
regulations will not stop them. Nor would a competent 
Fishery Officer be of much use in settling disputes on the 
spot because there are no disputes to settle. The 
Regulations are perfectly well known and are deliberately 
contravened owing to the difficulty of detection as the 
fishing is done by night. A Fishery Officer on shore is of 
no more value than a Proclamation in the Gazette. A 
Fishery Officer in a fast boat with net-cutting implements 
{s what is wanted" n . 
He believed that "Seine net fishing and set net fishing cannot 
take place on the same shores" and that it was the latter which 
had to go 77 • Proponents of this view, including the trek seine 
fishermen themselves, urged a blanket ban on all set net fishing 
within two miles of the coast. With their successful 
politicisation of the issue it was the latter view which 
prevailed and in October 1908 a proclamation was promulgated 
forbidding the use of stake, set or drift nets within a two mile 
radius of any trek ground~. 
~ Cape Archives; PAN 83, K 59\5 Annotation by G. Williams on undated 
Minute, c.1908. 
?b Cape Archives; PAN 83, K 59\5, Civil Commissioner Piketberg to the 
Acting Under Secretary for Agriculture, 10 July 1908. 
77 Ibid. 
~ Cape of Good Hope Government Gazette, Proclamation 456 of 1908, 12 
October 1908. 
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The effect of the new regulation was, as the Hopefield Magistrate 
eKplained, to effectively ban the use of set nets anywhere within 
two miles of the coast "as the recognised ·treks' or seine net 
fishing grounds are many and in some places in close proKimity to 
each other, and, as far as I can learn, in no place are two 
adjacent ·treks' as far as 4 miles apart"~. This left "only the 
deep sea open for set nets and at 2 miles off the shore the water 
is too deep to suit the ordinary class of set nets and the small 
craft of the poor man very often cannot venture out to sea for 
such a distance" W. Rather than resolve the impasse, Proclamat ion 
456 brought down the proverbial "storm of criticism" on the 
colonial state 81 • It was seen as "a palpable hit at set net 
fishing" and in February 1909 a petition organised by O'Connell 
and signed by more than siKty Malmesbury farmers called for the 
~ 
cancellation or suspension of the new regulation u~ . The farmers 
alleged, "That owing to the said Proclamation ••• [we] are unable 
to procure any fresh fish which are most essential it being 
now threshing season, and the labourers ask for and expect a 
daily ration of fish"~. They complained that since the ban on the 
set net, only small and prohibitively eKpensive rantsoenvis was 
available from the seine fishermen at the coast84 • The rentier 
~ Cape Archives; PAN 69, K 59\3, Assistant Resident Magistrate Hopefield 
to the Magistrate Malmesbury, 24 February 1909. 
OO Ibid. 
81 Cape Archives; PAN 83, K 59\5, Handwritten note by G. Williams, 1 
August 1908. 
~ Cape Archives; PAN 69, K 59\3, Assistant Resident Magistrate Hopefield 
to the Magistrate Malmesbury, 24 February 1909 & G.H. O'Connell to the 
Governor forwarding the Petition of Farmers Resident in the District of 
Malmesbury, 4 February 1909. 
~ Cape Archives; PAN 69, K 
forwarding the Petition of Farmers 
February 1909. 
84 Ibid. 
59\3, G.H. O'Connell to the Governor 
Resident in the District of Malmesbury, 4 
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interests of the Sandveld landlords thus conflicted with the 
rantsoenvis and labour needs of their Malmesbury neighbours, 
forcing the colonial 
stance on the set net. 
state to adopt a more accommodationist 
To this end a committee of the newly created Fishery Board was 
sent to St Helena Bay in June 1908 to conduct yet another on site 
~ 
investigation ~ . The two members of the committee, Williams and 
Daneel, spent a week on the west coast collecting evidence 
between Langebaan and the Berg River mouth%. Both were firm 
believers in the need to modernise inshore fishing methods and i n 
their view: 
"(T)he very acute stage at which matters had arrived at the 
Berg River was really due to disputes between the fishermen 
living on the Malmesbury side of the [Berg) River (a large 
number of whom are Italians) who are mostly either direct 
employes [sic) of, or suppliers of fish to, Messrs. Stephan 
Brothers, and who really are the more important fishermen, 
and persons dwelling on the Piquetberg side, mainly farmers 
combining fishing with their agricultural operations, and 
coloured people"ITT 
Their self-proclaimed bias in favour of the set net was premised 
on its technical superiority to the traditional trek seine. As 
they explained: 
"With the former 
will bring in a 
maintaining an 
it is reasonably certain that the fishermen 
fair quantity of fish from day to day, 
even supply and consequently receiving a 
~ Cape Archives; PAN 69, K 59\3, Secretary of the Fishery Board to the 
Under Secretary for Agriculture, 24 June 1909. 
% Cape Archives; PAN 8, A 120\b\48, G. Williams to J. Gilchrist, 9 March 
1909. Williams was Chief Clerk of the Departrrent of Agriculture and Secretary 
of the Fishery Advisory Board. He recommended John Daneel, an employee of the 
General Post Office in Cape Town, for appointrrent to the Board on the basis of 
his being Ha IOC)St enthusiastic fisherman of over 20 years standing, owning his 
own boat and in daily touch with the rrernbers of the fishing communityH. 
87 cai>e Archives; PAN 69, K 59\3, G. Williams and J. Daneel to the Under 
Secretary for Agriculture, 3 August 1909, p.2. 
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steady price. While with the trek net it may happen that 
no trek may be able to be carried out for several days, 
the men thus earning nothing, or on the other hand, 
phenomenal trawls are often made, the market is 
overstocked and prices consequently fall, exemplifying the 
old saying ~a feast or a famine' only it is mostly the 
latter" 88 • 
As a consequence 
fostered a better 
of its greater productivity the set net also 
class of fishermen. The Italian fishermen 
earned on 
counterparts. 
average more than double that of their local 
These high earnings, coupled with "notoriously 
frugal and temperate" habits, allowed many Italians to set 
seine 
other 
themselves up as independent boat 
fishermen were ever able to cto 89 • 
owners, something 
The trek seine, on 
few 
the 
hand, in addition to its destabilising effect on the rantsoenvis 
market, was held to have a "bad moral effect" on the fishermen 
who used it. "The long hours spent hanging idly about are not 
conducive to building up 
investigators noted%. 
industrious habits," the two 
Despite their enthusiasm for the set net they were forced to 
concede that its use was detrimental to seine fishing and that 
whatever its advantages, "it will be a considerable time before 
their use becomes general, and for certain purposes the trek net 
will never be superceded" 91 • Compromise was called for and, while 
they regarded it as essential to lift the burden of illegality 
from the set net, they also recognised the need to safeguard the 
interests of the trek fishermen, at least in the short term. They 
thus recommended "balkanising" the Bay into an Exclusive Trek 
Seine Fishing Zone (ETSFZ) and a Free Fishing Zone (FFZ) where 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid., pp.2-3. 
% Ibid., p.3. 
91 Ibid. 
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set net fishing could take place unhindered. It was no 
coincidence that the proposed boundaries of the two zones 
corresponded exactly to the district boundaries of Piketberg and 
Malmesbury. The ETSFZ stretched from the joint boundary at the 
Berg River mouth north to the farm Zoutkuil encompassing the 
entire Piketberg coastline of St Helena Bay, while the FFZ to t he 
south included the whole southern shore of the Bay 92 • The proposed 
solution thus exactly mirrored the different relations o f 
production in the fisheries of the two districts and attempted t o 
facilitate the 
fisheries while 
transformation of the Malmesbury 
simultaneously protecting the trek 
merchant 
s eine 
fishermen and their farmer landlords along the Piketberg coas t 
from the corrosive effects of this transformation. F in a l 
agreement was hammered out in the courthouse at Laaiplek between 
the committee, Stephan Brothers and a "thoroughly representat i ve 
throng" of interested parties~. Williams and Daneel believed the 
agreement ensured "that neither party will be prejudiced in any 
way but, 
pursue 
on the other hand, will gain advantages and be able to 
the respective modes of fishing undisturbed"~. The 
agreement was gazetted in September 1909, and by the end of 
November beacons . had been erected to mark the southern and 
northern boundaries of the ETSFZ~. Thereafter the conflict along 
the shores of St Helena Bay went into abeyance. 
92 Ibid., p.4 and HResume of RecommendationsH. 
93 Ibid., p.4. The two reported that the Hleading menH at Berg River were 
Hevidently inclined to 'fight shy' of the meeting#. 
94 Ibid., pp.4-5. 
~ Cape of Good Hope Government Gazette, Proclamation 385 of 1909, .14 
September 1909 and Cape Archives; PAN 69, K 59\3, Civil Commissioner Piketberg 
to the Under Secretary for Agriculture, 20 September 1909 & 22 November 1909. 
The Civil Commissioner supervised the erection of two 24-foot tarred masts 
with two white cross-pieces at the top, one above the high water mark half a 
mile south of the Berg River ~uth and second on a dune on the farm Zoutkuil. 
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3.2 THE STEPHAN PLAN 
The successful implementation of the 1909 agreement was, in large 
measure, due to a change of heart on the part of merchant 
capital. Stephan Brothers, from being the most vocif~rous 
opponent of the set net, played a central role in drafting and 
brokering the new modus vivendi which opened up the Malmesbury 
coast to the Italians. Williams and Daneel reported that "Stephan 
Brothers local representatives all spoke very highly of the 
Italian fishermen" and were instrumental in formulating the 
legislative division of the coast in such a way as to allow the 
Italians unhindered fishing along the Bay's southern shores 96 • The 
firm's belated conversion to the set net was prompted by i ts 
gradual move away from a reliance on snoek fishing and the 
rantsoenvis trade towards the production of canned crayfish for 
export to France. By 1909 the export potential of the St Helena 
Bay snoek fishery had been undermined by long years of resource 
scarcity97 • This, coupled with the internal crisis within Stephan 
Brothers brought about by the deaths of Carel and Hendrik and the 
end of the coastal grain trade, made restructuring of the firm ' s 
west coast operations imperative to its continued survival. It 
was in this context that the new head of the firm, Henry Stephan, 
set about expanding its involvement in crayfish production. 
The crayfish was regarded as "a food for the pbor" during the 
19th Century and used as bait for catching other types of fish~. 
By the 1890s, however, a number of factories · had been established 
9b Cape Archives; PAN 69, K 59\3, G. Williams and J. Daneel to the Under 
Secretary for Agriculture, 3 August 1909, p.3. 
~ Cape Archives; PAN 69, K 59\3, A. Cripps to the Secretary of the 
Fishery Advisory Board, 10 July 1911 and PAN 69, K 59\3, Alleged Diminution of 
Fish on the Coast of Halmesbury, Report by Resident Magistrate Malmesbury, 
November 1913, p.5. 
~ Report of the Fisheries Committee 1892, Evidence of C. Schroeder, p.18 
and W. Wardlaw Thompson The Sea Fisheries of the Cape Colony, p.48. 
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in Cape Town producing canned crayfish for the European market. 
All of these early attempts had met with financial disaster due 




the canning process and competition from 
the lucrative French market~. After 1902, 
the canning industry was revived on a small scale by a 
number of expatriates with experience in the French, Canadian and 
British fish canning industries. Their use of improved canning 
methods and the decline of the American lobster resource after 
1~ 1905 gave the Cape industry a new lease of life ~ 
The Table Bay crayfish beds had been heavily fished during the 
1890s leading many of the new canneries established in the 1900s 
to locate outside Cape Town at Hout Bay and Saldanha Bay. By 1909 
there were two canning plants at the latter locale. One, the 
North Bay Canning Company, owned by a Canadian and a Briton and 
the other, the Saldanha Bay Canning Company, owned by a Latvian 
tinsmith and a local coaster captain 10~ In view of the restricted 
fishing-range of oar- and sail-powered craft, the canneries were 
compelled to locate as closely as possible to the resource. Thus 
in 1908 the North Bay Canning Company leased a site at Steenbergs 
Cove from Stephan Brothers for an additional factory to tap the 
crayfish beds at the Bay 1~ The North Bay Canning Company's 
factory at Steenbergs Cove was forced to shut down for repairs in 
1910 after being battered by heavy seas, but re-opened the 
following year and in 1912 produced some 10 200 cases of canned 
~ S.C. Townell HThe Crayfish Industry of the Cape West CoastH, pp.10-27 
for the early history of crayfi~h canning in the Cape Colony. 
100 Ibid., pp.28-49. 
IOI Ibid., pp.28-30. Also E. & B. Silverman Merrr>irs of a Pioneer in the 
Fish Canning Industry of South Africa. 
102 Cape Archives; PAN 40, A 120\e\15, Merrr>randum on Crayfish Canning 
Factories, n.d. and PAN 84(1), A 120\x, General Information Regarding the 
Fishing Industry Prepared for the Assistant Provincial Secretary: Crawfish, 
c.1913. 
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crayfish valued at more than t18 ooo1~ Stephan Brothers' failed 
attempt at crayfish canning at Granger Bay in 1890 probably 
accounts for the firm's initial reluctance to establish its own 
factory. In the interim, however, the North Bay Canning Company's 
plant opened up a new market for crayfish, which the firm was 
eager to exploit1~ Crayfish fishing was concentrated in spring 
and early summer as a result of the legislatively closed season, 
snoek fishing and heavy winter seas along the Cape coast. The 
crustaceans were caught with hoop nets baited with fish and 
lowered to the seabed where they were left attached to a buoy or 
float for a period before being retrieved. Fishermen worked i n 
pairs from a dinghy, one man rowing and the other placing and 
hauling the nets 1~ This new fishery competed directly with beach 
seining for labour during summer, the prime fishing season for 
both. From the fishermen's point of view beach seining was the 
far preferable occupation as it allowed. them a share of the catch 
for subsistence or sale. The share system, however, was entirely 
inappropriate to crayfish fishing, there being no local market 
for crayfish outside of the factories owing to crayfish's 
unsuitability for transport and storage as rantsoenvis. To forego 
trek for crayfish fishing was thus to lose all control over the 
product of labour in return for a cash payment per hundred f i sh 
landed and greater dependence on credit and free housing. 
The Italians, on the other hand, were ideally suited to Stephan 
Brothers' needs in this regard. Not only were they well 
accustomed to working in pairs using dinghies to set and clear 
their nets, but their independence from merchant or farmer 
I03 Ibid. 
1~ Cape Archives; PAN 38, ~ 120\e\5 (2), Under Secretary for 
to the Resident Magistrate Halmesbury, 12 November 1909 & North 
Company to the Secretary for Agriculture, 12 February 1910. 
Agriculture 
Bay Canning 
1~ S.C. Townell #The Crayfish Industry of the Cape West Coast 1874-1947#, 
pp.56-57. 
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control made them immediately available to the firm for crayfish 
fishing. This explains the rapprochement between Stephan 
Brothers' managers and the Italians at the Bay noted by Williams 
and Daneel in 1909. It also sheds a different light on the 
"hostile disposition towards the set net" encountered by the 
committee amongst the firm's "coloured" employees. The two 
investigators dismissed such sentiments as unimportant, noting 
that "these men were merely servants, fishing with set or trek 
nets at the discretion of their employer" 1~ It was precisely 
their status as servants which prevented the firm's seine 
fishermen from resisting their employer's incorporation of the 
Italian set netters, rapidly undermining their last vestige of 
independence and compelling them to accept employment as crayfish 
fishermen. By 1913, four years after the balkanisation of the 
Bay, the dissolution of seine fishing along its southern shores 
was all but complete. At Paternoster it was reported that: 
"There had been no trek of harders ••• for two years owing to 
there beong [sic] no fish inside the bay, these being 
prevented from entering by set nets spanned across the 
channels in the openings in the reefs across the entrance" 1~. 
Stephan Brothers had been compelled to advance some llO 000 in 
credit to their fishermen as a result. At Britannia Bay one of 
the two trek seine boats had to be sent away "as the fishermen 
were starving owing to the fish being driven away by set nets and 
there being no catch" 1~ Stephans' ex-manager at Stompneus Bay, 
John McLachlan, reported as many as 38 boats carrying around ten 
set nets each anchored at Stompneus Bay in the years just prior 
I06 Cape Archives; PAN 69, K 59\3, G. Williams and J. Daneel to the Under 
Secretary for Agriculture, 3 August 1909, p.3. 
IO? Cape Archive~; PAN 69, K 59\3, Alleged Diminution of Fish on the Coast 
of Halmesbury, Report by Resident Magistrate Halmesbury, November 1913, pp.4-
5. 
l~ Ibid., p.7. 
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to his . retirement. McLachlan's estimates were wrong on both 
counts, but the hegemony of the set net and the Italians along 
the Malmesbury coast of the Bay was undisputed by 1913. 
TABLE 3.2 Italian Dominance of the Malmesbury Coast: 
Boat Ownership on the Southern Shores of St Helena Bay, 1913 1~ 
-----------------------------------------------------------------







Stephan Bros 1 2 23 6 135 3 23 
North Bay cc 1 2 10 
Italians 10 13 13 15 137 3 118 
Others 4 1 5 7 48 1 2 0 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL 16 16 43 28 330 7 171 
The legislative assimilation of the Italian set net fishermen 
thus enabled Stephan Brothers to restructure relations of 
production to suit the demands of crayfish fishing without any 
direct confrontation with fishing labour. The decline of seine 
fishing appeared to be the result of a general fish scarcity 
aggravated by state indifference rather than the needs and 
designs of merchant capital. Without the backing of their 
employer, the firm's fishermen were powerless to halt their own 
proletarianisation and were forced off the beach and onto the sea 
to fish for crayfish or to work as wage labour in the canneries. 
The seine fishermen along the Berg River were protected from a 
similar process of dissolution by their landlords' rentier 
interest in the fisheries and the ETSFZ. Paper regulatio~s, 
however, were no deterrent against a cutter poaching at night in 
unpoliced waters. Thus, as the beach seine fishery in the Free 
1~ Cape Archives; PAN 70, K 59\15, Fishing Ordinance Registration of 
Nets, c.1913, Magistrate Halmesbury to the Provincial Secretary forwarding 
List of Boats in the Hopefield Sub-District, 8 January 1913 & List of Fishing 
Boats, etc called for by letter from Provincial Secretary, A59b, dated 11th 
November 1913, addressed to Magistrate Halmesbury. 
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Fisbing Zone collapsed under pressure from the set net, the 
Piketberg trek seine fishermen consolidated and defended their 
exclusive right to the river and sea coast north of the river 
mouth against encroachment. In 1910 W.A. Kotze reported that the 
Italians were trespassing in the trek seine fishing area using an 
adapted form of set net containing a pouch, in an apparent 
attempt to exploit the 1909 legislation's failure to define a 
"trek seine" w: A similar legal loophole threatened the new 
status: quo the following year when the new provincial state 
consolidated all the colonial state fisheries regulations, 
including Proclamation 385 of 1909, ' t ' 1 d ' 111 1n o a sing e or 1nance ·· . 
The amended regulations: governed the territorial waters: of the 
province, defined as extending as far as the highest spring tide. 
This was taken to exclude the waters of the Berg River and the 
Italians took advantage of the sloppy legalese to again fish with 
set nets in the main channels of the river. Early in 1912 Kotze 
reported that: 
"The Italians were trespassing on the night of 30th Jan. I 
went so far as to throw three stones at a boat and hit the 
boat with last stone and damaged one plank and nearly killed 
one of the boys while they (boats) were busy trekking with 
their seines. If Government does not interfere into the net 
business there will be a fighting on the sea between Italians 
and niggers for it is a shame the way the Italians: are 
trespassing" 112 
A petition to Cape Town and the intervention of the Magistrate of 
. Piketberg led to the passing of a further regulation extending 
the definition of territorial waters to include the Berg River as 
far as its ebb and flow at Wilgenboschdrift some 40 miles from 
!lO Cape Archives; 1\HFD, 4\1\6\2, W.A. Kotze to the Assistant Resident 
Magistrate Hopefield, 26 September 1910. 
i 11 
"' Cape of Good Hope Provincial Gazette, Ordinance No.12 of 1911 To 
Consolidate and Anw:?nd the Fisheries Laws, 1 August 1911. 
112 Cape Archives; PAN 68, K 59\1, W.A. Kotze to the Administrator, 12 
February 1912. 
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the mouth II~ This determined opposition mirrored the economic 
concerns of the different groups along the river - the desire of 
local farmers to protect their rerit interests, fear of 
competition on the part of independent boatowners and the 
determination of tenant fishermen to resist proletarianisation. 
Rather than an innate conservatism therefore, the Berg River 
fisheries' resistance to the set net was an attempt to conserve 
the existing relations of production from dissolution. This was 
evidenced by the extent to which the set net was incorporated 
into the riverine fisheries. 
TABLE 3.3 Ownership in the Piketberg Fisheries, 1912 114 
Owner No 
Stephan Bros 1 
Seine Fisheries 16 



































By 1912 there were thus more than 150 set nets in use at the 
river, rising to 228 by 1920 11~ The majority of these nets were 
used for subsistence fishing along the river's backwaters, often 
113 Cape Archives; PAN 68, K 59\1, W.A. Kotze to the Civil Commissioner 
Piketberg forwarding the Petition of Poor White Fishermen Against the Set and 
Drift Nets in the Berg River, 12 April 1912, Magistrate of Piketberg to the 
Provincial Secretary, 17 April 1912 & 3 July 1912; PAN 70 (2), K 59\12, Civil 
Commissioner Piketberg to the Provincial Secretary, 19 June 1912 and Cape of 
Good Hope Provincial Gazette, Regulation 160 of 1912. 
ll4 Cape Archives; PAN 75, K77\1, Fisheries Ordinance 1911: Statistics 
District Piketberg, 14 February 1912. 
IIS Cape Archives; PAN 22, A 120\b\158, Abstract from Register Showing the 
Numbers and Various Kinds of Nets in Use at the Different Fishing Stations in 
the Cape Province during the Year 1920. 
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as an adjunct to seine 11 · fishing·~ This co-eKistence was subject 
to the undisputed primacy of seine fishing, a dominance 
increasingly dependent on state edict. The balkanisation of the 
Bay after 1909 was thus the state's attempt to accommodate the 
relations of production which arose as a result of the historical 
development of the fisheries in the two districts. The move 
towards factory production along the Bay's southern shores, 
however, dictated that the solution to the set net war negotiated 
in 1909 was at best temporary. The Italians had shown their 
willingness to poach in the ETSFZ almost from its inception and, 
in the absence of stepped-up policing, such incursions were bound 
to intensify given a continued fish scarcity. The resource crisis 
also presented opportunities for merchant capital to further its 
own agenda, as the incorporation of the set net and consequent 
decline of trek seining along the Malmesbury coast after 1909 
showed. By 1913, Stephan Brothers' involvement in the crayfish 
industry was changing from the supply of raw material to actual 
production and in this conteKt the firm launched a direct assault 
on the ETSFZ and the seine fisheries along the river under the 
guise of conserving the fish resource. 
In July 1913 Stephan Brothers forwarded a report to the 
Provincial Administrator from the firm's inspector of fisheries, 
J.F~ le Noury 11~ The latter advanced a radical new theory to 
eKplain the decline in the fish supply at the Bay over the past 
llb Cape Archives; PAN 68; K 59\1, J. Paxton to the Provincial Secretary, 
2 August 1915. Trek seine fishing was only possible every six hours with the 
ebb and flow of the tide and providing there were fish on the trek. Seine 
fisher~n therefore had considerable ti~ on their hands to engage in set 
netting in the river's backwaters on their own account. 
117 Cape Archives; PAN 69, K 59\3, L. Raphaely [Stephan Brothers] to the 
Administrator forwarding the Report by J.F. le Noury on the Destruction of 
Fish at St Helena Bay, 26 July 1913. 
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decade 11~ While conventional wisdom blamed the set net, Le Noury 
alleged that the real culprits were the trek seine fishermen 
fishing unhindered in the main fish breeding ground along the 
west coast, the Berg River. He claimed to have seen hauls on the 
river estimated at around 50 000 fish of which only 3 000 were 
fit for sale and the rest had to be buried in trenches along the 
banks. Le Noury concluded, "I consider it high time that steps 
are taken to amend the present state of affairs, and to protect 
both fish and fishermen in the near future, and to do this all 
fishing should be stopped inside the Berg River Mouth" 11~ 
TABLE 3.4: Stephan Brothers Declining Beach Seine Catches, 
1880-1913 1~ 
YEARS AVERAGE NUMBER OF FISH PER ANNUM 
Harders % Bokkoms# % Total 




1895-99 68 300 189 675 257 975 
1900-04 35 948 - 90.0 95 318 - 99.0 131 266 - 96.5 
1905-09 45 697 + 27.1 ·115 788 + 21.5 161 485 + 23.0 
1910-13 17 306 -164.1 51 439 -125.1 68 745 -134.9 
#=Immature harder (mullet). 
Henry Stephan, embellishing on the Le Noury report, maintained 
that the Berg River "affords great possibilities for breeding and 
experimental purposes [it] would afford a splendid site for 
118 Cape Archives; PAN 69, K 59\5, H. Stephan to the Administrator 
forwarding figures as to the Quantity of Fish Netted by Messrs Stephan 
Brothers at St Helena Bay 1880-1910, 23 August 1913 & L. Raphaely to the 
Administrator forwarding similar figures for the years 1911-1913, 8 September 
1913. 
119 Cape Archives; PAN 69, K 59\5, L. Raphaely to the Administrator, 
forwarding the Report by J.F. Le Noury on the Destruction of Fish at St Helena 
Bay, 25 July 19~3. 
1~ Own calculations based on data contained in Cape Provincial 
Administration Marine Biological Report No.2 1914, pp.77-80. 
113 
the '"! stocking of Salmon" 'L . In his opinion, banning all fishing in 
the river 
"would be far more preferable and beneficial to our fishing 
industry, which ought to be an enormous asset to this 
country, than the laws regulating the usage of d{fferent 
kinds of nets in various districts which are absolutely 
impossible to control without involving great expense by 
j'Yl 
having water police"'-'-. 
Stephan rejected any inference that he was "trying to injure the-
small man" with his proposal 1~ The small man (seine fishermen), 
he pointed out, blamed the set net for the fish scarcity, but a 
minimum mesh size for set nets was laid down by law and the so -
called small men themselves used set nets in the river. Rather it 
was their seines which were the real cause of declining catches. 
Minimum mesh legislation was useless: for 





meshes closed, trapping small fish inside. This: was: especially 
true of treks: in the river where distances were much shorter and 
the chance of escape for immature fish consequently less. He thus 
advocated a five-year ban on all net fishing in the river within 
a one mile radius: of its mouth on the seaward side. In addition, 
he also proposed that set net fishing be prohibited from Great 
Paternoster to Baboon Point (ie the whole of St Helena Bay). 
quite clear that his: plan would entail equal Stephan was: 
"hardship" for Italians: and the seine fishermen on the river 1~ 
Thus, rather than reviving the set net-trek seine conflict laid 
to rest in 1909, he claimed to be acting in a non-partisan 
121 Cape Archives; PAN 69, K 59\3, H. Stephan to the Administrator, 23 
August 1913. 
122 Ibid. 
123 · Ibid. 
124 Ibid. 
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fashion to protect the resource and the fishing industry as a 
whole. 
The Stephan Plan, however, while superficially about the 
diminution in the fish resource, was not primarily concerned with 
conservation. 
Stephan Plan, 
Timing is crucial to deciphering intent and the 
far from a belated conversion to the need for 
resource management, was inextricably tied to the firm's 
transition to crayfish canning at the Bay. In 1913 Stephan 
Brothers commenced canning crayfish at its new Paternoster 
factory, processing 52 000 crayfish in just two months o f 
operation in 1913 and 1.7 million fish in its first full seas o n 
1·"'\C 
the fa 11 owing year ,L: In 1915 it opened a second factory at 
Steen bergs 
' ~6 Cove 'L. These developments necessitated the creation 
The Ber-g River of a crayfish fishing and factory labour force. 
fisheries represented a potential labour supply in this regar-d, 
but one insulated against the proletarianising effects of the set 
net through its alliance with local agriculture and the 
legislative protection afforded it by the state. The Stephan Plan 
aimed to reverse this situation by having the state drive the 
trek seine fishermen out along the river in the name of 
conservation. After five years, legislation would no longer 
matter for the Piketber-g seine fishery would have gone the same 
way as the Malmesbury fishery after 1909. The plan's accompanying 
prohibition on set net fishing recalled the demands of Carel 
Stephan twenty years earlier, but with a very different goal in 
mind. As producers canned crayfish with substantial 
investments in plant and machinery, Stephan Brothers needed to 
125 Cape Archives; PAN 37, A120\e\3(1), Return showing the number of 
crayfish captured and the number of boats employed in the capture of such fish 
during the years 1913 to 1918 inclusive: Stephan Brothers, 19 February 1919. 
126 Ibid. Also Cape Archives; PAN 40, A 120\e\15, Crayfish Canning 
Factories, n.d. and PAN 84 (1); A 120\x, General Information Regarding the 
Fishing Industry Prepared for the Assistant Provincial Secretary, c.1913. 
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concentrate the precious fishing time during spring and summer 
exclusively on crayfish. By banning the set net outright from the 
Bay the Italian fishermen would have no alternative, but to fish 
for crayfish. The implicit removal of the legislativ~ division 
which this entailed, further benefitted the firm's crayfish 
enterprise by allowing unhindered movement of labour and craft in 
inshore waters. The Stephan Plan was thus a bold attempt to 
reorganise production across boundaries at St Helena Bay and 
consequently had little to do with conservation, as the "small 
men" whose labour power it was ultimately about, all too clearly 
understood. 
In September 1913 a meeting took place at Velddrift farm on the 
Berg River attended by some 200 fishermen and farmers. The 
meeting was chaired by F.F. Nimb, local Justice of the Peace and 
seine 
1'l"' 
fishery ownet·"- 1• The topic of discussion was - "a rumour 
afloat that certain persons on the Malmesbury side of the Berg 
River have approached the Government with a petition to close the 
f i she r i es " 1~ By September, the Stephan Plan was more than a 
rumour. The police had canvassed opinion among boatowners and 
fishermen in late August and the details of the proposal before 
the provincial state were thus well known 1~ This was clear from 
Nimb's opening remarks to the assembled throng rejecting the 
al.legations that small fi~h were destroyed by trek seines in the 
river and pointing out that a minimum mesh size for seines was 
laid down by law whic~ prevented such destruction. Other speakers 
127 HThe Berg River - A Question of Fish - Meeting of 
Times, 11 September 1913 and HFishing in the Berg River 
Ru.rrr>ured ClosingH in South African News 13 September 1913. 
ProtestH in Cape 
Protest Against 
128 "The Berg River - A Question of Fish - Meeting of Protest" in Cape 
Times, 11 September 1913. 
1~ Cape Archives; PAN 69, K 59\3, Detached Assistant Magistrate Hopefield 
to the Magistrate Malmesbury forwarding Report by Sergeant Baker on the 
Protection of Fish in Berg River, 29 August 1913. 
116 
dismissed the notion of the river as a breeding ground for sea 
fish. Freddie Tallie, a prominent boat owner and builder, pointed 
out that the current in the river was too strong to permit 
spawning. A certain Mr Pickstone concurred, stating that "The 
river was so small and the current so strong that wind and 
current would carry away the eggs if they were all laid in the 
river, so that it was 
~ 11) 
moment" · -~ The majority 
senseless to allow such an assertion for a 
of speakers, however, were less concerned 
with the rationale behind the planned closure than its 
implications. There were reportedly "over a thousand souls who 
had to make a living out of the river" and some 27 boats suitab l e 
only for river fishing. The river was also the only place "where 
a poor man could catch fish with ease and safety" and its 
threatened closure would result in widespread disaster and 
starvation 13~ Jan Bindeman, a man with 53 years' experience on 
the river, expressed the disbelief and sense of injustice felt by 
many of his fellows: 
"He said he could not understand why people 
must oppress one another, nor why the bread 
should be taken out of the poor man's mouth · 
in such a deceitful way. It was the rich men 
who now wished to drive out the poor 
fisherman and where would the poor children 
obtain their living and their education if 
the river were closed to these people" 1~ 
Gert Visser, a farmer from Paarde Dam who came specially to 
register his protest, was similarly dumbfounded and "could not 
believe that 
i n j us t i c e " 1~ 
the 
Swept up 
Government would permit such glaring 
in a mood of heightened indignation and 
1~ "The Berg River - A Question of Fish - Meeting of Protestn in ~ 





anger, the meeting carried a proposal by Nimb, seconded by 
Tallie, "unanimously amid cheers" which dismissed Stephan's claim 
that fish bred in the river as "sheer invention" and called on 
the Government to institute a "thorough enquiry" before taking 
any 
,~4 
action t.) . 
The coverage given the Velddrift meeting in the Cape Town press 
brought the simmering debate about Stephan's proposal into the 
public arena. At the end of September 1913 a letter appeared on 
the Cape Times under the nom de plume "A Fishery Preserver" :35_ 
"Preserver" dismissed the Velddrift gathering as "one of those 
indignation meetings which happen all over the world whenever any 
attempt 
that the 
is made to preserve fish" and defied anyone to dispute 
Berg River was a spawning ground and nursery for 
important commercial species such as harder 136• Mesh size limits 
to protect immature fish from capture, he were useless 
maintained, given the steady increase in fishing pressure on the 
river. For this reason, 
"Preserver's" opinion, 
closure was the only solution and 
"No one who understands fishery matters and who is acquainted 
with the facts would for a moment hesitate in prohibiting the 
use of nets in such a nursery for immature fish as the Berg 
River. That the destroyers of small fish will make an uproar 
on this subject goes without sayingl'l;Ji'. 
in 
1~ Ibid and Cape Archives; PAN 69, K 59\3, P.J. Retief to the Minister of 
Interior forwarding copy of the Resolution, 16 September 1913. 
135 Letter from " A Fishery PreserverH on HPreservation of Fish in the 
Berg RiverH in Cape Times, 26 September 1913. #Fishery PreserverH was alroost 
certainly Henry Stephan. "Preserver's" argument in favour of closure was a 
summarised version of Stephan's case as presented to the Administrator in 
personal correspondence. the previous roonth. 
136 Letter from HA Fishery PreserverH on HPreservation of Fish in the Berg 
RiverH in Cape Times, 26 September 1913. 
lJ? Ibid. 
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A month later a similar article endorsing the Stephan Plan 
appeared in the Afrikaans newspaper Ons Land 1~ The author, who 
again preferred the anonymity of a nom de plume "J.S.", berated 
the Government for neglecting its duty to protect 
continue in the 
a national 
asset by allowing netting to river to the 
detriment of the fish resource. "J. s." also questioned the 
desirability of river fishing for its practitioners. These were 
chiefly what he termed "poor whites" who were quite capable of 
fishing the sea, but "simply wish to keep the river as a back-
door when the sea is too rough or if they are unlucky in their 
catch in the sea, or perhaps when they do not feel inclined to go 
to the 
11Q 
sea'"·-~ By refusing to c 1 ose the river the Government was 
not only permitting the destruction of vast quantities o f 
immature fish to continue, but also encouraging the "systematic 
developing of the poor uneducated whites to the level of the 
fish and coloured people"14(: Closure would thus both protect the 
"force the strong young men who are growing up along the river to 
look for a better and more elevated occupation", presumably in 
the emergent canning industry 141• 
The provincial state once again found itself in the unwelcome 
position of arbitrator. As one internal memorandum nervously put 
it, "out of this multiplicity of statement and conflict of view 
it is difficult to find a solution, and someone is bound to be 
1~ J.S. HOnze Visserij: Versuim van het GovernernentH in Ons Land, 30 
October 1913 and Cape Archives; PAN 69, K 59\3, Provincial Secretary to the 
'Resident Magistrates of Piketberg and Malrnesbury, 4 November 1913. Stephan 
Brothers' hand was once again in evidence here. HJ.S.H used identical 
phraseology and argument to that of Henry Stephan and was clearly indebted to 
them for information if not actual copy. Henry Stephan also felt it 
appropriate to draw the provincial state's attention to the article. 





hit by whatever is done .. l4~ The Berg River fishermen had 
explicitly demanded a "thorough enquiry" from Cape Town and 
"Fishery Preserver" singled out Gilchrist as "a gentleman well 
qua 1 i f i e d to adv i s e the au tho r i t i e s " on the matte r 14~ I n a no - w i n 
situation, fearful of a resurgence in the old seine-set net 
conflict and . in need of objective evidence to decide the case, 
the provincial state requested the magistrates of Malmesbury and 
Piketberg as well as its Fishery Advisor, Gilchrist, t o 
investigate. The magistrates were the first to visit the Bay in 
November 1913. They found the old tensions between set netters 
and seine fishermen still very much alive, which greatly hampered 
their task as "The evidence given ••• varied considerably and the 
witnesses contradicted each other freely" 1~ Faced with such an 
array of partisan opinion, they relied instead on their own 
experimental fishing in the river to make their report. On the 
basis of one trek, they concluded that fish spawned in the river 
and spent a period of their early life there and that trek seines 
destroyed large quantities of these fish when used in the river. 
As they put it: 
"to our minds it is immaterial whether fish 
actually spawn in the river or whether in 
their earliest infancy take sanctuary there. 
The river if not the breeding ground is 
certainly the rearing ground and should be 
closed to all kinds of nets for a period of 
three years at least if not permanently"!~ 
142 Cape Archives; PAN 69, K 59\3, Merrorandum Berg River: Netting in and 
Near Mouth: Apparent Diminution of Fish Supply, n.d. 
143 HThe Berg River - A Question of Fish - Meeting of ProtestHin ~ 
Ti1TEs, 11 September 1913 and Letter from HA Fishery PreserverH on 
"Preservation of Fish in the Berg River" in Cape Til'IEs, 26 September 1913. 
l« Cape Archives; PAY 69, K 59\3, Alleged Diminution of Fish Supply on 
Piketberg Coast. Protection of Fish in Berg River, Enquiry held at Roode Baai 
on 21st-24th November 1913, Joint Report by Hr F. Shaw RH of Piketberg and Mr 
F. Wrensch, RH of Mal1TEsbury, p.1. 
145 Ibid., pp.3-4. 
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) 
They further maintained that "The Berg River fishermen should not 
suffer too severely" from such a closure as they still had the 
snoek season, beach trekking and the option of crayfish fishing 
to subsist on 1~ The magistrates thus recommended a permanent 
prohibition on the use of all nets except seines in St Helena Bay 
and a three year moratorium on all net fishing in the Berg River 
and to a mile either side of its mouth. A fishery officer should 
be stationed at the river to make monthly treks over the three 
year period to determine whether fish did indeed spawn in the 
river. If this was proved conclusively then the ban should become 
permanent. In addition they also advocated further controls on 
beach seining along the coast, including a larger minimum mesh 
size, limitations on the length of hauling lines and the 
imposition of a closed season from 1 September to 31 January each 
' 4"' year 1 · 1• Their report thus endorsed all the key points of the 
Stephan Plan and, if implemented, promised the fundamental 
reorganisation of the Bay fishing economy for the second time in 
five years. 
The provincial state, however, was wary of acting on the 
magistrates' reports alone, wanting to legitimate any action with 
scientific proof. For this it looked to Gilchrist. The latter 
only reached the Berg River in February 1914. Having read the 
magistrates' report and its recommendations, Gilchrist set about 
conducting experimental treks of his own. His findings were --inconclusive at best and cast serious doubt on the assumptions 
underpinning both the Stephan Plan and the magistrates' findin~s. 
Gilchrist concentrated on the commercially important harder and 
found no evidence to substantiate the claim that the fish spawned 
in the river, pointing out that this could only be ascertained 
with the aid of special nets and a microscope as the spawn was 
146 -Ibid., p.4. 
147 Ibid., pp.7-9. 
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invisible to the naked eye. The presence of small harders in the 
river was also not evidence of spawning, in his opinion, being 
more likely the result of tide action 1~ Despite this, Gilchrist 
acknowledged that "it is chiefly young immature fish that are 
caught in the river", but pointed to what he called a "greater 
source of danger" 
called bokkoms in 
to the fish resource - the catching of 
14Q 
so-
the Bay · ~ These were not a small species of 
harder as was commonly assumed, but immature fish of the same 
species. Referring to the catch figures supplied by Stephan 
Brothers, he noted that, "In the matter of the destruction of 
immature fish the sea fishermen are probably as blamable as the 
~ C' (\ 
River fishermen" ·J-: In view of this and the absence of any more 
reliable statistics, he did not feel able to recommend the 
closure of the river fisheries on the grounds that they were 
destroying the fish stock, advocating a size limit for the 
different fish species or a larger minimum mesh size for nets as 
mo re appropriate interim so 1 uti ons 151• 
Gilchrist's report discouraged the provincial state from 
proceeding any further with the Stephan Plan. Its enthusiasm was 
also sapped by the anticipated resistance of the Berg River 
As the Provincial Secretary cautioned, "[A]ny communities 15~ 
substantial advance in the direction indicated will create a 
1~ Cape Archives; PAN 69, K 59\3, J. Gilchrist to the Provincial 
Secretary forwarding his Report on the Alleged Destruction of Fish and Fish 
Spawn in the Berg River, Piketberg District, February 1914. 
149 Ibid., p.4. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Ibid., p.5. Also Cape Province Marine Biological Report No.2, 1914 
[C.P.6-'14], pp.75-84. 
152 Cape Archives; PAN 69, K 59\3, L. Mansergh to the Provincial Secretary 
forwarding report on South West Coasts: Piketberg and Malmesbury: Alleged 
Diminution of Fish Supply: Destruction of Immature Fish: Netting in the Berg 
River, etc, 11 June 1914. 
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tremendous outcry from practically all affected ••• the matter is 
one of a character which calls for serious consideration and 
tactful introduction and is a case in which rushing tactics must 
be 
1~ 
avoided" ,J--;_ In keeping with this cautious approa~h he 
suggested appointing a fishery officer at Berg River to monitor 
the situation . th . t . 154 1n e 1n er1m ~ Fear of antagonising the vested 
interests at the river, a lack of scientific evidence and limited 
funds ensured that nothing further was done on the matter and the 
Stephan Plan was quietly shelved with the advent of the First 
World War which imposed new financial constraints on the 
provincial state's already limited fisheries budget and sparked 
the biggest boom on the west coast since the heady days o f the 
snoek export trade in the 1870s and 1880s 1~ The canned crayfish 
boom reinforced and entrenched the existing divisions between the 
Malmesbury and Piketberg fisheries codified in the 1909 
balkanisation of the Bay, by concentrating development of a 
crayfish canning industry on the Malmesbury coast intb a few 
brief years. The rapid growth of factory production along St 
Helena Bay's southern shore in turn dictated that, rather than 
dissipate, pressure to abolish the legislative protection 
afforded the Berg River seine fisheries would intensify in the 
post war period. 
3.3 MERCHANT CAPITAL AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT 
Merchant capital's dominant presence on the west coast during the 
19th Century, has readily evoked notions of "empire" in the minds 
of writers, both contemporary and recent. Vast landholdings, 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid. 
I~ Cape Archives: PAN B; A 
Secretary of the Fishery Advisory 
state's wartime budget crisis. 
120\b\48 (1), Provincial Secretary to the 
Board, 19 January 1916 for the provincial 
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extensive fleets of fishing boats and cutters and a diversity of 
interests are all offered as evidence of this fact. The rapid 
decline of Stephan Brothers' trade monopoly after 1890, however, 
is suggestive of the fundamental weakness and vulnerability of 
merchant capital to developments in the national and regional 
economy over which it had no control by virtue of its location at 
the level of exchange rather than production. The coming of the 
railway and the concomitant reorientation of the grain trade in 
the Malmesbury and Piketberg districts, cut at the very base on 
which merchant hegemony rested - the underdevelopment of the 
region as a whole. The isolation of the western coastal districts 
during the 19th Century underpinned and nurtured the seaborne 
grain trade. Distance and the absence of an adequate road 
infrastructure were the key components of this isolation which 
enabled Stephan Brothers to insert itself into the local economy 
in parasitic relation to the dominant agricultural interests. In 
reaction to the loss of trade occasioned by the extension of the 
line of rail, the firm did its utmost to prevent similar 
developments from reaching the coastal periphery. It thus 
resolutely opposed the plans of the Saldanha Bay Development 
Company for the construction of a port at Saldanha Bay and the 
establishment of a rail link to the interior. 
The underdevelopment of the coastal districts was also crucial to 
the Stephan Brothers' other chief trade activity - fishing. The 
rantsoenvis trade and the labour needs of the fisheries 
themselves, depended on a labour intensive agriculture to provide 
a market and seasonal pool of labour for fishing. The arrival of 
the railway promised a further intensification of commercial 
agriculture and increasing mechanisation of production, both of 
which threatened the rantsoenvis market and the fishing labour 
force. A decline in the number of seasonal farm labourers and 
their expulsion from the countryside into the urban proletariat 
translated directly into a shrunken local market for fish and 
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increasing labour shortages in the merchant fisheries. Stephan 
Brothers' ability to diversify its fi$hing interests in the face 
of the macro-economic changes undermining its trading monopoly 
was severely hamstrung by its dependence on the Mauritian market 
and inability to develop the forces of production in the fishery. 
The former required 
development in the 
interests, whereas 
the active encouragement of infrastructural 
region, contrary to the firm's trade 
the latter necessitated the complete 
immobilisation and full proletarianisation of the fishing labour 
force, a task that was both beyond merchant capital's 
- capabilities and inimical to its own interests in the fishery. 
The 19th Century fisheries depended on the seasonal movement of 
labour into and out of fishing and were tolerated only insofar as 
they did not disrupt or threaten the labour needs of agriculture 
and kept the latter provisioned with adequate supplies of cheap 
rantsoenvis. The complete immobilisation of fishing labour at the 
coast would have placed merchant capital in direct competition 
for labour with farming, a showdown it was unable to win because 
of its lack of access to the levers of regional political power. 
A proletarianised fishing labour force would have also put an 
unwelcome debt burden on merchant capital during off-seasons and 
pBriods of bad weather or fish scarcity. Dependence on a single 
fish species for competitive advantage in a highly volatile 
export market and isolation from alternative local markets made 
Stephan Brothers acutely susceptible to the combination of 
resource failure and market contraction which plagued its fishing 
enterprise in the last decade of the century. In this context it 
had neither the ability nor the desire to effect the compl~te 
proletarianisation of the labour force. The very logic of 
merchant enterprise also dictated the degree to which it was 
willing to invest in the fishery, looking to exchange rather than 
production for profit. The result was the emergence of a 
commercial fishery based on the partial proletarianisation of a 
fishing labour force bound to fishing by relations of production 
12S 
in which the individual fisherman still enjoyed the de facto 
status of independent producer. 
The changed conditions of the 1900s, however, forced Stephan 
Brothers finally to diversify away from snoek into new areas of 
commodity production. In seeking to make the transition to 
crayfish canning, merchant capital remained constrained both by 
its limited control over production and the rentier interests of 
Sandveld agriculture in the Piketberg trek seine fisheries. The 
latter's conservatism derived not from an innate and irrational 
opposition to modernisation, but out of confluence of diverse 
economic interests - the rentier income of local farmers, the 
market share of independent boatowners and the resistance to 
proletarianisation among the fishermen all of which were 
threatened by the new forces of production unleashed at the Bay 
by the Italian set netters. Legislative protection remained their 
only defence against the mobility, greater productivity and lower 
labour costs of the set net and in turn blunted technological 
innovation in the river fisheries and made the maintenance of 
such protection ever more vital to their continued survival. 
These factors forced the firm to rely on the colonial-cum-
provincial state for support in seeking to restructure relations 
of production in the Bay fishery. The state, however, proved a 
contradictory ally, its support for modernisation counterbalanced 
by its susceptibility to pressure from local interests via 
popular representation in Parliament and the Provincial Council. 
This contradiction culminated in the 1909 balkanisation of the 
Bay, which although it facilitated the restructuring of 
relations of production in the Malmesbury fishery, destroyed the 
vestiges of labour's residual control over the means of 
production and the product of labour and cleared the ground for 
the development of a piece work crayfish fishery - nonetheless 
left p~tty-commodity production on the Piketberg side of the Bay 
largely intact. With the commencement of crayfish canning by 
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Stephan Brothers in 1913, the captive labour and marine resources 
of the petty-commodity mode in Piketberg and independence of the 
Italian boatowners of Malmesbury needed to be subjugated to the 
demands of factory production. The firm was again forced to turn 
to the state to overturn the ETSFZ, but with similarly 
disappointing results. The new provincial authority proved no 
more willing or able to confront Sandveld agriculture than its 
colonial predecessor and 
Merchant-cum-productive 
the Stephan Plan was mothballed. 
capital's political 





revolutionary edge, making it hostage to the petty-commodity mode 
and subjugating crayfish production to the seasonal rhythms and 
resource imperatives of the latter. Petty-commodity production 
remained as a site of alternative employment and accumulation to 
Stephan Brothers and an increasing brake on the development of 
productive capital on the periphery in general. 
Kay's assertion that, 
"The history of underdevelopment is the fullest expression we 
have of [the] contradictory tendencies of merchant capital to 
both stimulate and repress the development of the forces of 
production and to both o&fn and block the way for the full 
development of capitalism" , 
has the macro~theoretical ring of a law of an abstract process of 
capitalist expansion. It only has validity, however, when seen in 
terms of "the particular, historically developed class structures 
through which these processes actually worked themselves out and 
through which their fundamental character was actually 
determined" 1~ Merchant capital played a central role in the 
underdevelopment of the west coast in the 19th Century through 
156 G. Kay Development and Underdevelopment, p.95. 
l~ R. Brenner wThe Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-
Smithian Harzism• New Left Review, 104, July-August 1977, p.91. 
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the "conservative bias" inherent in accumulation through 
eKchange. Its peripheral location and inability to translate 
economic into political power, however, saw it defeated by 
organised commercial agriculture at the turn of the century. The 
very c lass structures which had sustained merchant accumulation 
and underdevelopment thus became its prison and forced merchant 
capital itself, with the aid of the state, to attempt to destr o y 
the petty-commodity mode it helped create and sustain. The 
political power of Sandveld agriculture and the importance o f 
petty-c o mmodity production to rural accumulation on the coastal 
fr i nge, however, blocked this dissolution process at a crit ic al 
j uncture, imparting an unevenness and incompleteness to the 
process which was to shape and determine the post-1914 
development of productive capital at the Bay. The 
underdevelopment of the west coast was thus neither fiKed nor 
immutable and the corollary of development always possible, but 
within the constraints of the eKisting class structure. 
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ii THE CRAYFISH FRONTIER 
c::.1914 c::. 1939 
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4: THE PERIPHERY R!INTIGRATID 
The mineral revolution subjugated all modes of production and 
forms of capital to the demands of mining capital. Mining's 
hegemony was entrenched and consolidated after the turn of the 
century, with the end of the South African War in 1902 and Union 
in 1910. For merchant capital on the Cape west coast this 
translated into the loss of labour and trade in competition with 
a burgeoning public works programme and new branch railways, 
geared to integrating the Cape and Transvaal economies and 
servicing the need of the mining industry for cheap food and 
imports. 
"To survive as capital it [merchant capital] was forced 
out of trade directly into the sphere of production; that 
is, it was forced to act as productive capital openly ••• 
But [merchant] capital could not wipe out its own history 
and begin as though nothing had happened previously: it 
was forced to operate in the conditions of 
underdevelopment which it had itself created"!. 
These conditions were a severe brake on Stephan Brothers' 
attempts to establish canning production at St Helena Bay, 
confining it to the Malmesbury coast and erecting a legislative 
barrier around the labour and marine resources of Piketberg. The 
advent of the First World War, however, provide~ nascent 
manufacturing capital nationally with the space to expand from 
the isolated beach-heads of the 1900s and forged closer links 
between merchant and manufacturing capital on an economic and 
political level~ 
G. Kay Development and Underdevelopment, p.124. 





of the import substitution industries which emerged 
war, the crayfish canning industry retained its 
exclusive export orientation and dependence on the French market. 
While this insulated it against the worst effects of the . post-war 
resumption in foreign competition on the local market and 
isolated it from the 1920s tariff debate, it made the industry 
hostage to international developments over which it had even less 
control. This was underlined by falling prices in Europe after 
1922 as a result of political instability in France and growing 
Japanese competition. The effect of lower prices and mounting 
competition internationally opened a moving crayfish frontier o n 
the Cape west coast in the 1920s as canners sought to preserve 
profits by keeping raw material 




conservation were the 
main outcomes 
south divide 
of this policy, 
in the industry 
creating an ever widening north-
and prompting the struggling 
southern canners to try and impose a production quota and minimum 
price restrictions on the industry as a whole. 
Stephan Brothers found it increasingly difficult to adapt to 
conditions in the post-war industry. Having expanded production 
during the war with a second factory at St Helena Bay and a third 
at Lamberts Bay, it rapidly lost ground as the crayfish frontier 
moved north after 1918. The chief reason for this was its 
continued trade and rentier interests at the Bay which precluded 
relocation and kept it tied to a work~d-out resource, finally 
closed to fishing by the provincial state in 1927. The firm thus 
looked to motorisation to keep it competitive and protect profit 
margins, but the effectiveness of motorisation was undermined 
both by the lack of adequate harbour facilities at St Helena Bay 
and, more importantly, the ETSFZ. The latter starved the crayfish 
fishery of bait and made it harder for crayfish fishermen to 
subsist during the ever-more frequent factory closures and 
lengthening off-season. Stephan Brothers made renewed efforts to 
131 
have its 1913 proposals implemented by the provincial state 
during the war without success. The failure of this and attempts 
in the 1920s to exploit loopholes in the 1909 legislation forced 
it to rely on large-scale poaching, in the context of a worsening 
cr ayfish scarcity locally and falling prices internationally. The 
ensuing conflict once again pitted ~eine fisherman against set 
netter in a replay of the pre-war dispute, but for higher stakes. 
Population pressure, a reduced fishing range and a continued 
resource-crisis made poaching a life and death issue for 
Piketberg seine fishermen, just as the declining Bay crayfish 
fishery and the marginalisation of a growing number of fisher men 
due to motorisation he ig htened the resolve of their counterparts. 
The provincial state, without its own police force and facin g a 
deepening budget crisis, proved increasingly unable to hold the 
circle. The industrialisation of St Helena Bay was thus at best 
partial and incomplete, with Stephan Brothers unable to dissol ve 
the petty-commodity mode or generalise the piece-work system to 
the Bay as a whole. This failure and the atrophy of the 
provincial state by 1929 threatened to consign the Bay canning 
industry to the margin 
economies once more. 
of the regional and international 
4.1 THE CRAYFISH BOOM 1914-1918 
The crayfish canning industry depended, from its inception, 
the food tastes of Europe's new middle classes and by 1913 
on 
"the 
crayfish [was] much in demand amongst the bourgeois class in 
< 
Paris"~ It was shipped in unlabelled tins to British agents who 
distributed it, under their own brand names, to retail outlets on 
the Continent~ With the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, 
3 W. Wardlaw Thompson Sea Fisheries of the Cape Colony, p.86. 
4 S.C. Townell HThe Crawfish Industry of the Cape West Coast 1874-1947#, 
p.37 ff. and Cape Archives; PAN 84(1), A120\x, General Information Regarding 
the Fishing Industry Prepared for the Assistant Provincial Secretary, n.d. 
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the demand and price for canned crayfish boomed on the British 
and French markets~ 
TABLE 4.1: Canned Crayfish Exports to Europe 1914-19186 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
YEAR UK FRANCE 
Cases Value Price Cases Value Price % of 
[481b] [ £. ] Per Case [481b] [ £. ] Per Case Exports 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
1913 41 632 51 366 25s 13 375 21 463 32s 88.4 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
1914 52 755 70 879 27s 6 643 11 031 33s 91. 8 
1915 71 249 87 875 25s 4 504 8 600 38s 89.3 
1916 73 581 129 000 35s 1 844 2 741 30s 91. 8 
1917 45 592 93 595 41s 39 12 1 72 632 37s 97.7 
1918 28 567 80 752 57s 20 033 36 051 36s 96.9 
1919 18 102 43 800 48s 61 005 150 536 49s 99.7 
This export-led boom resulted in a doubling in the number of 
canning factories in the Cape by 1918 and a massive increase in 
7 
fishing pressure on the crayfish resource~ The boom also made 
itself felt at St Helena Bay, where Stephan Brothers erected a 
second cannery at Steenbergs Cove in 1915. By the end of the war 
there were thus three canneries and around 80 boats employed in 
5 Cape Archivesj PAN 39, A 120\e\5 (4), Hickson and Sons to the 
Administrator, 8 October 1915. 
6 Own calculations from data contained in Union of 
Department of Customs and Excise British South Africa, Annual 
Trade and Shipping of the Union of South Africa, Southern 




7 Cape Archives; .PAN 38, A120\e\5 (2), Fishery Board Officer to the 
Secretary of the Fishery Advisory Board, 16 February 1912; PAN 37, A120\e\3 
(1), Return Showing the Number of Crayfish Captured and the Number of Boats 
Employed in the Capture of such Fish during the Years 1913 to 1918 and PAN 42, 
A120\e\36, Annual Return Showing the Number of Crawfish Caught for use of the 
Canneries of the Cape Province 1916-1918. 
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catching and processing crayfish for export~ Even the Berg Ri v er 
fishermen were drawn into fishing for the factories and in 192 0 
there were more than 230 crayfish nets registered to fishermen 
along the ' Q river ·. By the end of the war the St Helena Bay 
canneries accounted for 38% of the total industry catch and a 
4/t 
third of a 11 exports ' '· . 
TABLE 4.2 Crayfish Fishing at St Helena Bay 1914-1918 :! 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Year No of No of Catch % of Cfish Pack % o f 
Plants Boats Total per Boat Total 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
1914 2 40 1 710 311 ? 42 757 ? ? 
1915 3 54 2 993 383 22.9 55 433 ? ? 
1916 3 67 5 114 849 36.1 76 341 ? ? 
1917 3 82 5 112 897 35.4 62 352 20 159 2 5.6 
1918 3 77 3 464 546 37.7 44 994 15 298 31. 5 
? = Data incomplete or unknown. 
Stephan Brothers' participation in the wartime boom was made 
possible by legislative reorganisation of production in the 
fisheries after 1909, facilitating the incorporation of the set 
8 Cape Archives; PAN 37, A120\e\3 (1), Return Showing the Number of 
Crayfish Captured and the Number of Boats Employed in the Capture of such Fish 
during the Years 1913 to 1918. 
9 Cape Archives; PAN 22, A120\e\158, Abstract from Register showing the 
Numbers and Various Kinds of Nets in use at the different Fishing Stations in 
the Cape Province during the year 1920. 
lO Cape Archives; PAN 42, A120\e\26, Returns: showing the Total Canned 
Crayfish Pack for the Years 1917-1918 and PAN 37, A120\e\3 (1), Return Showing 
the Number of Crayfish Captured and the Number of Boats Employed in the 
Capture of such Fish during the Years 1913 to 1918. The local market was 
extremely limited and in 1917 the industry sold just 738 cases of canned 
crayfish in South Africa, dropping to 354 in 1918. 
11 Cape Archives:; PAN 42, A120\e\26, Returns: showing the Total 
Crayfish Pack for the Years 1917-1918 and PAN 37, A120\e\3 (1), Return 
the Number of Crayfish Captured and the Number of Boats Employed 





net ~nd demise of the contact-based snoek and seine fishery. 
Despite this, the crayfish fishing season remained inordinately 
brief. In 1915 the firm's crayfish boats managed only 90 days' 
fishing. The f ollo wing year this increased slightly to 103 days, 
but fell back to 80 in 1916 and just 72 days in 1918 12• Thus, for 
roughly three-quarters of the year, Stephan Brothers' investment 
i n canning plant and machinery stood idle for want of raw . .,
mater i al, nor was this unique ·J . Such idleness was enforced on the 
i ndustry as a whole by a range of factors. The first was the Cape 
wi nter whi c h marked the onset of ~eavy seas on the west coast and 
the annual snoek migration. Not only were the small oar-powered 
dinghies and hoop nets used for crayfish fishing unable to 
operate in the rough seas at the Bay, but the fishermen abandoned 
crayfish in favour of the more . 14 remunerative snoek ' · . Also the 
c rayfish moulted annually, shedding its old shell or exoskeleton. 
The new shell took a period to harden during which time the fish ... 
was "soft" and unsuitable for canning •.J . 
In addition to these "natural" constraints the provincial state 
i mposed legislative limitations on the fishery as well. Heavy 
fishing of the Table Bay crayfish resource in the 1890s had 
prompted the colonial state to introduce a minimum size limit, 
closed season and prohibition on the catching of females in 
1" 
,l Cape Archives; PAN 37, 
Crayfish Captured and the Number 
during the Years 1913 to 1918. 
A120\e\3 (1), Return Showing the Number of 
of Boats Employed in the Capture of such Fish 
13 Ibid. Also Cape Archives; PAN 
Reid, 15 January 1918 & Hickson and 
September 1918. 
39, A120\e\5(5), H. Scharmberg to J.G. 
Sons to the Provincial Secretary, 26 
14 See for example Cape Archives; PAN 38, A 120\e\5 (2), North Bay 
Canning Company, Steenbergs Cove to the Minister of Agriculture, 28 September 
1908. 
15 C. von Bonde and J.M. Marchand #The Natural History and Utilisation of 
the Cape Crawfish, Kreef or Spiny Lobster#, Fisheries and Marine Biological 
Survey Bulletin No.1, 1935. 
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berry. These measures were retained by the new provincial 
restriction authorities after 1910
16• By far the most important 
for the canners was the closed season, designed to allow the 
resource 2-4 months' respite from fishing each year and ti~ed to 
coincide with the period when the fish were moulting or in berry. 
Before 1906 it was assumed that all crayfish moulted and mated at 
the same time making a single closed season possible ' ; · In 1906, 
however, investigations by Gilchrist revealed that the off-seas o n 
varied at different points along the coast and a uniform closed 
season hindered canning either by denying fishermen access when 
the fish were neither soft nor in berry or allowing exploitat ion 
' Q 
for canning ·" . when they were breeding or otherwise unsuitable 
Following Gilchrist's advice, the coast was divided 
to four in 1915, fishing areas in 1906, increasing 
into thr e e 
each with a 
different closed 19 season • The admitted fallibility of the 
previous legislation sparked a prolonged debate between the 
canning factories and the provincial authorities over the best 
time to close fishing in the different areas, with the canners 
using their representation on the Fishery Advisory Board to 
pressure the provincial state into making frequent adjustments ~ . 
lb Cape Province Marine Biological Report No.1, 1913. 
17 Ibid. Also C. von Bonde and J.M. Marchand "The Natural History and 
Utilisation of the Cape Crawfish, Kreef or Spiny Lobster", Fisheries and 
Marine Biological Survey Bulletin No.1, 1935 and D.E. Pollack "Spiny Lobsters" 
'in A.I.L. Payne and R.J.M. Crawford (eds) Oceans of Life off Southern Africa 
for the life history of the crayfish. 
18 Cape Province Marine Biological Report No.1, 1913. 
i9 Cape Archives; PAN 39, A 120\e\5, Staterrent Showing Alterations to 
Crawfish Fishing Season in the Different Areas since 1906, n.d. 
20 In 1913 the managing director of the North Bay Canning Company, R.G. 
Reid, was appointed to the Board and was joined in 1916 by Henry Stephan. The 
correspondence on the closed season fills all of seven volurres at the Cape 
Archives and can be found in PAN 38-40, A 120\e\5 (vols.2-7). 
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The fledgling industry evinced an understandable ambiguity 
in the towards the closed season. On the one hand, it was 
ca nners' interests to protect the resource from overfishing, but 
on the other they were anxious not to unduly limit the already ~· restricted fishing season ~1 • With the spread of canneries along 
the west coast and the onset of the wartime boom the debate 
intensified, leading to repeated annual revisions-. The canners 
on which the especially disputed the dubious scientific data 
closed season purportedly rested, asserting their own or their 
than 
the 
fishermen's experience as having equal or greater validity 
the occasional experimental haul organised by Gilchrist as 
basis for legislation 23 • As to whether the closed season fulfilled 
any useful protective function, the industry was equally 
sceptical. Some canners went so far as to argue that legislation 
~.,1 
was unnecessary ~ . Whatever its dubious conservationary merits, 
ways, the closed season hampered canning in numerous 
concentrating production into a few hectic months each year, with 
detrimental effects on the final product. In 1913 
of the 
Stephan 
large Brothers alleged that "hurried work is the cause 
quantity of unsalable Cape crayfish now offering on the European 
market", explaining that, "The effort to can a large number of 
fish in a short time invariably leads, we need hardly point out, 
to hasty work, much of which has to be done at night, undue 
21 See for example Cape Archives; PAN 39, A120\e\5 (4), Provincial 
Secretary to the Members of the Fishery Advisory Board, 5 February 1917. 
n Cape Archives; PAN 39, A 120\e\5, Statement Showing Alterations to 
Crawfish Fishing Season in the Different Areas since 1906, n.d. 
23 See for example Cape Archives; PAN 39, A 120\e\5 (5), John Ovenstone 
Ltd to the Provincial Secretary, 27 December 1918. 
24 Cape Archives; PAN 38, A120\e\5 (2), North Bay Canning Company, 
Steenbergs Cove to the Secretary for Agriculture, 4 March 1909; PAN 39, 
A120\e\5 (4), Provincial Secretary to the Marine Biological Adviser, 6 October 
1915 and PAN 39, A120\e\5 (5), North Bay Canning Company to the Secretary of 
the Fishery Advisory Board, 19 September 1918. 
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employees, and does not tend towards a first pressure on the 
class production 
.-,: 
such as we would like to turn out"~. The closed 
season played havoc with production in other ways too. Unexpected 
revisi on s created shortfalls on forward contracts, gave better-
informed com petitors an unfair advantage for extended fishing and 
canning and imperilled new investment ~ . In 1918 Stephan Brothers 
invested £.20 000 in "a new up-to-date and modern factory" at 
Lamberts Bay on land leased from the governmentn. The imposition 
of a c losed season on the coast north of St Helena Bay from 
December 1918 to April 1919 threatened, in Henry Stephan's words, 
·}O 
to " c r i pp 1 e and b r i n g d i s a st e r " to the new v e n tu r e -~ . A s th e f 1 t· m 
explained, the closed season effectively prevented its factory 
from oper ating until October 1919, due to north-westerly gales 
'10 
from May to October "' . The first year's rent was thus "abso lutely 
wasted" and it would be all of fifteen months before the factory 
could process its first fish~. Stephan Brothers thus pleaded that 
"until more official information is known as to the habits of the 
25 Cape Archives; PAN 39, A 120\e\5 (4), Stephan Brothers to the 
Administrator, 6 December 1913 & 30 December 1913. 
26 See for example Cape Archives; PAN 38, A120\E\5 (3), Hout Bay Canning 
Company to the Provincial Secretary, 9 August 1913 and PAN 39, A 120\e\5 ( 4), 
Stephan Brothers to G. Ailing, 10 November 1914, Stephan Brothers to the 
Provincial Secretary, 9 September 1915 & the Provincial Secretary to the 
Marine Biological Adviser, 6 October 1915. 
27 Cape Archives; PAN 39, A 120\e\5 (5), Stephan Brothers to the 
Provincial Secretary, 23 December 1918 & Stephan, Lord & Co to the Provincial 
Secretary, 19 November 1919. 
~ Cape Archives; PAN 39, A 120\e\5 (5), Stephan, Lord & Co to the 
Provincial Secretary, 19 No vember 1919. 
29 Cape Archives; PAN 39, A120\e\5 
Provincial Secretary, 23 December 1918. 
3o Ibid. 
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(5), Stephan Brothers to the 
fish, and the weather conditions in that locality, no closed 
season should be made for the year 1919" 31 • 
A paucity of scientific knowledge about the resource and the 
demands of the wartime canning boom combined to frustrate the 
provincial state's attempts to reach a workable consensus on the 
closed season and forced it to rely instead on the minimum size-
limit ruling to afford the resource a modicum of protection. The 
first size-limit, imposed in 1893, was set at 3 inches, excluding 
crayfish caught for bait32 • It remained so until 1914 when it was 
increased to 4 inches and strictly enforced by the police~. If 
the canners were opposed to the closed season, the fishermen 
opposed the size-limit because it undercut their earning power. 
They were paid per hundred crayfish landed which required them to 
catch as many fish as possible each trip in order to maximise 
their earnings. As the fishery officer explained in 1916, this 
also encouraged them to catch the smallest possible fish: 
"The principle reason why the fishermen have vacated Area 
No. 3 [St Helena Bay], where they were catching very large 
male and medium sized female crawfish, is that they are paid 
by the Factories per 100 fish, and as long as they can get 
the factories to accept their catches they naturally catch 
and bring in as many fish as their boats will hold, thus 
fishing in Area 4 [north of Baboon Point] where the fish are 
on the average much smaller than those in Area 3, the boat's 
crew are capable of earning a much larger wage per diem"~. 
Ibid. Also correspondence in Cape Archives; PAN 39, A120\e\5 (5). 
Stephan Brothers was not the only company affected; the newly-formed Lamberts 
Bay Canning Company's factory and that of John Ovenstone Ltd at Port Nolloth 
were similarly disadvantaged. 
~ Cape of Good Hope Government Gazette, Proclamation 453 of 1893, 21 
November 1893. The bait provision was subject to widespread abuse. 
~ Cape Archives; PAN 38, A120\e\5 (3), J. Gilchrist to the Provincial 
Secretary, 22 July 1913. 
~ Cape Archives; PAN 37, A120\e\3 (1), Fishery Officer to the Provincial 
Secretary, 1 April 1916. 
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Thus, while the factories wanted large crayfish for canning, the 
fishermen "were more concerned in catching crawfish just over the 
legal limit so as to increase the carrying capacity of the 
boats"~. Stephan Brothers confirmed that, 
"The reason why Fishermen go to Seal Island and 
Paternoster in preference to North West Bay is that in 
spite of the extra distance they fill their boats very 
quickly, and being paid by the hundred can load, say, 
3\4000 fish as against 1500\2000 large fish from North 
West Bay"~ 
Given the constraints of weather and closed seasons, the s i ze-
limit was an added irritant, eroding the fishermen's earning 
capacity by demanding a degree of selectivity disruptive of 
established work rhythms and cutting into precious fishing ~ . 
Practical considerations also undermined the size-limit's 
effectiveness. Spiralling wartime demand and a limited fishing 
season prompted many canneries to work at night. In 1916 it was 
reported that on the west coast, 
"the canneries are working at full pressure day and .night 
and are constantly discharging their boats during night 
time by the light of a few miserable oil lanterns, the 
light of which is of little or no use either to the 
fishermen in the boats or to the men on the jetties in 
the detection of undersized fish"~. 
~ Ibid. 
~ Cape Archives; PAN 39, A 120\e\5 (4), H. Stephan to the Provincial 
Secretary, forwarding Report by D.C. Burrell, 8 February 1916. 
~ See for example HFishermen Strike: Sequel to Police Court 
Prosecutions• in Cape Argus, 27 July 1914. One of the fisherllEn interviewed 
asked, #How can they expect us to fish with a tape measure in our hands ••• 
There are two of us in a boat, each with a dozen nets to attend to, and it is 
impossible to examine each fish as it is caught and reject those that are too 
small, especially when it is dark•. 
~ Cape Archives; PAN 37, A 120\e\3 (1), Fishery Officer to the 
Provincial Secretary, 1 April 1916. 
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The degree of compa ny complicity in catching undersized crayfish 
is difficult to determine and although all the 
knowingly accepting undersized fiih, they argued 
canners denied 
that a certain 
10 
percentage was inevitable, given the size of the catch ·' . To what 
extent this was simply due to haste and poor lighting, and to 
what extent it involved a complicity of silence between 
management and fishermen is a moot point ~ . Hendrik Brand recalls 
how the Steenbergs Cove cannery used to fly its flag at half-mast 
whenever the police were inspecting the factory. The boats would 
then wait at sea until the flag went up to top mast before coming 
in to off -load their catches , presumably including a sizab l e 
proportion of undersized fish 41• What is clear is that t h e 
attempted enforcement of the size-limit provoked a v i o lent 
backlash from labour. In 1916 the police at Paternoster reported 
that five fishermen had 
crayfish and a further 
occurred at Stephan 
instructions had been 
been apprehended for catching undersized .~ 
f o r f i g ht i n g ~" • six summoned The latter 
Brothers' 
issued to the 
other cannery where strict 
fishermen not to catch or 
land undersized fish. Henry Stephan reported ~hat, "in carrying 
out my instructions, the Manager of the Factory last week was 
savagely attacked by several fishermen, 
open. Two or three others of the staff were 
and had his head cut 
also thrown into the 
39 Cape Archives; PAN 37, A120\e\3 (1), Secretary of the Fishery Advisory 
Board to the Provincial Secretary, 1 May 1916. 
W See for example Cape Archives; 1\HFD, A1\2\3, Periodical Court 
_ Vredenburg, Case No.85, Rex versus Alexander Smith, 18 May 1916. Smith was 
fishery manager at Stephan Brothers' Paternoster cannery and was charged with 
selling and trading in undersized crayfish. The case was dismissed. 
41 Interview with Mr Hendrik Brand, Velddrift, 19 July 1986. 
4" -~ Cape Archives; PAN 37, A 120\e\3 (1), Provincial Secretary to the 
Secretary of the Fisheries Advisory Board, 13 April 1916 and 1\HFD, A1\2\3, 
Periodical Court Vredenburg, case No.71. The King versus J. Ward, C. Read, W. 
Williams, S. Manual, C. Williams Jnr, 20 April 1916. 
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water" 43 • Such violent reactions and economic self-interest on 
Stephan Brothers' part no doubt accounts for the dearth of 
prosecutions at the Bay during the war 44 • For both the provincial 
state and the canners, therefore, the crayfish legislation had to 
do with ensuring the longevity of the resource and the continued 
profitability of the industry, although the canners sometimes 
lost sight o f the latter goal. For the fishermen, on the other 
hand, the closed season and size limit were direct constraints on 
income. Crayf ish fishing became an increasingly important source 
of seasonal earnings for the fishermen of St Helena Bay in the 





context a process of accelerated class divi sion 
fishing communities produced new fault l ines and 
tensions. 
The wartime crayfish boom put a temporary end to the pre-war 
the p rime conflict between Italians and locals. The former were 
beneficiaries of the new demand for crayfish emanating from the 
Stephan Brothers and North 
cutters and dinghies were 
with the exception of the 
Bay Canning Company factories. Their 
well suited to crayfish fishing and, 
three-month snoek season, they had 
every incentive to concentrate their fishing effort on crayfish. 
The market was 
rantsoenvis trade 
insatiable, the earnings were higher than the 
and the resource was abundant. The range and 
mobility of their cutters also allowed them to circumvent the 
closed season at the Bay by sailing south to fish a month or more 
43 Cape Archives; PAN 37, A ·120\e\3 (1), Secretary of the Fishery 
Advisory Board to the Provincial Secretary, 1 May 1916. 
44 Cape Archives; 1\HFD, · Al\2\3, Periodical Court Vredenburg, Criminal 
Record Book 1914-1919. In all there were just 8 cases involving wartime 
contraventions of the crayfish regulations relating to the catching and sale 
of undersized crayfish. These involved 31 fishermen of whom 23 were convicted 
and fined a total £33. All but one of the cases was heard in 1916. 
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before the St Helena Bay season 
4c: 
opened · . Italian involvement in 
the rantsoenvis trade thus dwindled to a few months each year and 
this, together with the ETSFZ legislation, 
competition and conflict with the Piketberg seine 
minimum. 
kept direct 
fisheries to a 
For the remnants of the contract labour force created by the 19th 
Century merchant fisheries, the outlook was less favourable. The 
legalisation of the set net in 1909 all but destroyed the seine 
fishery along the Malmesbury coast and the snoek fishery had l o st 
its export potential by 1908 and was confined to a brief wi n ter 
season. The canning factories also offered few empl o yment 
opportunities for these men. In 1918 the entire industry empl o ye d 
less than a thousand workers, half of whom were 
;lL 
female ·· . Factory 
labour 
hours, 
was also an unattractive option with low wages, l o ng 
F poor conditions and seasonal employment · . The only 
alternative was crayfish fishing, not as independent producers, 
but as piece-workers whose wages depended on the number of fish 
caught. The factory boats were oar-powered and thus confined to 
the inshore waters of the Bay, subjecting these fishermen to the 
closed season and minimum size-limit in a way that the Italian 
cutters were not. At Steenbergs Cove one observer was told that, 
"if the fishermen did not poach they would starve", but dismissed 
this. argument, noting that Stephan Brothers 
"supply their men with tents to live at 
they are within a short distance of 
dividing point between areas 2 and 3, 
Paternoster so that 
Cape Columbine, the 
and can fish at North 
45 Cape Archives; PAN 39, A120\e\5 (4), Stephan Brothers to the 
Admi ni str a tor forwarding Telegram from C.H. Cook, 4 March 1914, Statement by 
C.H. Cook, 13 March 1914 & North Bay Canning Company to L. Mansergh, 20 
January 1917 for the rrobility and range of the Italians. 
46 Union of South Africa, Office of Census and Statistics Statistics of 
Production 1923-24 [U.G.35-1926), p.90. 
47 Cape Archives; PAN 39, A 120\e\5 (4), Fisheries Officer to the 
Provincial Secretary, 27 April 1916. 
143 
West bay, whence they 
their catches into 
48 Stee nbergs Cove" • 
return to Paternoster and discharg e 
larger vessels for transport to 
Relian ce o n oar- and sail-power invariably reinfor ced dependence 
on co mpany credit by making factory fishermen's income directly 
subject t o legal and natural constraints. The snoek season and 
occ asional poaching and beach seining were the sole vestiges of 
inde pendence still permitted these men, for whom the wartime boom 
entrenched the loss of control over the means of product ion and 
further enmeshed them in the webs of dependence woven by company 
credit and housing. The boom thus sharpened divisions al ong the 
Bay's southern shores between Italian fishermen 
of thei r own vessels made them independent of 
wh ose o wne rship 
direct factory 
control and locals who had lost independent access to the mean s 
of production in the 19th Century and were reduced to being 
company fishermen, 
in crayfish fishing 
hamstrung by the canners' limited investment 
and working the inshore beds of the Bay with 
rowing boats. As these crayfish beds were depleted, their incomes 
fell and their dependence on company housing· and credit 
increased. 
The Piketberg fisheries witnessed a similar differentiation 
process during the war. Many boat owners turned to crayfish 
fishing with the onset of the wartime boom, but those without 
access to sea-going vessels or trek seines continued to fish the 
E~SFZ and the river 
The failure of the 
agriculture and the 
49 for the rantsoenvis market and subsistence • 
Stephan Plan, the protection of Sandveld 
crayfish boom ensured that they rema ined 
relatively undisturbed within their legislative cocoon, but still 
48 Cape Archives; PAN 39, A 120\e\5 (5), J. Gilchrist to the Provincial 
Secretary forwarding the Report by H.A . Hunter, 23 April 1919. 
49 Cape ~rchives; PAN 22, A 120\b\158, Abstract from Register showing the 
Numbers and Various Kinds of Nets in use at the different Fishing Stations in 
the Cape Province during the year 1920. 
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vulnerable to the resource crisis which prompted the Stephan 
Plan. Whatever Stephan Brothers' motives, the inshore fish 
resources of the Bay had undeniably been depleted by 1914 5c. Even 
with the easing of competition, catches remained small and 
uncert ain and the seine fishermen relied on working both coa st 
and river to make a living. This brought them into increasing 
competition with the class of poor fishermen after 1914. 
The riverine population increased markedly in the first decade o f 











war , . • The 
surrounding 
agricultur-al distr ic ts after- 1914 dr-ove ever--greater numbers of 
people off the land and onto the farms at the river- mouth where 
they r-ented a stand and engaged in subsistence fishing and 
=:? 
seasonal far-m labour=. It is in this context that the established 
tr-ek seine interests at the river launched a concerted and bitter 
c ampaign against the so-called 
war-king the river-'s backwater-s. 
river-ine fish resour-ce, a 



















Eur-opean who maintains a scanty living by 
(not commercially) 
~ See TABLE 3.4 above. 
q 
in the River"w·.·. They 
51 Compare Cape of Good Hope Statistical Register 1890, p.243; Cape 
Archives; PAN 61, K 18\19, Fisheries Ordinance 1911, Statistics District 
Piketberg and PAN 75, K 77\1 Magistrate of Piketberg to the Provincial 
Secretary, forwarding the List of Fishing Boats in the District of Piketberg, 
3 January 1914. 
<;') 
w~ W.J. Talbot Swartland and Sandveld, p.34 ff for the intensification of 
wheat . production in the Western Cape during the war. 
53 Cape Archives; PAN 69, K 59\3, G. Williams and J. Daneel to the Under 
Secretary for Agriculture, 3 August 1909, p.5. 
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"These poor people who are without the means of 
purchasing boats or the expensive trek net, which costs 
about l70 or l80, are in the habit of setting nets by 
wading into what are known as the 'plaaten' or 'fl ats' on 
each side of the main channel, the fish caught being us~d 
"4 
by them for food purposes" '" . 
A river set net cost 10s-l3 and was use d, without a boat, on the 
rive r's backwaters, where the depth of water was only a few 
feet "" . These backwater fishermen reminded 





dete rminat ion to "work on ly when they are forced to":: . Nor did 
they confine themselves to fishing, but, as the farmers on the 
r- i ve r- comp lained, they "disturb, destr-oy and kill every water 
fowl, wild duck and eatable bir-d they come across" ~ . Their modus 
oper-andi was summed up by the local constable who repor-ted that 
••• prowls abou t it selects the river for fishing "the man that 
all by himself sometimes tak[ing] a small boy with him and 
searches the river for miles 
until he makes a catch"~. It 
in every hoek and corners 
"prowling about" 
[ S i C ] 
wh ich 
alarmed local landowners and 
was this 
seine fishermen, making the 
activities of the subsistence fishermen impossible to control~. 
For the seine fishermen control was essential because illegal 
54 Ibid. 
:- r: 
J~ Cape Archives; PAN 68, K 59\1, J. Paxton to the Provincial Secretary, 
· 2 August 1915 and TABLE 3.3. 
56 Cape Archives; PAN 68, K 59\ 1, Magistrate of Piketberg to the 
Provin.cial Secretary, 27 February 1919. 
,,., 
.Jr Cape Archives; PAN 68, K 59\ 1, J .N. Townsend to the Resident 
Magistrate Piketberg, April 1922. 
SB Ibid. 
59 Cape Archives; PAN 68, K 59\1, J.N. Townsend to the Resident 
Magistrate Piketberg, 19 March 1922. 
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fishing was "irresistible and owing to the remote pos itio n of the 
shallows can be done with impunity" ~ . 
As a result, between the seine and subsistence 
fisherm en were 
rel ations 
strained if not openly hostile. In 1909 the 
two groups magi strates reported a "heated argument" between the 
over the sei n e fishermen's demand, made "in a somewhat chu rl ish 
spirit ", tha t subsistence fishermen be banned from fishing the 
L' 
river's back waters u• . The intervention of "some of the leading men 
o f th e community" forced this demand to be withdrawn 2 • Two years 
later , however, W.A. Kotze asked that the river be clo sed to set 
n ets for five years to pre ve nt them being spanned across the 
river or placed in the main c hannel ~3• While primaril y aimed at 
the Italians, Kotze also identified eleven locals as among the 
guilty parties M. The local MLA, M.J. de Beer, and Piketberg 
g eneral merchant, produce 
to it that the interests 
buyer and MPC, J. Dommisse, again saw 
of these locals were protected after 
Kotz e succeeded in having the river closed to set net fishing ~ . 




(was] brought to bear" on the 
provincial state politicians to ensure that the 
60 Cape Archives; PAN 68, K 59\1, Magistrate of Piketberg to the 
Provincial Secretary, 27 February 1919; W.A. Kotze to the Administrator, 12 
February 1912 & Fisheries Officer to the Provincial Secretary, 4 September 
1916. 
61 Cape Archives; PAN 69, K 59\3, G. Williams and J. Daneel to the Under 
Secretary for Agriculture, 3 August 1909, p.5. 
62 Ibid. 
:,.) Cape Archives; PAN 68, K 59\ 1, W.A. 
September 1911 and 12 February 1912 & Fishery 
Secretary, 9 October 1911. 
Kotze to the Administrator, 29 
Board Officer to the Provincial 
64 Cape Archives; PAN 68, K 59\1, W.A. Kotze to the Administrator, 12 
February 1912. 
~ Cape Archives; PAN 68, K 59\1, 
1912, F.F. Nimb to M. de Beer, 24 May 
with Netting in the Berg River, n.d. 
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Daniel Groenewald to M. de Beer, 22 May 
1912 & Precis of Correspondence Dealing 
backwaters were left open for set net fishing~. The increasing 
fishing pressure on resources, coupled with seasonal droughts 
which lowered the water-level in the river and exposed the flats, 
made the 1912 settlement the subject of ever more heated debate 
after 1914, as competition for the fish resources of the river 
intensified. At issue was the definition of a backwater, with 
both sides attempting to secure exclusive access to as much of 
the river as possible67 • The issue was given added importance by 
Henry Stephan's continuing attempts to close the river to all 
fishing. Stephan was appointed to the Fisheries Advisory Board in 
1916 and immediately revived his 1913 plan in the hope of using 
the Board as a lobbying forum to pressure the provincial state~. 
The Board endorsed Stephan's proposals in May 1917, but the 
following year the local magistrate reported an "unanimous 
opinion" at Berg River opposed to closure69 • This opposition again 
dissuaded Cape Town from attempting to close the fisheriesM. 
The revival of the Stephan Plan polarised the internecine 
squabble between seine and subsistence fishermen, however, with 
the latter accusing the former of destroying immature fish in 
~ Cape Archives; PAN 69, K 59\3, Henr::>randum Berg River: Netting in and 
Near Mouth: Apparent Diminution of Fish Supply, n.d and Cape of Good Hope 
Provincial Gazette, Regulation 160 of 1912, 16 July 1912. 
~ See Cape Archives; PAN 68, K 59\1, for the lengthy and 
detailed correspondence on .the wartime conflict between seine and 
subsistence fishermen at the river. 
~ Cape Archives; PAN 68, K 59\1, J. Dornmisse to the Provincial Secretary· 
forwarding the Petition of Voters and Persons Interested in the Division of 
Piketberg, Wards 4 and 5, Groot Berg River, 24 November 1916. 
69 Cape Archives; PAN 68, K 59\1, Magistrate of Piketberg to the 
Provincial Secretary, 21 May 1918. 
?O It was not fishermen sentiment alone which swayed the state. Gilchrist 
called the Plan "excessive and beyond any legislative reasons in any other 
country". See Cape Archives: PAN 68; K 59\1, J. Gilchrist to the Provincial 
Secretary, 11 June 1917. 
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~· treks along the . ! l river • The provincial state, after attempting to 
accommodate the riverine set netters by beaconing-off some 
backwaters for their use, gradually lost patience. By 1919, the 
lo c al magistrate "strongly recommend[ed] no further concessions 
~" 
be granted to set netters who are few in number-" .- ,;. In a 
reassessment of past policy he noted that the reason for allowing 
them access to the river was "purely philanthropic" 
opinion, a mistake n . They had increased in number, 
and, in his 
creat i ng an 
escalating conflict with seine fishermen. "Indolence" alone kept 
buy them from sea fishing and, "If they cannot afford to 
expensive trek nets they could make a capital living by sharing 
with 
74 
others" '· . A firm attitude was required to stop th ese 
"useless importunities", he ventured, failing which, set nett i ng 
should 
state 
be "entirely prohibited" in 
~ 
the river w. The pr o vin ci a l 
agreed and the new 
Advisory Board in July 
hardline approach was endorsed by the 
: /., 
1919 '" . Henry Stephan labelled further 
concessions to subsistence fishermen "an incentive to 
pauperisation" and J.G. Reid warned against "the making of more 
poor whites" n . Despite this, the subsistence fishermen remained a 
71 Cape Archives; 
Provincial Secretary, 21 
7'l 
<L Cape Archives; 




PAN 68, K 
May 1918. 
PAN 68, K 
April 1919. 
59\1, Magistrate of Piketberg to the 
59\1, Magistrate of Piketberg to the 
~· 
,e Cape Archives; PAN 68, K 59\1, Provincial Secretary to the Secretary 
Fisheries Advisory Bo~rd, 25 June 1919, Extract from Minutes of Meeting or 
Fisheries Advisory Board, 10 July 1919 & Secretary of the Fisheries Advisory 
Board to the Provincial Secretary, 11 July 1919. 
n Cape Archives; PAN 68, K 59\1, Extract from Minutes of Meeting or 
Fisheries Advisory Board he)d at the Huguenot Buildings, 10 July 1919. 
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thorn in the flesh for several years after the war". As late as 
1920 the local constable reported that a "strong feeling of 
Bitterness and Jealous y" still persisted between the two groups~. 
The wart ime crayfis h c anning boom thus had far-reaching effects 




rantsoenvis and the winter 




owners of cutters and decked sailing craft from both sides o f the 
Bay to include crayfish fishing in their expanded repertoire o f 
petty-commodity production. They were, however, a minority. ~o r 
the majority 
the Bay, the 
of company fishermen along the southern shores o f 
boom con firmed the demise of the seine f ishery on 
the Malmesbury co ast and forced them to sea in open b oats to fish 




piece-work system and their 





by virtue of their non-ownership of o f 
housing. At 
reinforced their dependence on company 
Berg River, those fishermen without 
credit and 
ownership or 
access to sea-going boats continued to work the ETSFZ and river 
with seines and set nets. The pre-war loss of trekking grounds to 
the south of the river and wartime eKpansion of the crayfish 
fishery forced the seine fishermen to rely on a much restricted 
fishing range and made the river a vital adjunct to the sea in 
the context of a continued resource scarcity. This created 
increasing conflict after 1914 between seine netters and the 
"poorer class" of subsistence fishermen over access to the 
~ Cape Archives; PAN 68, K 59\1, Provincial Secretary to the Secretary 
of the Fisheries Advisory Board, 7 June 1920, J.N. Townsend to the Resident 
Magistrate Piketberg, 19 March 1922 & the Provincial Secretary to the 
Secretary of the Fisheries Advisory Board, 24 July 1922. 
79 Cape Archives; PAN 68, K 59\1, J.N. Townsend to the Resident 
Magistrate Piketberg, 19 March 1922 & J.N. Townsend to the Resident Magistrate 
Piketberg, April 1922 and Cape of Good Hope Provincial Gazette, Proclamation 
181 of 1922, 25 August 1922. 
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riverine resource. The seine fishers succeeded in establishing 
the primacy of their claim to the river with the aid of the 
provincial state. The 
the 
latter remained unwilling to risk op en 
balked at conflict with seine fishermen and again 
implementing the Stephan Plan, despite its endorsement by the 
Fisheries Advisory Bo ard. The process of accelerated class 
division under way in the Piketberg fisheries during the war was 
thus conditioned by the canning boom along the Malmesbury coast 
and the attempts of the seine fishers to preserve independent 
commodity production at the river from the corrosive effects of 
the latter. Their success ca n be gauged from the fact that, when 
the c rayfish front ie r began moving north in 1918, it by-passed 
Piketber:-g 
Nolloth. 
entirely, leap-frogging to Lamberts Bay and Port 
The seasonal nature of crayfish fishing, its co -
existence with other kinds of petty-commodity production and the 
interchange of labour and craft, however, made the seine 
fisheries vulnerable to unseasonal incursions into both resources 
and markets by cr:-ayfish fishermen. While the boom lasted this was 
not a threat, but when the boom faltered in the early 1920s, it 
became an ever present reality, initiating a new wave of conflict 
at the Bay. 
4.2 A TROUBLED NEW ORDER 
The wartime canning boom continued until the early 1920s, 
. sustained by the increasing price of canned crayfish in France -
nearly doubling from 36s per case in 1918 to a record 71s in 
1922~ - and growing interest nationally in the development 
OO See TABLE 4.5 below. 
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potential of the Union fisheries '·" . This post-war euphoria was 
short-lived, however, giving way to a distinct downturn in the 
canning industry after 1922. 
TABLE 4.3: Canned Crayfish Exports to France 1918-1929 
::~ 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Year Cases Value Price % of 
[481b] [ £. J Per Case Exports 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
1918 20 034 36 051 36s 39.9 
1919 6 1 005 150 536 49s 76.9 
1920 64 395 224 341 70s 86.1 
1921 52 850 170 948 65s 89.4 
1922 65 634 233 305 71s 7 9 . 1 
1923 47 951 168 142 70s 76.8 
1924 53 214 159 064 60s 71. 6 
1925 59 278 156 394 53s 66.3 
1926 35 696 93 550 52s 52.3 
1927 42 542 119 584 56s 59.9 
1928 64 006 161 800 51s 75.7 
1929 65 270 163 838 50s 74.2 
Political instability in France, frequent devaluations of the 
French franc and growing competition from Japanese canned crab 
eroded price levels and the Union industry's position in the 
81 See R. Lees Fishing for Fortunes, pp.50-55; HThe Fishing Industry of 
South AfricaH in South African Journal of Industries [SAJIJ, 2, 10, October 
1919; H. Warington Smyth "The South African Fisheries Survey" in SAJI, 3, 8, 
August 1920; J.D.F. Gilchrist HThe Fish and Fisheries of South AfricaH in 
SAJI, 4, 2, February 1921; J.F. Dunn "The Fishing Industry of the Union and 
Its PossibilitiesH in SAJI, 4, 5, May 1921; "The Fishing Industry of the Cape 
Coast" in SAJI, 5, 7, July 1922; "The Fishing Industry of the Natal Coast" i:n 
SAJI, 5, 9, September 1922; K.R. Thomas HFishing Possibilities of the South 
West African Coast" in SAJI, 6, 10, October 1923; J.D.F. Gilchrist "Fish and 
Fisheries of South AfricaH in SAJI, 7, 2, February 1924; F.H. Sibson "The 
Crawfish Industry" in SAJI, 8, 6, June 1925 and "Development of the Fishing 
IndustryH in Industrial South Africa, 221, 20, September 1925. 
O'? 
"" Union of South Africa, Department of Customs and Excise British South 
Africa, Annual Statements of the Trade and Shipping of the Union of South 
Africa, Southern and Northern Rhodesia and South West Africa, 1918-1929. 
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French market~. The price of canned crayfish slumped - falling 
steadily from the high of 71s in 1922 to a mere 50s a case by 
1929~. At home the wartime boom severely depleted the crayfish 
beds of the Peninsula, causing the Cape canneries' share of the 
catch to 
million 
collapse from 8 million 
in 1920 (26%) and a paltry 
crayfish (60%) in 1915 to 4 
~ 1 million by 1928 (8.5%) • 
This forced many companies to relocate to sites as far north as 
South West Africa or go out of business~ and sparked the 
motorisation of the fishing fleet 87 • These developments, in turn, 
frustrated provincial state attempts to reach consensus on the 
closed season and allowed the confusion over resource management 
to drag on until 1927~. Relations between the industry and the 
~ S.C. Townell HThe Crawfish Industry of the Cape West CoastH, pp.50-51; 
R. Lees Fishing for Fortunes, p.67 ff.; Union of South Africa Fisheries and 
Marine Biological Survey Report No.3, 1922, p.ii; Cape Archives; PAN 41, 
A120\e\24(2), F.H. Sibson to the Secretary Crawfish Survey Committee, 30 
November 1925, pp.4-5 and PAN 40, A120\e\5(6), A.L. Brown to the South African 
High Commissioner London, 17 March 1925. 
~ See TABLE 4.3 above. 
~ Cape Archives; PAN 37, A120\e\3(1), HReturn Showing the Number of 
Crawfish Captured and the Number of Boats Employed in the Capture of such fish 
During the Years 1913 to 1918 inclusive#; PAN 42, A120\e\36, HAnnual Return 
Shewing the Number of Crayfish Caught by the Canning Companies of the Cape 
Province During the Year ending 31 December 1920H and FDS 12, FS 8\6\1, Return 
headed HCrawfish - 1928•. 
~ R. Lees Fishing For Fortunes, pp.68-73; Cape Archives; PAN 42, 
A120\e\36, Annual Returns Shewing the Number of Crayfish Caught by the Canning 
Companies of the Cape Province During the Years 1916-1921 and Union of South 
Africa, Office of Census and Statistics, Statistics of Production [U.G.35-
1926, U.G.32-1928, U.G.18-1930 and U.G. 44-1930,J. 
~ Union of South Africa Fisheries and Marine Biological Survey Report 
No.4, June 1923-June 1925, pp.v-vi and pp.ix-x; Union of South Africa 
Fisheries and Marine Biological Survey Report No.5, 1927, p.8; Union of South 
Africa Fisheries and Marine Biological Survey Report No.6, 1928, p.12 and Cape 
Archives; PAN 41, A120\e\24(2), Hickson and Sons to the Provincial Secretary, 
9 April 1925. 
~ Cape Archives; PAN 39, A120\e\5, vols. 5-8 for the full debate and FDS 
4, MIC 178\24, ·Diary• of the Crawfish Observer F.H. Sibson, 1-10 October 1924 
for a revealing, sample of industry opinion about the crayfish closed season. 
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provincial authorities were further strained by the imposition of 
a controversial provincial tax on canning company profits in 
J(l 
1922 '" . The canners' attempts to offset this by fostering closer 













shrinking profits without providing the industry with the 
research,infrastructure and control it desired. 
Instead, a growing north-south divide appeared in the industry, 
shaped by the impact of raw material availability on product io n 
cost s in the co ntext of a declining price in 
J 1 
Fran c e · . The 
industry was split between the area of high producti o n costs in 
the Cap e Peninsula and low costs on 
Q~ 
Helena Bay ''". By the late 1920s the 
the west coast, north of St 
northern canners enjoyed a 
profit per case of around 15s while their southern counterparts 
gq 
Cape Archives; PAN 42, A120\e\31 and PAN 4, CFT2. Also "Cape 
Provincial Taxation - Crayfish Canning Co's Action - Test Case in Supreme 
Court" in Cape Times, 3 February 1921; "The Provincial Taxation - Canning 
Company's Action - Important Judgement in Supreme Court" in Cape Times, 14 
April 1921; "Tax on Canning Companies Decision of Appellate Court 
Administrator's Appeal Fails" in Cape Times, 7 July 1921; "Taxing Crayfish 
Profits - Provincial Executive's Bombshell - Canners Aghast at Proposal" in 
Cape Times, 5 December 1921. 
9o Cape Archives; FDS 4, MIC178\24, Secretary Fisheries Survey Committee 
to the Chairman Fisheries Survey Committee, 22 April 1924, Chairman Fisheries 
Survey.Committee to John Ovenstone et al, 1 September 1924, Minutes of Meeting 
between Secretary for Mines and Industries and Representatives of the Crayfish 
,Canning Industry, 9 September 1924 & Minutes of Meeting between Secretary for 
Mines and Industries and Representatives of the Crayfish Canning Industry, 22 
April 1925. 
91 Union of South Africa Fisheries and Marine Biological Survey Report 
No.12, 1934, p.6 and State Archives; HEN 1538, 180\2\1(1), Department of Mines 
and Industries, "Report of Cost Accountant for Board of Trade and Industries: 
The South African Crayfish Canning Industry", 16 November 1931, pp.6-8. 
~ State ~rchives; HEN 1538, 180\2\1(1), Department of Mines and 
Industries, "Report of Cost Accountant for Board of Trade and Industries: The 
South African Crayfish Canning Industry", 16 November 1931, Table IV, pp.7-7a. 
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struggled just to bl'.'eak 
q1 
even · . With the increase in Japanese 
ca nned cl'.'ab on the Fl'.'ench market aftel'.' 1925, the northern canners 
began price-cutting to fend off competition and protect their 
market 
Q4 
share ' . The southern canners, dependent on a high price in 
France to show a profit, were unable to follow suit and faced 
q~ 
bankruptcy~ . In a bid to stabilise the market and pl'.'otect the it' 
v ulnerable profit mal'.'gins, they formed the South Aft'ican Lobster 
Canners Association (SALCA) in 1928 with the dual policy of a 
production quota and a minimum price in France (initially set at 
~L, 
60s per case)· . The SALCA's effectiveness was jeopardised by the 
t'efusal of the largest canner - the North Bay Canning Company -
to join the Association, but, despite this setback, its fir s t 
year was a relative success and the industry appeared to have 
weathered the crisis of the 1920s without the assistance o f 
eithe r the provincial or central state 1 1 • 
The macro-crisis of the 1920s was reflected in microcosm at St 
Helena Bay. In the heady years immediately after the war Stephan 
93 Ibid., pp.14-15. 
94 Ibid., p.18. Also Cape Archives; FDS 12, FS 8\6\1, Secretary Fisheries 
Survey Committee to the North Bay Canning Company, 29 August 1928 and State 
Archives; HEN 1538, 180\2\1(1), C. von Bonde to the Chairman Board of Trade 
and Industries, 28 November 1930, forwarding articles from Commercial and 
Industrial Gazette, June 1928 and HSouth African Industry: How Japanese 
Product is Proving a MenaceH Fishing News, 8 November 1930. 
95 For a nonsensical ·explanation of price cutting as beneficial to and 
initiated by smaller canners, see S.C. Townell HThe Crawfish Industry of the 
Cape West Coast, 1874-1947", p.60. 
96 State Archives; HEN 1538, 180\2\1(1), Stephan Brothers to the Chairma.n 
Board of Trade and Industries, 30 October 1928 & SALCA to the Chairman of the 
Board of Trade and Industries, 31 October 1928. 
97 State Archives; HEN 1538, 180\2\1(1), Department of Mines and 
Industries, "Report of Cost Accountant for Board of Trade and Industries: The 
South African Crayfish Canning IndustryH, 16 November 1931, pp.13, pp.15-16 & 
Table VI, p.17 and HEN 1538, 180\2\1(1), C. von Bonde, HMerrorandum on the 
Proposed Re-Establishment of a Closed Season for CrawfishH, 1 May 1931. 
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Brothers in i tiated an ambitious expansion programme in 
antici'pation o f a co ntinued hig h price in Eur o pe. The firm 
brought two Ameri ca n canning ex perts out to St Helena Bay to 
assist with o perations, launched itself as a limited com p any, 
op ened 3. new f.3.ctor y at Lamberts Bay, sp lit the general 
dealership 
can -ma king 
c3.nn eries 98 
from the c anning side of the 
to 









supply its wes t 
prices in Fran ce in 
ho we ve r, the f1rm ' s ~a nning operations co ntra cte d, leading to the 
abandonment 
evaporation 
of t h e ill -fated Lamberts Bay factory in 1921 , the 
o f ~o nsolidated Goldfields ' interest in 1924 and the 
~il 
dissolution of the limited co mpany i n 19 2 5 ·· . A proposed me c,;ec 
between the Hout Bay and North Bay Canning Companies and Ste[)han 
Brothers also fell 
:nt, 
through· · ~ Instead, both Stephan 
the No rth Bay Ca nn ing Company found themselves 
Br others and 
straddling the 
growing north-south divide in the industry. From being the 
furthermost ca nning o utpost in 1914, St Helena Bay was rap idly 
overtaken by the shifting crayfish frontier after 1918 as it 
leap-frogged up the west coast. The Bay's wartime catch fiqures 
already showed tell-tale signs of a declin i ng local crayfish 
resource and by 1926 the North Bay Canning Company's Steenbergs 
Cove factory manager reported that: 
The 
"originally good-sized fish could be found in large 
numbers in the bay, but that in recent years the size has 
decreased, till now nothing but undersized fish and fish 
o n the edge of the size-limit are obtainable" tOI. 
following year, the provincial state, well aware that 
98 E. Rosenthal "The Stephan Saga", pp.91 ff. 
~ F h f F t 66 Ibid., p.101 ff. Also R. Lees is ing or or unes, p • • 
10(1 R. Lees Fishing for Fortunes, pp.71-72. 
lOl Cape Archives; PAN 41, A120\e\24(2), F.H. Sibson to the Secretary of 
the Crawfish Survey Committee, 13 April 1926 and TABLE 4.3 above. 
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St 
Helena Bay was "almost entirely stocked with undersized fish" · ·~ 
and set on abandoning the closed season, proclaimed the s o uthern 
waters of the Bay a c rayfish sanctuary permanently closed to all 
; ·1( 
fishing ···: This co nf i rmed the demise of the local _crayfis h 
fishery an d 1 n 1927 the North Bay Cann in g Company c losed it s 
Steenbe rgs Cove factory 
'·,4 
Bay ·· . Stephan Brothers, 
and shipped the 
however, did not 
plant north 
foll o w suit. 
t o Th o rn 
Alth ou gh 
i t tem por arily shut it s Steenbergs Cov e plant as early as 1924 , 
it co ntinued canning at its Paternoster factory, util ising 
. ·~ 
cr ayfish c aught between 15 and 40 miles distant from the Ba y· ·~ 
Stephan Brothers' decisio n was doubtless influenced by the 
fai lu re o f it s earlier Lamberts Bay venture, as well as its land -
ho ld ings and other "mercantile" interests at the Bay, al l o f 
which mitigated against relocation and reinforced the inherent 
re sistance to change in what remained a quintessential family 
' r\ L 
firm . . c.. Instead, it attempted to offset the effects of a 
worsening crayfish scarcity by lobbying for a more sympathetic 
resourc e management strategy and experimenting with new fishing 
l02 Ibid. 
103 Cape of Good Hope Provincial Gazette, Proclamation 15 of 1918, 13 
February 1918 and Provincial Gazette, Proclamation 9 of 1927, 6 January 1927. 
The southern shores of St Helena Bay were first proclairred a sanctuary and 
closed to fishing in 1918, but this legislation was totally ineffective and 
ignored by both fisherrren and canning companies. The Bay was re-proclaimed in 
1927. 
104 R. Lees Fishing for Fortunes, p.72 and S.C. Townell "The Crawfish 
Industry of the Cape West Coast, 1874-1947#, pp.59-60. 
!OS Cape Archives; PAN 40, A120\e\5(6), Stephan Brothers to the Provincial 
Secretary, 25 March 1924 & 8 April 1924 and 1\HFD, 7\1\4, Petition of A. 
Dipaola et al to the Magistrate of Hopefield, 10 October 1932. 
'.% E. Rosenthal "The Stephan SagaH, p.96 and Cape Archives; 1\HFD, 
7\1\7, 15\1\2\4, Magistrate Hopefield to the Provincial Secretary, 13 April 
1922. The firm retained a 100 foot strip of land above the crown land reserve 
during the sell-off of its coastal farms in the first two decades of the 20th 
Century. 
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technologies. Henry Stephan had been a strong advocate of the 
closed season during the war, but his enthusiasm was tempered by 
the failure of the firm's Lamberts Bay cannery due to provincial 
state intransigence over the closed season :o: The 1:1artime 
practice of proclaiming different closed seasons for each part of 
the coast became untenable after 1918 as factories relocated to 
unsurveyed waters further north and motorisation gave the fleet 
an increased fishing range . The provincial state thus favoured a 
return to the old uniform closed season, but agreement on exact 
dates remained elusive. In the absence of scientific resear ch , 
proposal s , the industry contested all the provincial state's 
• t,C 
severely straining relations after 19 2 0 ·': The c anners were 
by Cape . Town's refusal to use the re venue fut·ther angered 
generated by its 
season and turned 
canning profits tax for research on the closed 
ire, 
to the central state for assistance ·· ·~ Pret o ria 
had resumed the marine survey in 1920 to prove new deep water 
trawling grounds, but although sympathetic to the problems of the 
canning industry, was of little 
1 Fi 
practical help " '·~ The industry 
thus agreed to 
1928 it had 
fund its 
run out of 
own "crayfish survey" in 1925, but by 
funds and failed to produce any new 
'.O? R. Lees Fishing for Fortunes, pp. 43-47 and Cape Archives; PAN 39, A 
120\e\5 (5), Stephan Brothers to the Provincial Secretary, 23 December 1918 & 
Stephan, Lord & Co to the Provincial Secretary, 19 November 1919. 
lOB For the full debate see Cape Archives; PAN 39, A120\e\5, vols. 5-8. 
!09 See for example Cape Archives; FDS 4, MIC178\24, Minutes of Meeting 
between Secretary for Mines and Industries and Representatives of the Crayfish 
Canning Industry, 9 September·1924 and State Archives; HEN 1538, 180\2\1(1), 
Stephan Brothers to the Minister of Justice, 11 September 1930 & Stephan 
Brothers to the Chairman Board of Trade and Industries, 30 September 1930. 
llO Union of South Africa Fisheries and Marine Biological Survey Report 
No.1, 1920 and Fisheries and Marine Biological Survey Report No.6, 1928, p.6. 
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f<!i 
evidence on the closed season '.;. With Gilchrist's death in 1926, 
the Fisheries Survey Division [ FSD] was restructured and control 
over t he industry began to shift away from the provinc ial 
·1 ·· · 
state··". The new-look FSD was more amenable to the needs o f the 
canners and in strumental in moving Cape Town to abolish the 
clo sed season in 1927, relax the legal size-limit in 1929 and .. , 
block the erection of new canneries after 1930- · -:. 
Stephan Brothers' sustained attempts at easing state regulation 
o f the cray fish fishery complemented its introduction of ne w 
fi shing technology at the Bay after 1920 to shore up flagging 
c atches . In 1922 the firm imported a Danish seine and power win ch 
from Europe to circumvent the effects of the ETSFZ on bait 
In 1924 it implemented a crate system for: 
transporting crayfish fr:om distant grounds to the Bay canneries 
and in 1925 considered importing lobster pots to extend th e 
•11 
"' Union of South Africa Fisheries and Marine Biological Survey Report 
No.6, 1928, p.8 and Cape Archives; FDS 3, MIC 169\25 vols.1 & 2, F.H. Sibson, 
Crawfish Survey Monthly Reports, 1924-1926. 
1"' 
.:L Union of South Africa Debates of the House of Assembly, 13 February to 
15 April 1925, vol.3, cols.458-480; Union of South Africa, Fishing Harbours 
Committee, General Observations and Conclusions in respect to the Fishing 
Industry of the Cape Province, 1927, pp.80-85; Union of South Africa Fisheries 
and Marine Biological Survey Report No.7, 1929, pp.4-10; Union of South Africa 
Fisheries and Marine Biological Survey Report No.8, 1930, p.4; Cape Archives; 
PAN 26, A120\b\305 vols.1-2 and State Archives; HEN 1499, 180\1\7(1) • . 
i l3 Cape Archives; PAN 40, A120\e\5(8), C. von Bonde to the Provincial 
Secretary, 10 March 1927, forwarding HReport on the Desirability or Otherwise 
of a Close Season for CrawfishH; PAN 37, A120\e\3(3), C. von Bonde to the 
Provincial Secretary, 5 February 1929 and State Archives; HEN 1538, 
180\2\1(1), C. von Bonde .to the Chairma.n of the Board of Trade and Industries, 
28 November 1930. 
114 Cape Archives; PAN 25, A120\B\206, Stephan Brothers to the Secretary 
of the Fishery Board, 7 November 1922. The Danish seine resembled the trek 
seine, but was worked from a boat out at sea with the aid of a power winch. 
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DIAGRAM 4: CRAYFISH FISHING 




deeper waters · ·-. The eff o rt out to latter plan 
was abandoned b ecause the currents on the west coast were too 
str on g t o all o w pots to be set. Lastly, the firm turned to 
mot o r isati o n to extend its fishing range to new distant grounds 
beyond Lam b er- t s Bay ::: It purchased a number of motorised fishing 
er- aft in the early 1920s, but with disappointing results, as 
Henry Stephan explained in 1926: 
" [T] he d i ffi c ulty ••• was that 40 to 50 ton [ moto r ] b o ats we r e 
required and as there were no facilities for- slipping b o a t s 
o f th i s size i f anything went wrong with them, pe o p l e wer-e 
u nable t o use them. He at one time owned a number o f mo t o r 
boa t s, but owing to difficulties which he had h ad with them , 
he h a d s c rapped pretty well all of the~; Pulling these type s 
o f boats o n to the shore strained them" ·· • 
The paucity of adequate harbour and maintenance f acil it i e s 





a 1 on g the en t i re we st co a st · •w. For this reason, the 
the industry trend of encouraging and assisting 
owners who f i s _hed for its factories to install 
paraffin engines on their boats at a cost of around l950, thereby 
H C' 
" J Cape Archives; PAN 40, A120\e\5(6), Stephan Brothers to the Provincial 
Secretary, 17 July 1924 and FDS 3, MIC 159\25, F.H. Sibson to the Secretary 
Fisheries Survey Committee, 26 June 1925 & F.H. Sibson to the Secretary 
Fisheries Survey Committee, 20 July 1925. Crayfish often arrived dead at the 
factory after hours in the boat hold. The crate system attempted to keep the 
fish alive in crates subrrerged in the sea imrrediately after capture until 
c anning. 
116 Cape Archives; PAN 40, A120\e\24(1), Minutes of Meeting of Fisheries 
Advisory Board, 5 February 1918. 
1P 
· · ' Cape Archives; FDS 17, FS36, Notes of Interview between Mr H.J.C. 
Stephan (Messrs. Stephan Bros., Cape Town) and Captain H. Scharmberg (Saldanha 
Bay Canning Co.), and the Fishing Harbours Committee, 18 May 1926. 
• IQ 
l,u Union of South Africa, Report of the Fishing Harbours Committee, Part 
III, 1926 and Fishing Harbours Committee, General Observations and Conclusions 
in respect to the Fishing Industry of the Cape Province, 1927, pp.76-77. 
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lessening its own risk while still reaping the benefits of a 
motorised fleet and an extended fishing range 11~ 
Stephan Brothers' refusal to relocate, coupled with the 
indifference of the provincial and central states and the failure 
of new fishing technology and motorisation to lift catches, saw 
the company slide into financial crisis by the end of the decade, 
reporting a large overdraft in both 1928 and 1929 1~ As profit 
levels shrank, so the firm became increasingly dependent on the 
maintenance of a minimum price in France and acutely susceptible 
to any instability in the market caused by its northern rivals. 
The abolition of the closed season in 1927, mounting competition 
from Japan and the South West African canning industry and fears 
about foreign factory ships canning crayfish in Union waters 
created general unease in the industry by 1928 121• In this climate 
Stephan Brothers lent its support to the formation of the SALCA 
to limit production at home and set prices abroad. Facing 
competition from more efficient producers, local and foreign, the 
firm was, by 1929, entirely dependent on containing such 
competition in order to remain profitable 1~ While the SALCA was 
119 Union of South Africa, Board of Trade and Industries, Report No.180: 
The Fishing Industry, 1934, p.30. 
lW State Archives; HEN 1538, 180\2\1(1), Department of Mines and 
Industries, #Report of Cost Accountant for Board of Trade and Industries: The 
South African Crayfish Canning IndustryH, 16 November 1931, pp.10-11. 
121 HFloating Cannery for West Africa - Converted White Star LinerH in 
Cape Times, 26 September 1929 and State Archives; HEN 1538, 180\2\1(1), 
Stephan Brothers to the Chairman of the Board of Trade and Industries, 30 
October 1928, SALCA to the Chairman of the Board of Trade and Industries, 31 
October 1928; SALCA to the Secretary for South West Africa, 23 November 1929; 
Minutes of Meeting between SALCA and Board of Trade and Industries, 8 April 
1930 & C. von Bonde HFloating Crawfish Canning FactoriesH, 8 May 1930. 
in State Archives; HEN 1538, 180\2\1(1), Stephan Brothers et al to C. von 
Bonde, 5 September 1930, Stephan Brothers to the Minister of Justice, 11 
September 1930 & Stephan Brothers to the Chairman of the Board of Trade and 
Industries, 30 September 1930. 
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moderately successful in this regard up until 1929, the onset of 
the Great Depression was to erode its fragile hegemony over the 
industry and plunge the firm into renewed crisis after 1930. 
The post-war crisis in the canning industry also impacted 
directly on the fishing labour force, many of whom depended on 
crayfish fishing as a source of seasonal income by 1918. On the 
strength of the boom, many boat owners went into debt in the 
early 1920s, motorising their craft and relying on sustained good 
catches of crayfish to repay their loans. For these men the 
downturn in the industry, marked by frequent resource and market 
crises throughout 1920s when fish were scarce or the canneries 
ceased production in season, translated into longer fishing 
trips, smaller catches and lower earnings. Under these new 
pressures, they resorted to ever-more frequent poaching in the 
ETSFZ for bait and the rantsoenvis trade and so came into 
increasing conflict with the seine fishermen. The paraffin engine 
also gave the crayfish fisherman-cum-poacher the advantage of 
speed over his pursuers in their oar- and sail-powered craft, 
made apprehension unlikely and illegal fishing irresistible, 
whether for bait or resale. By the end of the war crayfish 
fishing was an integral part of the St Helena Bay fishing 
economy. In 1919 the Bay canneries processed a record 7.5 million 
crayfish caught by fishermen from Paternoster, 
Stompneus and Berg River 1~ 
Steenbergs Cove, 
As the focus of fishing shifted north in the 1920s, so these men 
were compelled to move further afield and spend longer period~ at 
sea. A round trip to Denkins Bay or Groen River took more than 24 
hours in travelling time alone, making the average fishing trip 
123 Cape Archives; PAN 22, A120\B\1S8, Abstract from Register Showing the 
Numbers and Various Kinds of Nets in Use at the Different Fishing Stations in 
the Cape Province During the Year 1920. 
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in the 1920s about a day and a half ( 36 hours) 12~ Each motor boat 
"mothered" several dinghies which were used to fish the coves, 
kelp beds and inshore reefs inaccessible to the larger vessel. 
The catch was then loaded into the hold of the motor boat for the 
long journey back to the cannery. At St Helena Bay itself the 
open boat crayfish fishery, conducted with dinghies launched from 
the factory jetties, continued, but for ever declining returns. 
In all cases, crayfish fishing was back-breaking work. One man 
rowed the dinghy while another set and cleared the nets and both 
helped unloaded the catch. Besides physical exhaustion from 
rowing and hauling, the crayfish's spiny exoskeleton left the 
fishermen with blistered and bleeding hands. Those in the bakkies 
were also vulnerable to sudden changes in the weather or swamping 
by heavy swells. The canneries operated a strict piece-work 
system, paying per hundred crayfish caught and relying on 
independent motor boat owners for an increasing proportion of 
their raw material as the 1920s progressed 1~ The boat owners 
retained all the earnings until the end of the season (3 months) 
when - a settling of accounts to9k place. In the. interim the 
fishermen and their families subsisted on advances from the owner 
. and credit at the local store just as the company fishermen did. 
Willem Theart a private boat owner at Velddrift was 
particularly adept at manipulating this situation to his best 
advantage, as his skipper, Ulisse Donaggi remembers: 
"Hy [Theart] gee sak geld. Ek het min of meer meeste 
Kleurlinge gehad. Dan kom die Kleurling se vrou na sy 
[Theart] se huis toe. Dan moet hy hom nou in die week 
miskien Ss [gee] en dit laat hom lewe. Dit is wat sy kry, 
maar toe was dit nag baie geld. Toe vir die half-kroon 
kan sy nog goed gekoop het , · maar nou kan jy niks daarvoor 
keep nie. En nou na drie maande dan reken ans nou af. Dan 
maak hy - hy't altyd 'n vat wyn - en nou die Kleurlinge 
124 Interview with Hr Willie & Gert Smeda, Velddrift, 4 July 1986 & 
Interview with Hr Hendrik Brand, Velddrift, 19 July 1986. 
125 Board of Trade & Industries Report No. 180: The Fishing Industry 1934, 
p.30. 
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drink en nou weet hy [Theart] net mooi hoe om sy sommetjies 
te maak [laughter]. Hy was 'n slim kalantl"IU 
Theart was not the only "slim kalarit" among boat owners at the 
Bay. Willie Smeda regularly supplied his crew with cheap wine 
provided by his boss, Alkie Theart, restricting consumption to 
weekends and the end of season1~ In addition to debts incurred 
on alcohol, fishermen shared all food, fuel and other boat 
expenses, the amounts being deducted from their earnings before 
final payment 1~ Bertha Chilcott ran the store at Laaiplek foi 
her uncle Carosini and recalls how the skippers would come in at 
the end of the season and settle their crew's accounts before 
handing over what was left to the men 1~ The withholding of 
payment, credit, the provision of alcohol and illiteracy all gave 
owners wide scope for skimming-off fishermen's earnings. When 
catches were small or non-existent or crayfish fishing prevented 
by weather or law, both independent and company fishermen earned 
nothing and resorted to other avenues to subsist. While credit 
and housing were available to tide company employees over, 
independent producers depended on the annual win~er snoek fishery 
and bouts of harder fishing for the rantsoenvis trade during off-
seasons, bad weather or fish scarcity to make ends meet 1~ 
The gradual decline in legal-sized crayfish at St Helena Bay and 
the general fall-off in catches in the early 1920s hit all 
fishermen. Many boat owners responded by motorising their craft, 
p.30. 
lU Interview with Hr Ulisse Donaggi, Velddrift, 22 July 1986. 
IV Interview with Hr Willie & Gert Smeda, Velddrift, 4 July 1986 
1~ Board of Trade & Industries Report No. 180: The Fishing Industry 1934, 
1~ Interview with Hrs Bertha Chilcott, Laaiplek, 3 July 1986. 
1~ Interview with Hr Ulisse Donaggi, Velddrift, 22 July 1986. 
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but the cost and lack of safe harbour protection at the Bay made 
this an expensive and risky investment. As a result, the motor 
revolution at St Helena Bay was less. spectacular than at 
Saldanha, where safe anchorage was readily available. 













Saldanha B 22 22.2 38 16.6 52 21.1 
St Helena B 8 8.1 12 7.2 13 9.5 
Berg River 15 10.6 21 13.5 28 10.6 
Lamberts B 5 6.0 15 16.7 26 14. 1 
TOTAL so 12.2 86 13.4 119 16.2 
Motorisation also threatened owners' independence, many of them 
taking loans from the canning companies and gambling on sustained 
crayfish catches to clear their debts. Those that failed became 
de facto company employees. Other independent boat owners could 
not afford motorisation and thus continued fishing the local 
grounds for shrinking catches. A similar fate befell company 
fishermen. After the failure of Stephan Brothers' attempts at 
motorisation, the firm relied increasingly on independent 
producers, assisting them to motorise their craft rather than 
maintaining a fleet of its own. Motorisation also enhanced the 
efficiency of the individual vessel, increasing its range and 
allowing it to tow 4-5 dinghies to distant grounds to fish 1~ The 
sedentary open boat fishery at the Bay thus became an increasing 
anachronism by the mid-1920s, forcing many company employees out 
131 Own calculations based on data contained in Cape Archives; PAN 13, 
A120\b\90 and PAN 16, A120\b\90\1. 
in See for example Cape Archives; PAN 40, A120\e\5(6), Hickson and Sons 
to the Provincial Secretary, 15 Hay 1924. 
165 
of the crayfish fishery into rantsoenvis fishing 1~ For those 
fishermen and boat owners who made the transition to 
motorisation, the economics of fishing also changed radically. 
Whereas the old sail and rowing boats ran on wind and muscle-
power and required no mechanical skill and little ongoing 
maintenance, motorisation introduced a number of new costs, 
including fuel and spares. Nor were motor vessels as forgiving of 
rough handling or amenable to local improvisation in upkeep. 
These new demands led to a revision of the share system in 
favour of the owner and by the early 1930s, he received 
approximately double the share of a counterpart in the oar-
powered trek seine fishery 
combined 1~ 
and more than his whole crew 
TABLE 4.5: The Impact of Motorisation on the Share System 1~ 
Informant Owner 
TREK SEINE [OAR-POWERED] 
Alkie Theart 2.0 




CRAYFISH [PARAFFIN ENGINE] 
Hendrik Brand 5.0 55.5 
Ulisse Donaggi 5.75 47.9 
*=Owner-skipper 
NUMBER OF SHARES 




















133 Cape Archives; FDS 17, FS36, Notes of Interview between Hr H.J.C. 
Stephan (Messrs. Stephan Bros., Cape Town) and Captain H. Scharmberg (Saldanha 
Bay Canning Co.), and the Fishing Harbours Committee, 18 Hay 1926 & Fishing 
Harbours Committee, Notes of Meeting at Berg River Mouth, Piketberg District, 
4 June 1926. 
1~ Board of Trade & Industries Report No 180: The Fishing Industry, 1934, 
p.30 and TABLE 4.5 below. 
1~ Own tabulation based on data collected in Interviews with Hr John 
Tolken, Dwarskersbos, 17 July 1986; Hr Alkie Theart, Dwarskersbos, 18 July 
1986; Hr Hendrik Brand, Velddrift, 19 July 1986 and Hr Ulisse Donaggi, 
Velddrift, 22 July 1986. 
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Because of the high operating cost of a motorised boat new levels 
of efficiency were also required. A fishing trip cost money for 
fuel, regardless of its result and a series of failed trips ate 
into owners' cash reserves. With the exception of weather, closed 
seasons, and the vicissitudes of the resource, the other major 
constraint on a successful trip was an adequate supply of bait. 
Many owners of motor boats moved to Berg River during the 1920s 
because of the safe anchorage it provided 1~ It was thus no 
longer cost-effective for them first to go south to the free 
fishing zone to set nets for bait before heading north, when they 
could more easily and cheaply find bait in the ETSFZ en route and 
save fishing time and money. Surplus bait or fish caught on the 
return trip also supplemented earnings from crayfish fishing or 
turned a failed trip into a paying one through resale on the 
rantsoenvis market. In seeking to procure their bait needs 
without wasting time crossing and recrossing the Bay or simply 
looking for a welcome windfall, the motor boat fishermen began to 
poach with increasing regularity in the trek seine reserve after 
1922. If the cost pressures introduced by the new economy of 
motorisation were the primary cause of these incursions, a 
paraffin engine also gave poachers virtual immunity from 
prosecution. The decline of the Bay crayfish fishery and Stephan 
Brothers' resort to distant fishing over relocation thus revived 
the whole issue of non-seine access to the Piketberg coast and 
repoliticised it along the old faultlines of seine versus set net 
fishermen. 
Developments in the Sandveld during the 1920s also set the scene 
for a renewed conflict, as the roll call of evictions and 
bankruptcies of bywoners and small farmers ~teadily mounted. 
Alkie Theart remembers how his family lost their land in 1926 : 
1~ See TABLE 4.4 above and Cape Archives; PAN 41, A120\e\24(4), C.F.J. 
Thiart to J.J.H. de Waal, 25 March 1925. 
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"Ons het tog geboer. Hierdie plaas [Dwarskersbos] dit was ens 
plaas. Ek was dertien jaar cud toe my oorlede pa deed is. En 
toe hou ens later aan vandisie, die kinders. Ons ander broer 
di~ - hy was toe see toe. Neu ja, ek was toe neg baie jonk en 
ens - hulle't [the older brothers] toe perde, en hulle't 
beeste, en hulle't skape, en hulle't bokke, maar ek het niks. 
My een broer het [ook] niks gehad nie. Toe meet ens eers 
ender ander mense loop werk. Die oestyd en so aan ••• Ja, ja, 
sekel. Ooh vader ek het sekel gesny! Neu ja, in daai tyd 'n 
da 1 er per dag gekry" 137 • 
Theart's experience was not unique. Abraham Tolken's childhood 
was also shaped by poverty and hard manual labour. Born in 1915 
the son of a seine fisherman too poor to afford his own boat, 
Abraham's grandfather had been a herd in the Sandveld. He and his 
brothers were hired out as child labourers to local 
order to supplement the families income: 
farmers in 
"Toe loop ek. Toe's ek neg jonk. Toe maak hulle hier 'n pad 
hier uit hier. De Plaat karels - daai pad - maak gruis vir 
die boere. Toe's ek jonk. Toe sa my pa ek meet nou gaan kap -
klip kap, klei kap, graaf werk. Dit is bitter daardie jare. 
Aah, jy 's te jonk om die werk te doen" 138 • 
Abraham's namesake, John Tolken, was raised in similar 
circumstances. His family of eleven initially lived as bywoners 
in the Sandveld. Unable to support them on the returns from his 
own farming efforts, John's father worked as a shepherd for food 
and helped out on his own father's farm at harvest time, taking a 
"slagding" in payment 1~ As John explained, "Ons is te veel en 
die plekkie waar ens sit is te klein. Ons kan nie so bestaan nie, 
ons meet uitsprei" 1~ For this reason Tolken senior hired out his 
sons' labour to local landowners: 
137 Interview with Hr Alkie Theart, Dwarskersbos, 18 July 1986. 
138 Interview with Hr Abraham Tolken, Velddrift, 27 July 1986. 
139 Interview with Hr John Tolken, Dwarskersbos, 17 July 1986. 
140 Ibid. 
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"VoOr ons nou visvang het ek twee jaar by 'n Boonsaaier 
gebly, met ander woorde met plaas werk groat geword. My 
pa't my verhuur aan die, maar ek ~eet waarvoor nie. Ek 
werk! Die tweede jaar - ek weet nou nog - toe begin 
vandisie. Staan pa en die Boonsaaier daar bymekaar. Ek sa 
·ea, maar waarom moet ek bie waarvoor ek werk?' Goed jy 
kan nie vir 'n ander man werk en werk en weet ook nie 
waarvoor jy werk nie. ·Nee ek kannie uitkom met die ding 
nie'. Ek sa ·Nee, pa moat uitkom met die ding, ek moat 
weet, vanmore moet ek weer werkt' Pa sa ·vir 15s in 'n 
maand'. Toe sa ek ·ois 'n sixpence op 'n dag!' Dan moat 
ek met die sekel op die oesland loop, krom loop, benede 
kap vir 'n sixpence. Ek sa ·Nee, ek sal nie langer werk 
in die Vlak [Sandveld)'. Toe sa die man [Boonsaaier] vir 
my ·Jy moet jou maand uitdien'. Toe sa ek ·Ek sal die 
maand in die tronk loop sitt' - dit onthou ek goed 
·maar [ek] werk nie vir 'n sixpence niet• 141 
Despite this experience, John spent a further four years working 
for another farmer in Malmesbury for l2 a month from April to 
September each year. Piet Smit too was inured to labour at an 
early age. The son of a failed farmer-cum-seine fisherman from 
the northern Sandveld, 
relations: 
Piet grew up working for wealthier 
"My pa het nie 'n trek net gehad, want ens het by ander 
mense gewerk. My pa was 'n beer en wanneer die beer klaar 
was ek gekom, was ek nege jaar oud. Daar het ek so swaar 
gekry. Toe't my ma siek gewees, haart moelikheid gehad. 
Toe my pa nou by die see kom werk toe sa ek 'Nee, die see 
is nie vir my nie'. Toe't ek by 'n oom van my gebly, daar 
in Aurora se distrik~ Daar het ek skool toe gegaan, daar 
was 'n plaas skooltjie gewees. Ek kan, maar sa ek het 
gewerk vir kos en ou klere, soos die mense altyd gese 
het. Ek het niks verdien nie. En die het kos gegee en nou 
en dan 'n stukkie klere en so aan. My ma het ook vir my 
opgekom het. En toe ek 16 jaar toe dink ek nee ••• Ek kan 
mos nou nie 'n lewe lank vir ander mense werk en diet nie 
ek wat daaraan bou nie. Maar toe kom ek see toe. Toe kom 
ek ook vis vang" 1~ 
141 Ibid. 
142 Interview with Hr Piet Smit, Velddrift, 1 July 1986. 
169 
Both Tolkens and Alkie Theart followed Piet Smit to sea during 
the 1920s as an escape from exploitation as farm labourers and 
way of improving their lot in life. All but Abraham Tolken 
settled on Dwarskersbos farm to the north of the Berg River 
mouth. While the provincial state fretted about burgeoning 
informal settlement along the west coast, the Dwarskersbos 
community grew rapidly due to uncertainty over legal ownership of 
the land~~ From a handful of inhabitants in 1919 the population 
rose to 96 in 1925, 128 in 1930, and nearly doubled to 236 by 
1935 1~ Although small in comparison to the estimated 2000 people 
living along the lower reaches of the Berg River by 1926, 
Dwarskersbos was similar in many respects 1~ The land was owned 
by the Smit family who levied an annual rental of t3 on each 
household and the community retained direct links with Sandveld 
agriculture through laQour service at peak periods in the 
agricultural year. Like Berg River there was "a certain amount of 
joint relationship ••• between farming and fishing" conditioned 
by the seasonal nature of both 1~ As John Tolken recalls, "Ons 
het eers net so, hoe sal ek nou sa - oes tyd dan gaan ans oes op 
die plase, dan gaan ans sny met die sekel. Dan kom ons - as die 
af is - dan kom ans weer see toe, dan kom ans weer vis vang" 1~ 
Unlike Velddrift or Laaiplek, however, Dwarskersbos was a far 
143 See for example Fishing Harbours Committee, Part III, 1926, pp.43-45; 
Cape Archives; PAN 70, K59\16, Provincial Secretary to the Magistrate 
Halmesbury, 24 September 1919 & precis of correspondence relating to 
Application of H.J. van Schalkwyk for lease of a Fishing Site on Elands Kloof 
(Patrysen Berg), n.d.and correspondence in State Archives; JUS 549, 73\30, 
about the disputed boundaries of Dwarskersbos farm. 
1~ Calculated from State Archives; VNW 1075, SW 456(3), F.G.A. Kotze to 
the Department of Lands, 3 June 1952, . forwarding list of families and dates of 
occupation at Dwarskersbos. 
14s Fishing Harbours Committee, Part III, 1926, p.62. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Interview with Hr John Tolken, Dwarskersbos, 17 July 1986. 
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more homogenous fishing community, relying almost exclusively on 
the beach seine to survive and thus depending heavily on the 
ETSFZ for undisturbed access to the marine resource. 
The Dwarskersbos fishery owners built their fish houses at 
Zooverby, a trek ground between Dwarskersbos and Berg River. 
Johnny Eigelaar remembers there being six fisheries owned by 
different families, each employing two boats and twelve fishermen 
to work the ten treks along the 
Bobbejaanberg 1~ For young men like 
coast between Zooverby and 
Tolken, Theart and Sm i t, 
Zooverby offered freedom, camaraderie and a better living than 
farming. The trek season stretched from October to March and 
teams staked their claim to a trek for the season by anchor i ng 
one of their boats on it, leaving the second free to range along 
the coast 14~ The treks could only be worked twice a day at h i gh 
tide, so fishermen bivouacked on the beach nearby for the week. 
Temporary windbreaks were erected in the dunes and fires built 
for cooking, coffee, warmth and to dry out men wet through from 
fishing. Each fisherman dug a hole in the sand lined with a sack 
of straw as mattress in which he slept under a sack blanket, 
fully clothed except for his shoes 1~ The skippers cycled down 
the beach at low tide or rowed from trek to trek looking and 
listening for fish and the smoke from a green wood fire or a 
whistle in the dark brought the team down to the beach to throw 
the net 15~ Once · the fish were landed and the boat beached, 
cleaning and curing of the catch began, assisted by the women and 
children. The staple fish remained the harder, but catches of 
stompneus, galjoen and elf were common. The fish were sorted, 
!48 Interview with Mr Johnny Eigelaar, Laaiplek, 10 July 1986. 
149 Ibid. 
1~ Ibid. Also Interviews with Mr Piet Smit, Velddrift, 1 July 1986 and Mr 
Alkie Theart, Dwarskersbos, 18 July 1986. 
151 Interview with Mr Johnny Eigelaar, Laaiplek, 10 July 1986. 
171 
cleaned, gutted and then cured in cement tanks in the fish 
houses, soaking for two days in a pickle of sea water and salt. 
They were then threaded into bunches according to size and hung 
out on racks to dry in the wind and sun1~ The whole catch, 
except discards and eetvis, was the property of the owner, who 
sold it to farmers and hawkers either at the coast or in the 
rural small towns of the interior. The earnings were retained by 
the seine bosses until the end of the season in April, compelling 
fishermen to subsist on eetvis, credit and bartering fish for 
wood, food and alcohol with neighbouring farmers. Settlement 
included deductions for salt and, because most owners were also 
skippers, kept the tally book and sold the fish, there was wide 
room for manipulation of earnings 1~ After nagmaal in mid-April 
the boats crossed the Bay to Stompneus where the men camped each 
week for three months, worked the migrating snoek shoals off Cape 
Columbine and salted in the fish and mooitjies for transport back 
to the fish houses at Zooverby 1~ Payment was again deferred 
until the end of the season, but, unlike seine fishing, was 
individual rather than collective. Each fisherman thus split his 
catch (vlekked and salted) 60-40% with the boat owneri enabling a 
skilled line fisherman to equal or better the i50-l60 earned 
during a good six month seine season in just three months 
snoeking1~ At the end of the snoek season in June fishing ceased 
until October and many fishermen went out to work on the farms, 
ploughing and harvesting. Those that remained subsisted from line 
fishing and voet seining, caulked and painted the boats and 
IS2 Ibid. 
1~ Interviews with Mr John Tolken, Dwarskersbos, 17 July 1986; Mr Alkie 
Theart, Dwarskersbos, 18 July 1986 and Hr Abraham Tolken, Velddrift, 27 July 
1986. 
1~ Ibid. Also Fishing Harbours Committee, Part III, 1926, pp.58-60. 
1~ Interviews with Messrs Willie & Gert Smeda, Laaiplek, 4 July 1986; Mr 
Hendrik Brand, 19 July 1986; Mr Ulisse Donaggi, Velddrift, 22 July 1986 and Hr 
Abraham Tolken, 27 July 1986. 
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repaired and blooded the nets in preparation for the new seine 
fishing season in October 1~ 
The growth of Dwarskersbos was indicative of the increasing 
fishing pressure on the marine resources of Piketberg. Having 
lost the trek grounds along the southern shores of the Bay in 
1909, the district's seine fishing economy thus faced an internal 
crisis by the 1920s due to rising coastal populations, a 
sedentary fishing technology and a finite fishing range 
circumscribed by the ETSFZ and under threat from a swiftly 
motorising crayfish fishing fleet with problems of its own. The 
ETSFZ was first openly breached, not by the independent motor 
boat owners, but by Stephan Brothers in November 1922. The firm 
deployed its Danish seine in the reserve, apparently to procure 
bait for 








advantage of the 
fishing 
ETSFZ 
legislation's failure to define what constituted a "trek seine". 
The Berg River seine fishermen protested, fearful that every 
crayfish boat would soon be carrying a Danish sein~, fishing at 
will in the reserve and driving the fish away from the treks 1~ 
The provincial state, however, was impressed by the "labour and 
time" savings and low cost of the net and gave Stephan Brothers 
"every encouragement" to persevere with its experiment~! The 
1~ Interview with Mr Johnny Eigelaar, Laaiplek, 10 July 1986. 
157 Cape Archives; PAN 2S, · A120\B\206, Stephan Brothers to the Secretary 
, of the Fishery Board, 7 November 1922. 
158 Cape Archives; 
Commandant SAP Paarl, 
Provincial Secretary, 
Magistrate Piketberg, 
Provincial Secretary, 6 
PAN 25, A120\~\206, J.N. Townsend to the District 
14 November 1922, District Commandant SAP Paarl to the 
17 November 1922, J.N. Townsend to the Resident 
20 November 1922 & Magistrate Piketberg to the 
December 1922. 
159 Cape Archives: PAN 25; A120\B\206, 
Secretary, is-November 1922; Provincial 
December 1922 and Provincial Secretary 
December 1922. 
J.D.F. Gilchrist to the Provincial 
Secretary to Stephan Brothers, 2 
to the Magistrate Piketberg, 13 
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firm's lead was not copied, primarily because the net was 
unsuited to local conditions and, despite its low cost, was 
imported and required a power winch to operate. As a result the 
seine fishermen's protests abated. 
Three months later, in March 1923, more than 200 crayfish 
fishermen petitioned the provincial state to delay the impending 
close of the season by at least two weeks until the end of May 1~ 
They claimed that "Crayfish really only attain good condition in 
about the month of May" and to close the resource to fishing in 
mid-May was not only "premature", but 
"necessarily involves loss to those of us who have invested 
capital in suitable boats and gear etc, and means positive 
hardship, often want, to those of us who earn our living as 
fishermen in the crayfish industry" 161 • 
Despite Stephan Brothers' support, their request was turned down 
and in March 1924 .the agitation revived once more 162• The 
situation had deteriorated markedly in the interim, with both the 
North Bay Canning Company and Stephan Brothers temporarily 
closing their canneries at Steenbergs Cove on account of the low 
price of canned crayfish in France 1~ Henry Stephan estimated 
160 Cape Archives; PAN 37, A120\e\3(2), Stephan 
of the Fishery Board, 16 March 1923 forwarding The 
Fishing Boat Owners in the Fishing Industry in 
Division of Malmesbury, March 1923. 
Brothers to the Secretary 
Petition of Fishermen and 
the St Helena Bay Area, 
161 Cape Archives; PAN 37, A120\e\3(2), Petition of Fishermen 
Boat Owners in the Fishing Industry in the St Helena Bay Area, 
Malmesbury, March 1923. 
and Fishing 
Division of 
162 Cape Archives; PAN 37, A120\e\3(2), J.D.F. Gilchrist to the Provincial 
Secretary, 24 March 1923 & Provincial Secretary to Stephan Brothers, 28 March 
1923. 
1~ Cape Archives; PAN 40, A120\e\5(6), Stephan Brothers to the Provincial 
Secretary, 25 March 1924 & 8 April 1924 and PAN 42, A120\e\32, Stephan 
Brothers to F.S. Malan, 14 Harch 1924 
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that the closures had cost the fishermen and factory workers at 
the Bay between l30 000 and l60 000 in lost earnings: 
"Last season ending 15th May we paid out for crayfish 
catches the sum of l24,000, an~ although not having the 
figures of the North Bay Canning Company we would 
estimate this at something like · l35,000, whereas this 
year we have not paid out l5,000" 1~ 
He thus appealed to the provincial state to delay the 15 May 
close for two months to give the fishermen some relief by 
allowing them to fish for his firm's Paternoster factory. This 
request was granted and in April 1924 Stephan thanked the 
Administrator "for his human action toward our workers on the 
Malmesbury coast", adding that it would make "a wonderful 
difference" to the St Helena Bay fishing community 1~ 
Such a brief extension for one factory only was unlikely to make 
much difference to the earnings of crayfish fishermen and boat 
owners, who made up for lost income with bouts of rantsoenvis 
fishing. This explains the journey to Cape Town, in May 1924, of 
A.J. Brink, a farmer from Drommelvlei on the Berg River, and 
F.O. Visser, a seine fishery owner from Velddrift, to deliver a 
petition to the Administrator signed by more than 100 seine 
fishermen. The petitioners asked that the ETSFZ legislation be 
tightened to curb poaching by set net fishermen 1~ To this end 
they wanted to prosecute anyone anchoring a dinghy with set nets 
on board in the ETSFZ, increase the maximum fine to l25 with the 
automatic cancellation of the offending boat's licence after a 
third offence and a clear stipulation that only trek seines be 
lb4 Ibid. 
1~ Cape Archives; PAN 40, 
Administrator, 23 April 1923. 
A120\e\5(6), Stephan Brothers to the 
I~ Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27, Petition to the Honourable 
Administrator and the [Executive] Committee from the Fishermen of Velddrift, 
n.d. & Provincial Secretary to the Magistrate Piketberg, 9 May 1924. 
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allowed in the reserve 1~ The Magistrate of Piketberg confirmed 
that poaching was on the increase, noting that, 
"[C]rawfish boats encroach upon the three mile limit for the 
ostensible purpose of obtaining bait, and with the ndise of 
the motorboats disturb the influx of fish from the ocean. As 
their [set] nets do not reach the bottom the vast majority of 
fishes escape back to the ocean. Fishing with set nets is 
mostly done at night, while trek nets are used day and 
night" 168 
By October 1924 the old animosities were rekindled, prompting one 
seine fisherman, to implore the Magistrate to "a.u.b. maak so gou 
as u kan om die proklamatee [sic] te laat kom ••• want anders sil 
[sic] ans later mekaar nag doodmaak"~! The provincial state was 
wary of being stampeded into granting the seine fishermen such 
wide-ranging control over the ETSFZ. Gilchrist, while in favour 
of heavier fines, was concerned that if the seine fishermen were 
allowed to prosecute any boats found in the ETSFZ with set nets 
on board, this would "be a serious handicap to the Italian 
fishermen who find it convenient to anchor in this place, with no 
intent to use the nets illegally [and] have done so much to 
develop the industry" 17~ The local policeman, J.N. Townsend, 
agreed that such an amendment "would most decidedly be a very 
serious handicap to the Italian fishermen"Ut During the crayfish 
season they always carried set nets for catching bait and, if 
they entered the ETSFZ to seek shelter, they would now be 
167 Ibid. 
168 Cape Archives; PAN 71, KS9\27, Magistrate Piketberg to the Provincial 
Secretary, 29 July 1924. 
169 Cape Archives; PAN 71, KS9\27, F. Wiid to the Magistrate Piketberg, 1 
October 1924. 
170 Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27, J.D.F. Gilchrist to the Provincial 
Secretary, 9 October 1924. 
171 Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27, J.N. Townsend to the Resident 
Magistrate Piketberg, 31 October 1924. 
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"pounced upon" by the seine fishermen. A "feeling of bitterness 
and jealousy" existed between the two groups of fishermen, he 
explained, and any new powers granted the seiners would inflame 
the situation "instead of bringing more harmony amongst the 
fishermen" 1~ The seine fishermen, however, were desperate and, 
in December 1924 Piketberg attorney, C.J. Watermeyer, forwarded a 
second petition to Cape Town signed by more than 200 of their 
number, reiterating the demands of the May petition1~ The 
authorities now favoured a boundary revision, because, as the 
Magistrate of Piketberg put it, "the fishing population 
[was] outgrowing the supply of fish" 1~ Instead of heavier fines, 
he thus suggested reducing the ETSFZ "owing to the scarcity of 
fish" and the clear demarcation of the new boundary as more 
effective ways of controlling poaching1~ Gilchrist concurred, 
but suggested that any decision be left to the Fisheries Advisory 
Board 1~ The opposition of the Magistrate, Gilchrist and 
Townsend, decided the provincial state and it dismissed the 
petitioners' requests out of hand177. 
The root of the problem - the decline of the Bay crayfish fishery 
remained as intractable as ever and in 1925 boat owners and 
fishermen again lobbied Cape Town for an extension to the closed 
!72 Ibid. 
In Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27, C.J. Watermeyer to the Provincial 
Secretary, 10 .December 1924, forwarding the Petition of Charles Nimb and 218 
Others, 22 November 1924. 
174 Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27, Magistrate Piketberg to the Provincial 
Secretary, 6 January 1925. 
!7S Ibid. 
17b Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27, J.D.F. Gilchrist to the Provincial 
Secretary, 9 January 1925. 
177 Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\ 27, 
Administrator, 9 April 1925. 
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Provincial Secretary to the 
season until the end of June 1~ As A. Summers, a Berg River boat 
owner explained, the 1925 season had been a failure and "many of 
the fishermen are in want at present and have the greatest 
difficulty in keeping their families" 1~ He depended on crayfish 
fishing for a living and had invested in boats and gear, 
incurring heavy debts in the process which, on the strength of 
the current season's poor catches, he was unable to repay 1~ A 
similar fear was voiced at Saldanha Bay, where boat owners spoke 
of the "positive hardship and in many instances severe losses" 
which would result if the season closed on 15 May 181• "Some of us 
owe large sums of money," they explained, "Debts incurred in 
fitting out our boats for crayfish catching", and a 15 May close 
would mean that "we shall find it most difficult to meet our 
liabilities and provide for our families" 1~ In support, they 
submitted a petition signed by fishermen from Saldanha Bay, 
Paternoster, Steenbergs Cove and Berg River, calling for the 
fishing season to be extended until mid-July each year 1~ After 
lengthy discussion, the Fisheries Advisory Board agreed to delay 
178 Cape Archives; PAN 40, A120\e\5(6), Stephan Brothers 
of the Fishery Board, 25 March 1925, fon,arding Petition 
Fishing Boat Owners Resident on the South West Coast at and 
Bay, Paternoster, Steenbergs Cove and Berg River, March 1925. 
to the Secretary 
of Fisherrren and 
between Saldanha 
179 Cape Archives; PAN 40, A120\e\5(6), A-. Summers to H.J.C. Stephan, 24 
March 1925. 
l8:l Ibid. 
181 Cape Archives; PAN 40, A120\e\5(6), W.P. Veer to H.J.C. Stephan, 21 
March 1925. 
182 Ibid. 
1~ Cape Archives; PAN 40, A120\e\5(6), Petition of Fisherrren and Fishing 
Boat Owners Resident on the South West Coast at and between Saldanha Bay, 
Paternoster, Steenbergs Cove and Berg River, Harch 1925 & W.J. Leeson to Whom 
It Hay Concern, 30 March 1925, forwarding identical petition to that submitted 
by Stephan, signed by 25 Berg River fishermsn. 
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the season's close by two months until 15 July 1925 1~ By 1926 
the scarcity of crayfish at the Bay had become acute and 
marginalised a growing number of boat owners and fishermen 1~ 
Stephan Brothers ceased all open boat fishing as a result and the 
manager of the North Bay Canning Company's Steenbergs Cove 
factory - Heydenrich - freely admitted accepting large numbers of 
undersized crayfish from local fishermen 1~ He explained that, 
"[T]he offenders were Italian fishermen, owning open sailing 
dinghys which could not safely fish beyond the limits of the bay, 
and that he did not like to reject their fish on that account" 1~ 
This, he claimed, was a purely humanitarian gesture, as the 
factory obtained "larger and more satisfactory fish" from 
motorboats which fished further afield1~ Both Heydenrich and the 
industry's "Crawfish Observer", Sibson, favoured closing the Bay 
to crayfish fishing from Stompneus Point to the Berg River mouth. 
Sibson claimed that this "would be welcomed by all save the 
Italian fishermen", because: 
"With their present equipment they would be unable to 
continue in St Helena Bay if this area were closed, and a 
certain amount of initial hardship would appear 
inevitable. However it is universally recognised that the 
184 Cape Archives; PAN 40, A120\e\5(6), Minutes of a Meeting of the 
Fisheries Advisory Board held in the Provincial Council Chambers on Thursday, 
2 April 1925. 
1~ See also Cape Archives; PAN 40, A120\e\5(7), Petition of the Coloured 
and NatJve Labourers at Lamberts Bay, 17 November 1926, North Bay Canning 
Company et al to the Chairman of the Fisheries Advisory Board, 18 November 
1~26, Petition of the Fishermen at Lamberts Bay, 18 November 1926 & Petition 
of the Fishermen and Factory Workers of Saldanha Bay, 2 December 1926 for the 
general crisis in the west coast canning industry in 1926. 
1~ Cape Archives; FDS6, HIC 298\26, Secretary Fisheries Survey Committee 
to the Resident Magistrate Halmesbury, 7 December 1926 & Magistrate Malmesbury 
to the Secretary Fisheries Survey Committee, 21 December 1926. 
187 Cape Archives; PAN 41, A120\e\24(2), F.H. Sibson to the Secretary of 
the Crawfish Survey Committee, 13 April 1926. 
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day of the open sailing dinghy is practically over in 
crawfishing, save where the boats are towed to the grounds 
and ~mothered' generally by a larger vessel .. !89 • 
In his opinion "the immediate welfare of a few Italians should 
not be allowed to weigh against the lasting welfare of the 
industry in general" nor "sentimental considerations ••• close 
the eyes to manifest infractions of the Stepped-up 
policing would only lead to increased prosecutions, "bad blood" 
and a gradual "strangling" 
activities 191• Closing the Bay, on 
of the Italian 
the other hand, 
fishermen's 
would "settle 
the matter straight away once and for all" and was, Sibson 
believed, "the most satisfactory solution of the problem", 
allowing St Helena Bay to become "a valuable breeding-ground" for 
crayfish, and forcing the Italians "either to go in for 
motorboats or to move elsewhere" 1~ 
The sustained agitation surrounding the crayfish regulations in 
the period 1923-1926, underlines the disruptive effect of the 
postwar crayfish scarcity on the local fishing economy. The 
recurring refrains of debt and subsistence crisis echoing through 
the petitions reflected the growing plight of fishermen and boat 
owners, a pl{ght which cut across ethnic divides, marginalising 
Italian and company fishermen alike. While the canning companies 
could relocate, the fishermen remained tied to the Bay by family, 
debt and housing and, contrary to Sibson's glib assertion, were 
unable to simply "move elsewhere". Sibson conveniently overlooked 
these ties as well as the way in which crayfish fishing meshed 
189 Ibid. Also F.H. Sibson HThe Crawfish Survey# in South African Journal 
of Industries, 8, 6, June 1925, pp.359. 
1~ Cape Archives; PAN 41, A120\e\24(2), F.H. Sibson to the Secretary of 




with other fishing activities, leaving a number of alternatives 
to migration open to those fishermen displaced by the collapsing 
fishery. Rather than an exodus, the decline of crayfish fishing 
diverted effort into the rantsoenvis trade and intensified the 
conflict between the set netters-cum-crayfish fishermen and the 
Piketberg seine fishermen over the ETSFZ. In September 1926 
J.H.H. de Waal, MLA for Piketberg, appealed for greater police 
protection for the seine fishermen, warning that, 
"[S]trafbare onreelmatighede word daagliks in die water 
gepleeg en ek het verlede jaar voorspel dat daardie dinge 
in moord gaan eindig. Wat ek voorspel het is sedert byna 
bewaarheid, want ~n tydjie gelede is op een van die 
bootjies geskied" 19~ 
In October 1926 Townsend reported that poaching was again on the 
increase - 14 set nets having been seized the previous week and 
10 fishermen summoned to appear in court1~ The seine fishermen 
had made very poor catches during the year and tensions were 
running high. Townsend stressed the need for heavy sentencing to 
discourage poaching 1~ The seine fishermen, for their part, 
wanted the legislation amended to stipulate routes through the 
ETSFZ for boats carrying set nets, a time limit for being in the 
reserve and a strict prohibition on set netters taking shelter in 
the ETSFZ during bad weather except "under dire circumstances" 1~ 
The provincial state was also anxious to contain the tensions 
within existing legal channels, appealing to the Department of 
193 Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27, J.H.R. de Waal to the Administrator, 
n.d. & Provincial Secretary to the Secretary for Justice, 29 September 1926. · 
194 Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27, J .N. Townsend to the District 
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for an additional policeman at Berg River to patrol the 
It remained wary, however, of acceding to seine 
fishermen demands for legislative amendments for fear of 
provoking the set net fishermen. The latter wrote to the MLA for 
Malmesbury, F.S. Malan, in October 1926, dismissing the seine 
fishermen's protests, demanding a reduction in the ETSFZ boundary 
f rem 3 to 1 7 ., mil es and the right to use shark set nets in the 
L 
reserve 1~ In November they accused Townsend of favouring the 
seine fishermen 1~ Rather than tamper with the legislation and 
risk a set net fisherman backlash, the provincial state thus 
bided its time in the hope that the Department of Justice would 
agree to step up policing of the coast, but in March 1927 th i s 
request was declined by Pretoria~ 
Meanwhile, the situation at the Bay remained unchanged. 
J.F. Waso, a fisherman resident on the farm Kliphoek on the Berg 
River, warned that "die mense moet geen wet trak nie elke man 
maak wat hy wil"W~ Poaching intensified as a result of the 
proclamation of a crayfish sanctuary at the Bay in January 1927 
and the relocation of the North Bay Canning Company to Thorn Bay 
197 Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27, Deputy Commissioner SAP to the 
Secretary SAP, 15 November 1926. 
1~ Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27, J. Novella to S.F.C. Malan, 27 October 
1926. 
1~ Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27, J. Novella to S.F.C. Malan, 12 November 
1926 & S.F. Malan to the Administrator, 7 January 1927. 
200 Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27, Handwritten minutes headed #Piquetberg 
and Malmesbury Coasts: · Trek and Setnet Fishermen#, signed G.A. van O. and 
dated 2 March 1927 and 4 March 1927. 
~1 Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27, J.F. Waso to the Administrator, 29 
March 1927. 
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the same yearW~ There were no fewer than 42 crayfish boats (18 
motorised) as against 29 trek seine crews and the set netters 
thus continued to press their caseW~ In March 1927 140 of them 
signed a petition asking for the ETSFZ to be reduced from 3 miles 
to 1 mile and for the right to use 4-5 inch set nets in the area 
to catch shark and barber for crayfish bait204• Townsend, however, 
cautioned against allowing the set net fishermen access to ETSFZ, 
noting that "the two classes are very vindictive towards one 
another" and "cannot and never will work together in harmony on 
the same fishing grounds 11205• The 4-5 inch set net would al so 
provide poachers with a "golden opportunity" to carry the smaller 
1 'l 2 inch mesh set net in the ETSFZ, he warned, and advocated a 1 
mile reduction in the ETSFZ boundary to create a "neutral zone" 
between the warring fishermen~ In September 19 27, 
C.F.J. Thiart, a Dwarskersbos seine fisherman, appealed to the 
MLA De Waal to speak to the police on the trek seine fishermen's 
behalf, 
"want as dit langer so meet gaan sal die trek seene se 
manne meet omkom. Ons het geen vis om te eet ·in [sic] 
bakkies loop gelykvol die rivier in mouters duisend. Want 
W2 R. Lees Fishing for Fortunes, p.72; S.C. Townell "The Crawfish 
Industry of the Cape West Coast, 1874-1947#, pp.59-60; Cape of Good Hope 
Provincial Gazette, Proclamation 9 of 1927, 6 January 1927 and Provincial 
Gazette, Proclamation 234 of 1928, 25 October 1928. The latter proclamation 
extended the St Helena Bay sanctuary from 1\2 to 3 nautical miles from the 
coast.· 
w3 Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27, Typed minute signed G.A. van 0., 16 
August 1927, including attached statistics from Townsend. 
204 Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27, Petition by Fishermen Residing at and 
about the Berg River Mouth to the Honourable Administrator to amend Section 
17(4) of the Regulations framed under Section 5 of Ordinance No.30 of 1920, 
n.d. 
205 Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27, J.N. Townsend to the Resident 
Magistrate Piketberg, 6 August 1927. 
206 Ibid. 
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waar 15 tot 2 0 mouters in van 20 to 30 bakkies vang tel 
hoveel nette dit i s elke bakkie besit 11 tot 10 nette"~7 • 
De Waal duly wrot e to the Commissioner of Police, who sent the 
deputy inspector o f police to investigate~ The latter found six 
poaching cases s ti ll outstanding at Berg Ri ver and favoured 
amending the existing legislation to define a clear passage for 
the set net boats through the ETSFZ, making their presence 
elsewhere in the area illegal. He also authorised Townsend to 
hire a skipper for occasional night patrols in the reserve ~~ The 
pending showdown was averted and poaching went into temporary 
abeyance after September 1927, reportedly due to the appearance 
of the so-ca 11 ed Italian seine or 1 ampara net in the Ba/1~ 
Introduced at Saldanha Bay in the mid-1920s, after being banned 
from Table Bay after the war, it was worked from a motorboat in 
much the same way as the Danish seine, but was smaller and could 
be used without a power winch~~ In Townsend's opinion, the 
lampara, "will have very effective results affording the 
motorboat fishermen an ample supply of bait without intruding in 
the trek seine reserves"~~ Despite his optimism, however, the 
new net's high cost, unsuitability to local conditions and 
inexperience in working it, ensured that it was not widely 
~7 Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27, C.F.J. Thiart to J.H.H. De Waal, 26 
September 1927. 
200 Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27, J.H.H. de Waal to the Commissioner of 
the SAP, 28 September 1927. 
2(11 Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27, Deputy Inspector SAP Paarl to the 
District Commandant Paarl, 14 October 1927 & Deputy Inspector SAP Paarl to The 
Deputy Commissioner of the SAP, 1 December 1927. 
21° Cape Archives;PAN 71, K59\27, J.N. Townsend to the Resident Magistrate 
Piketberg, 6 August 1927. 
211 FishingHarbours Report Part III, 1926, p.50 and Cape Archives; PAN 71, 
K59\27, J.N. Townsend to the Resident Magistrate Piketberg, 6 August 1927. 
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adopted 21~ The first to try it were again Italians, popular 
memory naming Michael di Paola on the Malmesbury side of the Bay 
and a Casselegio, Carosini and Tallie at Berg River as the 
innovators in chief 21~ Di Paola reportedly bought his net from a 
man in Moorreesburg while Casselegio's net was purchased by 
Carosini who sold it to Tallie because he could not catch 
anything with it~~ The fish tore the nets out of the crews' 
hands, the currents washed them onto reefs and they were too 
shallow to catch fish in paying quantities21~ Tallie though 
persevered, deepening the net and learning how to work it, but 
the majority of crayfish fishermen continued to rely on the 
tried, trusted and cheaper set net to procure their bait 
requi rements 21~ A more compelling reason for the respite in 
poaching after 1927 was rather the abolition of the closed season 
which allowed year-round crayfish fishing and removed one of the 
chief constraints on the motor boat fishermen's activities. 
The effect of the motor revolution at St Helena Bay was thus to 
gradually undermine the pre-war fishing economy and threaten the 
position of the seine fisheries at Berg River. Motorisation 
burdened boat owners with new fixed costs, necessitating a high 
level of efficiency in operation to avoid having to absorb fuel 
bills out of their own pocket. The economics of motor fishing led 
to increased poaching in the ETSFZ by crayfish fishermen for 
bait, confident in the ease of escape afforded them by their 
paraffin engines, ineffectual policing . and pedantic legal 
2!J Interview with Hr Ulisse Donaggi, · Velddrift, 22 July 1986. 
214 Interviews with Hr Amil Di Paola, Laaiplek, 6 July 1986 and Hr Ulisse 
Donaggi, Velddrift, 22 July 1986. 
215 Ibid. 
216 Interview with Hr Ulisse Donaggi, Velddrift, 22 July 1986. 
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It was in the latter areas that the pre-war 
balkanisation of the Bay broke down in the 1920s. The 1909 modus 
vivendi assumed a rough equivalence in forces of production 
between set and seine netters and relied on the latterA rather 
than the police, to bring transgressors to book. This 
arrangement, however, was unable to accommodate the advent of the 
motor. Not only could the seine fishermen not police the reserve 
effectively against motorised craft, but the motor boat owners 
proved adept at using the court system to their advantage and 
were immune to its censure 2~ The court required proof "beyond 
any doubt" that nets had been set inside the ETSFZ, which was 
unobtainable, because the exact boundary of the ETSFZ was 
unmarked and poaching was done at night when distances were hard 
to judge~ Cases were also dismissed if the seine fishers seized 
gear and they were often sued by poachers for damagesn~ In 
addition, when a conviction was secured, poachers received only 
nominal fines which served as no deterrent and were "amply 
recouped by the amount realised by the offenders for the fish 
218 See Cape Archives; PAN 71; K59\27, C.J. Watermeyer to the Provincial 
Secretary, 10 December 1924, forwarding the Petition of Charles Nimb and 218 
Others, 22 November 1924 and Pierre du Plessis to S.F.C. Malan, 22 October 
1926 for the seine fishermen's difficulties in apprehending poachers in m'.)tor 
boats. 
219 Cape Archives; PAN 41, A120\e\24(2), Acting District Commandant SAP 
Paarl to the Deputy Commissioner SAP, 18 June 1926 & J.N. Townsend to the 
District Commandant SAP Paarl, 20 September 1926 on the difficulties of 
policing the Bay. 
220 Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27, C.J. Watermeyer to the Provincial 
Secretary, 10 December 1924, forwarding the Petition of Charles Nimb and 218 
Others, 22 November 1924, Magistrate Piketberg to the Provincial Secretary, 6 
January 1925 & Deputy Jnspector SAP Paarl to the District Commandant Paarl, 14 
October 1927 and PAN 71, K59\27(2) Magistrate Piketberg to the Provincial 
Secretary, 8 August 1932. 
n1 Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27, Inspector C.R. Seeber District 
Commandant SAP Paarl to the Deputy Colfflti.ssioner SAP, 11 November 1926. 
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sold"~ The crayfish fishermen thus contested the restrictions 
on their activities with increasing vigour during the 1920s, 
aided by the court system and weak legislation. The weakness and 
creeping atrophy of the provincial state fisheries 
administration, unable to reconcile the competing demands of the 
crayfish and seine fisheries, left the latter powerless to defend 
themselves against this onslaught. 
Motorisation and the ensuing poaching conflict cannot be 
understood in isolation, however, and is only intelligible 
against the background of the crisis in the Union and St Helena 
Bay crayfish canning industries during the 1920s. Although 
international factors played a role, developments at St Helena 
Bay were shaped more by the specifics of Stephan Brothers 
accumulation regime. Despite its entry into production, the firm 
still retained many vestiges of its merchant pedigree, making it 
an ambiguous agent of industrialisation. Its land, rentier and 
trade interests thus kept it shackled to the Bay at the very 
moment the crayfish frontier was expanding northwards. Unwilling 
to relocate, Stephan Brothers relied on motorisation and distant 
water fishing instead to keep its canneries supplied with raw 
material. In so doing, however, it encountered its own legacy in 
the lack of harbour infrastructure at the Bay and the existence 
of an alternative petty-commodity economy only loosely tied to 
crayfish fishing. Having failed to motorise its own fleet, the 
firm fell back on the private boat owners, but with limited 
success. The latter's operations were constrained by the ETSFZ 
and Stephan Brothers' failure to defeat Sandveld agriculture in 
1913 and 1917 and the poveFty and reluctance to act of the 
'll2 Cape Archives; PAN. 71, K59\27, C.J. Watermeyer to the Provincial 
Secretary, 10 December 1924, forwarding the Petition of Charles Nimb and 218 
Others, 22 November 1924, Magistrate Piketberg to the Provincial Secretary 6 
January 1925, Inspector C.R. Seeber District Commandant SAP Paarl to the 
Deputy Commissioner SAP, 11 November 1926 & J.N. Townsend to the District 
Commandant SAP Paarl, 16 October 1926. 
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provincial state ensured that this obstacle remained as 
intractable as ever. As conflict raged at the Bay between 
crayfish and seine fishermen, the firm's profits declined and it 
was forced to seek remedies further afield. Its support of the 
SALCA marked the culmination of these efforts. Shunned by 
Pretoria, Stephan Brothers resorted to shoring up its position on 
the export market by imposing a production quota and minimum 
price on the industry as a whole, seeking to protect its 
inefficient operation at the expense of the industry. While · 
initially successful, the SALCA controls were undermined by the 
onset of the Depression in 1929, exposing the firm to the brunt 
of market forces with disastrous consequences for both the bottom 
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in the sea at night [SASNFIRJ. 
30. "The World's Richest One Hundred Miles of SeaH. A record 35-ton catch 
of 120 000 maasbankers taken in a single haul by the HPatrysbergH in 
1948 [SASNFIRJ. 
31. A HbakkieznanH in tow behind a pilchard boat holding the end of the 
net in readiness for a set [SASNFIRJ 
32. The net has been set. Note the bakkieman in the background attaching 
the net to the dinghy while the crew begin the long haul [SASNFIRJ. 
33. Hauling the net. The crew pulls the lampara net in by hand with the 
cork line clearly visible [SASNFIRJ. 
34. The catch. Note the bakkieman alongside, with the net ~till attached 
to the dinghy, waiting to start brailing [SASNFIRJ. 
35. Brailing the catch. The brailer emerges from the net with a load of 
fish while the bakkieman uses an oar to keep the dinghy away from 
the boat [SASNFIRJ. 
36. Into the hold. The brailer's purse string is released and the fish 
shower into the hold [SASNFIRJ. 
37. Offloading the catch at the factory using a crate and winch 
[SASNFIRJ. 











'i .. . . ~:








·: i .. 
' . 













5: THE PERIPHERY DISINTEGRATED 
By 1929 the St Helena Bay fishing economy was in the grip of a 
protracted organic crisis, caused by the 1909 balkanisation of 
the Bay. This division initially reflected the balance of class 
forces between Sandveld agriculture and merchant-cum-productive 
capital. By the 1920s, however, the balance had tilted decisively 
in the latter's favour, with the motorisation of the Bay fishing 
fleet making the ETSFZ an increasingly permeable barrier agai~st 
outside access to the marine resources of the Piketberg 
coastline. Stephan Brothers, however, was unable to exploit this 
opportunity to the full because of its lack of direct control 
over distant water fishing and rapidly declining position in the 
industry. The revolutionary potential of motorisation was thus 
blunted by its being controlled by petty-commodity producers 
rather than productive capital. As the latter stagnated, 
independent boat owners at the Bay fought a prolonged internecine 
war of position along faultlines reflecting less a traditional 
versus modern dichotomy than growing class differentiation within 
the petty-commodity mode itself. The inherent weaknesses of 
merchant-cum-productive capital and the provincial state fuelled 
this impasse which saw the wartime promise of development 
strangled at birth. St Helena Bay had, however, been reintegrated 
into the world economy by the wartime canning boom and as such 
was subject to the long wave of capitalist development both 
nationally and internationally. The post-war boom ended in the 
Great Depression of 1929, sending shock waves around th~ globe 
which continued to reverberate at the Bay until the late 1930s. 
The Depression undercut the St Helena Bay fishing economy both 
from without and.· within and the interdependence of petty-
commodity and factory production amplified its effect on both 
sectors. A worsening balance of trade between South Africa and 
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France after 1929 prompted the latter to impose strict quota 
restrictions on crayfish imports to France in 1934. Coming in the 
wake of the collapse of the SALCA production and price controls 
in 1931-32, the French quota forced Stephan Brothers to cease 
canning altogether. The collapse of the crayfish fishery created 
an acute subsistence\accumulation crisis for many fishermen\boat 
owners at the Bay. The petty-commodity economy was in trouble 
from other quarters too, as the Depression decimated the 
agricultural demand for rantsoenvis and seasonal farm labour in 
the context of increasing population pressure at the coast and a 
renewed marine resource crisis. The inshore fishery was thus 
unable to absorb the ever-more frequent and unseasonal incursions 
of crayfish-cum-set net fishermen into depleted fishing grounds 
and shrunken markets. Nor was this influx confined to locals, but 
included motor boats from Saldanha Bay, unemployed as a result of 
factory closures and using lampara nets at will in the ETSFZ. The 
lampara fishermen devastated the already weakened seine fish i ng 
economy of Piketberg in two short years, 1934 and 1935, and by 
1936 the Berg River fisheries were an increasing cause of DRC 
concern as "poor whiteism" reached epidemic proportions. 
The Depression also tilted the balance of power politically away 
from the provincial t~ the central state. The latter, bolstered 
by increased tax revenue from mining after South Africa left the 
Gold Standard in 1932, was able to consolidate and expand its 
role in the economy, pursuing secondary industrialisation wi th 
new vigour. Pretoria was specifically drawn into the inshore 
fisheries in the wake of the French quota crisis, negotiating 
with France for revisions based on reciprocal trade and 
legislating to ensure an equitable distribution of the quota 
among canners. The central state also refused to uphold the ETSFZ 
against the lampara . fishermen in 1934-1935 and the reserve 
finally collapsed in 1936 when Pretoria took over responsibil i ty 
for marine fisheries from Cape Town. Determined to develop the 
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inshore fisheries along modern lines, the central state passed 
two pieces of enabling legislation in 1940, laying the basis for 
the rationalisation and single-channel marketing of the crayfish 
export trade as well as the integration of the inshore fisheries 
into the national fresh fish market through co-operatives. This 
increasing state intervention confirmed the demise of the old 
status quo at the Bay, as Stephan Brothers and Sandveld 
agriculture were subjugated to the national agenda. The central 
state allocated the crayfish export quota on the basis of 
efficiency and Stephan Brothers received only a small pack, while 
the Sandveld farmers' harbouring of poor whites came under 
increasing attack from the Department of Social Welfare and the 
DRC. 
The Depression and its aftermath thus led to the disintegration 
of both factory and petty-commodity production at the periphery, 
in the context of consolidation by the central state of its 
political and economic power in the fisheries and ever more 
direct intervention in production. The initiative at the micro-
level now passed to the nascent petty-bourgeoisie 
class who, following the collapse of the crayfish 




fishermen, turned to lampara fishing for the rantsoenvis and Cape 
Town markets by the late 1930s. Motor lorry transport facilitated 
the Bay's integration with the economy of the Cape Town 
metropolis and price equalisation on the west coast which 
prevented any large-scale recovery in beach seine fishing. Labour 
from the shattered Piketberg seine fisheries was either absorbed 
into the expanded motorised lampara fishing fleet or abandoned 
the Bay altogether. The de facto abolition of the ETSFZ, decline 
of Stephan Brothers and Sandveld agriculture and advent of the 
motor lorry enabled a new class of fish dealers and petty 
merchants to emerge at Berg River. Freed from the strictures of 
competing and more powerful capitals, they were able to 
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accumulate in their own right, combining crayfish, rantsoen and 
fresh fish production in an annual production cycle attuned to 
shifts in the different markets and the marine resource and more 
responsive to the vagaries of both than either the canning and 
seine fishing economies. 
5.1 CONSOLIDATION BY THE CENTRE 1929-1939 
The Depression undermined the canning industry's consensus over 
the SALCA quota and price controls. The contraction in 
international trade after 1929 resulted in large quantities of 
canned crayfish being diverted to France, where the SALCA minimum 
price guaranteed a reasonable return. This created an oversupply 
which slowed the movement of stock and threatened a resurgence in 
internecine price wars by 1930~ In a bid to avert this, the 
Association concluded the so-called "London Agreement" in June 
1931 with a cartel of British and French buyers, to take the 
industry's entire 1931-1932 season output at a set price of 
65s Sd per case up to 130 000 cases~ The Agreement broke down in 
late 1931, however, due to opposition from the North Bay Canning 
Company and the South West African industry, as well as the 
British government's abandonment of the Gold Standard~ In the 
State Archives; HEN 1538, 180\2\1(1), C. von Bonde HMem:,randum on the 
Proposed Re-Establishment of a Closed Season for CrawfishH, 1 May 1930, 
Minutes of Meeting between the SAL.CA and the Board of Trade and Industries, 28 
April 1931, Minutes of Meeting between the SAL.CA and the Board of Trade and 
Industries, 27 Hay 1931 & Minutes of Meeting between the SAL.CA and the Board 
of Trade and Industries, 10 June 1931. · 
2 State Archives; HEN 1538, 180\2\1(1), SAL.CA to C. von Bonde, 10 August 
1931. 
3 See correspondence in State Archives; HEN 1538, 180\2\1 vols.1-2. Also 
see HEN 1538, 180\2\1(1)/ North Bay Canning Company to the Chairman of the 
Board of Trade and Industries, 10 August 1931, North Bay Canning Company to 
the Chairman of the Board of Trade and Industries, 21 September 1931, 
Department of Hines and Industries, #Report of Cost Accountant for Board of 
Trade and Industries: The South African Crayfish Canning Industry#, 16 
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abandonment of the SALCA production and price controls turned 
1931-1932 into a bumper season for the industry~ Price cutting 
re-emerged, output surged and at home the canners faced mounting 
competition for raw material and labour from a nascent export 
trade in frozen crayfish tails at Cape Town~ The first attempts 
at freezing for export were made in the early 1920s and, with the 
abolition of the closed season and relaxation in size-limit, Cape 
Town merchants commenced large-scale production using rented cold 
storage near the docks. In 1932 they exported more than 1.5 
million lbs frozen tails valued at l32 000 to Britain and France; 
by 1933 this had increased to 3 million lbs worth i94 000 ~ 
Packing was labour intensive and had none of the overheads of 
canning. Packers thus invested in boats and paid higher prices 
for their crayfish, drawing both labour and raw material away 
4 State Archives; HEN 1538, .180\2\1(1), Stephan Brothers to the Minister 
of Mines and Industries, 22 February 1932. 
5 Union of South Africa, Department of Customs and Excise British South 
Africa, Annual Statement of the Trade and Shipping of the Union of South 
Africa, Southern and Northern Rhodesia and South West Africa, 1931-1932. Union 
canned crayfish production rose from around 72 000 cases in 1931 to an all-
time record of nearly 88 000 cases the following year. 
b Union of South Africa Fisheries and Marine Biological Survey Report 
No.11, 1933, pp.18-20; Board of Trade and Industries Report No.180: The 
Fishing Industry, 1934, p.61; R. Lees Fishing for Fortunes, p.80 and S.C. 
Townell #The Crawfish Industry of the Cape West Coast, 1874-1947#, pp.87-92. 
7 Union of South Africa Fisheries and Marine Biological Survey Report 
No.11, 1933, pp.18-20. 
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from the beleaguered canners~ Abroad, frozen tails competed with 
French langouste, prompting the French government to raise 
tariffs on all crayfish imports in July 1933, undercutting the 
canned product's ability to compete with Japanese canned crab and 
posing a new threat to industry profits~ The 1931-1932 boom and 
increasing pressure from the frozen tail packers also compelled 
canners to increasingly process soft, undersized and berried 
crayfish. This, together with unhygienic factories, defective 
processing methods and the use of unlacquered tin plate, resulted 
in a sharp decline in the quality of the Union pack 10• Poor 
quality and renewed price wars in France prompted complaints from 
French importers and renewed calls in industry circles for 
tighter state contro1 11 • In October 1933 the majority of canners 
joined the South African Food Canners Council (SAFCC) and 
proceeded to use this forum to lobby the central state 12 • The 
establishment of a Department of Commerce and Industries in 
8 Board of Trade and Industries Report No.180: The Fishing Industry, 
1934, pp.59-66. Comparative prices per 100 crayfish in 1934 were as follows: 
Location 
Cape Town 
West Coast - Company Boat 
- Private Boat 
Canning 
7s.6d - 15s.Od 
3s.6d - 4s.6d 
9s.Od - 13s.Od 
Packing 
16s.Od - 20s 
9 S.C. Townell "The Crawfish Industry of the Cape West Coast, 1874-1947", 
pp.76 & 94. 
lO Union of South Africa, Board of Trade and Industries Report No.180: 
The Fishing Industry, 1934, pp.59-62. 
11 Ibid., pp.96-99. Also 
Board of Trade and Industries 
Angra Fish Canning Company to 
1933. 
State Archives; HEN 1538, 180\2\1(2), Secretary 
to Angra Fish Canning Company, 28 March 1933 and 
Secretary Board of Trade and Industries, 3 May 
12 State Archives; HEN 1538, 180\2\1(2), SAFCC to the Chairman of the 
Board of Trade and Industries, 10 August 1933, SAFCC to the Secretary Board of 
Trade and Industries, 6 October 1933 and 10 October 1933, SAFCC to the 
Secretary for Commerce and Industries, 24 November 1933 and 14 December 1933. 
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November 1933 , r-aised hopes of closer co - operation between 
industry and state, but development s were cut short in Ja n uar-y 
193 4 by the French government's impo siti on of an import quota on 
Un ion and S o uth We st Afri ca n canned and frozen crayfish' ' · 
The French we re anxious to protect their own langouste and 
nascent colonial can n ing indu s tries and right the ske we d b a l 3nce 
of trade which had developed between France and South Afr- ica ~n 
the wake of the 1933 Otta wa 
·a. 
Agreement - . This was underscored by 
France ' s linking any increa se in the quota to reciproca l trade 
with the Union . In the inter im, th e price of canned crayfish rose 
shar ply 
France 
as stocks rapidly accumulated in bonded wareh ouses in 
and by April 1934 all the Union canneries had closed , 
leaving their labour forces unemployed- · . Under mounting pressure 
Afr ica n g ove r nment from the industry and Parliament, the South 
unsuccessfully attempted to head off the quota in January 1934 
and th en began negotiating for a trade agreement with Fran c e ·~. In 
May 1934, amid accusations of inactivity, foot-drag ging and 
sacrificing the crayfish industry on the "altar of Empire", the 
government passed th e Crayfish Export Control Act as an em e rgency 
measure with industry support u . The 
allocating the French quota equitably 
legislation was aimed at 
among canners, prohibit ing 
the export of crayfish without a government permit and imposing 
:3 R. Lees Fishing for Fortunes, p. 81 and S.C. Townel l "The Crawfish 
Industry of the Cape West Coast, 1874-1947H, p.76 ff. 
:4 S.C. Townell "The Crawfish Industry of the Cape West Coast, 1874-
1947", p.76 ff. 
Ibid. 
'. 6 Ibid. 
'.? Union of South Africa House of Assembly Debates 1934, vol. 23 , 
cols.3441-3442 & 4529-4536 and Union of South Africa Extraordinary Government 
Gazette, No.2202, 7 June 1934, Crawfish Export Control Act, Act No.SO of 1934. 
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heavy f in es on transgressors '. 8• Initially it was seen as an 
interim measure, but the Crawfish Export Control Amendment Act o f 
' Q 
May 1935 extended the new provisions indefinitely· · . In February 
1935 a prel i minary trade agreement was signed with France and the 
-,-
quot a i n c reased -· . Despite this and subsequent in c reases, t he 
c anning i ndustry never regained its former productivity o r s h are 
o f the French Market. 
TABLE 5.1: Canned Crayfish Exports to Fran c e 
























% o f 
Exp o rts 





1934 47 502 135 601 58s 84.6 
1935 40 432 132 986 66s 7 4. 9 
1936 62 959 204 209 64s 87. 9 
1937 55 472 156 281 56s 8 4. 1 
1938 43 895 108 076 sos 83. 8 
1939 36 626 91 583 sos 57. 3 
Output and earnings lingered at half 1933 levels for the 
remainder of the decade as the canners struggled to find 
alternative markets. The quota was jointly allocated by the 
i O 
... ., Ibid. 
19 Union of South Africa House of Assembly Debates 1935, vol.25, 
cols.5240-5244 and Union of South · Africa Extraordinary Govern~nt Gazette, 
No.2272, 10 May 1935, Crawfish Export Control A~nd~nt Act, Act No.41 of 
1935. 
20 S.C. Townell "The Crawfish Industry of the Cape West Coast, 1874-
1947H, pp.80-81. 
21 Union of South Africa, Depart~nt 
State~nts of the Trade and Shipping of the 
Territory of South West Africa, 1930-1939. 
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of Customs and Excise Annual 
Union of South Africa and the 
Department of Commerce and Industries and t h e S A F C C -- • In 
addition, the state produced a spate of new research to help the 
industry improve the quality o f its pr o duct and tighte ned 
-, 
cont ro l s ove r the cr ayfish 
Pretoria ' s new attitude, 
standardised the us e of 
resource~-. The SAFCC, emboldened by 
established an industry newsletter, 
l acquered tin plate in canning , 
substitut ed ca rdboard f or wood in packaging, attempted to fi nd 
ne w markets for c anned crayfish and encouraged canners to 
·" d1ver sify into the loc al ma rk e t~. 




BRIT AIN \FR ANCE 
Cases Value % o f 
[301 b) [l) Total 
51 821 31 959 99.9 
103 185 93 318 99.5 
Cases 
[301b) 
Li S A 
Val ue 




193 4 27 664 21 916 86.3 
1 935 30 797 27 304 75.2 3 449 3 010 5. 7 
1936 36 162 30 510 60.2 20 853 19 701 3 4. 7 
1937 34 967 37 501 37.6 54 42 260 008 58.5 
1938 42 145 39 484 4 5. 5 41 642 32 268 4 4. 9 
1939 27 600 23 099 30.2 59 046 53 935 64.5 
~ = < 100 cases or llOO. 
S.C. Townell 
1947", p.80. 
"The Crawfish Industry of the Cape West Coast, 1874-
23 Union of South Africa Fisheries and Marine Biological Survey Report 
No.12- No.17, 1934-1939; Union of South Africa Fisheries and Marine Biological 
Survey Division Investigational Report No.5, 1935 and diverse articles in Cape 
Archives; PAN 43, A120\e\46, vols.1-2, "Crawfish Canners News BulletinH 1933-
1939 . 
:, 
S.C. Townell "The Crawfish Industry of the Cape West Coast, 1874-
1947", pp. 82; R. Lees Fishing for Fortunes, pp.82-85 and Cape Archives; PAN 
43, A120\e\46, vols.1-2 for "Crawfish Canners News Bulletin" 1933-1939. 
25 Union of South Africa, Departrrent 
Staterrents of the Trade and Shipping of the 
Territory of South West Africa, 1932-1939. 
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of Customs and Excise Annual 
Union of South Africa and the 
The frozen tail packers, for their part, also reorganised, 
seeking a political voice through membership of the SAFCC and 
successfully pioneered a new market for their product 
United States of Americau. 
in the 
This period of growing state intervention in the industry 
culminated in the passing of the Crawfish Export Act in 1940. 
Ongoing price wars, a falling price in France and the threat of a 
ban on frozen tail imports to America due to poor qual i ty ensured 
that both canners and packers supported the new legislation27• The 
Act entrenched Pretoria's right to set export quotas and quality 
standards for producers and, most importantly, enforce any 
agreement reached by seventy-five percent of exporters on the 
industry as a whole~. In the ten years 1929-1939, the crayfish 
industry thus moved from a situation of disruptive competition to 
the threshold of collective marketing under the impetus of an 
increasingly interventionist central state. 
The shift away from competition towards single-channel marketing 
under state auspices threatened Stephan Brothers. The .firm was a 
major supporter of the old SALCA production and price controls 
and vociferous in its call for state enforcement of these 
U S.C. Townell "The Crawfish Industry of the Cape West Coast, 1874-
1947#, p.95 ff. 
27 R. Lees Fishing for Fortunes, pp.86-95 and Union of South Africa 
Report of the Select Committee on the Subject of the Crawfish Export Bill, 
1939 [S.C.13-.39), Evidence of N. Swerling, H. Goodspeed, E.R. Keegan, A. 
Ovenstone, pp.5-13 and Evidence of J. Lurie, p.20-21. 
~ Report of the Select 
Bill, 1939; Union of South 
cols.3692-3699, 3702-3737 & 
Government Gazette, No.2749, 
1940. 
Committee on the Subject of the Crawfish Export 
Africa House of Assembly Debates 1940, vol.38, 
3744 and Union of South Africa Extraordinary 
10 April 1940, Crawfish Export Act, Act No.9 of 
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measures~. Pretoria, however, was sharply critical of the SALCA, 
dismissing the Association's argument that price instability in 
France was the result of overproduction at home~. The state 
alleged that divergent production costs were to blame, allowing 
more efficient producers to lower prices and meet Japanese 
competition". The SALCA, however, set its minimum price "at a 
level sufficiently high to allow of the most inefficient 
[producer] making a profit" 32 • Pretoria's commitment to the Union 
crayfish export industry was premised on rationalisation at home 
to eliminate inefficient producers. 
production quota, quality standards, 
The state-administered 
resource management and 
support for the frozen tail industry combined to alienate the 
smaller and less efficient canners, including Stephan Brothers, 
from the reorganisation of the industry after 1934. Stephan 
Brothers was something of an enigma by 1929, being one of the 
three biggest producers in the industry in terms of capital 
employed and output, but recording a loss of ll 600 because 
"costs were loaded with an additional burden of 3s per case to 
meet interest charges on a huge overdraft"n. The Department of 
Commerce and Industries' cost accountant reported in 1931 that, 
~ State Archives; HEN 1538, 180\2\1(1), Stephan Brothers et al to C. von 
Bonde, 5 September 1930, Stephan Brothers to the Minister of Justice, 11 
September 1930 and Stephan Brothers to the Chairman of the Board of Trade and 
Industries, 30 September 1930 and HEN 1538, 180\2\1(2), Extract of Letter from 
Stephan Brothers, 12 Hay 1933. 
~ State Archives; HEN 1538, 180\2\1(1), Department of Hines and 
Industries, "Report of Cost Accountant for Board of Trade and Industries: The 
South African Crayfish Canning Industry", 16 November 1931, pp.16-20 and _Board 
of Trade and Industries Report No.180: The Fishing Industry, 1934, pp.59-64. 
31 State Archives; HEN 1538, 180\2\1(1), Department of Hines and 
Industries, "Report of Cost Accountant for Board of Trade and Industries: The 
South African Crayfish Canning Industry", 16 November 1931, p.18. 
32 Ibid. 
D State Archives; HEN 1538, 180\2\1(1), Department of Hines and 
Industries, "Report of Cost Accountant for Board of Trade and Industries: The 
South African Crayfish Canning Industry", 16 November 1931, pp.10-11. 
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"[T]he company's factory costs compare favourably with those 
of the other large factories, but their Cape Town overheads 
are extraordinarily heavy. There appears to me to be a lot of 
dead wood in the head office organisation of this company 
which it should be possible to eliminate under a dra~tic .,t 
sc heme o f reorganisation" · . 
The "dead wood" reflected the firm's mercantile roots and the 
fact that it was not j ust a canning company like its co mpet itors . 
The profitability of its St Helena Bay canneries depended, from 
the mid-1920s on wards, on the SALCA controls and exploitation of 
its fishing labour f o rce . The price of cray f ish at th e fir m ' s 
jettie s fell 
the abolition 
steadily after 1927 as 
of the closed season 
the firm took advantage of 
Bay Ca nning Co mpany, to intensify 
and relocation of 
the extraction of 
the North 
absolute 
surplus value from the Bay cr ayfish fishermen. In the late 1920s 
the piece work system was revised and the "tel" (payment per 100) 
replaced by payment per crate containing 300-800 crayfish, 
~ 
depending on size ·~ . The price, however remained the same 
1930 whereafter it was repeatedly cut. From ll per crate 




mere Ss by March 1932 . By October 1932 it had recovered slight ly 
to stand at 10s for locally-caught crayfish and 14s for fish 
netted 140 miles away - still a 50% reduction in less than three 
lA years .·u. Stephan Brothers' raw material problems were further 
exacerbated after 1934, by the growth of the frozen tail trade, 
an industry-wide quality drive and the .t i g ht en i n g of state 
34 Ibid. 
,e 
-'~ Interviews with · Mr Hendrik Brand, Velddrift, 19 July 1986 3.nd Mr 
Ulisse Donaggi, Velddrift, 22 July 1986. 
3b Cape Archives; 1\HFD, 7\1\4, Petition of A. Dipaola et al to the 
Magistrate of Hopefield, 10 October 1932. 
200 
controls over resource exploitationTI. With the French quota 
limiting output, no alternative foreign or local markets and 
unable to diversify into frozen tail packing, the firm found it 
increasingly difficult to keep production costs down by squeezing 
labour in order to show a profit on its much reduced canning 
output~. By the late 1930s, Stephan Brothers had become one of 
the main obstacles to the SAFCC's attempts to establish single-
channel marketing in the industry, refusing to join unless it was 
assured of a larger quota allocation~. Such obstructionism 
prompted the majority of the canning industry to support the 1940 
Crawfish Export Act, to compel Stephan Brothers and other 
renegades to abide by majority decisions in the interests of the 
industry as a whole. 
Increased state intervention in the crayfish industry and the 
decline of Stephan Brothers further disorganised the St Helena 
Bay fishing economy, marginalising a growing number of former 
crayfish fishermen, intensifying conflict over the ETSFZ and 
hastening the final collapse of the Piketberg seine fisheries. 
This process of disintegration was accelerated by the devastating 
effects of the Depression on agriculture along the west coast and 
the replacement of provincial by central state administration of 
the country's marine fisheries. Pretoria's commitment to 
secondary industry and modernisation led to the rupturing of the 
earlier alliance between Sandveld agriculture and the provincial 
state, which provided the Berg River seine fisheries with 
legislative protection and cleared the way for their final 
TI Cape Archives; PAN 37, A120\e\3(4), Stephan Brothers to the Provincial 
Secretary, 17 November 1937 and State Archives; HEN 1512, 180\1\24, Stephan 
Brothers to the Minister of Mines and Industries, 21 February 1936. 
~Ibid.Also Cape Archives; PAN 41, A120\e\24(5), Saldanha Bay Canning 
Company to the Provincial Secretary, 16 October 1936 for a company in a 
similar position to Stephan Brothers. 
39 R. Lees Fishing for Fortunes, p.87. 
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dissolution and incorporation into the central state's scheme for 
centralised co-operative marketing in the inshore fisheries. 
5.2 DISSOLUTION AT THE PERIPHERY 1929-1939 
The proclamation of a crayfish sanctuary at St Helena Bay in 1927 
shifted 
1930 some 
fishing effort to more 
local fishermen still 
distant grounds and, whereas in 
operated within a 15-40 mil e 
radius of the Bay, by 1932 all were travelling 120-150 miles to 
find legal-sized crayfish in paying 
.1/i 
quantities ··. Owners and 
fishermen without motor boats co ntinued fishing the coa st between 
Paternoster 
erosion of 
and Sdldanha Bay for ever-diminishing ca tches. The 
both gr o ups' earning power was worsened by Stephan 
Brothers lowering the boatside price of crayfish after 1930 4: . In 
a bid to halt their gradual immiseration, fishermen and boat 
owners pressurised the provincial state into reducing the minimum 
size-limit for crayfish to 3 1/2 inches for a twelve-month trial 
period from February 1929, explaining that 
exceptionally bad year due to drought and the 
caused by the proclamation of sanctuaries at 
Helena 
l~· 
Bays~ The 1927 relocation of the 
1928 had been an 
loss of earnings 
Saldanha and St 
North Bay 
Company also cut raw material demand and only 3.8 
Canning 
million 
crayfish were processed by Bay canneries in 1928, half the number 
canned a decade 
q 
earlier ~ . The concession was extended each year 
4o Cape Archives; 1 \HFD, 7\ 1 \4, Petition of A. Dipaola et al to the 
Magistrate of Hopefield, 10 October 1932. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Cape Archives; PAN 37, A120\e\3(3), Provincial Secretary to C. von 
Bonde, 1 February 1929, forwarding petitions from HFisher~n and Fishing Boat 
Owners Resident on the South West Coast in the Mal~sbury, Piketberg, 
Clanwilliam and Van Rhynsdorp Divisions", handed in by MLA J.H.H. de Waal and 
C. von Bonde to the Provincial Secretary, 5 February 1929 and Cape of Good 
Hope Provincial Gazette, Proclamation 37 of 1929, 19 February 1929. 
43 Cape Archives; FDS 12, FS 8\6\1, Return titled "Crawfish 1928", n.d. 
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until June 1933, when the rapid growth of 
prompted reinstatement of the 4 inch 
Following sustained agitation by the 
fisherm en supported by the SAFCC, how ever, 
J :' 
the :, 1 \2 1 n ,::h minimum in November 1933 "" . _, 
another concession to op en boat crayfish 
the frozen tail trade 
minimum size ruling ~ . 
west co ast crayfish 
the state reintroduced 
In 1932, it granted yet 
fishermen at St Helena 
Bay , a l lowing them to fish in th e s anctuary for three months fr om 
March - May 19 32 and again from December 193 3 ,.mt i 1 the e n d o f 
M a r c h 1 9 3 4 · : • 
The decl i ning position of the c rayfish fishermen was exacerbate d 
b y a co ntraction in the rural rantsoe n vis mar k et and a pr o tracted 
r es ou rce scarcity along the west coast . The Depre s sion , cou p l e d 












labour an d 
and 
intersected and mutually reinforced one another most 
farm i n 9 
str on g l y . 
income to Seasonal farm l abour, as an alternative s ource of 
~t 
Cape Archives; PAN 37, A120\e\3(3), J.H.H. de Waal to the Provincial 
Secretary, 24 March 1930 and Provincial Secretary to the Administrator, 24 
March 1931; Cape of Good Hope Provincial Gazette, Proclamation 59 of 1930, 27 
March 1930; Provincial Gazette, Proclamation 40 of 1931, 25 March 1931 and 
Provincial Gazette, Procla111,3tion 80 of 1932, 27 April 1932. 
4: Cape Archives; PAN 37, A120\e\3(4), F.C. Erasmus to the Administrator, 
25 August 1933, forwarding the Petition of Fishermen Resident at and about the 
Mouth of the Berg River in the Divisions of Moorreesburg and Piketberg, n.d., 
General Manager SAFCC to the Provincial Secretary, 17 October 1933 & C. von 
Bonde to the Provincial Secretary, 30 October 1933 and Cape of Good Hope 
Provincial Gazette, Proclamation 88 of 1933, 21 June 1933 & Proclamation 168 
of 1933, 17 November 1933. 
46 Cape Archives; PAN 41, A120\e\24(4), C. von Bonde to the Provincial 
Secretary, 22 February 1932 & 9 March 1932; PAN 41, A120\e\ 24(5), C. von Bonde 
to the Provincial Secretary, 2 7 November 1933; Cape of Good Hope Provincial 
Gazette, Proclamation 49 o f 1932, 9 March 1932 & Proclamation 67 of 1932 , 7 
April 1932 and Provinci al Gazette, Proclamation 173 of 1933, 6 December 1933. 
Also PAN 41, A120\e\ 2 4 (4) , C.F.J. Thiart to J.J.H. de Waal, 25 March 1932 and 
M.J. Koegelenberg to J.J.H. de Waal, 25 March 1925 for seine fisher~n 
opposition to this concession. 
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fishing, thus declined at the very moment when failure of the 
marine resource made it essential to supplement earnings from 
fishing 47 • The concomitant shrinkage in the rantsoenvis trade 
further depleted the subsistence base of the Bay fishermen, 
offset to some extent by the introduction of motor lorries in 
place of horse-drawn carts in the conveyance of fish to the 
interior~. It was now possible to find markets as far afield as 
Cape Town, but the impact of motorisation on the St Helena Bay 
trade was limited by isolation, poor roads and a scarcity of f i sh 
along the coast between Saldanha and Lamberts Bay 49 • In 1929 and 
again in 1931 the snoek season failed and in April 1931 the 
research ship "Africana" spent two weeks searching the west coast 
between Cape Town and Port Nolloth, but located only one small 
shoal and a few "strays" off Paternoster. Von Bonde concluded, 
"the fish were either swimming deep for some unaccountable 
reason, or ••• were keeping very far away from the coast"~. In 
October 1931 the Lambert's Bay canning companies suffered a 
crippling bait shortage, reporting that only dogfish were readily 
obtainable51 • When the snoek stayed away for a third year the 
"Africana" again "scoured" the west coast in March 1932 with even 
more depressing results, a solitary snoek hooked off Baboon Point 
during a cruise of more than two weeks~. In July 1932 the 
47 Cape Archives; 1\PKB, 6\1\23, Magistrate of Piketberg to the Secretary 
Industrial Legislation Commission, 3 October 1934 for the effect of the 
Depression on Piketberg district. 
~ Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27(2), R. Schwers to F.C. Erasrrus, 30 June 
1934. 
49 See Fishing Harbours Committee Part III, 1926 for the state of roads 
at the Bay. 
~ Union of South Africa Fisheries and Marine Biological Survey Report 
No.9, 1932, p.12. 
51 Ibid., p.24. 
52 Union of South Africa Fisheries and Marine Biological Survey Report 
No.10, 1933, p.8. 
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Vredenburg Farmers Assoc i ation complained ab o ut the high pr ice of 
rantsoenvis in the district. Maasbankers, not u sually pr i zed a s 
rantsoenvis, were selling for 15s a 100, more than six times t h e 
no rma l pr i ce o f 2s 6d five years previously. The farmers bl a me d 
t he s c ar cit y o f fish and higher prices on the sea bird coloni es in 
t he area and c alled for their i mmediate e:<termination, b ut , as 
one farmer p o inted o ut, "many birds o n th e i sland s a re 
[themse lve s ] dyi ng o f st a rv ati o n o wi ng t o th e s c arcit y of f ood " - . 
The cr1 s is in the c rayfi s h fishery coupled, wi th d epres sion 1n 
the r a n tso env i s market and general fish s c arcity thus def in e d the 
Depr essio n at th e Ba y. Bertha Chil co tt r e c alls; 
"It was v ery bad it was v ery bad. Yo u 
know that the people - there was no f o od, 
very l i ttle food and you would see many 
women and c hildren and the men also - they 
would come early in the morning you k n o w, 
even from the farms - from Velddrift and 
everywhere - with bags or baskets. And they 
would go down to the beach at low tide and 
take out white mussels and the black 
mussels. But people practically lived o n 
" 4 
that" " . 
Mounting poverty 
little official 
and endemic "poor whiteism" at the Bay drew 
attention. The Department of Health decried th e 
unsanitary living conditions at Berg River, branded the fishermen 
"a dirty thriftless and shiftless 1 ot", and worried about 
ma l nutrition among the children~. Its hands were 
" because the fishing communities resided on private 
tied, however, 
land and were 
~3 HDecline of Fishing Indust~y - Destruction of Fish By Sea Birds" in 
Cape Tirres, 21 July 1932. 
:i Interview with Mrs Bertha Chilcott, Laaiplek, 3 July 1986. 
~ Cape Archives; 1 \ PKB, 6\1\10 13\2\3, A.P. Viljoen to the Health 
Departrrent, 25 February 1930, Magistrate Piketberg to the SAP Roodebaai, 24 
March 1930, Assistant Health Officer to the Secretary for Public Health and 2 
March 1932, Under-Secretary for Public Health to the Magistrate Piketberg, 23 
October 1935. 
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too poor to provide a rate base for a Village Management Board~. 
By the early 1930s many tenants were in arrears with their rent 
and struggling to survive from either fishing or farming~. Baas 
Wiid left, working where he could on construction sites and as 
foreman of a road gang and only returning to Velddrift in 1934~. 
Abraham Tolken also abandoned the river, going to Middelburg to 
work on building the Loskop Dam~. His three brothers followed, 
the one to Paarl, another to work in the post office and a third 
for the railways~. The latter was a popular choice, Dan 
Groenewald's family also trading in the uncertainties of fishing 
for a secure wage on the railways at Bellvilleb1• The majority of 
fishermen, however remained at the Bay and were joined by many 
first-time arrivals at the coast, refugees from the rural 
hinterland. In this context of depression, resource scarcity and 
rising population pressure, renewed conflict over the ETSFZ was 
inevitable. 
In 1929 the provincial state was still considering a reduction in 
the ETSFZ boundary to create a neutral zone between the set and 
seine fishermen, a decision delayed for more than a year by a 
lack of accurate survey maps of St Helena Bay which made location 
~ Cape Archives; 1\PKB, 6\1\10 13\2\3, Senior Assistant Health Officer 
to the Magistrate Piketberg, 9 March 1933 and _Provincial Secretary to the 
Magistrate Piketberg, 17 July 1937. Also State Archives; LDE 4733, 19784\17, 
Senior Welfare Officer to the Secretary for Social Welfare, S January 1939. 
~ See for example Cape Archives; 1\HFD, 7\1\4, for the rent difficulties 
facing the Novellas and Angelo Dipaola at St Helena Bay. 
~ Interview with Hr Baas Wiid, Velddrift, 18 July 1986. 
~ Interview with Hr Abraham Tolken, Velddrift, 27 July 1986. 
~ Ibid. 
bl Interview with Dan Groenewald, Velddrift, 18 July 1986. Also ·Hard 
Times at Oliphants Kraal• in Cape Times, 9 August 1928. 
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of ETSFZ boundary beacons impossible62 • The police, however, 
remained unconvinced and the provincial state requested Von Bonde 
to once again investigate~. In March 1930 he reported that the 
existing restrictions on set net fishing were hampering the 
crayfish fishermen in procuring bait and that the 60 square miles 
allotted the trek seine fishermen was "too large"M. He proposed a 
trade-off, banning set net fishing in the Berg River in return 
for moving the southern boundary of the ETSFZ 3 miles to the 
north of the river mouth, thereby opening up 9 square miles of 
the reserve for set net fishing~. The low cost of Von Bonde's 
scheme appealed to the provincial state, but before legislation 
could be enacted, the Speaker of the House, De Waal, intervened 
to block its passage~. He claimed that the proposed changes would 
antagonise the seine fishermen and suggested that he, Piketberg 
MPC, J. Kellerman, and Von Bonde go to Berg River to reassess the 
situation67 • Von Bonde and Kellerman eventually went to Velddrift 
in January 1931 and held a public meeting to review the evidence. 
The set net fishermen claimed the ETSFZ was too large and openly 
admitted to poaching, "being drawn to this expediency owing to 
the lack of grounds where fish could be obtained for the purpose 
62 Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27(2), Provincial Secretary to the Deputy 
Comm:issioner SAP, 18 April 1929. 
~ Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27(2), District Commandant SAP Paarl to the 
Deputy Conai.ssioner SAP, 30 April 1929 and Acting Provincial Secretary to C. 
von Bonde, 11 September 1929. 
M Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59.\27(2), C. von Bonde to the Provincial 
Secretary, 10 March 1930. 
~ Ibid. 
~ Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27(2), Provincial Secretary to the 
Administrator, 16 June 1930 and Provincial Secretary to the Acting Provincial 
Secretary, 10 November 1930. 
bl Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27(2), Provincial Secretary to the Acting 
Provincial Secretary, 10 November 1930. 
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of bait for catching 
L.Q 
crawfish"-. The seine fishermen, countered 
the areas that the set net fishermen "fouled" and "spoilt" all 
they worked and would "ruin" the ETSFZ if given access - . 
Foliowing 
boundary 
impo ssib le 
the meeting, Von Bonde 
reduction would give 
changed tack, claiming that a 
encouragement to poaching, be 
to control and st r:-ess i ng the need for stepped up 
policing ~. His report, coupled with further pressur:-e from De Wa al 
and Keller:-man, pr:-ompted the provincial state to again appeal to 
the Depar:-tment of Justice in early 1932 for a "water:- poli ceman" 
to be stationed at Berg River, but the request was cur:-tly 
refu sed 
De Waa l 
fishermen 
and Kellerman were also under pr:-essure fr:-om their 
increasing constituents feeling the effects of 
population pressure on the resource. In March 1932 C.F.J. Thiar:-t 
app e aled to 
river, 
De Waal to stop the influx of "buite mense" to the 
"[w ] ant dit is van nag tot nag van 20 tot 30 ba~kies dis nie 
die ou en mankoliekes wat in die bakkie is nie dis almal die ~., 
jong jong manne wat nie wil onder een baas werk nie" 1~. 
In the same month 80 tr:-ek seine fishermen from Zover:-by on the 
Piketberg coast petitioned the provincial state for a ban on all 
~ Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27(2), C. von Bonde to the Provincial 
Secretary, 6 February 1931. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. Also Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27(2), C. von Bonde to the 
Provincial Secretary, 4 November 1931. 
~. 
1 1 Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27(2), Deputy Commissioner SAP to the 
Provincial Secretary, 8 February 1932. 
~" 
' L Cape Archives; PAN 41, A120\e\24(4), C.F.J. Thiart to J.J.H. de Waal, 
25 March 1932. 
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~.., 
set net fishing boats in the ETSFZ ' . Failing this they wal'.'ned, 
"ans as seen visser-s geen bestaan sal kan maak en ans met ans 
vr-oue en kinder-s die weg van wer-kloses moet volg en 
die staat moet wor-d"~. With no pr-aspect of additional 
'n las 
police 
V 1 t' 
at 
Ber-g Rivel'.' and hounded by De Waal, Kellel'.'man and the seine 
fisher-men , the pr-ovincial state finally r-elented and in July 1932 
banned all boats carr-ying set nets fr-om passing thl'.'ough o r being 
inside the ETSFZ unless seeking shelter- dur-ing a storm· . I n stead 
of l'.'esolving the conflict , however-, this created chaos on the 
west coast, pr-eventing set net fishermen at both St Helena and 
Saldanha Bay from leaving their- moor-ings along the Bel'.'g Rivel'.' and 
Langebaan Lagoon : • Cape Town was thus f o cced to stay 
implementation and finally repeal the new legislati on entirely in 
September 1932 ' . As the Magistrate of 
such measur-es 
legislation, 
were doomed to failure, 
Piketberg explained , al l 
not because o f inadequate 
but its lack of enforcement which encoul'.'aged 
poaching and denied the court the objective evidence it nee d ed to 
7Q 
prosecute offenders". The provincial state was back to square 
one. De Waal and Keller-man were asked to use their " influence" 
73 Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27(2), Petition of Soverby Trek Seine 
Fisherrren to the Provincial Council, 30 March 1932. 
74 
Ibid. Also Cape Archives; PAN 41, A120\e\24 (4) , C.F.J. Thiart to 
J.J.B. de Waal, 25 March 1932. 
~" 
..; Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27(2), 
Administrator, 14 June 1932 and Cape of 
Proclamation 126 of 1932, 8 July 1932. 
Provincial 
Good Hope 
Secretary to the 
Provincial Gazette, 
7/.. 
" ' Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27(2), Hand written minute titled "Netting 








van Oordt, ,12 
20 September 
Archives; PAN 71, K59\27, C. von Bonde to 
29 August 1932, Provincial Secretary to G.A. 
1932 and Provincial Secretary to the Administrator, 
78 Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27(2), Magistrate Piketberg to the 
Provincial Secretary, 8 August 1932. 
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with Pretoria to get more police stationed at Berg River and a 
new proclamation was issued in September 1932 , setting out a 
route through the ETSFZ for set net boats entering or leaving the 
Berg 
~ 
River ' · 
approached the 
presence at the 
In January 1933 
Co mmissioner of 
the 
Police 
Bay, but was 'to 1 d that 
provincial state .itself 
for a greater police 
its request "cannot be 
considered"~. Cape 
in catch es after 
Town was sa~ed further trouble by a recovery 
1932. The poaching issue, however, remained 
unresolved and when the gathering crisis in the crayfish fishery, 
temporarily delayed by state concessions on size-limi ts and 
sanctuaries, broke with the French quota in January 1934, it re -
emerged with a vengeance. 
Whereas 
quota in 
canning companies measured the effects of the French 
lost production time, declining profits, mounting fixed 
costs and wavering investor confidence, their labour force 




deprived many men and women of their chief means of 
and transformed the loss 
into personal poverty, 
starvation for many thousands of 
hands 
factory 
and their families. Between 
off workers were laid 
corresponding loss of income in 
of a distant export market 















absence of alternative employment, the effect of these lay-offs 
was devastating. In October 1934, one reported that 
~ Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27, Provincial Secretary to G.A. van Oordt, 
12 September 1932 and Cape of Good Hope Provincial Gazette, Proclamation 195 
of 1932, 23 September 1932. 
90 Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27, 
Commissioner of the SAP, 26 January 1933 
Provincial Secretary, 30 January 1933. 
Provincial Secretary 





81 Union of South Africa, Department of Census and Statistics Census of 
Industrial Establishments 1936-1937 [U.G.39-1939), p.52. 
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unemployed workers "had no other means of living and could not 
find work in the surrounding district , that, since the closing of 
the canneries, they had been living on mielie meal , and that in 
small quantities " ~ . He further warned that "if wor-k was not 
resume d ,-.t coastal canner-1ec; befor-e long , a large populatio:1 
along the c oast would be on the very verge of starvation" = . Th ,=: 
fishermen and boat owners fared little better as cr-ayf:sh catches 
r_:,l·Jmmeted, from 22 million fish in 1933 to just 9 m1ll1 c n 
193S , driving earnings down from 1..102 500 in 1933 to 1..4 1 800 '.:!:! 
=t 
1935, . The dual income str-ategy sustaining many fishing families 
thus been thorouc;hly disrupted , leading to a wi despr:-ead 




1934 250 Ber-g River seine f ish ermen petiti o ned their new 





set net fishers, but "' n ve el 
Italian seine or ne t, 
enthusiastically welcomed by Townsend in 1927, but subsequently 
not widely adopted at St Helena Bay~. At Saldanha Bay, however, 
road and rail connections with Cape Town, two canning factories, 
a natural harbour and extensive motorisation, justified the 
lampara's adoption by boat owners confident of recouping their 
investment through c r-ayfish fishing, the rantsoenvis tr:-ade and 
,.,"I 
;, HFacing Prospect of Starvation - Acute Distress Among Fishermen -
Waiting for News from France" in Cape Times, 12 October 1934. 
83 Ibid. 
·3" Union of South Africa, Department of Census and Statistics Census of 
Industrial Establishn~nts 1936-1937, p.52. 
oc; 
·"' Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27(2), Petition of 251 Dwarskersbos and 
Velddrift Trek Seine Fisherrren to F.C. Erasmus, 11 May 1934. 
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Cape Town market~. Their devastating effect on the seine fishing 
economy of the Langebaan Lagoon, however, resulted in lam para 
fishing being banned there in Septembet 1932 TI . 
Wit h the o nset o f the French quota crisis, the l ampara o wners' 
in desperati on , they investment was o nce again threatened and, 
turned to St Helena Bay, where the ETSFZ legislation ' s failure to 
define a "trek seine" allowed them to fish at will in the 
:-c 
t·eserve -"' . F o r the s:e ine fishermen this invasion of motorised 
craft and a highly efficient fishing technology pla c ed fur ther 
unbe arab le 
i n de pendent 
strains on their own continued existence as 
producers. They warned Erasmus that the lampara net 
would destroy both them and the fish as it had done elsewher e on 
the west coast. They c la i med that the lampara fishermen's ability 
to hunt fish at sea enabled them to "rooi die vis totaal uit, 
r 
daar die vis n~rens buite h u 1 1 e be re i k i s " ~.., . The invaders ' 1 a r g e 
c at c hes 
price of 
bore ample testimony to this and had already dri ve n the 
rantsoenvis down from 18s a 100 harders 
:' :"1 
to a mere 6s 
These Saldanha Bay fishermen were not only outsiders with no 
permanent ties to the Bay, they asserted, but also "bemiddeldes ", 
able to afford mot o rboats and expensive nets beyond the seine 
91 
fishermen's means ·· . The latter thus demanded the c losing of the 
36 Board of Trade and Industries Report No.180: The Fishing Industry, 
p.29. The Board reported that there were no fewer than 9 lampara nets i n use 
at Saldanha Bay in 1932. 
87 Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\20, 
Administrator, 21 September 1932 and Cape 
Proclamation 196 of 1932, 24 September 1932. 
Provincial Secretary to the 
of Good Hope Provincial Gazette, 
~ Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27(2), R. Schwers to the Provincial 
Secretary, 4 September 1934. 
~Q 
"' Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27(2), Petition of 251 Dwarskersbos and 




entire Bay to lampara fishing. The Saldanha Bay fishermen, under 
the leadership of one Manus van Schalkwyk, were also girding for 
battle , hiring a lawyer, Rudolf Schwers, to represent them"-. 
Schwers kept up a steady stream of correspondence to Erasmus, 
explaininq that his clients were opposed to the seine fishermen's 
demand, claiming instead that the ETSFZ was too large and ought ~. 
to be reduced ., . 
Both sides saw Erasmus' support as vital and on 9 June 
convened a meeting at Velddrift under the auspices of 
Velddrift Farmers Union and attended by MPC, Jacob La ubschet· , 
J . Brink of the Piketberg Divisional Council and some 400 farmers 
.-, .• 
and fishecmen-'. Erasmus gave "a very sympathetic hearing to both 
sides" and informed the gathering that he had 
Administrator and that Von Bonde, would visit 
spoken to the 
Velddrift on -~ 
25 June to investigate~. After appointing delegates to interview 
the Fisheries Advisor, the meeting broke up. Von Bonde, however, 
only reached the Bay on 4 July 1934 and "did not commit himself 
in any way as far as the respective methods of trek fishing and 
trawl fishing were 
Q~ 
concerned" '". 
the need to protect immature 
Instead he spoke 
fish and a plan 
at length about 
for constructing 
weirs in the Berg River to allow fish to breed undisturbed and 
restock the Bay. This, he believed, would be "a most important 
factor in staving off the ever impending -poor whiteism' with 
92 Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27(2), R. Schwers to F.C. Erasmus, 28 April 
1934. 
93 Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27(2), R. Schwers to F.C. Erasmus, 28 May 
1934. 
·'' "' "Trekking versus Trawling - St. Helena Bay Fishing Controversy - The 
Rival Method Explained" in Cape Times, 14 June 1934. 
95 Ibid. 
% "Trawl-Seine Fishing Opposed - Deputation Meets Dr. Von Bonde" in Cape 





. this fishing area is threatened" · . Back in Cape Town, Von 
dismissed the trek seine fishermen's demands as 
impractical, claiming that the ETSFZ gave them sufficient 
protection and calling yet again for stepped-up policing of the 
e:<istinq reserve - . His sympathies clearly lay with the l ampara 
fishermen . In his Annual Report for 1934, he stressed the need 
f o r the "adoption of additional and more modern methods of 
c apture, and a more enterprising spirit amongst 
:c 
fishermen " tc offset the .endemic problem of fluctuating catches 
The "progressive" Saldanha Bay fishermen epitomised the 
mode rni sation he advocated and the "usual outcry of conservatis m" 
from the seine fishermen and their "very militant attitude" he 
undisturbed in their saw as "the outcome of a desire to remain 
1 ( ·. /\ 





however, were feeling in crea singly 
and Schwers voiced growing concern to isolated 
Erasmus about the way he and his clients were being misinf ormed 
about developments. He co mplained that he was only told about the 
9 June meeting half-an-hour before it started, making attendance 
i ,j ~ 
impossible-· ·. Similarly, his clients, going by the Caoe Times 
report on the meeting, journeyed to Berg River on 25 June 
·?? Ibid. 
98 Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27(2), C. von Bonde to the Provincial 
Secretary, 18 July 1934. 
~ Union of South Africa Fisheries and Marine Biological Survey Report 
No.12, 1934, pp.42-44. Also Union of South Africa Fisheries and Marine 
Bfological Survey Report No.10, 1932, pp.26-28. 
::n; Union of South Africa Fisheries and Marine Biological Survey Report 
No.12, 1934, pp.42-44. Also Union of South Africa Fisheries and . Marine 
Biological Survey Report No.11, 1933, pp.24-26 for an earlier example of von 
Bonde's attitude towards the Berg River fishermen. 
!01 Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27(2), R. Schwers to F.C. Erasmus, 9 June 
1934. 
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expecting to meet with Von Bo nde, onl y to find that he was not 
'i!? 
due until 4 July · ·-. Aggrieved at the unnecessary expense, they 
- -,~ 
demanded their travelling costs be refunded · ··. Rumours were also 
circul atin g which added to the Saldanha Bay fishermen's un ease. 
C h 1 e f ,:: u l p t· i t was Laaiplek merchant, L.H. Carosini , who cla1med 
to have been to l d by Vo n Bon de, during a recent visit to Cape 
legislation would be amended in January Tow n th at the 
exact nature 
strength of 
f i shermen to 
of the amendmen t wa s not s9ecif i ed, but o n t- \.-, .::. .... . • . ._ 
this Carosi.ni was co llecting money from the seine 
,::ov er the ,:: o st of his trip :: 4. Schwers himself had 
also been stonewalled by Erasmus since he had begun writ 1ng to 
· ::-
the MLA in April 1934 · -. In spite of this, he remained optimisti ~ 
i n de alings with h is clients , exhorting Van Schalkwyk to 
the seine fishermen's protest and dismissing them as : 
"these minor and nonsensical moves of Do we 
Jan [Smit, the owner of Velddrift farm] his 
advisers, farmer-friends 
instigated for nothing but 
through the medium of 
Velddr ift fishermen, whose 
or fall by the will of 
Velddrift etc. farm" :%. 
etc., a move 
benefit to them 
the Zooverby-
interests stand 
the owner of 
ign o re 




104 Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27(2), R. Schwers to F.C. Erasmus, 16 
August 1934. 
;05 Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27(2), R. Sewers to F.C. Erasmus, 30 June 
1934, S. Siebert to R. Schwers, 4 July 1934, F.C. Erasmus to R. Schwers, 11 
July 1934. Schwers' and Erasmus' paths had crossed in the 1920s when Schwers 
had represented another group of fishermen in a bitter rent struggle with 
their landlord, local MPC', Jacob Laubscher. Erasmus took Laubscher's side and 
both he and Laubscher blamed their troubles on Schwers' involvement. It is 
unlikely that the Saldanha Bay fishermen knew of Schwers' track record with 
Erasmus w~en they hired him. 
:06 Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27(2), R. Schwers to M. van Schalkwyk, 7 
July 1934. 
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Schwer-s believed the Sandveld far-mer-s wer-e behind the seine 
fisher-men's pr-otests and that the latter- wer-e mer-e pawns in the 
hands of their- landlor-ds . "If the far-mer-s ar-e allowed to 





to w r-eck and 
war-ned, "ever-ything in that 
r-uin, that the past has 
sufficiently 
'!Y:' 
proved" ·· . Schwer-s thus ur-ged Van Schalkwyk and the 
rest of the lampar-a fisher-men to co ncentrate on pr-epar-ing for- the 
coming season, safeguar-d their- shar-e of the r-antsoenv is and Cape 
• !'C 
To wn mar-kets and trust in Er-asmus' im partiali ty ''·"-'. He, however, 
evidenced n o ne of the trust in Erasmus that he encouraged in his 
clients . Schwer-s explained to the MLA that the r-umour-s and 
confusion and 
them hesitant 
misinfor-mation cir-culating at the Bay had sown 
uncertainty amongst the lampar-a fisher-men, making 
to invest in new gear- and asked for- a statement of intent from 
the provincial state as well as an under-taking to con su lt all the 
in the event of any major- changes to the affected communities 
legislation'.('~ This would allay fear-s, he explained, and allow 
t he Saldanha Bay fisher-men to expand their- oper-ations with 
• ' (, 
obvious benefits to the countr-y 's food supp 1 y :>.: 
Er-asmus' 
per-sonal 
main concer-n, by August 1934, was not food, but his 




he led a deputation of seine 
Fisher-y Advisor, Administr-ator-




--·~ Ibid. Also Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27(2), R. Sewers to M. van 
Schalkwyk, 13 & 17 July 1934. 




Committee in Cape To wn 'L. The de putat ion succeeded 1n getting Ven 
Sande's to reco nsider extending the ETSFZ and an assu ra nce fr om 
the pr ovincia l state to approa c h the police f or more men at the 
The deputa tion 
di. s cuss polici ng with 
als o waited on the Minister of 
him 
the 
in person ··-. Er-asmus thus 
Justice to 
c am e down 
firmly o n the s i de of seine fishing 1nter-e sts and in 
Sep tember 1934 , Von Bonde again vi sited Berg River , agreed to the 
e :< t e n s i o n o f the ETSFZ north 
si.milar extension south ward t.o 
to Babo o n Point , but 
St Mar ti n's Point 
r-ef •..1 seci 
The 
) 
Times , however , gave a very different account of the vi.sit , 
stating that the F is her ies Advi sor had agre ed to b an the lampara 
it! 
net from the terr-itorial wa ters of the Bay···. T he r e p o r t p r- ,:i •1 o k e c 
an angry resp on se from Schwers who dismissed Vo n Bond e as merely 
an " adviser " a n d questioned why he had only visited the Berg 




to Lambert's Bay ·· : No legislation had yet bee n gazetted 
Schwers pointed out and he asked the Pr-ovincial Secretary 
to warn the editor o f the Cape Times against false ceport1ng 
1 ikel y to c t· eate u ncertainty on the west coast : '. t. If the Saldanha 
Bay fishermen were alarmed by the Cape Times report , it did not 
deter them from conti nuing to fish in the ETSFZ, alth o ugh t hey 
ap pear to have ended their relationship with Schwers aft er 
September 1934. By the end of the year it was the seine fishers 
Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27(2), Handwritten minute, "Fishing off 
Mouth of Berg RiverH signed .G.A. van 0., 27 August 1934 . 
4 4,, 
Iii. Ibid. 
1!3 Cape Archives; PAN 71, K5.9"\27(2), C. von Bonde to the Provi ncial 
Secretary, 21 September 1934. 
"Trawl-Seining ban at the Bays - Record Catch of 250, 000 Maasbankers" 
in Cape Ti mes, 10 September 1934. 
:• '= 
Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27(2), 
Secretary, 14 September 1934. 
'1' 
•• c Ibid. 
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R. Schwers to the Provincial 
who were becoming increasingly restless as the promised extension 
of the reserve failed to materialise and their own catches 
dee 1 i ned 11~ The new po 1 iceman at Berg River was the main target 
of their discontent 11~ Un 1 i ke Townsend, who patro 11 ed the coast 
on horse or by car and observed boats working in the ETSFZ 
through a telescope to identify poachers, the new incumbent, one 
Senekal, was totally uninterested in policing the reserve, 
claiming he was a land policeman. Because of this and the seine 
fishermen's inability to apprehend the faster motorboats, 
prosecutions for fishing offences declined in 1934-1935. 
TABLE 5.3: Prosecutions for Poaching in the ETSFZ, 
1933-1939 119 
YearCases Involving 1-5 
Fishermen 
Cases Involving >5 
Fishermen 
No. C Ag C\Ag Fines No. C Ag C\Ag Fines 
1933 17 7 4 5 E. 47.lOs 1 1 
1934 11 10 1 E. 47.10s 
1935 10 6 2 2 E. 33.00s 2 1 1 E. 8.00s 
1936 5 3 2 E. 3.10s 1 1 
1937 1 1 E. 2.00s 
1938 3 1 2 E. 2.00s 
1939 2 1 1 E. 14.00s 
TOTAL 49 29 12 7 E.149.lOs 4 1 3 E. 8.00s 
C = Convicted; Ag= Acquitted; C\Ag = Cases in which both applied 
The. majority of those convicted were working alone or in pairs 
and were thus not lampara fishermen. The brunt of the 
prosecutions were borne by fishermen resident at the Bay fishing 
117 See for example Cape Archives; PAN 71, KS9\27(2), J.J. Gallowitz to 
the Administrator, 30 November 1934. 
118 Cape Archives; PAN 71, KS9\27(2), J.J. Gallowitz to the Administrator, 
18 December 1934. 
119 Cape Archives; 1\PKB, A1\2\1, Periodical Court Roodebaai, Criminal 
Record Book 1933-1939. 
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with set nets. As such they did not con stitute the major threat 
to the seine economy. The paucity of both cases and convictions 
against large crews (upward of 5 men) underscores 





aqainst the lampara fishecmen. In venting their angec 
o wn powerlessness, the seine fishers picked on 
vulnecable , locally resident set net fishermen. By 
legislation had been forthcoming and Erasmus felt 
Ma r ,:: h 1 9 3 5 n o 
compelled t. o 
again enter the fray. In mid-Macch he led yet another delega t i on 
to Cape Town, this time to interview the Seccetary for Commer c e 





fines for offenders and the pr ovision o f a 
police service at St Helena Bay. Their last 
dismissed by the Secret ary 
and small number of boats 
as im practi c al, given the 




th e legislation had been amended, the local Magistcate be asked 
to warn lampara fishermen against poaching under threat of 
fu rther restrictions·-·. 
This was not what the delegation had hoped for and theic 
confidence in the authorities was further shaken when one of 
their number, J.F.J. Theart, obtained a copy of Von Sande's 
September report from Erasmus in which it was revealed that the 
ETSFZ would not be e:<tended south to St Martin's Point ··: In 
addition, Von Bonde claimed to have informed the seine fishermen 
'.:'.O State Archives; HEN 1512, 180\1\24, Handwritten minute from the 
Secretary of Commerce and Industries to the Minister, 8 March 1935. 
~ .., 1 
Ibid. Also State·Archives; HEN 1512, 180\1\24, Secretary of Commerce 
and Industries to the Magistrate of Moorreesburg, 21 March 1935, Secretary of 
Commerce and Industries to F.C. Erasmus, 3 April 1935 and Acting Magistrate 
Piketberg to the Secretary for Commerce and Industries, 19 July 1935. 
1.,,, 
• L'- Interview with Mr John Tolken, Dwarskersbos, 17 July 1986. 
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of this at a public meeting at Velddrift in F e b r u a r y 1 9 3 5 '. :?~ The 
to an uninformed community which had report's 
entrusted 
disclosure 





Bonde, c reated a 
an acrimonious 
At issue was his 
1934. The seine 
heightened sense of betrayal and 
hate campaign against the Fishe ries 
handling of the whole issue since 
fishermen alleged that his September 
" i nvestigation" involved nothing more than him driving do wn the 
main street to the post offic e, climbing out of his car and 
""' announcing that the ETSFZ would be extended :~: Similarly, in 
February, he arrived to speak to J.F.J. Theart about the latter's 
allegations that he an d Carosini were "kop in een mus", following 
Carosini's rumour-mongering about an impending amendment to the 
legislation. On this occasion Von Bonde met with Theart and five 
public others at Theart's house. His claims to have held a 
meeting were thus a 
- . ..,c 
lie.tJ. Willem Nieman summed up the feeling 
along the river in April 1935, when he said, "Ons verwag oak nou 
nie meer beloftes nie dit is al genoeg, ons wil nou liewe d ade 
, .., , 
h~ .. . ~=. Von Bonde did little to restore the seine fishermen's 
faith in the authorities, arriving at Velddrift a few days after 
the fit· st allegations reached Cape Town, accompanied by a 
co nstable and sergeant from the local police station and ha ving 
several seine fishermen arrested for making libellous allegations 
123 State Archives; HEN 1512, 180\1\24, J.C.P. Theart to the Minister of 
Labour, 19 March 1935 and J.F.J. Theart to the Minister of Labour, 19 March 
1935 with attached handwritten copy of Von Bonde's report. 
'.24 State Archives; HEN 1512, 180\1\24, J.C.P. Theart to the Minister of 
Labour, 19 March 1935 and J.F.J. Theart to the Minister of Labour, 19 March 
1935 with attached handwritten copy of Von Bonde's report. 
l:S Ibid. 
126 State Archives; HEN 1512, 180\1\24, W. Niemann to the Minister of 
Labour, 9 April 1935. 
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,,,~ 
against him ,~ ;. Such strong arm tactics were sufficient to stamp 
out agitation at the Bay and 
co mmenced a libellous campaign 
back in Cape Town Von 




ment.::i c 1 ty 
explained , 
in te c pr•= t 
as 
"It is very 
exemplified 
difficult to deal with 
by the fishermen at 
the type of 
Velddrift", he 
"who are, in most cases , illiterate, and do n o t 
clear and logical exp l anati o ns of facts" ·- =. He thus 
suggested that "kn o wing the type of mentality from wh ich these 
letters o ri ginate, I think that a pract ical sol u tion would be tn 
completely ignore all su c h effusions in future"·"·. The Secretary 
o f Commerce and Industries was inclined to agree, 
te l ling insight into th e ce ntral state's change in attitude 
towards the seine fishing economy at the Bay. 
By April 1935 the seine fishermen's agitation against Vo n Bonde 
as the symbol of their betrayal had given way to a more general 
sense of desperatio n. In March they had gone a month wi thout any 
' 1 ;"1 
catches and by July starvation was threatening· ·'~ This was in 
stark contrast to the lampara fishermen who continued to dump 
large quantities of fish along the river for want of buyers · · ·. 
The seine fishermen's inability to halt their own imrniseration 
was underscored by their failure to obtain legal redress through 
Labour, 
1·935. 
State Archives; HEN 1512, 180\1\24, J.C.P. Theart to the Minister of 
4 April 1935 and J.F.J Theart to the Minister of Labour, 15 April 
,-,o 
-~" State Archives; HEN 1512, 180\1\24, Handwritten notes by von Bonde 
rebutting J.C.P. Theart's, 3 April 1935 and C. von Bonde to the Secretary for 
Commerce and Industries, 17 April 1935 • 
. -,o 
·" State Archives; HEN 1512, 180\1\24, C. von Bonde to the Secretary for 
Commerce and Industries, 17 April 1935. 
:::o State Archives; HEN 1512, 180\1\24, D.J. Waso to the Minister of 
Labour, 18 April 1935, P.J. Meissenheimer to the Minister of Labour, 17 May 




the courts. Not only was the new policeman unsympathetic, but the 
old problem of evidence remained as intractable as ever. P.J. 
Meissenheimer spoke for many in May 1935 when he complained that 
"ons as Trek vissers kry geen reg voor die hof nie," adding, "die . ..,.., 
Trol v i s s e r s d r y we d i e s po t me t d i e wet " · -·~. The l amp a r a f i she r men 
usually eluded capture and could only be charged if they were 
injudicious enough to have set nets with them in the boat when 
apprehended. Even then, cases were still lost on evidence and th e 
fines handed down were too small to act as deterrent ···-~ For thi s 
re ason, a proposal 
tr3nsfer Velddrift 
district was roundly 
in July 1935 by the Department of Justi ce to 
from the Piketberg to Hopefield magiste ri al 
. ..,,, 
defeated at a public meeting at Roodeba a i .:: 
As the Magistrate of Piketberg explained: 
"By die bespreking was dit duidelik, dat 
net een beswaar teen oorplasing het en 
~vyand, wat van oorkant kom'. Hierdie 
sleepnetvissers. Hulle is bang, dat hulle 
word, terwyl die van die sleepnetvissers 
•;,:: 
sodra die oorplaasing plaasvind" """ . 
die treknetvissers 
hulle noem dit die 
viand is dan die 
regte ingekort sal 
uitgebrei sal word 
The proposed transfer aimed to streamline the court system and 
give the Berg River community easier 
magistrate, but with Von Sande's betrayal 




people's minds, it readily suggested conspiracy and the plan was 
i<'l 
.,~ State Archives; HEN 1512, 180\1\24, P.J. Meissenheirrer to the Minister 
of Labour, 17 May 1935. 
lTI Ibid. Also Acting Magistrate Piketberg to the Secretary for Commerce 
and Industries, 19 July 1935, K.J. Thiart to the Minister of Labour and.Social 
Welfare, 23 September 1935 and J.J. Gallowitz to the Minister of Labour and 
Social Welfare, 24 September 1935. 
f "tA 
:.,., Cape Archives; 1\PKB, 6\1\21 17\17\2\3, Magistrate of Piketberg to the 
Secretary for Justice, 2~ July 1935. The voting was evenly divided between 
lampara and trek seine fisherrren with 28 of the forrrer voting for 
incorporation into Hopefield and 75 of the latter carrying the rreeting with 





shelved soon afterwards·~ In view of the continued impasse and 
the provincial state's failure to provide the promised 
legislative protection, Erasmus again took up the matter with the 
Administrator- i n July 193 5, asking for the legislation to be 
speeded up and the ETSFZ to be extended to St Martin's Point . At 
the same time he st resse d the need for an adequate water police 
service to enforce t he extende d ETSFZ and asked the Administrat o r 
to put pressure on Pretoria in this regard ·· ·. 
With the end of the snoek season in July, the lampar a fishermen 
::-et.urned to the Bay in force and tensions escalated according ly . 
By September the seine fishermen had gone three months with out 
catche s due to the daily presence of the lampara fishe r men in the 
ETSFZ 
mos t o f 
The latter we re la nd in g vast quantities of fish, dumping 
it a nd driving the pr ice of rantsoenvis 
•. ::c 
further -- ·. From 15-16s a 100 harders in 1933 the p rice 
do wn even 
collapsed 
to a mer e 3s 6d by the second half The lampara 
fisherme n had also been encouraged to apply for an c horag e rights 
in the ETSFZ by the local Magistrate and adopted a 
"ver volgin g" against the trek fishermen, attempting to 
policy of 
ru n them 
• 1 : 
:_,t Cape Archives; 1\PKB, 6\1\21 17\17\2\3, Secretary of Justice to the 
Magistrate Piketberg, 20 August 1935. 
Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27(3), F.C. 
18 July 1935. 
Erasmus to the Administrator, 
139 State Archives; HEN 1512, 180\1\24, P.J. Meissenhei~r to the Minister 
o f Labour and Social Welfare, 19 August 1935 & 21 September 1935 and K.J. 
Thiart to the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare, 23 September 1935. 
:~q State Archives; HEN 1512, 180\1\24, J.F.J. Theart to the Minister of 
Labour and Social Welfare, 3 September 1935, P.J. Meissenhei~r to the 
Minister of Labour and Social Welfare, 21 September 1935, K.J Thiart to the 
Minister of Labour and Social Welfare, 23 September 1935 and K.J. Thiart t o 
the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare, 14 October 1935. 
"(\ 
.~,, State Archives; HEN 1512, 180\1 \24, J.J. Gallowitz to the Minister of 
Labour and Social Welfare, 24 September 1935. 
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down with their motorboats in the 
! ,!1 
reserve-·. In September o ne 
seiner alleged, "dit is hopeloos vir ons om v1r hulle te vang in 
die verbod e waters, want hul wil vir o ns stukkend loop met die 
' ·' "" 
motor bate" '-". The following month he again warned: 





• % ~ 
see .. . - . . 
in groat qevaar . Hulle is baie woedend 
en ons word al bang, want hulle is daagli ks 
waters met die motor schuite en vervolg ans 
te l oo p en as Li nie nou vir hulle weg neem 
nie zal daar groat o ngelukke plaas vind 
en ook 
in d i e 
om ans 
uit die 
o p die 
Under intensified assault , denie d legal redress by the courts and 
fa cing a "n aderende hongersnood", the trek seine fishe rmen 
. " 
threatened more drastic a ctio n if the state 
is baie beloftes 
f a i 1 e d t o a c t · ~: As 
J . F . J . Thiart said, "v ir a ns gemaak , maar nou 
sien ons in werk likheid uit na die dade", warn ing that if 
legisla t io n was not soon forthcoming, "sal ans maar ans wapens 
ne e m en uitkoms soek, want die boer word op elke gebied gehelp en 
, ,cc 
die visser word vergeet " '~-. By the end of September 1935, the 
State's co ntinued 
and contem pt to the 
inactivity had added a new 1 a y e r o f c y n i ,_: 1 s m 
seine fishermen's already jaundi ced view of 
their erstwhi le protectors. They compared the treatmen t a ccor ded 
farmer s to that meted out to them and concluded that: 
· a.· 
Ibid. Also J.J.D. Thiart to the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare, 
24 September 1935, P.J. Meissenheimer to the Minister of Labour, 29 August 
1935 & 21 September 1935. 
' 4" 
- L State Archives; HEN 151 2 , 180\1\24, P.J. Meissenheimer to the Mi nister 
of Labour, 29 August 1935. 
'.A} State Archives; HEN 1512, 180\1\24, P.J. Meissenheimer to the Mi nister 
of Labour, 21 September 1935 . 
1 d4 
- State Archives ; HEN 1512, 180\1\24, J.J. Gallowitz to the Minister of 
Labour and Social Wel fare , 24 September 1935 and J.J.D. Thiart to the Minister 
o f Labour and Social Wel fa re, 24 September 1935. 
, 4c: 
· ·" State Archives; HEN 1512, 180\1\24, J.F.J. Thiart to the Mini ster of 
Labour and Social Welfare, 3 September 1935. 
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"as ans 'n bietjie ondersoek doen en ans sien hoe die 
boere behandel word en ans arme vistermense wat omtrent 
soos [sic] is klein en groat dan sal jy s~ ans is diere 
om ans niks verkrij nie maar as die man in die Parlement 
' .!.: 
wil wees da n 1s ans geed" · 
'!'he collapse of their universe and their failure to right 1t was 
as devastating a blow psychologically to the seine fishP.rs ~s th e 
lam para fishermen's presence was economically . The old methods of 
protest through petitions 
all -powerful local 
and the intercessions of , in their 
eyes, power-brokers such as Erasmus, had 
failed and left widespread depression , disillusionment and anger 
• ,1., 
i n its wake·" '. A ha 1 f century later John Tolken still remembers 
Erasmus with great bitterness as a "klaerige, suinige ding" wh o 
failed his fishermen constituent s in their hour of need:~ 
After a delay of more than a year, the Administrator finally 
signed the long-awaited legislation extending the ETSFZ in 
0 ct ob er 1 9 3 5 '. A9• I t was a pyrrhic victory for the seine fishermen . 
Two long years of sustained lampara fishing in the reserve had 
devastated the seine fishing economy of P iketberg, starving it o f 
resources, undermining the rantsoenvis market, immiserating many 
' 4,~ ' ·- State Archives; HEN 1512, 180\1\24, K.J. Thiart to the Minister of 
Labour and Social Welfare, 14 October 1935. 
1.P 
• 
1 State Archives; HEN 1512, . 180\1\24, K.J. Thiart to the Minister of 
Labour and Social Welfare, 23 September 1935 and J.J. Gallowitz to the 
Minister of Labour and Social Welfare 24 September 1935. 
•C,C 
Interview with John Tolken, Dwarskersbos, 17 July 1986. 
~!9 State Archives; HEN 1512, 180\1\24, Provincial Secretary to C. von 
Bonde, 1 October 1935 and Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27(2), Provincial 
Secretary to the Administrator, 12 October 1935 and Minute No.64,132 of the 
Executive Committee of the Cape Provincial Council, 16 October 1935. 
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trek fishermen and driving others to the brink of starvation 1~ 
The legislation itself was also inadequate, because, as Von Bonde 
conceded, without an effective water police service it was a dead 
letter~t Erasmus knew this as well and continued to lobby for 
the extension of the reserve to St Martin's Point, but to no 
avail 1~ He was flatly refused and the Department of Commerce and 
Industries moved swiftly to straitjacket further protests from 
the seine fishermen after October 19351~ A Complaints Committee, 
comprising two seine and two lampara fishermen with an "impartial 
chair", was formed at Berg River and the fishermen informed that 
all future grievances were to be brought to and discussed in this 
forum. If necessary, the chairman would relay matters to the 
"right quarters" and the Minister of Commerce and Industries 
would only consider representations from the Committee 1~ Thus, 
by the time the legislation was actually promulgated in July 
1~ State Archives; HEN 1512, 180\1\24, K.J. Thiart to the Minister of 
Labour and Social Welfare, 14 October 1935; Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27(2), 
P.J. Heissenheimer to the Administrator, 15 October 1935 and I. Freed HWeight-
Weight-Age Standards as an Index of Nutrition of Children• in South African 
Medical Journal, 13 July 1935. 
151 State Archives; HEN 1512, 180\1\24, C. von Bonde to the Secretary for 
Commerce and Industries, 13 November 1935. 
152 Cape Archives, PAN 71, K59\27(2), F.C. Erasnus to the Administrator, 
21 October 1935. 
1~ Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27(2), C. von Bonde to the Provincial 
Secretary, 13 November 1935. 
1~ State Archives; HEN 1512, 180\1\24, Secretary of Commerce and 
Industries to C. von Bonde, 10 October 1935, C. von Bonde to the Secretary for 
Commerce and Industries, 14 October 1935, C. von Bonde to the Secretary for 
Commerce and Industries, 13 November 1935 and Handwritten Hea:,randum from the 
Secretary for Commerce and Industries to the Minister, 20 November 1935. 
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1936, owing to a delay in erecting the boundary markers for the 
extended reserve, it was of little more than token value 1~ 
The seine economy's recovery was frustrated by more ~han just 
inadequate legislation, provincial state ineptitude and central 
state indifference, however. While the easing of the French quota 
after 1935 lessened pressure from the Saldanha Bay lampara 
fishermen and seine catches recovered, the Bay crayfish fishery 
did not enjoy such a swift recuperation 1~ In December 1936 more 
than 200 crayfish fishermen at the Bay petitioned for the minimum 
size-limit to be reduced from 3 1\2 inches to 3 inches. As they 
e>eplained, "We are finding it increasingly difficult [to catch 
legal size crayfish], and are obliged to go further and further 
afield while 
comparatively easy 
fish 3 inches long 
reach" 157• The request was 
are found within 
flatly refused 1~. A 
year later Stephan Brothers threatened the permanent closure of 
its Steenbergs Cove factory, because "we cannot get supplies [of 
crayfish] in conformity with the law to-day" 1~ Many crayfish 
fishermen went north in the late 1930s, Hendrik Brand to fish for 
the Lamberts Bay Canning Company after 1934 and Bertha Chilcott's 
155 Cape Archives; PAN 71, K59\27, Provincial Secretary to the 
Administrator, 6 December 1935, C. von Bonde to the Provincial Secretary, 18 
Hay 1936 and Provincial Secretary to the Administrator, July 1936 and Cape of 
Good . Hope Provincial Gazette, Proclamation 88 of 1936, 20 July 1936. 
156 For the recovery in crayfish fishing see Departirent of Census: and 
Statistics Census of Industrial Establishments 1936-1937, p.52. Industry 
catches climbed back from 9 million fish in 1934-1935 to 14 million in 1935-
1936 and more than 16 million fish in 1936-1937, the same as before the French 
quota crisis. For the recovery in seine catches see Union of South Africa 
Fisheries and Marine Biological Survey Report No.14, 1936, p.20. 
157 Cape Archives; PAN 37, A120\e\3(4), L. Carosini to the Administrator, 
December 1936. 
1~ Cape Archives; PAN 37, A120\e\3(4), Provincial Secretary to L. 
Carosini, 30 December 1936. 
l59 Cape Archives; PAN 37, A120\e\3(4), Stephan Brothers to the Provincial 
Secretary, 17 November 1937. 
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father for three months each year to Thorn Bay where he fished 
for the North Bay Canning Company :~ Stephan Brothers blamed its 
problems on the packing industry and called for the abolition of 
the size limit for c anners, but to no avail. The d e facto erosion 
o f the ETSFZ and the demise . of the local crayfish fishery 
encour a ged ind ep e nd ent boat owners to invest in lampara '.' nets ·'-. 
The greater productivity o f the new net co nt i nued to undermine 
rantsoenvis prices, inducing a protracted profitability crisis in 
the seine economy which made rec ove ry impossible. 
Price erosion was hastened by the rapid integration of the Bay 
fisheries in to the Cape Town market through improved 
infrastructure and motorised lorry transport. In December 




River still went direct to farmers, the remainder was taken by 
local lorry drivers who sold roughly three quarters of it in the 
rural towns of the South Western Cape and transported the rest to 
the fish 
la nded 
market i n Ca pe Town 1~ Thus, when Bay seine fishermen 
"remarkable quantities" 
lbs found 
of maasbankers . in 1936, a 
staggering 1 million its way to Cape Town and "the 
.surrounding countrysi de was flooded with lorry loads of these 
f i sh " '. ~":~ The net re s u 1 t , however, was "sub-economic prices" a nd, 
although 1936 "was a good fisherman's year from the point of vie w 
:.so Interviews with Mrs Bertha Chilcott, Laaiplek, 3 July 1986 and Mr 
Hendrik Brand, Velddrift, 1.9 July 1986. 
161 Report of the Select Committee on the Subject of the Fishing Industry 
Developrrent Bill, 1944, Evidence of S.J. Levin, pp.170-171; Cape Archi ves; PAN 
71 , K59\27(2), R. Schwers to F.C. Erasmus, 30 June 1934 and State Archive s ; 
HEN 1512, 180\1\24, F.C. EraslTll..ls to the Secretary for Commerce and Industries, 
7 March 1936 and Secretary for Commerce and Industries to F.C. EraslTll..ls, 21 
March 1936. 
~ L., 
.u~ State Archives; HEN 1512, 180\1\24, C. von Bonde to the Secretary for 
ComrrErce and Industries, 6 December 1935. 
~n 
_,_, Union of South Mrica Fisheries and Marine Biological Survey Report 
No.14, 1936, p.20. 
228 
of captures, it was a bad year as far as earnings were concerned . 
Prices for line- and trek - caught fish reached a record lo w 
lev el ., '.b~ This pattern was r-epeated in the year-s 1937 -1 939 , w l th 
good catches o n the west coast flooding the Cape Town market and 
undermining prices·~ Even the annual snoek season, traditionally 
the time of good earninqs at the Bay, was affected , through 
competition from Walvis Bay snoek for the Cape Town market . The 
Walvis Bay season ran from November to February and with the 
return of th e fleet from South West Afr ic a, the Cape ~own marKe~ 
was flooded, large quantities of snoek r em aining unsold when the 
Union season opened 1n April depressing pr ic es. Thus in l93 4 - 35 
750 000 salted s~oek were shipped to Cape Town from Wa lvis 8dy . 
This coincided with " o ne of the bes t ever" snoek seasons in the 
Union and by October 
dropped to 4 0s pe r 
1935 the price of 
effect s of 
snoek in Ca pe 
the 1934 - 1935 
Town had 
season 
were still being fel t i n 1936 when "prices were too low to make 
this [ snoek J a pr o fi table f isher y due to the large quanti ty of 
--
salted snoek held over from the exceptional 1935 glut" 
The prime beneficiaries of this expansion in production and 
market s were the o wners of motorboats and lampara nets. For the 
seine fishermen the steady increase in catches undermined prices 
and the west coast's i ntegration into the Cape To wn market 
brought about a pr ic e equalisation which was detrimental to their 
interests. Coming so soon after the 1929-32 resource failure and 
the 1934-35 conflict, the new market conditions were a further 
lb4 Ibid. 
!bS Union of South Afri c a Fisheries and Marine Biological Survey Report 
No.15, 1937, p.24 and Union o f South Africa Fisheries and Marine Biological 
Survey Report No.16, 1938, p.148. 
:b6 Union of South Africa Fisheries and Marine Biological Survey Report 
No.13, 1935, pp.32 -34. 
,,., . 
:o, Union of South Africa Fisheries and Marine Biological Survey Report 
No.14, 1936, p.20. 
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body plow to the seine fishing economy and prevented its recovery 
after 1935. 
In Ei'ebruary 1936 a delegation from the Dutch Reformed Church 
(DRC) Komm i ssie vir Algemene Armesorg (KAA) met the Minister o f 
Labo1.1r in Cape Town to discuss the "~rnstige toestande" at Berg 
River ,~.:. The Minister asked the KAA to make recommendations and 
in March 1936 Dominee A.O. Luckhoff, KAA Secretary, forwarded his 
report. It painted a graphic picture of a community in decline, 
"Alles het goed gegaan tot 'n jaar gelede toe die begin gekom het 
van 'n pr o ses van agteruitgang en verarming onder die mense," the 
do m i n e e r- e po rte d · ~: 
"Vandag heers daar meers as armoede; daar is by baie 
huisgesinne nood en broodgebrek. Die Inspekteur van Skole is 
begaan oar die ondervoeding wat by die kinders te gespeur is . 
Die selfstandigheid, wat tot 'n paar jaar gelede 'n aangename 
kenmerk was van die mense van Velddrift, raak stadigaan 
verlore en die Ned Geref. gemeente wat tot nag toe sy mas 
self kon ophaal, is op weg om 'n hulpbehoewende gemeente te 
· ~A 
word" '·' . 
More than 75% of those interviewed gave their income as less than 
t.30 per annum - nearly half of whom earned under l15 
Owarskersbos evidenced a similar process 
chief cause of which, according to Luckhoff, 
metodes van visvang" in use :~ 
of "verarming", the 
was "die verouderde 
:68 DRC Archives; SKDB S13, 2\b\1, A.D. Luckhoff to the Minister of 
Labour, 19 March 1936. 
1~9 DRC Archives; SKDB S13, 2\b\ 1, A.D • . Luckhoff, "Rapport oor die 
Toestande op Velddrif, Piketberg District", 18 March 1936, p.2. 
,.., ,., 
' ") Ibid. 
See TABLE 5.4 below • 
. .,.., 
. ,~ DRC Archives; SKDB S13, 2\b\1, A.D. Luckhoff, "Rapport oor die 
Toestande op Velddrif, Piketberg District#, 18 March 1936, p.3. 
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TAB LE 5. 4 : 
·-~ 
"Poor Whiteism " a t Veld dr i f t 1936 
CATEGORY INCO ME PER ANNUM 
l 30 -l 60 ll5 - l30 < ll5 
TOTAL 
No . o f Famil.i1:)S 




5 • 1 
29 







37 . 5 
176 
817 
100 % o f all fam1l1es 
Luckhoff noted that the f1~h resou r c es of the river .=1.r.d the Bay 
had declined , 
The 
" en die 0 11 toe rust 1 ng v an 'n s k ui t met trek seine W.Jt 
vroee~ voldoende was vir ' n brood win n ing , is d~t vandag 
n1e meer nie . Tra wlers e n diep see- nette en mot o r - skuite 
is v a ndag nodig o m 'n be staan te maak. Al meer en meer 
word di t r e el ond er die vi ssers van die ou bedel Lng om 
n ie na se e t e g a ~p ni e ••• d i t betaal nie en 1s nie die 
moeite wer d n ie " -· 
coll ap se o f t rek seine fishing was 
factors , i n c l udi ng non-enfor c ement o f the 
ac c e l er at e d 
ETSFZ, th e 
by other 
lack of 
a d equate mar k eting o f c at c hes, a s harp fall in t he p rices due to 
o ver-supply c aused by the lampara f i shermen an d th e a bse n c e of 
c o-operation among the f i shermen themselves. As Luckho f f p u t it , 
, - c 
"el k een is 'n wet vi r homse 1 f en maak soos hy g o edd in k" ·'". Wh i 1 e 
the dominee proposed immediate relief through the p rov i s ion of a 
soup kitchen for the c hildren and a public-work pr o gramme f o r the 
men, he was also concerned to find a long-term 
stressed, "die noodsaaklikheid dat die vissers hu lle 
soluti on a n d 
o u metod es 
van visvang sal prys gee en d i e nuwe en beter metodes sal aan v a ar 
[want] hoe langer hulle vashou aan die ou met o des van 
. -~ 
I b i d., p. 3 . Al s o DRC Archivesi SKDB S13, 2\b\1, A.J. Wagenaar, 
"Stat i stieke re Velddrift Huisgesinne met Afhanklikes", February 1936 .• 
' ~.4 
-·~ DRC Archives; SKDB S13, 2\b\ 1, A.D. Luckhoff, "Rapport oor die 




visvang, hoe dieper sal hulle 
·~t. 
word"-! New methods required 
in ellende van armoede 
sizable capital outlay, 
gedompel 
h o wever, 
and Luckhoff thus advocated the formation of a fishermen's co -
operative at Berg River to enable the government to assist them 
such in this "onverbiddelike rots" in the way of 
assistance, however, was the Velddrift community's residence on 
private land· ·~ 
the burgeoning 
The Smit family resolutely refused to s ell, but 
poverty on the farm had led to a ch anye of mind . 
Luckhoff 
either 
thus sug9ested that the state purchase the land ..:ind 
boar d or es tablish a township with a village management 
turn it o ver to the DRC to run as an 
favoured the latter course, because, as he 
"arbeidskolonie" · ~ He 
put it, "dit kan nie 
ontken word nie dat Velddrift 'n bietjie dissipliene nodig h et, 
•7Q 
en die kerk sal dit beter kan beoefen as die staat" ' "· 
5.3 STATE INTERVENTION AND THE PERIPHERY 
The state shared the dominee's concern with disciplining the Berg 
River fishermen, but refused to regard their plight as a symptom 
of the wider pathology of 
Labour and the Secretary 
"poor 
191~ 
whiteism" · ·• Both the Minister of 
of Commerce and Industries referred the 
DRC to the provincial authorities and otherwise 
176 Ibid., p.4. 
,.,., 
.. ii Ibid., p.5. 
:78 Ibid., p.6. 
179 Ibid. 
'.BO C. J. Groenewal d "The Methodology of Poverty Research 
The Case of the First Carnegie Investigation 1929-1932H in 
13, 2, 1987 for Hpoor whiteism" as a pathology. 
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ignored the 




report·W~ When the KAA ag ain app roached the government , 
in February 1937, with the warning that , " D i e toestande o p 
Velddrift bly onv eranderd en di e laaste b erig te wa t die Ko mmiss ie 
a ntvang het , b evestig die oo rtuiging dat die Regering hier s.:i.: 
moet ingry? om noodlott.ige gevolge te voo rkom", 1t was dismiss ed 
with a token donation of t.25 for 1ts soup kitchen at Velc. ·:!r1:t :: _  
The newly created Department o f Social Welfare also made sev era l 
1 n e f f e c t u a l e f f o r t s t o -+:. a ,::: k l e t h e p r ,.J b l e m .:i. s a w e l f a r e :.. :: s , · e • I n 
~ebruary 1 9 38 it requested the Department o f Lands to 1n~ ~ stiga~e 
over p op ulation on the farms at Berg River , but the latt-. er was 
unable to take action because the land was being sub - let b y t.he 
o wn et· ·· . In January 1939 the Dep art ment ' s Senio r Welfare Offi cer 
a •=1a in raised the issue o f overpopulation , c1ccusing the Smit 
family of "uitbuiting van armblanke families" a nd calling 
drastic legislation: 
belet dat onverantwo o r del ike persone groat " om te 
getalle arm families aanlok en versamel met d ie doel o m 
'n lewensbestaan uit sulke mense te maak, sander om a an 
hulle die allernodigste ~~ngeleenthede te verskaf vir 'n 
rede 1 i ke beskaaf de 1 ewe" -=~ • 
for 
State Archives; HEN 1512, 180\1\24, C. van Bonde to the Secretary for 
Commerce and Industries, 6 April 1936 & Secretary for Commerce and Industries 
to the Secretary for Labour and Social Welfare, 16 September 1936 and DRC 
Archives; SKDB S13, 2\b\1, Minister of Labour to A.D. Luckhoff, 22 July 1936. 
:32 DRC Archives; SKDB 
Interior & National Health, 
and Labour & Social Welfare 
S13, 2\b\1, A.O. Luckhoff to the Minister of the 
11 February 1937 and Minister of Mines, Education 
to A.D. Luckhoff, 12 . February 1937 & 1 March 1937. 
18.J State Archives; LDE 4733, 19784\15, Secretary for Lands to the 
Secretary for Social Welfare, 28 October 1938 and Cape Archives; 1\PKB 6\1\13, 
15\1\16, Secretary Department of Lands to the Magistrate Piketberg, 14 June 
1938, Magistrate Piketberg to the District Commandant SAP Paarl, 20 June 1938, 
L.J. Jones to the District Commandant SAP Paarl, 4 July 1938 and Magistrate 
Piketberg to the Secretary for Lands, 11 July 1938. 
, ,-, A 
.c~ State Archives; LDE 4733, 19784\15, Senior Welfare Officer to the 
Secretary for Social Welfare, 5 January 1939. Also Cape Archives; 1\PKB, 
6\1\10 13\2\3, Senior Assistant Health Officer to the Secretary for Public 
Health, 2 March 1933 and Under-Secretary for Public Health to the Magistrate 
Piketberg, 23 October 1935. 
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Drastic legislation was indeed in the pipeline by 1938, but it 
came not from the Department of Social Welfare, but from the 
Department of Commerce and Industries and looked to the market 
rather than state welfare as the salvation of the beleaguered 
Berg River community. 
The Sea Fisheries Act of 1940 aimed at the comprehensive 
development of the inshore fisheries as a whole rather than a 
piecemeal approach to isolated problem areas, such as St Helena 
Bay. The long delay in amending the ETSFZ legislation in 1935, 
Von Sande's resistance and the constraints imposed on further 
seine fishermen protests by the Department of Commerce and 
Industries were indicative of a fundamental shift in state 
policy. In the 1920s it was widely believed that underdevelopment 
of the inshore fisheries was due to a lack of adequate harbour 
facilities which discouraged investment in motorisation and new 
fishing technology and constrained productivity1~ With increased 
state intervention in the fisheries in the 1930s, the continued 
backwardness of the inshore sector offended the modernisation 
ethos of state scientists and bureaucrats alike 1~ The latter 
pointed out that "adequate shelters for the fishing craft are not 
sufficient in themselves, if the actual practical methods of 
fishing do not show concomitant developments" 1~ By 1934 the 
inshore fisheries employed 90% of all fishermen and 95% of 
185 Union of South Africa Debates of the House of Assembly, 13 February to 
15 April 1925, vol.3, cols.458-480; Union of South Africa, Fisheries and 
Marine Biological Survey Report No.4, 1923-1925, pp.iv-v; Union of South 
Africa, Fishing Harbours Committee, General Observations and Conclusions in 
respect to the Fishing Industry of the Cape Province, 1927, pp.76-77 and Union 
of South Africa, Fisheries and Marine Biological Survey Report No.8, 1931, 
pp.8-10. 
1~ Union of South Africa Fisheries and Marine Biological Survey Report 
No.10, 1932, pp.26-28 and Union of South Africa Fisheries and Marine 
Bioi'ogical Survey Report No.12, 1934, pp.42-44. 
1~ Union of South Africa Fisheries and Marine Biological Survey Report 
No.10, 1932, p.28. 
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all fishing craft. Despite thi s, le ss than 10% of the fleet ~as 
moto rised and it a ccounted for or. l y SO% of the 
·co 
cat ch··--: The need for "m ore efficient methods of fishing and the 
em ~l~ yment af up to date equipment " was self - evident , but , as the 
Board of Trade and Industries explained in Jg3 4, "T he importance 
o f effective f1shing gea r is thoroughly realised by the [1n~hore: 
.. 
f1'..:he::-men , but ~hey are too poor to buy their o wn boats" ·= ·. :he 
the la c k of investment capital in tr:e !.:-"".sho-re 
~isheries to '' marketing di ff iculties " and the fa ct that f ishermen 
had no means of storing their catch and we re th u s " at the ::i e r ,:: y 
o f l,),::al buyers " ···. 
This new underst and ing sha ped cen tral state thinking on the 
1ns hore fisheries until the Second World War. Modernisation was 
no longer sought s~lely through the provisi on of infrastructur e , 
but also by strengthening the inshore fishermen's position in the 
market · 
li nked to 
Pretoria proposed establishing co-operative so c1etie s 
a n ational selling organisation to overcome the 
scattered nature, lack of organisation and predominance of small 
wit h a notoriously "conservative disposition" in produce rs 
in shore It was impressed by the success of co -
o peratives both in addressing the "poor white problem" at h om e, 
such as the Hereford scheme in the Transvaal, and modernising the 
United States fisheries through the provision of credit, 





Ibid., pp.84-87. Also Union of South 
Biological Survey Reports No.9-17, 1932-1939 for 
dul'ing the 1930s. 
Africa, Fisheries and Marine 
ongoing harbour construction 
:~ Bo~rd of Trade and Industries Report No.180: The Fishing Industry, 
1934, pp.38-39 & 84-87 and Union of South Africa Fisheries and Marine 
Biological Survey Report No.13, 1935, p.32. 
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education and infrastructure and the elimination of damaging 
t . t. 19~ com pe 1 10n-. The co-operative idea was given legislative 
expression in the Sea Fisheries Act of 1940 whi ch made provision 
for the proclamation of so-called Fish Market ing Improvement 
Areas ( FMIAs), the establishment of co -operatives wi th the s o le 
right to receive and market all fish landed in such areas and 
levy of 
"'4 join ·' . 




as an "induc ement" t o 
a central ,: o -




through proporti o na l 
' ·:,.:-
representation '·. The co-operative would control t h e 
selling of the fish 
central 
"to get surplus from the co astal fishing 
ce ntres to Cape Town for distribution either in Cape Town or up 
compete with the country " an d create a "marketing unit" ab le to 
trawling industry in the national fresh fish market '. ~ 
Central state intervention in the inshore fisheries after 1. 9 3 4 
was t hus 
solely 
qualitatively different to the 
conc erned with development via 
provincial state, being 
modernisation and the 
creation of a unified marketing entity capable of competing 
effectively for a share of the Union market under the umbrella of 
.n, 
;, . Report of the Select Cammi ttee on the Subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of C. von Bonde, pp.27-56. 
194 Union of South Africa Report of the Select Committee on the Subject of 
the Sea Fisheries Bill, 1939 [S.C.12-'39], Evidence of E.P. Smith, F.P. 
Spooner and C. von Bonde, pp.1-6, 15-31 & 82-83; Union of South Africa· House 
of Assembly Debates 1940, vol.38, cols.3692-3699, 3702-3737 & 3744 and Union 
of South Africa Extraordinary Government Gazette No.2749, 10 April 1940, Sea 
Fisheries Act, Act No.10 of 1940. 
i9~ 
' ~ Report of the Select Committee 
Bill, 1939, Evidence of E.P. Smith, F.P. 
31 & 82-83 
196 Ibid. 
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on the Subject of the Sea Fisheries 
Spooner and C. von Bonde, pp.1-6, 15-
co-operative societies ' ". Pretori a's refusal to treat the 
co llapse of the Piketberg trek seine economy as separate from 
this broader project was premised on its political defeat of the 
tacit alliance 
state and the 
between Sandveld agriculture and the provincial 
consequent dissolution of the tenant relationship 
between Sandveld landlords and their f i she r me n · ·~ No r e m nan t o f 
the old order was allo wed to remain, hen ce the central state's 
resistance to treating the Berg River as a special case o f th e 
broader "poor white problem ". Instead, the St Helena Ba y 
fisheries wer e reorientated away f r om the rural rantsoenvis trade 
and their integration into the Cape Town an d national fresh 
markets encouraged . The new order which emerged at the Bay 
fis h 
after 
1940 was fashioned in the market-place and conditi o ned b y 
~ ompeti tion for ra w material, labour and market share. 
For the Bay fisheries the advent of the interventionist central 
state p ro duced few immediate benefits and promised a further loss 
of local control over the fishing economy. The shift from 
provincial to central state administration of marine fisheries in 
the mid-1930s undermined the power of both the Piketberg trek 
seine fishermen and Stephan Brothers. While the former drew more 
direct and tangible benefits from Cape Town's control over the 
:
9
' For a 
South African 
Town, 1984), 
t o Yudelman's 
general discussion of the "coming of age" of the interventionist 
state see D. Yudelman The Emergence of Modern South Africa (Cape 
pp.249-262. State intervention in the fishing industry conforms 
broad periodisation of the interventionist state during the 
inter-war period. 
1~ Union of South Africa RefX)rt of the Provincial Finance Commission, 
1934 [U.G.46,1934]; Union of South Africa, Board of Trade and Industries 
RefX)rt No.180: The Fishing Industry, 1934, pp.79-84 and State Archives: HEN 
1505; 180\1\20(1) and HEN 1512; 180\1\27(1). The fX)litical defeat of the 
provincial state for conjro l over the marine fisheries of the country came in 
1936, in the wake of the French crayfish quota crisis and after the earlier 
defeat of Von Bonde's "National Fisheries Bureau" idea. The drafting of 
enabling legislation to give effect to the new division of resfX)nsibility -
the Sea Fisheries Act - took all of three years to complete, creating a fairly 
lengthy impasse in the years just prior to the Second World War. 
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west co.ast fisheries via the ETSFZ, Ste phan Brothers had also 
enjoyed considerable influence through the Fisheries Advisory 
Board and Henry Stephan's pro minent position in Cape Town 
muni cipal politics . The central state's assumption o f control and 
the formulation of a brnad devel op ment strategy for the inshore 
fisheries as a who le envisaged b y the Crawfish Export and Sea 
eroded and ultimately 
?retoria ' s e mbrace of moder ni sation and 
u ndercut local infl u en ce . 
concern with efficiency 
of production boded ill for both the Bay ca nning industry and 
inshore fisheries , exposing them to the full force of ~Jrket 
forces and threatening to co nsign them to the periphery of th8 
new order if they failed to adapt . 
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III SECON , ARY INDUSTRIALISATION 
c ..., 1939 c.1956 
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6: THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
Robin Lees titled her chapter on the inshore fisheries in the 
Second World War "Into the Melting Pot", explaining that 
"At the start of the Second World War, South African 
inshore fisheries were nearly 300 years old - yet still 
insignificant. But during the next five years, world 
events provided the sparks which were to ignite the latent 
fires of prosperity. Just as the French Revolutionary Wars 
had stimulated research into food preservation, so this 
war gave food, and particularly preserved food, a premium 
value. Traditional ~sources were disrupted or fell into 
enemy hands - and armies had to be fed consistently and 
well" 1 • 
On the one hand, Lees is merely restating an accepted truism 
about the relationship between the wartime disruption of imports 
and the growth of secondary industry~ On the other, she implies 
that "igniting the latent fires of prosperity" was a simple and 
trouble-free process, the natural next step ~n fishing capital ' s 
pre-ordained forward march of progress. Such a glib, after-the-
fact assumption, made from the vantage point of the late 1960s 
with the benefit of hindsight and two decades of post-war 
development in canning and by-products production, 
extent to which wartime industrialisation in the 
belies the 
inshore 
fisheries was a difficult and highly contested process. Whilst 
the Secbnd World War certainly provided the Union canning 
industry with virtually free access to the local market for the 
first time in its history, the "melting pot" of global conflict 
was an insufficient solvent to erase the previous half century of 
troubled development. The formalisation of relations between the 
R. Lees Fishing for Fortunes, p.100. 
2 See for example D. Hobart Houghton The South African Economy (London, 
1969), p.112 ff.; B. Bozzoli The Political Nature of a Ruling Class, p. 143 
ff.; G. Bloch _ HThe Development of Manufacturing Industry in South Africa, 
1939-1969# (Unpublished MA thesis, UCT, 1980) and D. Innes Anglo: Anglo 
American and the Rise of Modern South Africa (Johannesburg, 1984), p.118 ff. 
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canning industry and the central state was only completed in 1940 
and the new modus vivendi had yet to be implemented in practice. 
In the interim, serious problems continued to hinder canning 
production, including a paucity of marine research and a lack of 
adequate harbour and other infrastructure. The existence of a 
large petty-commodity producing sector also placed constraints on 
the canning industry's ability to restructure production in 
accordance with the new market opportunities created by the war. 
In addition, the state remained committed to fostering co-
operation in the inshore fisheries, geared to supplying the 
national fresh fish market. Rather than dissolve in the crucible 
of conflict, these structural features instead shaped the rapid 
wartime expansion of the canning industry according the existing 
contours and topography of the fisheries. 
The structure of the industry reflected the particular balance of 
class forces in the fisheries on the eve of the war. As such, the 
reorganisation of inshore fishing to meet changed circumstances 
necessitated a realignment of class forces through a process of 
heightened struggle. At issue was the nature and direction of 
development in the most neglected of the nation's primary 
industries. The struggle culminated in the passing of the Fishing 
Industry Development Act in June 1944. The new legislation saw 
the state jettisoning the co-operative idea under pressure from 
both trawling capital and the canning industry, and its belated 
embrace of direct assistance of fishing capital through a new 
parastatal, the Fisheries Development Corporation. This change of 
tack was prefaced by the defeat of militant trade unionism in the 
most highly capitalised sector of the fishing industry and a 
rapprochement between the state and the petty bourgeois boat-
owning class in the inshore fisheries. The latter was persuaded 
to shun trade union organisation in return for a share of the new 
state largesse. The alliance of state, capital and petty 
bourgeoisie thus co-operated to eradicate all vestiges of trade 
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unionism in the inshore industry through formal and informal 
means, placating fishing labour with a range of social upliftment 
schemes instead, closely tied to the needs of an emergent fishing 
capital. 
6.1 INTO THE MELTING POT 
Whereas the First World War strengthened the infant canning 
industry's export orientation, 
a shift to import substitution. 
the 1939-1945 conflict encouraged 
Aside from the inter-war growth 
and consolidation of the canning industry and a more sympathetic 
central state, the Second World War had a very different impact 
on both foreign and local markets, which combined to shift the 
canning industry's focus 
substitution after 1942. 
from export production to import 
A fall-off in fish exports from the 
Union was occasioned by the loss and\or disruption of both the 
European and American markets. With the fall of France in May 
1940 the crayfish canners' chief export market closed~ The 
British Ministry of Food stepped into the breach · in 1941 and 
contracted to take all the Union and South West African canner's 
surplus canned crayfish productiont In the absence of the French 
market and with only "negligible" local demand for canned 
crayfish, the Ministry of Food absoNed virtually the ent.ire 
industry pack. While these wartime contracts provided the 
industry with unlimited demand, the controlled price was not 
sufficiently remunerative to sustain exports at their pre-war 
level~ Rising production costs at home, increasingly hazardous 
3 R. Lees Fishing for Fortunes, pp.101-102. 
4 Ibid. 
5 See TABLE 6.1 below. The average price per case of canned crayfish in 
Britain rose from 66s in 1941 to 80s by 1945. 
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trade routes and a growing local demand combined to make export 
to Britain risky and unattractive~ 
YEAR 














1939 36 626 91 583 22 878 59 148 93.2 
1940 21 339 54 765 49 723 135 421 96.3 
1941 53 216 173 977 89.5 
1942 67 220 216 219 96.3 
1943 38 668 129 219 89.7 
1944 33 594 125 045 92.9 
1945 29 836 118 907 79.5 
The frozen tail trade was similarly hard hit. Exports to Britain 
were prohibited in August 1940 to preserve refrigerated shipping 
space and with America's entry into the war in December 1941, 
frozen crayfish was excluded from the list of permissible 
imports~ Although the newly formed South African Frozen Rock 
Lobster Packers Association (SAFROC) succeeded in having the 
embargo lifted in 1942, the American government took over all 
shipping and controlled both its movement and cargo, giving 
essential war supplies first priority~ In 1942 the west coast 
canners stopped packing frozen tails and Cape Town packers were 
forced to stockpile their output until they could find space on 
6 R. Lees Fishing for Fortunes, pp.107-108. 
7 Own calculations based on data contained in Union of South Africa, 
Department of Customs and Excise Annual Statements of the Trade and Shipping 
of the Union of South Africa and the Territory of South West Africa, 1939-
1945. 
8 Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of J.F. Stubbs, pp.76-83. 
9 Ibid. Also R. Lees Fishing for Fortunes, pp.102-104. 
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passing ships. Consignments waited 4-5 months before shipping and 
in 1943-44 only three shipments actually reached New York lO. In 
1944 SAFROC reported 15 000 cases in cold storage at Cape Town 
and one member stated that "to-day it [the frozen tail industry) 
is a gamble so much so that I do not think an industrialist 
worthy of that name would attempt to go in for that class of 
business" 11 • The packer's attempts to expand the local market 
proved "an uphill struggle" in the face of sustained consumer 
prejudice and resistance to the high price of frozen ta i ls 
compared to other fresh fish 12 • 
The disruption of trade routes, price controls and the shortage 
of shipping space thus forced the industry to turn i nward after 
1941. In the past, neither canners nor packers had had much 
success in finding a local market for crayfish due to the 
availability of cheap imported canned fish in the interior and 
fresh crayfish at the coast 13 • In addition, the industry had 
encountered cultural prejudices against crayfish from newly 
urbanised Africans and Afrikaners 14 • By 1942, however, imported 
canned fish's hegemony over the Union market had been broken by 
lO Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industrl 
Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of J.F. Stubbs, p.83 & p.87. 
11 Ibid., Evidence of J.F. Stubbs, p.107 and Evidence of C.H. Gaggins, 
p.92. 
12 · Ibid., Evidence of J.F. Stubbs, N. Swerling, C.H. Trautman, C.H. 
Gaggins and A. Friedlander representing SAFROC, pp.76-114. 
13 Department of Hines and Industries Fishing Harbours Committee: General 
Observations and Conclusions in respect to the Fishing Industry of the Cape 
Province, 1927, pp.75-79 and Board of Trade and Industries Report No.180: The 
Fishing Industry, 1934, pp. 43-57, for a review of the local and export markeb: 
for fish during the inter-war period. 
14 Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of J.F. Stubbs, N. Swerling, C.H. Traut.man, 
C.H. Gaggins and A. Friedlander representing SAFROC, pp.76-114 and Evidence of 
A. Ovenstone representing SAFCC, p.356. 
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the wartime disruption of shipping and trade routes, opening the 
way for the canners to make the transition to import substitut i on 
production. The initial impetus was provided by the Union's entry 
into the war in 1939. The rapid expansion in the armed {orces and 
their deployment in East and North Africa created an expanded 
demand for cheap, non-perishable foodstuffs 15• Similarly, All i ed 
convoys iequired victualling, giving further encouragement to the 
development of fish processing in the Union 16 • The mi litary 
market, though, was too small to supplant the British Ministry of 
Food demand. 
Developments in 1940-1941, however, were to fundamentally a lt er 
this and encourage the local canning industry to turn i ts 
attention increasingly to the Union market. The German occupat i on 
of Norway in 1940 and South Africa's declaration of war on Japan 
in 1941, both major suppliers of canned fish to the Union, put an 
end to imports from these sources 17 • South Africa's other ma j or 
suppliers, Canada and America, also scaled down exports rapidly, 
redirecting output to their own home markets and armed forces 18• 
The spread of the sea war to the South Atlantic and the declining 
number of Allied convoys calling at Union ports further disrupted 
trade and fish imports plummeted after 1941 19 • 
15 R. Lees Fishing for Fortunes, p.106. 
lb Ibid., p.100. 
l? Ibid., p.105. 
18 State Archives; HEN 1497, 180\ 1 \ 1 ( 1), HReport of the Committee 
appointed by the Controller of Food Supplies to advise him in regard to the 
Canning of Fish other than Crawfish in the Union of South Africa", 9 July 
1943, pp.2-3. 
19 J.C. Goosen South Africa's Navy: The First Fifty Years (Cape Town, 
1973), pp.81-110. 
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TABLE 6.2: Union Fish Imports 1939-1945W 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
YEAR PRESERVED CURED\DRIED FRESH\FROZEN 
lbs l lbs l lbs l 
[1000s] [1000s] [1000s] [1000s] [1000s] [1000s] 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
1939 12 974 402 3 285 71 271 7 
1940 11 307 427 1 918 52 173 5 
1941 11 046 368 1 168 43 128 5 
1942 2 367 106 343 12 86 4 
1943 1 500 184 95 5 140 7 
1944 797 137 403 20 21 1 
1945 1 310 130 629 34 78 4 
The gradual decrease in fish imports from 1939-1941 gave way i n 
1942 to a massive 79% drop, followed by further drops of 37% i n 
1943 and 47% in 1944 21 • In addition, the British Ministry of Food 
began contracting for canned fish other than crayfish and t h e 
local industry started receiving orders from Africa, India, the 
Middle East and Australian. The incentive to produce a wider 
variety of fish for both local and overseas consumption had never 
been stronger and the canners were able to capture a sizable 
share of both the military and national market. The industry th u s 
turned its attention to more abundant and readily available 
pelagic species such as maasbanker, pilchard and harder 23 • In 
W Own calculations based on data contained in Union of South Africa, 
Department of Custo.ms and Excise Annual Statements of the Trade and Shipping 
of the Union of South Africa and the Territory of South West Africa, 1939-
1945. 
21 See TABLE 6.2 above. 
n R. Lees Fishing for Fortunes, p.108 and State Archives; HEN 1497, 
180\1\1(1), #Report of the Committee appointed by the Controller of Food 
Supplies to advise him in regard to the Canning of Fish other than Crawfish in 
the Union of South Africa#, 9 Jµly 1943, p.3. 
~ State Archives; HEN 1497, 180\1\1(1), #Report of the Committee 
appointed by the Controller of Food Supplies to advise him in regard to the 
Canning of Fish other than Crawfish in the Union of South Africa#, 9 July 
1943, pp.3-7. 
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addition, the wartime demand for fish meal and oil from local 
agriculture and industry prompted canners to utilise the high oil 
content of these pelagic species to eKpand into another import 











2 527 130 
3 083 178 
3 337 208 




1 615 52 
3 971 139 
3 889 137 
MEAL OIL 
lbs lbs 
? ? ? 
? ? ? 
? ? ? 






1943 2 731 184 3 622 183 ? ? 779 134 
1944 2 185 167 6 302 367 3 567 32 797 156 
1945 2 235 i1s 7 684 499 2 810 28 733 153 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
? = unknown. 
By 1942, however, the burgeoning demand for pelagic fish and the 
requisitioning of trawlers had raised the price of inshore fish, 
making it too eKpensive for processing. In 1940, the canning 
industry was working at only 35% of its total capacity, rising 







a South African Industry with Great Possibilities" in Commerce and 
4, 5, November 1941; C. von Bonde HThe South African Fishing 
in The Annual Proceedings of the Associated Scientific and Technical 
of South Africa, 1941-1942, pp.85-87 and C. von Bonde Hour Sea 
a Gold Hine Still to be Prospected" in The Outspan, 35, 902, 9 June 
~ Own- calculations based on data contained in Union of South Africa, 
Department of Census & Statistics Census of Industrial Establishments, 1939-
1945. 
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slightly to 43,5% by 1943 26 • The trawling industry, by contrast, 
was utilising 83,4% of its available capacity in 194327. The 
latter's raw material was caught in vast quantities on the deep-
water grounds by a highly mechanised fleet, while the canners 
experienced increasing difficulty in obtaining supplies of 
inshore fish for canning~. A 1943 committee investigating the 
industry pointed out: "In general it would seem that only when 
the demands of the fresh fish traders and the curers have been 
satisfied can any fish be obtained by canneries"~. The canners 
estimated lS-llO per 100 snoek as 1 an economic price f or 
processing, but even this was less than half the ruling price in 
Cape Town that year and well below the price on the west coast, 
ensuring that the availability of snoek for canning purposes was 
restricted to: 
"[I]ndividual days when available transport is insufficient 
to remove the fish from the beaches to other centres, or 
towards the end of the season, when the demands of the curers 
have been completely satisfied, and they are making no 
further purchases"~. 
Curers paid higher prices for their fish, making it too expensive 
to process. In 1944 the SAFCC lamented the "woefully 
disappointing" wartime snoek pack, complaining that "The industry 
~ State Archives; HEN 1497, 180\1\1(1), SAFCC, HReport on the Productive 
Capacity of the South African Fish Canning Industry•, 9 October 1940 and 
HReport of the Committee appointed by the Controller of . Food Supplies to 
advise him in regard to the Canning of Fish other than Crawfish in the Union 
of South Africa•, 9 July 1943, pp.3-7. 
27 Ibid. 
~ Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of H. Abao, p.242. 
~ State Archives; HEN 1497, 180\1\1(1), HReport of the Committee 
appointed by the Controller of Food Supplies to advise him in regard to the 




was quite unable to obtain snoek at prices which were in any way 
economic; the demand for it in the fresh or dried state being 
apparently insatiable at prices which made the canning 
prohibitive" 31 • The catching of other pelagic species 
of it 
was 
similarly problematic. Seasons were unknown, crayfish boats 
unsuited to this kind of fishing, gear inefficient and fishermen 
inexperienced or unwilling to fish for the new species32• The 
industry was thus forced to rely on independent boat owners and 
fishermen to provide it with raw material, in competition with 
other producers, who drove the price of the fish up to levels at 
which it could no longer be profitably canned~. "The success of a 
fish canning industry", said the SAFCC, "depends fundamentally on 
its ability to obtain ample supplies of fish at economic 
prices"~, because 
"the cost of the fish ••• does not by any means represent 
the major portion of the cost of a can of fish and as the 
canned product must necessarily be sold at an economical 
price, the canners are unable to pay for their [fish) 
prices as high as those paid for fish which is sold as 
fresh or cured"~. 
An "economical price" was one "which will enable you to compete 
with the imported article, and of course is one which your public 
31 Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Developnent Bill, 1944, Evidence of A. Ovenstone, pp.350-352. 
32 Ibid. Also State Archives; HEN 1497, 180\1\1(1), HReport of the 
Committee appointed by the Controller of Food Supplies to advise him in regard 
to the Canning of Fish other than Crawfish in the Union of South Africa#, 9 
July 1943, pp.6-7. 
~ Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Developnent Bill, 1944, Evidence of A. Ovenstone, pp.350-352. 
~ Ibid., p.354. 
~ State Archives; HEN 1497, 180\1\1(1), #Report of the Committee 
appointed by the Controller of Food Supplies to advise him in regard to the 
Canning of Fish other than Crawfish in the Union of South Africa#, 9 July 
1943, p.10. 
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can afford to pay"~. Noting that in the pre-war period South 
African canners had had to compete with imported canned fish 
produced in countries where 
available at very low prices, 
large quantities of fish were 
the SAFCC warned that they would 
inevitably have to do so again after the war 37 • A single factory 
in Vancouver or California, it claimed, produced as much canned 
fish in a year as the entire South African industry. Large boats 
and nets ensured these factories of a regular supply of raw 
material by the ton. In South Africa, howev~r, it was 
"unthinkable" that pilchards could be caught in sufficient 
quantities to price by the ton. Catches were small and purchased 
by the bushel basket at a price of 8s per 100 lb as against 2s.6d 
per 100 lb in Vancouver~. 
The wartime demand for fish was thus increasingly incompatible 
with the continued independence of producers in the inshore 
fisheries, their ownership of the product of labour and free 
access to a range of both local and regional markets. And yet it 
was this independence which the state proposed tp . conserve and 
expand through the co-operative societies. By 1944 the co-
operative idea was pure anathema to the canning industry. Instead 
of inshore co-operatives integrated into the national fresh f i sh 
market, the industry wanted the state to expand research into t he 
pelagic fish resource, construct harbours for larger fish i ng 
vessels and provide other necessary infrastructure, to ensure 
that the wartime processing of inshore fish did not suffer t he 
same fate as similar efforts in 1914-1918. In short t he 
development of the inshore fisheries, the industry argued, should 
be linked to supplying the raw material needs of the canneries, 
~ Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of G.E. Williamson, p.385. 
TI Ibid., Evidence of A. Ovenstone, p.354. 
~ Ibid. 
250 
not competing with the trawling industry for a share of the 
finite fresh fish market. Only in this way could the wartime 
gains of the industry be con~olidated and expanded in a 
competitive post-war climate and the long-standing development of 
the inshore fisheries be achieved~. 
6.2 THE WARTIME BOOM AT ST HELENA BAY 
On the eve of the war the St Helena Bay fisheries were in the 
final stages of protracted dissolution. The canning industry was 
being undermined by its distant location from the prime crayfish 
grounds and increasing competition for r~w material with the 
frozen tail industry, while the inshore fisheries were undergoing 
a process of speeded-up stratification and attrition in the wake 
of the 1936 de facto abolition of the ETSFZ and subsequent 
widespread adoption of the lampara net. In December 1940 a 
Department of Social Welfare investigation estimated that fully 
70% of the fishing population at Berg River still lived below the 
bread-line~. With the advent of the war two related trends 
emerged: an ever-more rapid movement away from seine to lampara 
fishing and the steady movement of labour out of fishing 
altogether. As one local observer explained: 
"There was a lot of prejudice there [at St Helena Bay] for 
a long time. There were two schools, the trek-netters and 
the trawl-netters. The trawl-netters earn big money 
because they go out to sea. They have big catches as 
compared with the meagre catches of the people with tiny 
rowing boats who fish near to the shore. These two 
sections were always in conflict with one another. All the 
reports way back mention this fact. The result is that 
very often there is a sort of prejudice among them, from 
the primitive type to the better type, but once they see 
that somebody else has brought himself a motor boat and 
has got a big trawl net and that it is bringing him more 
39 Ibid., pp.349-359. 
~ State Archives; HEN 1518, 180\1\34, H.A. de Beer to the Secretary for 
Social Welfare, 9 December 1940 •. 
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broken down. And so there 
when that prejudice was 
almost a fisherman who 
money went and bought a 
money, a lot of the prejudice is 
ca~e a period just before the war 
breaking down en masse. Every month 
had borrowed or saved sufficient 
motor boat" 41 • 
The shift to lampara fishing involved a concomitant reorientation 
of the Bay fishery towards the Cape Town market and away from the 
rural rantsoenvis trade. Increased catches and oversupply made 
rantsoenvis production unprofitable and motor lorries became 
necessary adjuncts to lampara fishing, enabling owners to 
transport fish fresh to Cape Town or the small rural towns of the 
region. Alkie Theart bought a motor boat and lorry, the latter 
second-hand for llSO from a school in Moorreesburg and the former 
on credit from Jasper Visser, brother-in-law to the Smits and a 
big fish trader on the river; 
"Daar was 'n ou, ou Visser kerel, ou Jaapie Visser. Hy was 
'n harde ryk man - jy weet daardie jare. Hy't sy geld in sy 
Bybel gehou, in sy Bybel gebere ••• in die blaaie van die 
Bybel ••• En toe koop ek 'n skuit by horn vir l350, maar ek 
het nie die geld nie - al die geld nie. En ek kom en ek leen 
hier by my broer leen ek 'n lSO en ek leen by my swaer oak 
lSO en toe skuld ek nag llOO. Ek het toe die ander [llSO] het 
ek en ek skuld llOO nag toe. En hy [Visser] gee my daardie 
sander rente of iets, teken ek skuld vir 'n jaar. En binne 'n 
jaar betaal ek toe vir Jasper"~ 
John Tolken too sold his trek seine net to put a l125 down 
payment on a 3 ton Chevrolet lorry. The balance (l250) he wor k ed 
off selling fish in Cape Town, but had to borrow lS from h is 
brother for petrol on the first trip43 • Johnny Eigelaar's family 
also moved from Dwarskersbos to Laaiplek, paying llOOO fo r a · 
fishery (including land, fish houses and jetty) with l900 loaned 
41 Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of S.J. Levin, p.171. 
42i Interview with Mr Alkie Theart, Dwarskersbos, 19 July 1986. 
43 Interview with Mr John Tolken, Dwarskersbos, 17 July 1986. 
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from an uncle who farmed at Tiervlei in the Sandveld«. Johnny, 
who was still at school, lent his father a further l95, saved 
from fishing in his spare time, to buy a black Dodge lorry for 
l!Oo 45 • Theart, Tolken and the Eigelaars either owned boats or had 
family who did and were thus assured of a regular supply of fish 
for transport to the Cape, but others relied on buying from the 
boats as middlemen. Baas Wiid bought his first lorry for l120 
from his employer, fish trader Bull Waso, paying it off over 
twelve months in tlO installments%. He sold the lorry for t140 
and bought a new Chevrolet with t20 loaned (at 12% interest) from 
his wife's employer, local farmer Martin Melck~. With this lorry 
he began his own business as a fish dealer and retailer with 
shops in Moorreesburg and Porterville. 
For those without the capital or credit to become lampara owners, 
few options remained, but to continue in the old way or depart 
the Bay altogether. The shift to lampara fishing and the 
introduction of motor lorry transport created massive oversupply 
and undermined prices at the river. By 1939 the price of harder 
and maasbanker had collapsed to ls per 
better at tl.13s per 100 (vlekked) and 
100 and snoek was little 
ls.Gd for 100 mooitjies, 
with fishermen compelled to attract buyers by giving free bokkoms 
or two for the price of one in the case of snoek~. With the onset 
of the war and expansion of the armed forces, Velddrift thus had 
the highest per capita enlistment rate of any town in South 
« Interview with Hr Johnny Eigelaar, Laaiplek, 10 July 1986. 
45 Ibid. 
% Interview with Hr Baas Wiid, Velddrift, 18 July 1986. 
47 Ibid. 
~ Interviews with Hr Piet Smit, Laaiplek, 1 July 1986, Hr Dan 
Groenewald, Velddrift, 18 July 1986 and Mr Ulisse Donaggi, Velddrift, 22 July 
1986 
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Africa49 • The majority of enlistees sought to escape the grinding 
immiseration of the post-1935 years and gain a monthly 
maintenance grant for their families while they were away on 
service~. Others left to work elsewhere. Ulisse Donaggi came to 
Cape Town to fish for snoek and took work on the harbour tugs. At 
the end of the war he bought his own boat to catch snoek, but 
when the vessel was wrecked at Ysterfontein he returned to the 
Bay 51 • Abraham Tolken, recently returned from Middelburg, spent 
1941-1944 as a crayfish fisherman at Lamberts Bay 52 • Tommy Summers 
also abandoned Stephan Brothers and worked at Saldanha Bay during 
the war transporting water for the Saldanha Bay Canning Company~. 
For those who stayed, however, the war brought new and expanded 
opportunities for trade and accumulation as the burgeoning demand 
for fish in Cape Town and on the west coast gave a new lease of 
life to the river's beleaguered fishing communities. The 
requisitioning of the Union trawler fleet in 1939 created an 
expanded market for fresh fish in Cape Town which was further 
enlarged by the demand of Cape Town canners and smokers. On the 
west coast, the use of Saldanha Bay as a marshalling point for 
Allied convoys led to restrictions on fishing activities there, 
which constrained the Saldanha Bay fishermen and weakened their 
pre-war advantage over the Bay fisheries in supplying the Cape 
~ R. Lees Fishing for Fortunes, p.110. A propaganda film, HMen of 
Velddriftw was made during the war in recognition of this fact and the Berg 
River comnunity's contribution to the Allied war effort. 
~ Interview with Hrs Bertha Chilcott, Laaiplek, 3 July 1986. 
51 Interview with Hr Ulisse Donaggi, Velddrift, 22 July 1986. 
52 Interview with Hr Abraham Tolken, Velddrift, 27 July 1986. 
~ Interview with Hr TolMly Summers, St Helena Bay, 5 July 1986. 
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Town market~. Berg River thus become the centre of inshore 
fishing on the west coast, supplying Cape Town, the regional 
rantsoenvis trade and increasingly the local canning factories as 
well. 
Boat owners exploited their unique position and range of market 
opportunities to the full, manipulating supply and demand on the 
various markets. In 1944 it was reported that 2 million lbs of 
fish were sent annually from Berg River to Cape Town where it 
fetched an average of 16s 6d a bushel basket as against lls 6d on 
the west coast~. The major Cape Town demand came from fish 
processors and in 1943 Irvin and Johnson paid i22 000 to Berg 
River fishermen for maasbankers for its smokery in Maitland~. 
the catch was When the Cape Town market was over-supplied, 
directed elsewhere. As one boat and lorry owner from Berg River 
said, "You can bring quite a lot of fish [to Cape Town] before 
the prices fall. Today if the market is low, they do not bring 
the fish to Cape Town, and the ·result is that within a day or two 
the market recovers again"~. The alternative to Cape Town was the 
countryside and the rantsoenvis price doubled from 3s.6d-5s.6d a 
100 in 1939 to 8s.6d-10s.6d by 1944, due to the increased demand 
from the canneries~. In 1944 fish from Berg River was sent by 
lorry 22 miles to the Saldanha Bay canneries, 24 miles to Stephan 
Br~thers at Paternoster, and 40 miles by sea to the Lambert's Bay 
~ State Archives; HEN 1497, 180\1\1(1), HReport of the Committee 
appointed by the Controller of Food Supplies to advise him in regard to the 
Canning of Fish other than Crawfish in the Union of South AfricaH, 9 July 
1943, p.9. 
~ Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of S.J. Levin, p.153 & p.175. 
~ Ibid., Evidence of H. Abao, p.237. 
~ Ibid., Evidence of F. Tallie, p.175. 
~ Ibid., Evidence of F. Tallie, p.176 and Evidence of A.J. Smit, p.287. 
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factories 59 • The increased price of fish at Berg River was thus 
due "very largely if not wholly to the large amount taken off the 
market by the canning factories. They are canning tremendous 
quantities for military purposes, apart from the normal trade, 
and export, and that most definitely have [sic) 
price 11 60 • 
increased the 
This expanded market depended for its supplies on the increased 
productivity of lampara fishing, but the latter was constrained 
by environmental factors, the seasonal nature of the pelagic 
resource and the winter snoek season. Even during the lampara 
season prices fluctuated. At the start of the season "junior 
maasbanker" retailed at only 4s a bushel basket because they 
were small and difficult to process, producing a low grade 
product61 • As the season progressed, however, the size and quality 
of the fish improved as did the price. This rose to between 5s 
and 5s 6d for "mixed" fish (both small and large maasbankers) and 
peaked around 12s a basket once catches were of a uniform size 62 • 
The price also fluctuated on a daily basis. Each boat landed 
roughly 3-4 lorry loads of fish after a night's fishing, with t he 
first boats usually returning at around 3.00 a.m. and the last 
at noon 63 • Ther·e was thus a steady fall in price in the 
intervening nine hours. Those buyers with the longest distance to 
travel or shortest deadline bought immediately at the highest 
price, 12s a basket. As the morning wore on, however, demand 
tapered off and the last fishermen back had to take a 50% cut in 
59 Ibid., Evidence of S.J. Levin, p.154. 
60 Ibid, p.176. 
61 Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Jndustry 




price, letting their catch go for a mere 6s a basketb4. 
The wartime boom at the Bay focussed on Berg River and by 1944 
there were 66 motor boats at the river, compared to 17 a decade 
before~. With the rapid increase in the fleet after 1941, land 
for a jetty, fish house and drying racks was at a premiumM. The 
only public land available along the river was just inside the 
mouth where ten crown land lots were leased by the state to 
would-be fishery owners in addition to the private land leased 
out by Stephan Brothers and the Smit family on Laaiplek and 
Velddrift farms~. In 1941 the Department of Lands started 
charging jetty owners tl per annum rental in addition to t3 
annual rent for crown land sites and by 1944 the local Receiver 
of Revenue suggested tripling rents, "In view of the enormous 
profits which fishermen have been making during the past two 
years - and are still making"~. The main beneficiary of these 
"enormous profits" was not the state, but an emerging, petty 
bourgeois, boat-owning class which controlled both the lampara 
fishery and the Cape Town trade~. The latter provided a new 
b4 Ibid. 
~ Ibid, Evidence of S.J. Levin, p.152 and Cape Archives; PAN 16, 
A120\B\90(8), ·Return Shewing Number and Value of Vessels, Boats and Gear and 
the Number of Fishermen engaged at the Different Fishing Stations in Division 
Piketberg, Cape Province during the year ended 31 December 1934•. 
M Cape Archives; 1\PKB, 6\1\14-16 15\8\5\6-13, For correspondence on 
wartime land issues at the river. 
of 
for 
67 State Archives; 
Lands, 7 June 1943 
Social Welfare, 9 
LDE 4733, 19784\14, Secretary of Lands to the Minister 
and HEN 1518, 180\1\34, M.A. de Beer to the Secretary 
December 1940. 
~ Cape Archives; 1\PKB, 6\1\14 15\8\5\10, Receiver of Revenue Piketberg 
to the Provincial Representative Department of Lands, 23 May 1944 and 1\PKB, 
6\1\16 15\6\5 P.IA, Provincial Representative Department of Lands to the 
Secretary of the Piketberg Divisional Council, 25 March 1942. 
-
~ Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of S.J. Levin, p.152. 
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outlet for the enormous surplus catches generated by the 
introduction of the lampara net in the late 1930s. Demand peaked 
in spring and summer, tapering off during the winter snoek 
season, and turning a profit on the Cape run depended on a number 
of variables 70 • The first was tight fuel management. Petrol was 
rationed and ls coupons were issued monthly by the Magistrate at 
Piketberg bearing the registration number of the vessel or 
veh i c 1 e 71• The petrol price was controlled at 4s per gallon and 
owners received coupons according to the number and engine size 
of their lorries and motor boatsn. Many owners thus kept a second 
truck or vessel for the extra petrol allowance, all traded fish 
for coupons with local farmers and some built up their own 
private stores which they sold illegally73 • In this way most 
managed 3-8 return trips per month - a far cry from the pre-war 
days when 4-5 runs per day were not uncommon 74 • Given this fuel 
constraint, timing was also vital. The Salt River market opened 
at 5.00 am so the lorries loaded at night after the boats came in 
and set off for the Cape around 1.00-2.00 am~. Most ow n ers 
stressed the importance of being first, in order to get the best 
price, but one said he was not a fast driver out of respect for 
his vehicle and benefitted from reaching Salt River after 
70 Interview with Mr John Tolken, Dwarskersbos, 17 July 1986. 
7l Interview with Mr Alkie Theart, Dwarskersbos, 18 July 1986. 
n Ibid. 
73 Ibid. · Also Interviews with Mrs Bertha Chilcott, Laaiplek, 3 July 1986, 
Mr John Tolken, Dwarskersbos, 17 July 1986 and Mr Hendrik Brand, Velddrlft, 19 
July 1986. 
74 Interviews with Mr John Tolken, Dwarskersbos, 17 July 1986, Mr Baas 
Wild, Velddrift, 18 July 1986 and Mr Hendrik Brand, Velddrift, 19 July 1986. 
~ Interview with Mr John Tolken, Dwarskersbos, 17 July 1986. 
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everyone else had sold and left 76 • Speed led to many acc i dents as 
tired drivers negotiated the poor roads south in ageing lorries. 
Burst tires, overturning, waking up behind the wheel and runn i ng 
off the road were all commonplacen. In addition the blackout in 
Cape Town meant that lights had to be switched off at Melkbos 
and, unless the lorry had a dimmer, the vehicle had to wait there 
until sunrise~. For this reason buyers often came to Milnerton 
and even Darling to meet the incoming trucks n . Once in the Cape 
the owners attempted to sell their entire consignment to a single 
buyer, but were often forced to sell by the basket and even hawk 
it around Cape Town as far afield as Lansdowne and Hout Bay in 
search of buyers 00 • The alternative was to dump the fish or take 
it back to Berg River for salting and drying which involved a 
loss to the owner for petrol and fish because he had to pay the 
fishermen upon his return regardless of the success of the tr i p81 • 
Because of this secrecy was also essential. In Cape Town owners 
lied to one another about asking prices and undercut each other 
freely to make a sale and upon return to the river kept their 
earnings to themselves~. In this way they were able to both 
exploit the individual advantage of contacts, personality and 
salesmanship to maximum benefit and ensure that the fishermen 
76 Interviews with Mr John Tolken, Dwarskersbos, 17 July 1986, Mr Alkie 
Theart, Dwarskersbos, 18 July 1986 and Mr Baas Wiid, Velddrift, 18 July 1986. 
n Ibid. 
~ Interview with Mr Alkie Theart, Dwarskersbos, 18 July 1986. 
n Interviews with Mr John Tolken, Dwarskersbos, 17 July 1986 and Mr Baas 
Wiid, Velddrift, 18 July 1986. 
OO Ibid. Also Interview with Mr Alkie Theart, Dwarskersbos, 18 July 1986. 
81 Interviews with Mr Johnny Eigelaar, Laaiplek, 10 July 1986, Mr Alkie 
Theart, Dwarskersbos, 18 July 1986, Mr Baas Wiid, Velddrift, 18 July 1986 and 
Mr Dan Groenewald, Velddrift, 18 July 1986. 
~ Interviews with Mr John Tolken, Dwarskersbos, 17 July 1986, Mr Alkie 
Theart, Dwarskersbos, 18 July 1986 and Hr Baas Wiid, Velddrift, 18 July 1986. 
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remained ignorant of market conditions. By so doing, prices at 
the river were standardised and owners could widen their profit 
margins while lessening the risk of a failed trip. A few owners 
secured supply contracts with Cape Town processors such as the 
trawling companies and were thus assured of a ready market at a 
set price~. 
The Cape Town trade also had a trickle-down effect on the fishing 
labour force at the river. The share system in theory ensured 
that the fishermen also enjoyed the benefits of the wartime boom, 
but this was less through increased earnings than the more ready 
availability of cash. Deferral of payment, common in the interwar 
years in all the Bay fisheries, appears to have been eroded 
during the war. Because the lampara net was less environmentally 
dependent than the beach seine and the Cape Town trade was in 
fresh fish, productivity increased while the time it took to 
realise the value of the catch declined sharply. Fishermen no 
longer spent hours after each catch cleaning, salting and drying 
the fish which was sold within hours of landing rather than hung 
out on racks drying for days and even weeks before sale~. Owners 
thus began paying their men more regularly, sometimes immediately 
after returning from a trip to the Cape, and the old barter 
economy based on credit gave way to a more monetised economy. The 
average income of a Berg River fisherman reportedly rose to 
between t150 and t200 per annum by 1944 - · three to four times 
~ Cape Archives; 1\PKB, 6\1\16 15\6\5 P.1, Atlantic Smokeries to the 
Provincial Representative Department of Lands, 11 July 1944 & Station 
Commander SAP Roodebaai to the Magistrate Piketberg, 11 September 1944; 1\PKB, 
6\1\16 15\6\5 P.1A, National Trawling and Fishing Company to the Provincial 
Representative Department of Lands, 26 Hay 1945; 1\PKB, 6\1\16 15\6\13, 
Provincial Representative Department of Lands to National Trawling and Fishing 
Company, 28 June 1945 and Interview with Mr Amil Di Paola, Laaiplek, 6 July 
1986. 
~ Interviews with Messrs Willie & Gert Smeda, Laaiplek, 4 July 1986, Mr 
Hendrik Brand, Velddrift, 19 July 1986 and Hr Ulisse Donaggi, Velddrift, 22 
July 1986. 
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that reported by Luckhoff in 1936 - with skippers earning even 
more~. Luckhoff, however, only recorded the fishermen's take home 
earnings and the increase was probably less dramatic than his 
figures suggest as, instead of extended credit, labour . gained its 
first taste of a cash economy. This opened new consumption 
horisons for people accustomed to subsisting on dried fish, brown 
bread, black coffee and credit and led one observer to note with 
disapproval that: 
"Laaiplek gives one the impression that it is a newly rich 
community. All the houses are small and the people are 
very simple. Prior to the war they lived under very poor 
conditions. During some periods they did not earn a decent 
livelihood, but now the average income of an ordinary 
fisherman is anything from llSO to l250 per year. And as 
can be expected of people like that, many of them do not 
know how to use their money. As a matter of fact they 
refuse to buy suits that are ready made. It must be tailor 
made costing up to l17 per suit. If they require a hat is 
must be a stetson and it must be purchased from Phil Moss 
[a fashionable clothing shop in Cape Town] and when it 
comes to drink they are prepared to hire a lorry and pay 
l9 for it to go and get a couple of vaatjies of wine. 
Mr Carosini is a local shopkeeper and he will tell you 
that he cannot import biscuits and jams fast enough to 
meet the demand. The women folk are not interested in 
cookinj a decent meal at home. They prefer to buy tinned 
foods" • 
The Berg River community's new "wealth" stood in stark contrast 
to the factory hamlets along the Bay's southern shores where 
Stephan Brothers' monopoly of the coast and means of production 
prevented fishermen from responding to the boom. As the Coloured 
Advisory Council reported in 1944, "Being private property the 
~ Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of S.J. Levin, p.170 and DRC Archives; SKDB 
S13, 2\b\1, A.D. Luckhoff', HRapfX)rt oor die Toestande op Velddrif, Piketberg 
District#, 18 March 1936 and A.J. Wagenaar, HStatistieke re Velddrift 
Huisgesinne met AfhanklikesH ~ebruary 1936. 
~ Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of G.J. van Zyl, p.280. 
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residents cannot own their own boats and nets" 87 • There were 300 
fishermen dependent on Stephan Brothers for housing and "good 
fors" 00 • The firm used these controls to depress prices, reaping 
the benefits of the boom for itself and recovering some . of the 
ground lost during the 1930s. 
TABLE 6.4: Stephan Brothers Fish Prices c.1944 





















It is thus not surprising that the firm had to buy in fish from 
Berg River as independent boat owners abandoned crayfish fishing 
and Stephan Brothers for the more lucrative profits to be made on 
the open market~. The Advisory Council described the condition of 
labour along the Bay's southern shores as follows: 
87 Ibid., Evidence of Dr F.H. Gow, p.458. 
00 Ibid. The wGood Forsw [credit] allowed fishermen by Stephan Brothers 
varied from Ss per week at Steenbergs Cove to Bs at Paternoster. 
~ Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill, 1944, Evidence ~f Dr F.H. Gow, p.458; Evidence ot• J.F. 
Stubbs and C.H. Gaggins, pp.90-91; Evidence of S.J. Levin, p.158 & Evidence of 
F. Tallie, p.175 and State Archives; HEN 1497, 180\1\1(1), #Report of the 
Committee appointed by the Controller of Food Supplies to advise him in regard 
to the Canning of Fish other than Crawfish in the Union of South Africaw, 9 
July 1943, pp.10. 
~ Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of S.J. Levin, p.153 & p.161 and C.H. 
Gaggins, p.91 for Paternoster crayfish fishermen fishing for the Lamberts Bay 
Canning Company for 30s-33s per crate of crayfish. 
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"The housing is very bad, there are 
arrangements; water is stored in tanks in 
the summer is sold at 3d. per paraffin 
conditions regarding health and drunkenness 
and rife] exist here"~ 
no sanitary 
winter and in 
tin. Similar 
[ie. very poor 
The contrast with Berg River was stark indeed and explains the 
appeal of the Cape Town-based Trawler and Line Fishermen's Union 
(TLFU), along the southern shores of the Bay, with its call for 
higher prices and collective action~. The Stephan monopoly also 
deterred new capital from locating along the Malmesbury shores of 
the Bay as they preferred Berg River where the open market 
promised a ready supply of raw material. Between 1942 and 1944 
two new companies, one owned by incipient Afrikaner capital and 
the other by Irvin and Johnson, established factories at Berg 
River to process pelagic fish. Both attempted to incorporate the 
primary producers into a dependent relationship as suppliers of 
raw material for factory production. The state, for its part, was 
also intent on using Berg River as a testing ground for co-
operation. These various attempts to control the primary 
producer's access to the market heralded a new phase in the 
history of the Bay fisheries. 
In January 1942 Marine Products was formed in Cape Town~. The 
main shareholders in the new company were a local firm, Jameson 
Welding and Engineering Works and the emergent Afrikaner 
91 Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of Dr F.H. Gow, p.458. 
~ TLFU Archives; HHaritime Union of South Africa: General Secretary's 
Report to the ConferenceH, 4 January 1944, pp.4-5. 
93 State Archives; HEN 1518, 180\1\32, Marine Products to the Secretary 
for Social Welfare, 29 January 1943. 
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financial corporation, Federale Volks Beleggings 94 • Jamesons used 
the knowledge acquired erecting a vitamin oil plant for Irvin and 
Johnson in 1938 to enter the industry in its own right~. It soon 
diversified into inshore fishing, reconnoitring the coast between 
Mossel Bay and Still Bay and acquired options on land at Gansbaai 
and Hermanus 96 • After experimental fishing at St Helena Bay, 
however, it. decided on Berg River as providing the "most stable 
and consistent conditions for the development of an intensive 
industry" because of the large number of private fishing boats 
and their "embrace" of a fishing area rich in pelagic fish, 
especially pilchard97 • Jamesons attempted to secure a crown land 
site at the river mouth with the aim of salting, smoking and 
packing pilchard on a 
industry~. Lacking the 
scale similar to 
requisite capital, 
the British herring 
however, it entered 
into partnership with Federale Volks Beleggings. The latter was 
94 D. O'Meara Volkskapitalisme, (Johannesburg, 1983), 
Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the 
Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of P.E. Rosseau, p.286. 
pp.192-193 and 
Fishing Industry 
~ R. Lees Fishing for Fortunes, pp.106-107; Report of the Select 
Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry Development Bill, 1944, 
Evidence of P.E. Rosseau and F.C. Jameson, pp.272-273 & 278-280 and State 
Archives; HEN 1518, 180\1\34, Secretary of Commerce and Industries to the 
Minister forwarding letter from Concerta Ltd to Dr L. Brown, 22 June 1943, 
intercepted by wartime censor. 
9b Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of P.E. Rosseau and F.C. Jameson, pp.278-280 
and State Archives; HEN 1518, 180\1\32, Marine Products to the Secretary for 
Social Welfare, 29 January 1943. 
~ State Archives; HEN 1518, 180\1\32, Marine Products to the Secr-etary 
for Social Welfare, 29 January 1943 and HEN 1538, 180\2\1(2), Jameson Welding 
and Engineering Works to C. Von Bonde, n.d. 
~ State Archives; HEN 1538, 180\2\1(2), Jameson Welding and Engineering 
Works to the Secretary f9r Lands, 20 August 1941; Provincial Representative 
Department of Lands to the Secretary for Commerce and Industries, 29 August 
1941, Secretary for Commerce and Industries to the Provincial Representative 
Department of Lands, ? August 1941, Provincial Representative Department of 
Lands to Jameson Welding and Engineering Works, 18 September 1941 and Jameson 
Welding and Engineering Works to C. Von Bonde, n.d. 
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formed in October 1940 after the 1939 Ekonomiese Volkskongres, 
with the aim of establishing Afrikaner businesses in commerce and 
industry by taking shares in appropriate undertakings~. 
In September 1942 Marine Products began negotiations with the 
Industrial Development Corporation (!DC) for funding to float the 
Berg River Mouth Development Company, but the IDC withdrew 1~ 
Unable to acquire a crown land site on suitable terms, Marine 
Products purchased Laaiplek farm from Stephan Brothers in October 
1942 and registered a new company in November, Laaiplek 
Fisheries, with a starting capital of i. 50 000 101• Inc 1 uded in the 
150 shareholders were the Smit family and local merchant, 
Carosini, while Marine Products held a two-thirds majority 
by way of interlocking interest and exercised control 
directoratesW! Laaiplek Fisheries began production in May 1943, 
concentrating on rantsoenvis and in September received permission 
to erect a canning factory 1~ Other concerns were also eyeing 
Berg River with interest by 1941. The growing wartime demand for 
canned fish prompted the trawling giant Irvin and Johnson also to 
diversify into inshore fishing. Its Cape Town cannery processed 
mainly stockfish, but it was aware of the availability of inshore 
~ D. O'Heara Volkskapitalisme, pp.191-194. 
!OO Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of P.E. Rosseau, p.288 and State Archives; 
HEN 1518, 180\1\32, Marine Products to the Secretary for Social Welfare, 29 
January 1943. 
101 Ibid., pp.285-286. Also State Archives; HEN 1518, 180\1\32, Marine 
Products to the Secretary for Social Welfare, 29 January 1943. 
!02 R. Lees Fishing for Fortunes, p.123; Report of the Select Committee on 
the subject of the Fishing Industry Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of P.E. 
Rosseau, p.285-286 and· State Archives; SES F1900\(A)\(C)\05, Prospectus of 
Marine Products Corporation of Africa Ltd, 15 June 1950. 
!OJ Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of P.E. Rosseau, p.283 and State Archives; 
HEN 1518, 180\1\34, P.E. Rosseau to C. Von Bonde, 13 September 1943. 
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fish at St Helena Bay through purchases of maasbankers to feed 
its Maitland smokery 1~ In 1943 it despatched one of its chemists 
to America to investigate inshore fishing methods and applied for 
crown land at Berg River 1~ In June 1943 managing director, 
Herbert Abao, visited the river as part of a government committee 
and, after discussions with local fishermen and boat owners, 
began pushing for a canning factory and smokery at Velddrift, 
with facilities for the production of by-products such as fish 
meal, oil and fertilizer 1~ Priority certificates were arran ged 
for the importation of new plant and in July 1943 Irvin and 
Johnson purchased a portion of Velddrift farm from the Smit 
family 1~ Two months later it formed a subsidiary, African 
Inshore Fishing Development Corporation, but only commenced 
production at Berg River in July 1944 1~ In the interim it 
continued to purchase fish at the river for its Cape Town 
factories. 
Both Laaiplek Fisheries and African Inshore Fisheries sought to 
harness the primary producers to factory production, although 
well aware of "the different temperament of the average inshore 
fisherman who is an individualist and not a good co-operator" 1~ 
l04 Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of H. Abao, p.237. 
105 Ibid, p.239. 
106 Ibid., pp.239-240. 
lO? Ibid. Also State Archives; HEN 1518, 180\1 \34, Secretary of Commerce 
and Industries to the Minister forwarding letter from Concerta Ltd to Dr L. 
Brown, 22 June 1943, intercepted by wartime censor. 
1~ R. Lees Fishing for Fortunes, p.109; Report of the Select Committee on 
the subject of the Fishing Industry Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of H. 
Abao, p.240 and State Archives; BVE 251, N9\1, Irvin and Johnson (South 
Africa) Ltd, Report of the Directors, 1944-1945. 
1~ Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of P.E. Rosseau, p.274 & p.288. 
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The wartime prosperity of the Berg River fisheries was 
conditional upon their independence from outside control and free 
e~try to the market, allowing owners to manipulate supply and 
demand in their favour. This autonomy was dependent on access to 
land readily available before 1942 on the crown reserve at the 
river mouth or one of the farms 11~ With the sale of Laaiplek farm 
and a large portion of Velddrift in 1942-43, however, numerous 
boat owners and fishermen found themselves with new landlords who 
were more interested in appropriating the product of their labour 
than their ground rents. In seeking to tie the inshore fishermen 
to factory production, capital was able to use its land ownership 
to incorporate the primary producers into factory production as 
raw material suppliers. Both Laaiplek and African Inshore 
Fisheries embarked on housing construction programmes soon after 
acquiring their land. Laaiplek Fisheries presented its housing 
scheme as a commitment to building a "happy community" 11 ~ The 
majority of Laaiplek farm's 500-600 strong coloured population 
lived in wood and iron houses or tin shacks, most of which were 
in a bad state of disrepair 11~ Laaiplek Fisheri~s invested 10% of 
its starting capital in the construction of 29 cement block 
houses between October 1942 and March 1944 moving families out of 
the old wood and iron structures and demolishing the latter 11~ 
The company charged no rent, but limited occupation to company 
l!O State Archives; HEN 1518, 180\1\34, M.A. de Beer to the Secretary for 
Social Welfare, 9 December 1940. 
Ill Report of the Select Committee on 
D __ e_v_e_l_o_p_me~n_t~B_1_·1_1~,.__~1_9_4_4, Evidence of H. 
Rosseau, p.273. 
the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Abao, p.241 and Evidence of P.E. 
1!2 Ibid., Evidence of P.E. Rosseau and G.J. van Zyl, pp.276-277 and 
Evidence of A.J. Smit, P.E. Rosseau and G.J. van Zyl, pp.284-285. 
113 Ibid., Evidence of P.E. Rosseau and G.J. van Zyl, pp.276-277; Evidence 
of S.J. Levin, p.176 and Evidence of A.J. Smit, p.284. 
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employees 11~ It also engaged in incipient social engineering, 
setting out separate "coloured" and 
the nucleus of 29 houses forming the 
"European" townships, with 
core of the former 11~ This 
was reinforced by different tenure systems in the two townships, 
with coloured housing for rent only, but whites encouraged to buy 
their plots. In March 1944 it reported 70 plots had already been 
sold 11~ Laai pl ek Fi sher i es was eager to expand its housing scheme 
and applied for funding from the Housing Board to construct an 
additional 30-40 houses in the "coloured township" as well as 
housing for its white employees and tenants 11~ 
Whatever Laaiplek Fisheries' claims, the local boat owners were 
deeply suspicious of its motives. While acknowledging that the 
new housing was an improvement, 
Levin, warned that: 
their legal representative, 
"One must always 
a direct return. 
putting ufi these 
fishermen" 18 • 
take it that they [Laaiplek Fisheries] want 
It is not only altruism and I infer by 
houses they want to have a hold on the 
Given the high enlistment rate in the army, the labour supply was 
tight along the river by the early 1940s and boat owners were not 
in a position to compete with Laaiplek Fisheries' housing to 
attract fishermen. Such fears were reinforced by the ensuing 
squabble over a liquor licence at Berg River. No licence had been 
granted prior to 1939 and liquor was provided by local farmers or 
114 Ibid., Evidence of A.J. Smit, P.E. Rosseau and G.J. van Zyl, pp.284-
285. 
llS Ibid., Evidence of G.J. van Zyl, p.293. 
116 Ibid., Evidence of P.E. Rosseau, pp.272-273 and Evidence of G.J. van 
Zyl, p.293. 
117 Ibid., Evidence of P.E. Rosseau, pp.272-273 and 276. 
118 72 Ibid., Evidence of S.J. Levin, p.1 • 
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smuggled in by hawkers 11~ Despite this, all sides were unanimous 
the "coloured" fishing that drunkenness was rife amongst 
community at the river 120• Boat owners, however, rejected company 
claims that a licence was necessary to control workers' access to 
alcohol, claiming that, "It is a remunerative business apart from 
other aspects", particular 1 y the "co 1 cured" trade 121• The 
companies took a different view, although this was not without 
its contradictions. One Laaiplek director, G. van Zyl, claimed 
that African Inshore Fisheries, the loser in the contest for a 
liquor licence, was using the fact - that his company had been 
1"" awarded a licence against it in the community-~ 
"They also interested themselves in the application for a 
licence but the application was refused and now they are 
inclined to use the fact that we have got a licence 
against us by stating that we are out to exploit the 
people" 123 
Van Zyl categorically denied his company was interested in the 
llOOO per annum to be made from liquor sales to the fishermen. 
Rather, possession of the licence was part of its attempt to 
build a "happy community" and was obtained "purposely with the 
intention of trying to control the sale of drink to these 
people" 1~ Van Zyl had no doubt that such control was necessary, 
for the fishermen "When they get hold of liquor ••• generally 
consumed [it] in one night" 1~ Attempts to control access to 
119 Ibid., pp.178-180. 
120 Ibid., p.178; Evidence of G.J van Zyl, A.J. Smit and P.E. Rousseau, 
pp.280-282 and Evidence of Dr. F.H. Gow, pp.453-461. 
121 Ibid., Evidence of S.J. Levin, p.178. 
122 Ibid., Evidence of G.J. van Zyl, p.281. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid., pp.280-281. 
125 Ibid., p.280. 
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alcohol in co-operation with the local store owner proved futile 
becau~e there was another store at Velddrift 1~ The company thus 
had no alternative but to control the sale of alcohol itself 
means of a licence 1~ Laaiplek Fisheries' concern, however, 
by 
was 
more than philanthropic. One of Van Zyl's co-directors alleged 
that at least once or twice a month a boat was unable to put to 
sea on account of the crew being drunk 1~ Thus the disruptive 
effect of liquor on production was also a motive behind the 
company's acquisition of a licence. Van Zyl himself made the 
connection when he said, "It will be against our own interest to 
sell liquor in excess quantities because we want the fishermen to 
catch fish and work in our factory"!~ The local petty 
bourgeoisie's interests coincided with Laaiplek Fisheries ' in 
this regard. Indeed private boat owners were major suppliers of 
liquor to their crews, keeping large quantities on tap for 
limited distribution at weekends and more liberally at the end of 
the season when shares were paid out and accounts settled 1~ 
Thus, as with housing, the boat owners were less opposed to the 
control of alcohol than the fact that the company ~as exercising 
it and wresting yet another key labour recruitment and control 
device from their grasp. 
Underlying Laaiplek Fisheries' housing and liquor control 
initiatives and informing its notion of a "happy community" was 
the need to create a settled industrial 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid. 
1~ Ibid., Evidence of A.J. Smit, p.281. 
1~ Ibid., Evidence of G.J. van Zyl, p.281. 
labour force, be~t 
1~ See for example Interviews with Messrs Willie & Gert Smeda, Laaiplek, 
4 July 1986 and Hr Ulisse Donaggi, Velddrift, 22 July 1986. 
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defined in Van Zyl's own words as "orderly"!~ Orderliness began 
at home with a stable domestic life. Hence the company's concern 
with what it perceived to be the two main threats to such 
stability, poor housing and alcohol abuse. Its concern, however, 
extended to encompass consumption as well. Noting that some women 
were not interested in cooking, baking bread and other domestic 
responsibilities and that children were often improperly fed as a 
consequence, Laaiplek Fisheries launched several initiatives to 
encourage correct consumption habits 1~ It arranged for the local 
store to sell flour, cooking fat, bread, milk, meat and fire-wood 
on a non-profit basis 1~ For its own part, it provided fresh 
water free of charge and announced plans to set up a soup kitchen 
and a bakery, provide its factory workers with a midday meal and 
allow female workers to buy meals for their children 1~ The 
results were very encouraging, with orderliness, house pride and 
an improved outlook everywhere in evidence. As one director, 
A.J. Smit, said, "I can take anybody into those [company) houses 
and they will find them clean and tidy. We make them realise that 
they have to look after their homes" 1~ If domestic pride and 
correct consumption habits were easy lessons to teach, respect 
for the production cycle of would-be industrial capital and 
submission to its work regime was far more difficult to inculcate 
and as traumatic for the fishermen to accept. Laaiplek Fisheries 
was a stern taskmaster, 
stubborn. 
but its recalcitrant pupils were equally 
131 Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of G.J. van Zyl, p.282. 
132 Ibid., p.281. 
133 Ibid., pp.280 and 291. 
134 Ibid., p.281 and Evidence of A.J. Smit, p.285. 
135 Ibid., Evidence of A.J. Smit, p.282. 
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The factory was initially geared to producing rantsoenvis for the 
rural market 1~ In addition to demolishing the fish houses of all 
competitors on the farm to make way for its factory, Laaiplek 
Fisheries mechanised production, enabling it to handle larger 
quantities in a shorter time. Mechanisation, however~ was 
extremely primitive. Lees, referring to "homespun attempts at 
mechanisation", describes "A machine for cutting heads off the 
fish designed out of bicycle tyres and other 13"' parts" ' 1• 
Experiments were also made to improving curing methods by 
mechanically cleaning and partially curing the fish. The most 
important refinement was the removal of the fish head, previously 
pickled and dried, before process ing 1~ The company began 
"educating" farmers to buy rantsoenvis without the head and so 
retained approximately 25% of the weight of the catch, containing 
the highest oil content for its own use 139• Initially the heads 
and other offal were buried, but the wartime demand for fish by-
a more profitable waste disposal products soon presented 
solution, meal production 1~ The problem was again plant, but for 
a company boasting a biochemist, food technologist, chemical 
engineer and two chemists, innovation was no problem and on 
1 March 1944 the company's new fish meal 
operation 14\ 
1~ Ibid., Evidence of G.J. van Zyl, pp.286-287. 
lTI R. Lees Fishing for- Fortunes, p.123. 
"plant" went into 
!38 Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of P.E. Rousseau, p.287. 
139 Ibid. 
140 R. Lees Fishing 
on the subject of the 
P.E. Rousseau, p.287. 
for Fortunes, p.122 and Report of the Select Committee 
Fishing Industry Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of 
141 Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of P.E. Rousseau, p.289. 
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"It was improvised using an old grape press, the back-axle 
of a motor-car, bicycle chains and belts of all 
descriptions. Both the cooker which was coal fired, and 
the press were on a platform above the plant, but the 
drier was at ground level. The press was tiny and the 
cooker liable to boil over unexpectedly with some risk to 
anyone working down below. They called it a 1-ton-an-hour 
plant and they were very pleased if they got two-thirds of 
a ton through it in an hour" 1~ 
Laaiplek Fisheries' claim to conduct inshore fishing on an 
"industrial basis" must thus be seen in the context of its 
"homespun" and inefficient plant and machinery. The factory was 
not only susceptible to frequent mechanical breakdowns, but also 
solely dependent on local fishermen for its raw material. Never 
intending to fish itself, it bought on the local market in 
competition with Cape Town buyers, local hawkers and canning 
company representa~ives 1~ This arrangement worked satisfactorily 
until the end of 1943, with seasonal and daily fluctuations in 
price enabling it to obtain sufficient fish for its factory and 
lower the retail price of rantsoenvis to the farmers from 25s a 
100 in 1943 to 10s 6d a 100 for big bokkoms and 8s 6d for normal-
sized fish by 1944 1~ The company ascribed the lower consumer 
price, with no concomitant decrease in the cost of raw material, 
to improved methods of handling and distribution 1~ This period 
of successful market "articulation" of petty commodity and 
nascent industrial production was short-lived, however, as 
1~ R. Lees Fishing for Fortunes, pp.122-123. 
143 Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of P.E. Rousseau, pp.275-276 and State 
Archives; HEN 1518, 180\1\32, Marine Products to the Secretary for Social 
Welfare, 29 January 1943. 
144 Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of P.E. Rousseau and A.J. Smit, pp.286-287. 
145 
p.167. 
Ibid., Evidence of G.J. van Zyl, p.287 and Evidence of F. Tallie, 
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competition for raw material increased, forcing Laaiplek 
Fisheries to try and subordinate the fishermen to the demands of 
factory production more directly. 
New demand and growing competition for fish emanated from a 
variety of sources. Laaiplek Fisheries itself was diversifying 
away from rantsoenvis production into canning and fish meal by 
late 1942, requiring larger quantities of fish at a cheaper pr.ice 
in order to be profitable 1~ Other canning companies at Saldanha 
Bay, St Helena Bay and Lambert's Bay were doing likewise and 
drawing on the Berg River fisheries to supply them with raw 
material 1~ Then in July 1943 Irvin and Johnson purchased land at 
the river for its own factory. In September the managing director 
of Marine Products, P.E. Rousseau, protested against what he 
calle~ "nothing more than an attempt to embarrass our company"!~ 
He claimed there was room for only one factory at Berg River and 
Irvin and Johnson, although long familiar with conditions along 
the west coast, had never entered inshore fishing until now, when 
it acquired land right next to Laaiplek Fisheries after earlier 
refusing an offer from Marine Products to supply its Cape Town 
factories with raw material 1~ Irvin and Johnson's aim was to 
compete with Laaiplek Fisheries, Rousseau alleged, adding "their 
representatives have openly stated that they are out to destroy 
our business" 1~ He thus appealed to the state to prevent 
!% Ibid., Evidence of P.E. Rousseau, pp.296-297. 
147 See R. Lees Fishing for Fortunes, p.105 ff and Union of South Africa 
Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
D __ e_ve_l_o-p_me __ n_t __ B_i_l_l_, __ 1_9_4_4, Evidence of S.J. Levin, pp.153-154. 
1~ State Archives; HEN 1518, 180\1\34, P.E. Rousseau to C. Von Bonde, 13 
September 1943. 
149 Ibid. 
1~ Ibid. Also HEN 1518, 180\1\34, Secretary of Commerce and Industries to 
the Minister forwarding letter from Concerts Ltd to Dr L. Brown, 22 June 1943, 
intercepted by wartime censor. 
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"unnecessary duplication of effort and increase in production 
cost which is bound to happen if new developments at Berg River 
Mouth are given free reign" 15t Marine Products' protestations 
fell on deaf ears and its hostility to the new venture was not 
shared by the primary producers. They looked forward to increased 
competition for fish on the Berg River market and correspondingly 
higher prices for their catches. As Van Zyl said, "If they [ Irvin 
and Johnson] erect a factory it will force the price of fish up 
as the supply will be smaller than the demand" !~ 
Laaiplek Fisheries' options were severely limited in meeting the 
challenge posed by African Inshore Fisheries as Irvin and Johnson 
had the capital to equip and supply a more efficient factory than 
their own "homespun" affair 1~ The one option was to transfer its 
shark fleet from Kalk Bay, but this meant jeopardising vitamin 
oil production in Cape Town 1~ It is also doubtful whether the 
Kalk Bay fleet would have been able to produce maasbankers at a 
"lower cost" than Laaiplek Fisheries could buy them on the open 
market, as Van Zyl claimed 1~ Buying from the locals still 
remained the preferable alternative, as Rousseau pointed out: 
"We went there [to Berg River] with the idea of buying 
fish from the fishermen ••• We thought that by letting the 
fishermen fish for us it would save us a great deal of 
trouble; we would have no worry, and as long as they 
151 State Archives; HEN 1518, 180\1\34, P.E. Rousseau to C. Von Bonde, 13 
September 1943. 
152 Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Indust~y 
Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of G.J. van Zyl, p.286. 
153 Ibid., p.285. 
1~ Ibid., Evidence of P.E. Rousseau, p.286 and Evidence of P.E. Rousseau 
and F.C. Jameson, pp.289-290. 
1~ Ibid., Evidence of G.J. van Zyl, p.286. Pelagic fishing required skill 
in using a lampara net and a good working knowledge of local conditions and it 
would have taken the company boats some time to acquire the necessary 
experience to be able to operate efficiently. 
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fished without exploiting us we would be prepared to let them . 156 
carry on in that way" 
By the end of 1943, however, Laaiplek Fisheries was feeling ever 
more vulnerable and "exploited". Not only were Irvin and Johnson 
buying large quantities of fish at Berg River, but African 
Inshore Fisheries had begun work on its new factory up-river and 
the prospect of a future rise in the price of raw material loomed 
large in the minds of the Laaiplek Fisheries directors. With no 
other alternative, they thus sought to fundamentally alter 
relations of production with the fishermen, forcing t h ose 
resident on company land to sell their catches only to the 
company, at a lower than market price. To this end the com p any 
used its ownership of both the land and houses. Asked about the 
relationship between the fishermen tenants and companies in 19 44, 
African Inshore Fisheries managing director, Abao, said: 
"I think you will admit ••• that it would only be fair i n 
regard to people who come to live there [on company land] i n 
future and for whom we provide houses that we should make i t 
a condition of their staying there that they co~operate wi t h 
the company" 157 • 
Housing was thus seen by capital as a legitimate lever with which 
to obtain "co-operation" from the fishermen who, both companies 
agreed, were ill-disposed to give such co-operation voluntar i ly. 
As early as January 1943, Laaiplek Fisheries attempted to induce 
the fishermen to sell directly to it. At a meeting at Velddrift 
Van Zyl tried to negotiate contracts for the delivery of fish to 
the Laaiplek factory by intimating that the company was a 
government concern and claiming that "all fish will ultimately 
156 Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bille 1944, Evidence of P.E. Rousseau, pp.275-276. 
157 Ibid., Evidence of H. Abao, p.241. 
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flow through (its] ••• hands" 151!. He demanded and obtained the 
books of a local 
over under the 
off i c i a 1 159• Van 
fish dealer, whose representative handed them 
impression that 
Zyl also tried to 




support the company's application for crown land and promised to 
assist those who only delivered fish to his factory 1~ Van Zyl's 
deceitful bullying achieved little. No boat owners or fishermen 
were prepared to bind themselves contractually to one compa~y 
when the demand on the open market assured them of a higher price 
for their catch. 
By the end of 1943, however, Laaiplek Fisheries was desperate and 
also possessed a new hold over the fishermen, land and housing. 
In March 1944 Van Zyl informed boat owners and fishermen resident 
on company land that in future they would be forbidden to sell 
their fish on the open market and would have to sign a contract 
to deliver it to the factory at 6s.6d per crate, 5s less than the 
ruling market price 161• No reference was made to punitive 
measures, but this was understood to be implicit, as the case of 
Fernando Tallie makes clear. Tallie, a long-time resident of 
Laaiplek, did well for himself during the war. In 1944 he lived 
at Laaiplek in a house rented from the company and initially 
conducted his fishing business there as well, until his fish 
store was demolished to make way for the new factory 1~ He then 
moved his fishery to a crown land site leased from the state for 
158 State Archives; HEN 1518, 180\1\32, J.C. Bodenstein to F.P. Spooner, 
24 February 1943. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Ibid. 
lb! Ref'Ort of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of S.J. Levin, p.158. 
162 Ibid., p.159. 
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163 l4 per annum. Laaiplek Fisheries' ar~ival brought other changes 
as well. The price of rantsoenvis increased, according to Tallie, 
from Ss-Bs a 100 to more than 10s and the company prohibited 
production of rantsoenvis on its land, demolishing all private 
fish houses 16~ Forced to carry on his fishery on crown land, he 
found even this avenue closed to him by Van Zyl's March 1944 
announcement. He agreed to sign a two-month contract on the 
latter's terms because, as he explained, "I do not want to insult 
the man because I am on his ground" 165• He had since been 
forbidden to load his lorry with fish to transport to Cape Town 
and vehemently rejected any suggestion that the Ss reductio n in 
price was merely rent for the company house. 
Levin, said: 
As his lawyer, 
"Mr Tallie is paying rent for his own place 
the price reduction], and he is continuing 
virtue of the fact that they are occupying 
houses they are getting lower prices" 1~ 
in addition [to 
to pay rent. By 
these [company] 
The reason, Levin suggested, was rather that the ruling price of 
lls 6d was not "economic" for Laaiplek Fisheries 1~ It was thus 
making use of "the power it can wield by reason of the land it 
owns" to drive down the price and bind the fishermen to supplying 
its needs alone 1~ Laaiplek Fisheries, however, denied Tallie's 
allegations and attributed the drop in price to a fall-off in 
163 Ibid., Evidence of F. Tallie, p.167. 
164 Ibid., pp.167-168 and Evidence of F. 
165 Ibid., Evidence of F. Tallie, p.166. 
I~ Ibid., Evidence of S.J. Levin, p.172. 
lb? Ibid. 
168 Ibid., pp.173-174. 
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Tallie and S.J. Levin, p.159. 
demand and a decline in the market price 1~ Its tenants could 
sell to anyone and even load lorries at its jetty, except hawkers 
who distributed the company's rantsoenvis. The latter were only 
allowed to load a limited quantity of fresh fish to prevent 
competing with the company 1~ Laaiplek Fisheries itself bought 
them 
on 
the open market at the ruling price and did not contract for i ts 
raw material. Besides, the company pointed out, it was imposs i b l e 
to impose a contract price on its tenants, because both the boat 
owners resident at Laaiplek had crown land sites 171• Rather, it 
ventured, fishermen preferred to sell to the company because of 
i ts large jetty 172 Despite the denials, it is unlikely that 
Tallie, a company tenant, would jeopardise his position by making 
unfounded allegations in public. His disclosures, however, were 
an acute embarrassment to the company, tarnishing its carefully 
cultivated image of a group of benevolent entrepreneurs with the 
best interests of the community at heart, 
circumstances denial was the best defence. 
and under the 
Away from the public eye, however, Laaiplek Fisheries intensified 
attempts to bind the fishermen to supplying its raw material 
needs at below-market prices. To this end it attacked the open 
market, querying the legality of trading on crown land and the 
subletting of leases 1~ It alleged that state tenants not only 
bought fish from other fishermen for resale, but frequently acted 
as agents for Cape Town buyers. The result was that "(hulle) sake 
169 Ibid., Evidence of P.E. Rousseau and A.J. Smit, pp.275-276 & 283 and 
Evidence of P.E. Rousseau, A.J. Smit .and G.J. van Zyl, p.293. 
170 Ibid., Evidence of P.E. Rousseau, A.J. Smit and G.J. van Zyl, p.293. 
171 Ibid., Evidence of P.E. Rousseau and A.J. Smit, pp.275-276 & 283 and 
Evidence of P.E. Rousseau, A.J. Smit and G.J. van Zyl, p.293. 
l72 Ibid. 
In Cape Archives; 1\PKB, 6\1\15, 15\8\5\15, Laaiplek Fisheries to the 
Magistrate Piketberg, 26 & 28 June 1944. 
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moeilik maak vir die besigheid [Laaiplek Fisheries] wat op groat 
omset staatmaak. Op die manier word die minder lonende handel 
[rantsoenvis] aan die grater besigheid gelaat wat dan kwalik sy 
bestaan kan regverdig" 1~ The company thus requested thw local 
magistrate to put an end to the practice. As a result, the 
Department of Lands inserted a clause into contracts with i ts 
crown land tenants in 1945 stipulating that: 
"No person other than the Lessee shall, while on the site ••. 
or any jetty abutting •.•• request, solicit or invite a n y 
person who may be conveying fish on the Berg River to sell o r 
deliver to him the said fish or any portion thereof. The 
Lessee should take all reasonable steps to ensure that th i s 
condition is not infringed" 175 • 
In the absence of effective policing this was a purely token 
gesture. It is doubtful whether Tallie paid any heed and the open 
market remained until the end of the war. Laaiplek Fisher i es' 
lack of success was due to a number of factors, the most 
important of which was the wartime importance of the open market 
at the river for other concerns, especially the Cape Town 
trawling companies and the canning industry. In this context, the 
appeals, protestations and ambitions of a small Afrikaner company 
were largely ignored. Laaiplek Fisheries' problems, however, were 
not unique and canners in general began to encounter ever-more 
serious barriers to expansion by 1944 as a result of their 
enforced reliance on inshore fishing for raw material 1~ State 
acti'vity, in this regard, was limited by wartime financial 
constraints, the requisitioning of its research vessel for 
seaward defence purposes and the loss of personnel and increased 
174 Ibid. 
175 Cape Archives; 1\PKB, 6\1\14, 15\8\5\10, Provincial Representative 
Departrrent of Lands to the Receiver of Revenue Piketberg, 1 June 1945. 
176 Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Developrrent Bill, 1944, Evidence of A. Ovenstone representing SAFCC, pp.349-
359. 
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administrative duties of the Department of Commerce and 
Industries 1~ More importantly, Pretoria was still wedded to co-
operation as the solution to the inshore fisheries' problems. 
This blinded it to the wartime articulation of canning and 
inshore fishing and was directly contrary to the interests of the 
canning industry, with its aim of higher fish prices for primary 
producers. 
6.3 CO-OPERATIVES VERSUS CANNERIES 
The Sea Fisheries 
Improvement Areas 
Act made provision for Fish Marketing 
(FMIAs) as the base for co-operatives 1~ The 
state, however, had no idea how such co-operatives would operate 
in practice. Its models were European and American where 
industrialisation created a massive demand for fish at a constant 
price as raw material in factory production 1~ No such demand 
eKisted in the Union and the state thus looked to integrate the 
inshore fisheries into the national fresh fish market. The 
economics of co-operation were also fused with social welfare 
concerns about increasing poor whiteism in the inshore fisheries 
by the late 1930s. Attention thus focussed on those fisheries 
where white fishermen predominated, such as Berg River and 
177 Union of South Africa House of Assembly Debates, vol.47, January-March 
1944, col.511; Division of Sea Fisheries 19th Annual Report for the year ended 
December 1947 in Commerce and Industry, 7, 8, April 1949 and State Archives; 
HEN 1497, 180\1\1(1), HReport of the Committee appointed by the Controller of 
Food Supplies to advise him in regard to the Canning of Fish other than 
Crawfish in the Union of South Africa#, 9 July 1943, p.14. 
1~ Report of the Select Committee on the Subject of the Sea Fisheries 
Bill, 1939, Evidence of E.P. Smith, F.P. Spooner and C. von Bonde, pp.1-6, 15-
31 & 82-83; Union of South Africa, Department of Commerce and Industries 
Report of the Rural Industries Commission, 1940 [U.G.27\1940], pp.50-58; Union 
of South Africa House of. Assembly Debates vol.38, 1940, cols.3692-3699, 3702-
3737 & 3744 and Union of South Africa Extraordinary Government Gazette 
No.2749, 10 April 1940, Sea Fisheries Act, Act No.10 of 1940. 
1~ Report of the Select Committee on the Subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill, Evidence of C. von Bonde, pp.27-56. 
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Gansbaai on the southern Cape coast, and looked to co-operatives 
to uplift this sector of the white population in much the same 
way job 
industry 
colour bars and civilised labour 
during the inter-war years 1~ 
policies had don e 
In Apr i l 1941 
in 
the 
Department of Commerce and Industries recommended Velddrift as a 
site for the establishment of one of eight local co-operatives lS~ 
In October, the Department of Social Welfare's Controller of 
Settlements, J.C. Bodenstein, also proposed a pilot co-operative 
at Berg River to test the viability of a larger welfare scheme 
for fishermen 1~ Berg River thus became the designated testing 
ground for the state's co-operative plans during the war and by 
the end of 1941, the Departments of Commerce and Industries and 
Social Welfare were collaborating on refining their ideas 1~ At 
the Treasury's behest, control was vested with the former and the 
emphasis placed on reorganising the inshore fisheries a s a 
whole 1~ In July 1942 a joint proposal was submitted to the 
Minister of Commerce and Industries calling for the establishment 
of a state-controlled Public Utility Company (PUC) with a cap i tal 
180 Union of South Africa Report of the Commission of Inquiry regarding 
the Cape Coloured Population of the Union, 1937, pp.79-80 and Union of South 
Africa Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of the Coloured Advisory Council, pp.453-469 
for attempts to foster a similar state concern for the declining lot of 
coloured fishermen during the late 1930s and Second World War. 
181 State Archives; HEN 1518, 180\1\32, Secretary for Commerce and 
Industries to the Minister, .2 October 1940, Booklet HThe Co-operative Movement 
Arrong South African FishermenH, n.d. and HReport of the Departmental Committee 
Appointed to Investigate and Report Upon the Organisation of the Inshore 
Fishing IndustryH, April 1941. 
1~ State Archives; HEN 1518, 180\1\34, J.C. Bodenstein HVoorgestelde 
Skerna vir Behoeftige Vissers: VelddriftH, n.d. 
183 State Archives; HEN 1518, 180\1\34, J.C. Bodenstein to the Secretary 
for Social Welfare, October 1941. 
1~ State Archives; HEN 1518, 180\1\34, Secretary for Finance to the 
Secretary for Social Welfare, 5 December 1941, #Notes on the Proposed Scheme 
for the Reorganisation of the Fishing Industry", n.d. and Secretary for 
Finance to the Secretary for Commerce and Industries, 25 March 1942. 
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of ll million for this purpose 1~ The PUC would fulfil the 
functions of the central co-operative society envisaged by the 
Department of Commerce and Industries, as well as the local level 
social welfare work proposed by Bodenstein. The PUC was approved 
by the Treasury support, but legislation was delayed until 
1944 1~ In the interim, Bodenstein's pilot scheme went ahead, on 
condition that it was later transferred to the Department of 
Commerce and Industries' PUC 1~ 
Bodenstein soon encountered problems. In addition to rising 
costs, delays in acquiring land and the small amount of land 
finally made available, he encountered the hostility of local 
capital and labour 1~ The wartime boom had effectively undermined 
whatever support may have existed at Berg River for the co-
operative idea before 1939. With the primary producers 
experiencing resurgent profitability, state proposals for an end 
to independent production and market competition in return for a 
small weekly allowance and deferred profit share eaten away by 
administrative costs held as much attraction for boat owners and 
fishermen as a contract with Laaiplek Fisheries. They were also 
unhappy with the scheme's intention to tie them to the Bay by 
providing alternative employment ashore during off-seasons. 
Laaiplek Fisheries also opposed Bodenstein's plans. News of the 
scheme frightened off the IDC and prevented the company securing 
185 State Archives; HEN 1518, 180\1\34, F.P. Spooner to the Secretary for 
Comrrerce and Industries, 20 July 1942. 
1~ State Archives; HEN 1518, 180\1\34, J. H. Hofmeyr to R. Stuttaford, 30 
October 1942. 
IS? Ibid. 
1~ State Archives; HEN 1518, 180\1\34, Secretary for Social Welfare to 
the Secretary for Finance, 18 December 1942. 
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crown land at the river mouth for its factory 1~ After Bodenstein 
had addressed a meeting at Velddrift in February 1943, Pretoria 
was inundated with protests from Marine Products 1~ Having itself 
failed to persuade the fishermen to deliver fish to their factory 
the month before, the company confidently asserted that "the 
Fishermen are not enamoured of the Scheme and do not want to 
It asked to be given an opportunity to participate in 
develop the local fisheries before the state intervened 19~ The 
resistance of local capital, fishermen and boat owners sapped the 
Department of Social Welfare's philanthropic zeal and the 
Bodenstein scheme died a quiet death before the end of the 
year 19! 
189 Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of P.E. Rosseau, p.288; State Archives; HEN 
1518, 180\1\32, Marine Products to the Secretary for Social Welfare, 29 
January 1943 and J.C. Bodenstein to F.P. Spooner, 24 February 1943 and LDE 
4733, 19784\14, Secretary for Social Welfare to the Secretary for Lands, 30 
April 1943 and Secretary for Lands to the Secretary for Finance, 10 September 
1943. 
1~ State Archives; HEN 1518, 180\1\32, P.E. Rousseau to C. Von Bonde, 3 
February 1943; P.E. Rousseau to the Secretary for Commerce and Industries, 20 
February 1943 and C. Von Bonde to the Secretary for Commerce and Industries, 2 
March 1943. On 1 March 1943 Von Bonde met a delegation from the river 
comprising the MPC for Piketberg, J. Kellerman, G.J. van Zyl, and Messrs 
Thiart and Carosini. The delegation had previously met with Dr D.F. Malan, MP 
for Piketberg. 
191 State Archives; HEN 1518, 180\1\32, C. Von Bonde to the Secretary for 
Commerce and Industries, 2 March 1943. 
1~ State Archives; HEN 1518, 180\1\32, P.E. Rousseau to C. Von Bonde, 3 
February 1943; P.E. Rousseau to the Secretary for Commerce and Industries, 20 
February 1943 and c. Von Bonde to the Secretary for Commerce and Industries, 2 
March 1943. 
193 State Archives; LDE 4733, 19784\14, Secretary for Social Welfare to 
the Secretary for Lands, 30 April 1943; Provincial Representative Department 
of Lands to the Secretary for Social Welfare, 6 May 1943; Secretary for Lands 
to the Minister, 19 June 1943; Provincial Representative Department of Lands 
to the Secretary for Social Welfare, 29 July 1943 & 7 August 1943; Secretary 
for Lands to the Secretary for Finance, 10 September 1943 and Secretary for 
Social Welfare to the Provincial Representative Department of Lands, 24 
November 1943. 
284 
The larger PUC, however, remained on track through 1943 and on 
17 December the Fishing Industry Development Bill was gazetted 1~ 
The PUC was renamed the Fisheries Development Corporation (FDC) 
and its il million share capital equally divided into A and B 
shares, the former devoted to social upliftment and the latter to 
the improved marketing of inshore fish 1~ FMIAs were superceded 












Minister was also empowered to prohibit fishermen selling fish to 
any person except the Corporation or an approved company and 
anyone except the FDC or an approved company buying fish in a 
controlled area. He could fix fish prices, setting down a maximum 
and minimum for fishermen and maximum price for traders 1~ 
The state blueprint was, however, pre-war in its 
conceptualisation of the inshore fisheries, remaining oblivious 
to the articulation of canning and inshore fishing and viewing 
the canners as crayfish producers unaffected by the Bill 1~ 
Indeed, the state evidenced a growing hostility towards private 
194 Union of South Africa Extraordinary Government Gazette No.3280, 17 
December 1943, pp.ii-xviii; State Archives; HEN 1518, 180\1\34, Secretary for 
Commerce and Industries to the Minister, February 1943 & March 1943; 
Department of Commerce and Industries Explanatory Herrorandum #Fishing Industry 
Development Bill#, 19 July 1943 & n.d.; #Government Proposals regarding 
Fisheries Development#, [marked Confidential], n.d.; Secretary for Commerce 
and Industries to the Minister,9 September 1943 and #Statement to Press: 
Fisheries Development#, 17 December 1943. 
1~ Union of South Africa Extraordinary Government Gazette No.3280, 17 
December 1943, pp.iv-viii. 
196 Ibid., pp.viii-xvi. 
197 Ibid., pp.xii-xiv. 
1~ See for example State Archives; HEN 1518, 180\1\34, Department of 
Commerce and Industries Explanatory Memorandum #Fishing Industry Development 
Bill#, 19 July 1943. 
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capital.. In 1942 the Department of Commerce and Industries argued 
for the state "supplanting" private capital in inshore fishing, 
warning that the majority of fishermen were indigent, illiterate 
and thus "in danger of being exploited by private enterprise, if 
i{ was allowed t6 fund the reorganisation of the industry" !~ 
These sentiments were echoed by the Treasury in approving funding 
for the 
Waterson, 
FDC and the Minister of Economic Development, S.F. 
'.'()() 
in presenting the Bill to the House in 1944~--. Waterson 
called the inshore fisheries "a child problem in the South 
African family" manifesting in a profound socio-economic crisis, 
with low wages and "drunkenness" as the key indica t ors 
underscoring a host of related social illsW~ Private enterpr i se, 
the Minister ventured, had failed to either address or allev i ate 
these problems and the state as "guardian of the 
fishermen" thus had an obligation to interveneW~ 
inshore· 
Because of the Bill's narrow definition of capital in the inshore 
fisheries, only Marine Products was asked for pre-publication 
comment on the BillW~ Although Laaiplek Fisheries had opposed 
Bodenstein's co-operative scheme, by late 1943 the threat of 
African Inshore Fisheries prompted it to enthusiastically endorse 
the new Bill, stressing how its own commitment to a happy and 
199 State Archives; . HEN 1518, 180\1\34, F.P. Spooner to the Secretary for 
Commerce and Industries, 20 July 1942. 
200 State Archives; HEN 1518, 180\1\34, HNotes on the Proposed Scheme for 
the Reorganisation of the Fishing Industry#, n.d. 
Wl Union of South Africa House of Assembly Debates, vol.47, January-March 
1944, cols.510-517; Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the 
Fishing Industry Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of the Coloured Advisory 
Council, pp.440-447 and MetrrJrandum by the Department of Public Health on the 
"Fishing Industry Development Bill", Appendix E, pp.xxvii-xxviii. 
W2 Union of South Africa House of Assembly Debates, vol.47, January-March 
1944, cols.510-517. 
203 State Archives; HEN 1518, 180\1\34, P.E. Rousseau to F.P. Spooner, 5 
November 1943. 
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orderly community at Berg River meshed with and complemented the 
state's plans~ Irvin and Johnson, on the other hand, had no 
prior warning and was taken unawares by the far-reaching powers 
proposed for the FDC:~ It was more concerned that . the FDC's B 
share capital would be used to nationalise its national fish 
distribution 
River ~~ Its 
network than it was 
financial resources 
about the situation at Berg 
and diversity of processing 
interests in Cape Town enabled it to continue purchasing fish on 
the open market at Berg River for the duration of the war. In the 
long term too it was confident of its ability to produce more 
efficiently, pay higher prices for its raw material and so 
squeeze out Laaiplek Fisheries, as it had with so many of i ts 
under-capitalised competitors in the trawling industry. It thus 
concentrated on addressing the widely perceived anti-Irvin and 
Johnson and anti-capitalist slant of the new legislation. 
While the Minister of Commerce and Industries was at pains to 
allay private enterprise's fears, others were less circumspect ~~ 
The Bill was welcomed by the Labour and National Parties, both of 
whom saw it as primarily aimed at Irvin and Johnson's monopoly of 
204 Ibid. Also Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the 
Fi-shing Industry Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of P.E. Rosseau, pp.270-275 
& 296. 
205 Report of the Select Committee on the Subject of the Sea Fisheries 
Bill, 1939, Evidence of H. Abao, S~F. Furneaux, L. Leask and H.J. Lait, pp.44-
81; State Archives; HEN 1518, 180\1\32, #Report of the Departmental Committee 
Appointed to Investigate and Report Upon the Organisation of the Inshore 
Fishing Industry#, April 1941 and HEN 1518, 180\1\34, Secretary for Commerce 
and Industries to the Minister, 17 August 1943. 
206 Union of South Africa Report of the Select Committee on the subject of 
the Fishing Industry Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of H. Abao, pp.219-233. 
~7 Union of South Africa House of Assembly Debates January-March 1944, 
vol.47, col.510-517. 
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national fresh fish production and distribution~ The anti-
private enterprise stance of this cross party consensus and the 
Bill's neglect of the needs of capital in the inshore fisher.ies 
united the industry against it. Fishing capital was incensed by 
the veiled suggestion that it was responsible for the socio-
economic problems of the inshore fisheries and pointed to past 
state neglect as the root cause of the problems 209• Organ i sed 
commerce and industry was also worried about a home-grown var i ant 
of "state socialism 11 210• The "fundamental issue", according to 
Association of Chambers of Commerce (ASSOCOM), was "that of the 
proper sphere of State and private enterprise" 21 ~ In this re g ard 
Irvin and Johnson spoke for everyone when it said, "the fish i ng 
industry, either sectionally or as a whole, does not look to the 
State for adoption, but for "!" advice and guidance" £ ~ Capital, in 
dismissing the state's parastatal solution as an unwork a ble 
on private enterprise, set about re-ordering encroachment 
priorities for the state. The socio-economic crisis was 
downgraded and a series of production problems prioritised, 
208 Union of. South Africa House of Assembly Debates January-March 1944, 
vol.47, cols.510-539 & 807-831 and House of Assembly Debates May-June 1944, 
vol.SO, cols.8301-8333, 8495-8526 & 8562-8580. 
209 Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing I ndustry 
Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of Prof. S.H. Frankel, pp.1-26; the Wholesale 
Fish Distributors in the Cape Peninsula & SAFROC, pp.56-114; National Trawling 
and Fishing Company, pp.190-219; Irvin and Johnson, pp.219-270; ASSCX:OM, 
pp.298-339 and FCI & SAFCC, pp.340-386. Also Appendix B #Merrr,randum by Mr G.D. 
Irvin#; Appendix D #Merrr,randum by Prof. W.H. Hutt; Appendix G #Merrr,randum by 
SAFROC on Harbour Facilities#; Appendix H #Herrr,randum by SAFROC on the Export 
Salt Snoek Trade, etc# and Appendix I #Merrr,randum by Wholesale Fish 
Distributors in the Cape Peninsula on the Earnings of Fishermen, etc" for the 
wide-ranging, but uniformly outraged response of fishing capital, organised 
comrrerce and industry and a brace of eminent liberal economists to the Bill. 
210 Ibid. 
211 Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of W.R. Skeeles, p.298. 
212 Ibid., Evidence of H. Abao, p.220. 
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constituting an accumulation crisis requiring both urgent state 
attention and a redirection of funding away from fishing labour 
into research and infrastructure21~ The Select Committee ignored 
these lengthy protestations and appeals, however, reporting an 
essentially unchanged Bill to the House in April 1944 21~ 
Rather than closing the debate, the Select Committee report only 
intensified it. Irvin and Johnson, the Federated Chamber of 
Industries and ASSOCOM conducted a concerted lobbying campaign i n 
Parliament and finally forced the Government to agree to a series 
of amendments before the second 
?!" reading~"!. These included 
trawling capital's exclusion from the Bill, Parliamentary 
approval for all FDC B share issues and a levy provision to fund 
the expanded research programme demanded by capital 21~ While in 
the Minister's opinion these last-minute amendments 
socio-economic functions of the original Bill intact, 
left the 
for the 
Labour and National Parties they were a blatant indication of the 
United Party's capitulation to the demands of big capital. The 
early cross-party consensus was shattered and the Minister forced 
213 Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill, 1944, the Wholesale Fish Distributors in the Cape Peninsula 
& SAFROC, pp.56-114; National Trawling and Fishing Company, pp.190-219; Irvin 
and Johnson, pp.219-270; ASSOCOH, pp.298-339 and FCI & SAFCC, pp.340-386 for 
the ·various alternative solutions to the development problem of the inshore 
fisheries. 
214 Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill, 1944, pp.iii-ix. Waterson, in addition to making himself 
chairman of the Committee, appointed only MPs known or thought to be 
supporters of the Bill, including representatives of the Labour and National 
Parties, to the Committee. The Committee's sole amendment was to make 
provision in the legislation for a Fisheries Development Advisory Council 
(FDAC) to advise the FDC. The FDAC was less a sop to capital's demands for a 
greater say than it was to allay the fears of boat owners and fishermen about 
registration and the controlled areas. 
215 Union of South Africa House of Assembly Debates, vol.SO, May-June 
1944, cols.8301-8333, 8495-8526 & 8562-8580. 
216 Ibid. 
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to run the gauntlet of Opposition outrage in piloting the revised 
legislation through the House at the end of May 194421~ 
For the National Party, the government's: capitulation was both a 
political and economic defeat which placed nascent Afrikaner 
capital's attempts to gain a foothold in a primary industrial 
sector not dominated by English capital in jeopardy 21~ As the 
National Party MP for Mossel Bay, Dr van Nierop, 
back of the Fishing Bill has been broken 11 21~ 
put it, "the 
Moorreesburg 
National Party MP, F.C. Erasmus, a strong supporter of Marine 
Products, warned the House that Irvin and Johnson "have now 
parked themselves alongside Laaiplek Ltd. of the Afrikaner s at 
the mouth of the Berg River"~ Erasmus claimed Laaiplek 
Fisheries was a company "in which the whole of the people of 
South Africa have representative shares in both branches" n~ This 
was in stark contrast to Irvin and Johnson which he likened to 
the "the tentacles of the octopus" whose reach extended into 
various sectors of the national economy and apparently into the 
217 Ibid. 
218 D. O'Meara Volkskapitalisme, pp.212-213 for 
to the economic movement of Afrikaner nationalism, 
Volks Beleggings. 
the importance of fishing 
spearheaded by Federale 
219 Union of South Africa House of Assembly Debates, vol.SO, May-June 
1944, cols.8S63-8S67. 
220 . Ibid., col.8317. Erasnus, as chairman of the 1939 Select Committee on 
the Sea Fisheries Bill, had ridden rough-shod over Irvin and Johnson's earlier 
objections to the FMIAs in returning an unchanged Bill to the House. He was 
similarly antagonistic to trawling capital as a member of the Select Committee 
on the 1944 Bill and may well have exerted an influence on Waterson, steeling 
the latter's resolve. His outrage and anger at the subsequent amendments was 
thus all the stronger, also because Laaiplek Fisheries was located on the 
boundary of his own constituency. 
ni Union of South Africa House of Assembly Debates, vol.SO, May-June 
1944, col.8329 and Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the 
Fishing Industry Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of P.E. Rousseau and G.J. 
van Zyl, p.288. 
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halls of political 
"•?? 
power as we 11 i.:~. On this basis, he appealed to 
the House, "If one can protect the Laaiplek fishing concern one 
should do so because of public interest " 22~ It was rather 
Afrikaner capital's interests which were at stake after the last-
minuteamendments to the Bill; 
to prevent Irvin and Johnson 
but the National Party's attempts 
"torpedoing" the Bill were to no 
avail and amid taunts from United Party members the Nationalists 
""4 saw all their counter-amendments and objections defeated ·.: . 
The FDC was formally constituted in October 1944 2~ Despite . its 
inauspicious pedigree and the growing misgivings about the 
viability of pelagic canning once the war 
')·16 
ended ~~, the 
Corporation committed itself to "From the outset ••• working in 
the closest co-operation with those already established in the 
'n"' industry"~~ To this end, co-operatives were abandoned and by the 
end of the war the FDC was talking instead about a boat-financing 
scheme to uplift inshore fishermen~ In addition, A share 
capital went on the provision of housing at a number of key west 
coast factory hamlets 229• The bulk of the Corporation's time, 
222 Union of South Africa House of Assembly Debates, vol.SO, May-June 
1944, col.8317. 
223 Ibid., col.8329. 
224 Ibid., col.8310. 
225 R. Lees Fishing for Fortunes, p.125; Fisheries Development CorfX)ration 
[FDC] 1st Annual RefX)rt, 1945, p.3 and State Archives VWN 1074, SW456(1), FDAC 
Minutes of Inaugural Meeting, 30 October 1944. 
226 RefX)rt of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of H. Abao, pp.247 & 265-266. 
227 FDC 1st Annual Report, 1945, p.3. 
228 Ibid., p.8. Also State Archives VWN 1074, SW456(1), FDAC Minutes of 
the Second Meeting, 4 June 1945 and FDAC Minutes of the Third Meeting, 24 July 
1945. 
m FDC 1st Annual Report, 1945, pp.7-8. 
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effort and resources, however, were directed into healing the 
breach with capital and prov i ng the prophets of doom wrong by 
assisting the canning industry to meet international 
after the war. In this regard, 
competition 
"[I]t was suggested that the Corporation should invest new 
capital in all the companies, to the extent of a one-third 
share - this new money to be devoted to the purchase of new 
plant, boats and gear and to the general modernisation and 
improvement of the factories. Such a link-up, it was hoped, 
would bring about the measure of co-operation a nd 
rationalisation needed to develop the industry to its fullest 
extent and to meet keen competition from overseas after the 
war" 230 • 
Initially, however, only 
• 
Stephan Brothers agreed to 
the Lamberts Bay Canning Company and 
sell a third interest to the FDC n ~ 
These joint ventures soon bore fruit, with the Lamberts Bay 
company importing a plant to produce oil and meal from the offal 
of its canning operation and joining the FDC, Stephan Brothers, 
the Table Mountain Canning Company and Laaiplek 
erecting a new canning and by-products plant at St 
Fisheries in 
")3") 
Helena Bay '" ·. 
The Corporation also paid increasing attention to re-earch and 
infrastructure2~ Thus, in its first year the FDC went a long way 
towards assuaging the fears of fishing capital and its chairman, 
S.H. Skaife, could justifiably claim that "The first year's work 
of the Corporation has ••• laid sound foundations for big and 
far-reaching developments in the months and years to come" 2~ 
230 FDC 1st Annual Report, 1945, p.4. 
231 Ibid. 
232 Ibid., pp.5-6. 
m CM Ibid., p.3. Also State Archives VWN 1074, SW456(1), FDA inutes 
the Inaugural Meeting, 30 October 1945, Menr:,randum by C. von Bonde. 
2~ FDC 1st Annual Report, 1945, p.9. 
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of 
The "melting pot" of the Second World War was certainly critical 
for the local canning industry in making the transition from 
export to import-substitution production. It was not, however, a 
sufficient panacea to conjure away the old, and the wartime gains 
of the canning industry were tenuous at best by 1945. What the 
war did do was recast the balance of class forces in the industry 
in a way that made a different path of post-war development 
possible. Key to this was the clarification of "the proper sphere 
of State and private enterprise" 3 ~ Pretoria's attempts to take 
over development of the fishing industry via the FDC were 
defeated by capital. The long march of the interventionist state, 
which carried all before it in the wake of the 1934 French quota 
crisis, was finally checked ten years later in 1944. The future 
development of the fishing industry would be undertaken by 
private capital with state assistance through research, 
infrastructure and capital to rationalise the industry and ensure 
its competitiveness in the post-war world. The state's social 
welfare concern was also fundamentally recast. The petty-
bourgeoisie boat-owning class in the inshpre fisheries was 
encouraged and supported as a bulwark against trade unionism and 
the suppliers of raw material for post-war factory production. 
Most canners realised that with the return of foreign imports and 
the local trawler fleet after the war, the huge demand and high 
prices for inshore fish would rapidly dissipate and independent 
producers once again be dependent on the canning companies for a 
market. Provided their boats and equipment could be modernised to 
keep pace with the industry, capital was happy to leave the 
fishing up to them while it concentrated on processing, looking 
to the state, via the FDC, for assistance in meeting labour's 
basic housing and social welfare needs. 
235 Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill, 1944, Evidence of W.R. Skeeles, p.298. 
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Wartime developments found their echo at St Helena Bay, where the 
post-1939 boom in demand and price for fish facilitated a major 
shift in focus from the old canning factory hamlets along the 
southern shores of the Bay to Berg River. Stephan Brothers and 
the Sandveld landlords were both spent forces by 1939. The former 
was conspicuous by its absence from the wartime debate over the 
future of the fishing industry and the latter was under 
increasing pressure from both church and state as conditions on 
the farms at the river mouth deteriorated after 1936. Both gave 
ground quite literally during the war, selling up their land at 
the river to new interests from outside. These new interests, 
Laaiplek Fisheries and African Inshore Fisheries, integrated the 
Bay into the emerging industrial order in South Africa. Their 
presence on the periphery was conditioned solely by the 
opportunities which it offered for rapid capital accumulation. 
They were uninterested in ground rent or trade except insofar as 
it complemented their need to secure adequate supplies of labour 
and raw material for canning and by-products production. As the 
post-war period would show only too clearly, however, once these 
conditions disappeared, so did the companies, closing down or 
moving elsewhere. Thus, despite the wartime boom and the 
resurgent profitability of the primary producers at the river and 
increasing state involvement in the fisheries, St Helena Bay and 
Berg River still remained very much on the periphery of the new 
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7: MAKING LIKE AMERICA 1945-1956 
In 1944 the South African fish processing industry was casting a 
wary eye to the future and the unwelcome prospect of renewed 
international competition after the war. Irvin and Johnson's 
managing director, Herbert Abao, told the 1944 select committee 
quite unequivocally, "Actually we have not got a canning industry 
to speak of. If we are to continue after the war it will just be 
a question of whether we can compete with the overseas product" ~ 
The canning industry was even more pessimistic, citing the lack 
of marine research, paucity of harbours, inadequate and costly 
rail transport and small local market as major obstacles in the 
? 
way of competitive post-war production~ Both Abao and the 
industry looked to the state to remove these constraints and 
guarantee the industry an adequate supply of raw material at a 
price low enough to make processing profitable and the product 
competitive. 
I 
The post-war development of the South African inshore fisheries, 
however, was determined by more than just the specific concerns 
of the nascent canning industry. The reconstitution of the world 
capitalist order under American hegemony fundamentally altered 
the terms of "international competition", placing new constraints 
on industries in peripheral economies~ The most important shift 
to occur within the advanced capitalist countries was from the 
1 Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill 1944, Evidence of H. Abao, p.266. 
2 Ibid, Evidence of A. Ovenstone, pp.349-359. 
3 G. Bloch "The Development of Manufacturing Industry in South Africa" 
(Unpublished MA thesis,. UCT, 1980); G. Bloch NRoom at the Top? - The 
Development of South Africa's Manufacturing Industry 1939-1969" Social 
Dynamics, 7, 2, 1981 and G. Bloch "The Development of South Africa's 
Manufacturing Industry" in Z.A. Konczacki, J.L. Parpart & T.M. Shaw (eds) 
Studies in the Economic History of Southern Africa Vol.2: South Africa, 
Lesotho & Swaziland (London, 1991). 
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generation of absolute to relative surplus value, increasing 
labour productivity through greater technology inputs and the 
incorporation of science in production~ Plant specialisation and 
integration across national boundaries within a u-n if i ed 
production process laid the basis for the emergence of monopoly 
capital and its internationalisation in the form of multi-
national corporations (MNCs). The impact of these changes on 
peripheral economies in the capitalist world economy was 
profound. Whereas prior to the war, 
"Any industrial development had been predicated on a struggle 
by 'national' capitalist classes to assert their independence 
against the grain of imperialist producers ••• Capitalist 
production, using the high technology and sophisticated 
techniques of the capitalist centres, could now take place 
under imperialist aegis in select countries on the periphery 
where conditions were 'right'" 5 [emphasis in original]. 
Peripheral countries were thus compelled to open up their 
economies to MNCs, reproduce the new capitalist relations of 
production pertaining in the advanced capitalist economies and 
create the conditions conducive to both, or face the ~xtinction 
of their own industries through "international competition" on 
both local and foreign markets. 
South Africa's post-war indqstrialisation was no exception and 
was conditioned by the shift to relative surplus extraction and 
the emergence of monopoly capital in the metropole. Despite its 
impressive wartime growth, local secondary industry was poorly 
equipped to meet the challenges of the new international order~ 
Growth had been largely quantitative and created a "profound ••• 
4 G. Bloch HRoom at the Top? The Development of South Africa's 
Manufacturing Industry 1939-1969# Social Dynamics, 1981, pp.47-49. 
5 Ibid., p.48. 
b Ibid., pp.49-50 for a quantification of the wartime growth of 
manufacturing and its social implications. 
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'duality' between small and large undertakings" in a wide range 
of industries~ Capital, assisted by the state, thus sought the 
urgent "rationalisation" of the country's ambiguous wartime 
manufacturing heritage to ensure its survival in the post-war 
world. This involved the reorganisation of production through 
plant specialisation and vertical integration, laying the 
foundations for the emergence of monopoly capital and the shift 
to relative surplus extraction via increased 
technology and a dependent relationship with 
investment in 
multinational 
capital~ In all this, the state played an active role, turning a 
blind eye to monopolies, making selective use of tariffs and 
taxation and itself funding and assisting in the establishment of 
specific secondary industries~ 
The result was that South Africa's post-war industrialisation was 
a form of "dependent industrialisation where the dominant 
influence came from outside 
original]. However 
the periphery"lO [emphasis 
"[I]t is the articulation of these changed conditions on 
an international level with the specific internal 
determinants of the social formation, that determine the 
trajectory and nature of the path of development that 
emerges" 11 [emphasis in original]. 
in 
Thus, although the post-1945 development of the local fish 
canning and by-products industry conformed to the "dependent 
industrialisation" model, it also exhibited certain peculiarities 
of its own. These reflected both the uncertainties of secondary 
7 Ibid., p.49. 
8 Ibid., pp.50-54. 
9 Ibid., pp.54-55. 
lO Ibid., p.49. 
11 Ibid. 
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production based on a largely unknown primary resource and the 
historical development of the fishing industry and balance of 
class forces which had evolved within it prior to 1939 and 
emerged intact from the "melting pot" of global conflict. 
7.1 DEPENDENT INDUSTRIALISATION 
In 1945 the inshore fish industry comprised some 16 factories on 
the west coast from Hout to Walvis Bay, most dating from the pre-
war period and geared to crayfish canning. Capital stock was 
antiquated and run-down and the industry was a "one-plant 
business", the majority under-capitalised and with a history of 
mutual animosity and cut-throat competition 12 • Just eight years 
later, however, the inshore fisheries were "entirely modern " and 
"highly trustified", reflecting capital's rapid re-adjustment to 
the new conditions of international competition, with state 
assistance 13 • By 1945, the state had acquired extensive, albeit 
contested, powers to conserve the marine resource and develo p the 
fishing industry through the FDC 14 • It was thus well placed to 
restructure the industry along "rational economic" lines and used 
the sector it was most familiar with, crayfish canning and 
packing, as its testing ground. 
In August 1946 the state activated the 1940 Crawfish Export Act's 
quota provisions, making it illegal to export crayfish without a 
l2 Board of Trade and Industries Report No.337: The Marine Oils Industry 
of the Union 1953, p.58. 
13 Ibid., p.58 & p.74. 
1945, p.4; R.F. Robinow HA 
Business Efficiency, 12, 5, 
in SASNFIR, January 1946, 
the 1944 Fishing Industry 
14 See for example · ·Foc 1st Annual Report, 
Million Tons is a Lot of Fish# in South African 
April 1945 and Editorial HThe Fishing IndustryH 
pp.18-19. The anti-state anirrr,sity generated by 
Development Bill lingered on until the late 1940s. 
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government permit 15 • The quota was portrayed as a conservation 
measure necessary to, "prevent the over-exploitation of our 
crayfish beds" and complement existing measures dating from the 
16 late 19th Century · . It was set annually, purportedly on advice 
from the Division of Sea Fisheries as to the maximum sustainable 
yield 17 • In reality, horse-trading between the state and industry 
and the old tensions between canners and packers determined the 
global export ceiling and its 70-30 split between canned and 
frozen crayfish 18• Individual allocations too were set according 
to political influence and economic muscle 19 • Conservation was 
thus at best an ideal and at worst a gloss on the state's real 
agenda, the rationalisation of the crayfish export industry ~ . As 
F.P. Spooner, 
FDC, put it, 
chief architect of the 1940 legislation and the 
quota allocations were used to "eliminate small 
capitalists" from the post-war industry by denying them the right 
to export 21 • For this reason the state allocated half the frozen 
15 Union of South Africa Extraordinary Government Gazette, No. 3698, 30 
August 1946, Notice No.1866. 
i6 FDC 2nd Annual Report, 1946, p.4; State Archives: HEN 1555, 180\29\13 
(1), Commercial Adviser to the Secretary for Commerce and Industries, August 
1947; VNW 1074, SW 456(1), Meroorandum HControl of the Crawfish IndustryH, 
n.d., discussed at 5th Meeting of the FDAC; FDAC Minutes of 5th Meeting, 29 
April 1946 and HEN 1558, 180\29\13\16, C. von Bonde to the Secretary for 
Commerce and Industries, 20 February 1948. 
17 Division of Fisheries [DFJ Annual Reports 1947-1955, for the post-war 
crayfish patrol and research work carried out by the Division of Fisheries. 
18 State Archives; VNW 1074, SW 456(1), SAFROC to the Secretary for 
Commerce and Industries, 21 May 1946; SAFCC to the Secretary for Commerce and 
Industries, 27 May 1946 and FDAC Minutes of 6th Meeting, 10 June 1946. 
19 State Archives; VNW 1074, SW 456(1), FDAC Minutes of 6th Meeting, 10 
June 1946 and HEN 1558, 180\29\13\19, F.P. Spooner to the Acting Secretary for 
Commerce and Industries, 9 September 1946. 
W State Archives; VNW 1074, SW 456(2), FDAC Minutes of 7th Meeting, 9 
December 1946. 
21 State Archives; HEN 1558, 180\29\13\19, F.P. Spooner to the Acting 
Secretary for Commerce and Industries, 9 September 1946. 
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tail quota to South African Sea Products, formed out of the 
amalgamation of several small Hout Bay and Cape Town packing 
interests and assisted by substantial · infusions of capital from 
?? 
both the FDC and the state-. 
Reorganisation in the canning industry was necessarily more 
circumspect 23 • The canners were still contracted to supply the 
British Ministry of Food and saw little immediate need for the 
quota, except to limit and control the packing industry 24• While 
the four largest producers were endowed with generous export 
quotas and FDC capital injections, reorganisation was 
immediate and dramatic~. By the end of 1946, however, 
less 
South 
African Sea Products and the North Bay Group controlled more t han 
43% of the total quota, with the other three big canners 
accounting for a further 35%. South African Sea Products' 
position was entrenched in 1947 with state acceptance of the 
South African Frozen Rock Lobster Packers (SAFROC) as the sole 
marketing organisation for export tails 26 • All packers had to be 
'Y) 
u HSouth African Sea Products Ltd.-£250,000 ExpansionH in SASNFIR, June 
1947, p.34; Editorial HHout Bay: Model Fishing Station# in SASNFIR, October 
1947 and HGreat Send-off for Sea Products at Hout BayH in SASNFIR, October 
1947, p.51. Also State Archives; SES, N1900\A\(c)\09, Prospectus of South 
African Sea Products, 19 December 1947. 
23 Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill., 1944, Evidence of A. Ovenstone, p.356 for the SAFCC's views 




Archives; VNW 1074, SW 456(1), SAFCC to the Secretary for 
Industries, 27 May 1946 and FDAC Minutes of 6th Meeting, 10 June 
~ The bulk of the canned crayfish quota went to the North Bay Group of 
companies formed in the late 1930s (North Bay, Namaqua and Hicksons Canning 
Companies), Ovenstones, the Lamberts Bay Canning Company and the African Fish 
Canning Company. 
26 FDC 3rd Annual Report, 1947, p.4. 
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members of SAFROC and export through it to the United States 27• In 
1949 the South West African administration passed similar 
legislation compelling Luderitz producers to follow suit~. 
State intervention in other areas of the inshore industry, 
however, was complicated by the dearth of scientific knowledge 
about the pelagic resource and absence of specialised plant and 
machinery. Wartime production used excess crayfish canning 
capacity and "homespun mechanisation" with wide variations in the 
quality of the product~. Given the primitive methods of handling, 
only a limited proportion of fish caught were suitable for 
. 10 Th canning··. e rest, together with the offal from canning was 
discarded. A few crayfish canneries had installed plants to 
process this waste into meal akin to the fisheries of Europe, 
America and Japan which systematically processed the bulk of 
their catch through reduction plants to produce meal and extract 
fish body-oils for agricultural and industrial applications. The 
state, on the assumption that "specialisation is wasteful", thus 
sought to ensure the post-war viability of the pelagic canning 
industry by diversifying it into meal and oil production 31 • 
Pretoria's first task was to create a modern processing industry 
and standardise and improve the quality of its output.· To this 
end the FDC invested more than £.400 000 (80% of its 8 share 
capital) in twelve fish-canning companies in the first five years 
after the war and by 1955 had exceeded its permissible 8 share 
n State Archives; VNW 1074, SW 456(2), FDAC Minutes of 9th Meeting, 1 
September 1947 and FDAC Minutes of 10th Meeting, 12 December 1947. 
~ R. Lees Fishing for Fortunes, p.135. 
~ State Archives; HEN 1497, 180\1\1(1), Deputy Controller of Food 
Supplies to the Secretary for Commerce and Industries, 16 March 1943. 
~ Board of Trade and Industries Report No.337: The Marine Oils Industry 
of the Union 1953, pp.73-74. 
JI Ibid., p.90. 
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issue by ieinvesting its profits in shares 32 • In addition, a 
growing number of canning companies went public after 1945, 
offering their shares on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and more 
than tripling the capital investment in the inshore industry from 
tl.1 million in 1944 to t3.7 million by 1947. 
YEAR 
TABLE 7.1: Capital Investment in the Fishing Industry 













1939 950 1 575 725 775 1 675 2 350 
1944 1 100 2 050 1 175 1 380 2 275 3 430 
1947 1 550 3 150 3 765 6 950 5 315 10 100 
K = Subscribed Capital & Reserves. 
The capital raised through FDC and public investment facilitated 
the importation of canning and reduction plant from California~ . 
The latter's sardine industry went into protracted decline after 
1945 and American suppliers were anxious to find new outlets for 
their plant~. By 1950 the South African industry had the capacity 
to reduce 178 tons of fish per hour, increasing to more than 237 
32 Ibid., p.60 and FDC Annual Reports 1945-1955. 
33 S.H. Skaife HRemarkable Growth of South African Fishing Industry: 
Fourfold Capital Increase Since 1939: Production Soaring# in SASNFIR, July 
1948, p.43 and Board of Trade and Industries Report No.337: The Marine Oils 
Industry of the Union 1953, pp.52-54 for later figures on capital investment. 
34 FDC 1st Annual Report, 1945, p. 4 and Board of Trade and Industries 
Report No.337: The Marine Oils Industry of the Union, 1953, p.54. 
~ M. Culley The Pilchard: Biology & Exploitation (Oxford, 1971), pp.143-
174 and A.F McEvoy The Fishermen's Problem: Ecology & Law in the Californian 
fisheries 1850-1980 (Cambridge, 1986), pp.123-155 for the Californian sardine 
fishery's collapse. 
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tons in 1953~. With the plant came American experts, wholesale 
distributors and the whole gamut of fishing technology, turning 
the South African industry 
smaller scale" 37 • 
into "the Californian fishery on a 
This rapid expansion placed an enormous strain on the west 
coast's rudimentary infrastructure, forcing the state to again 
intervene. By 1950, the FOC had loaned more than ~330 000 of its 
A share capital to fishing companies for the provision of "houses 
and other amenities for fishermen"~. The state also provided 
water and electricity to inshore stations, reorganised its pre-
war harbour construction programme to create "suitable all-
weather harbours" at key points along the west coast, upgraded 
road communication and erected bulk handling facilities for fish 
~ C. G. du Plessis HTrends in the Pilchard Fishery of the Union of South 
Africa, 1943-1958#, Division of Fisheries Investigational Report No.38, Table 
V, p.25 and Board of Trade and Industries Report No.337: The Marine Oils 
Industry of the Union 1953, Table XXXI, p.89. 
37 #'No Peanut Garre' on Pacific Coast: SA Expert's Impressions of 
American Fishing# in SASNFIR, January 1946, pp.14-15; HAmerican Expert on SA 
Pilchards: Says They're better than California's# in SASNFIR, August 1946, 
p.33; #Canning Lessons from Monterey# in SASNFIR, January 1947, pp.41-42; 
"Know-how from Pacific CoastH in _SASNFIR, June 1947, p.46; "Well-known US 
Company sets up in SAH in SASNFIR, July 1948, p.64; HUS Interest in SA 
Fisheries# in SASNFIR, February 1949, p.80; "American Expert on Union's 
Fishing PossibilitiesH in SASNFIR, June 1949, p.58; #Americans Who Aid Union's 
Fish ExportsH in SASNFIR, July 1950, pp.46-47 and Editorial: "An Industry 
Matures# in SASNFIR, October 1951, p.53 for the American influence on the 
South African inshore fishery after 1945. 
~ FDC 6th Annual 
FDC 8th AnnuaJ Report, 
No.337: The Marine Oils 
Report, 1950, p.5; FDC 7th Annual Report, 1951, p.6; 
1952, p.5 and Board of Trade and Industries Report 
Industry of the Union 1953, pp.64-65. 
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oil at the Cape Town docks 39 • The need to improve and standardise 
output led to the establishment of the Fishing Industry Research 
Institute (FIRI) in 1946 as a joint venture between the Council 
for Scientific and Industrial Research and the industry on a 
pound for pound basisw. FIRI took over inspection of the 
industry's export production and conducted research aimed at 
improving the quality of its products 41 • The harnessing of sc i ence 
to production continued in marine biology where s h ortag e s of 
staff and essential equipment as well as the advanced age of the 
state's research vessels hampered progress until the late 1940s 42 • 
In 1950 the Division of Fisheries took a new research vessel i n t o 
commission, established research stations at St Helena and 
39 "Cape West Coast Water Problems in the Fishing IndustryH in SASNFIR, 
December 1947, pp.57-59; Editorial HFishing Harbours" in SASNFIR, June 1946, 
p.17; Editorial "A West Coast Highway?" in SASNFIR, October 1950, p.51; "Union 
Harbour Improvements will Cost £2 1/2 Million" in SASNFIR, April 1954, p.71; 
"South Africa's Fishing Harbours" in Comrrerce and Industries, Februar y 1958, 
pp.293-296; FDC 1st Annual Report, 1945, p.3; FDC 7th Annual Report, 1951, 
p.6; FDC 8th Annual Report, 1952, p.5; FDC 9th Annual Report, 1953, p.5 and 
Board of Trade and Industries Report No.337: The Marine Oils Industry of the 
Union 1953, pp.63-64. 
W "Fishing Industry to Finance Research Institute: Preliminary Plans for 
Ambitious Project" in SASNFIR May 1946, pp.13-15; "Fishing Industry Research 
Institute Goes into Action" in SASNFIR, August 1947, p.55; Editorial HResearch 
& Fishing" in SASNFIR, . January 1950, p.45; Editorial "Fishing Industry 
Research Institute" in SASNFIR, July 1950, p.45; Editorial Hincreasing 
Efficiency" in SASNFIR, October 1953, p.59; Board of Trade and Industries 
Report No.337: The Marine Oils Industry of the Union 1953, pp.76-77; "Science 
Serves the Fishing Industry" in SASNFIR, June 1954, pp.71-77 and Editorial 
"The Bureau Forgets" in SASNFIR, February 1955, p.49. 
41 FIRI Annual Reports 1947-1956 and Board of Trade and Industries Report 
No.337: The Marine Oils Industry of the Union 1953, pp.70-76 for a discussion 
of production processes in the canning and reduction industries and some of 
their shortcomings. 
42 DF Annual Reports 1948-1955 and S.H. Skaife "Development of the SA 
Fishing Industry" in SASNFIR, November 1949, p.55. 
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Lamberts Bays and 
Prag ramme 43 • 
initiated a comprehensive Pilchard Research 
An expanded marine research programme was vital to bo~h capital 
and the state, the former because of concern about "overfishing" 
and foreign intrusion into Union waters«, the latter because it 
provided "the only means by which the fundamental scientific 
facts for State management of the fishery in a proper manner can 
hope 
4c 
to be determined" J • In the absence of such research, the 
Californian industry's decline provided the state with the 
pretext to extend its conservationary control over the pelagic 
resource 46 • In 1948 the FDAC established a Pilchard Advisory 
Committee to recommend appropriate measures and the following 
year the FDC called for legislative restrictions on the number 
and capacity of processing plants as well as a catch quota 47• In 
1949-1950 the state took the first steps in this regard, with the 
promulgation of a minimum mesh size for nets, two-month closure 
of the resource to fishing, licensing of all plants and a three 
43 C. Von Bonde HFishery Science and the FisheriesH in SASNFIR, November 
1949, pp.57-61 for a review of past work and a statement of future needs. 
« Editorial HA Matter of Urgent National ImportanceH in SASNFIR, July 
1948, pp.36-37; C. Von Bonde HFisheries and International LawH in SASNFIR, 
August 1949, pp.53-76; Editorial HThe Pilchard ProblemH in SASNFIR, February 
1950, p.45; Editorial HThe "Africana II'H in SASNFIR, March 1950, p.43; 
Editorial HFisheries Research" in SASNFIR, April 1950, p.47; Editorial "Foot 
in the Door# in SASNFIR, February 1952, p.59; Editorial HA Warning RepeatedH 
in SASNFIR, March 1953 and Editorial HScience and the Fishing IndustryH in 
SASNFIR, April 1953. 
45 DF 22nd Annual Report, 1950, p. 82. 
% State Archives; VNW 1075, SW 456(2) HMerrorandum on the Control of Fish 
Meal and Fish Oil PlantsH, 19 July 1948, discussed at 12th Meeting of the FDAC 
and VNW 1075, SW 456(3) "Merrorandum on the Conservation of the Pilchard and 
Maasbanker Fisheries of the Union West Coast and South West AfricaH, n.d., 
discussed at the 24th Meeting of the FDAC. 
47 State Archives; VNW 1074, SW 456(2), FDAC Minutes of 12th Meeting, 19 
August 1948 and C. von Bonde, Merrorandum #Pilchard Advisory CommitteeH, 
discussed at 13th Meeting of the FDAC. 
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year-moratorium on the erection of new factories or any increase 
in the capacity of existing plants 48 • With the collapse of the 
Californian industry in 1952, sustained growth in local reduction 
capacity, mounting concern about the effectiveness of existing 









season, restrictions on the size of the fishing fleet and a 
"purely arbitrary" catch ceiling of 250 000 tons based "on a 
comparison between the area of commercial pilchard\maasbanker 
fishing in Union waters and the area over which the erstwhile 
sardine fishery of California extended"~. 
Although growing state control over the pelagic resource was 
motivated by conservationary concerns, its effect was similar to 
that of the crayfish quota, limiting exploitation to a small 
group of producers with factory licenses who reaped the "profits 
of privilege" 51 • By 1953 profits were averaging 25% on operating 
capita1 52 • Privilege and record profits encouraged producers to 
further reduce competition among themselves through the 
establishment of collective marketing structures in the pelagic 
industry similar to SAFROC. Meal and oil producers' associations 
were formed in 1949-1950, enabling the industry to cut costs by 
~ L.P.D. Gertenbach HLicense Limitation Regulations: The South African 
System# in Fisheries Research Board of Canada, 12, December 1973 and State 
Archives; VNW 1074, SW 456(2), FDAC Minutes of 13th Meeting, 24 September 1948 
and P.E. Rousseau & F.P. Spooner Memorandum HConservation of Pilchards & 
Maasbankers#, 23 September 1949, dis~ussed at 15th Meeting of the FDAC. 
49 DF 22nd Annual Report, 1950, p.82 and Board of Trade and Industries 
Report No.337: The Marine Oils Industry of the Union 1953, pp.89-92. 
~ DF 25th Annual Report, 1953-1954, p.542. 
51 Board of Trade and Industries Report No.337: The Marine Oils Industry 
of the Union 1953, pp.92-95. 
~ Ibid., pp.80-81. 
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refining at a single plant and share the proceeds of foreign 
sales equitably through the collective marketing of 
~ 
exports ~ . 
Combination was also facilitated by the growing centralisation of 
ownership in the industry. From twelve "one-plant" businesses in 
1945, ownership was concentrated in three big "financial groups" 
by 1953~. This reflected the fishing industry's vertical 
integration into the food, animal feeds and associate secondary 
industries by mining and finance capital. The largest of the 
three groups was controlled by Anglo Transvaal and Tiger Oats & 
National Milling, the second by the Seafare Holdings and the FDC 
and the third by Federale Volks Beleggings 55 • Combination allowed 
for economies of scale and the horizontal integration of 
different sectors and geographical areas, ensuring year-round 
production and offsetting the effects of poor catches on profits. 
The FDC, through its representation on the boards of the majority 
of big companies, played an important role in establishing 
producers organisations and brokering company mergers 56 • 
This reorganisation of the inshore fisheries after 1945 was thus 
integral to the making of "Little California" and the inshore 
~ Editorial "A Great New Enterprise" in SASNFIR, September 1948, p.37; 
H£500,000 Fish Oil Refining Plant - the First of its Kind in the World 
Swings into Operation at Simonstown" in SASNFIR, September 1948, pp.42-51; FDC 
5th Annual Report, 1949, p.5; FDC 6th Annual Report, 1950, p.4 and Board of 
Trade and Industry Report No.337: The Marine Oils Industry of the Union 1953, 
w~fil-~. 
~ Board of Trade and Industries Report No.337: The Marine Oils Industry 
of the Union 1953, p.58. 
S5 Ibid., pp.58-59. 
~ FDC 5th Annual Report, 1949, p.4; FDC 7th Annual Report, 1951, p.5 and 
Board of Trade and Industries Report No.337: The Marine Oils Industry of the 
Union 1953, pp.60-61. 
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fishing boom which gripped the west coast from "7 late 1940s"' . 
Legitimated by the "tragedy of the commons", joint state-capital 
management of the marine resources had gained international 
recognition by the mid-1950s and ideology and necessity merged~. 
State control became the sine qua non for successful 
industrialisation59 • The resulting boom rested on the increas i ngly 
inter-related exploitation of the crayfish and pelagic resources 
of the west coast by a modernised and highly trustified industry 
created both directly and indirectly by state intervention. 
In the crayfish industry, SAFROC secured and expanded the Union's 
share of the lucrative United States market with impr o ved 
products tailor-made to American consumer demand. By the early 
1950s, the conflicts of the immediate post-war period vanished as 
the packing industry shed its pariah status and overtook canning 
in export earnings by the mid-1950s. Frozen tails became a 
"substantial dollar-earner" and canners began to process an 
increasing percentage of their canned quota in the form of frozen 
tails 60 • 
57 Editorial HA Great IndustryH in SASNFIR, August 1950, p.51; 
H£2,000,000 Pilchard Harvest on West Coast this Season# in SASNFIR, August 
1950, pp.57-87; Editorial "A Great Adventure: The Pilchard Industry" in 
SASNFIR, March 1951, p.51; Editorial HA Permanent AssetH in SASNFIR, May 1951, 
p.47; Editorial HThe Pilchard Industry in 1951H in SASNFIR, December 1951, 
p.52; HSouth Africa's Pilchard Industry in 1951# in SASNFIR, pp.63-103 and 
HSouth Africa's Pilchard Industry in 1954H in SASNFIR, November 1954, pp.55-
113. 
~ C. von Bonde HConservation of Our Natural Fisheries ResourcesH in 
Commerce and Industries, 6, 11, July 1948; FDC 8th Annual Report, 1952, pp.5-
6; Board of Trade & Industries Report No.337: The Marine Oils Industry of the 
Union, 1953, pp.86-89 and FDC 11th Annual Report, 1955, p.5. 
59 See for example FDC 5th Annual Report, 1949 p.5 for the Corporation's 
views as regards the crayfish industry. 
60 FDC 7th Annual Report, 1951, p.3 and DF Annual Reports 1950-1956. The 
percentage of the canned quota convertible into frozen tails started at 30% in 
1950, rose to 50% by 1953 and reached 100% in 1956. 
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Table 7.2: Crayfish Catch & Exports 1945-195661 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Year Catch EXPORTS [lOOO's) 
[Millions] Frozen Canned Total 
lbs £. lbs £. lbs £. 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
1939 14.1 2 746 82 3 066 161 5 812 243 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
1945 9.5 996 54 1 802 145 2 798 200 
1946 14.8 2 536 161 2 544 222 5 080 383 
1947 17.8 2 567 183 3 691 366 6 258 549 
1948 17.9 2 767 148 3 875 467 6 642 615 
1949 20.3 2 346 188 3 957 516 6 303 704 
1950 21. 2 4 310 638 5 175 925 9 4851 563 
1951 2 8 • 2 '* 4 218 640 5 502 1 157 9 7201 797 
1952 22.4* 3 983 593 3 756 959 7 7391 552 
1953 21.0* 3 743 791 3 519 1 111 7 2621 902 
1954 19.2* 3 545 946 3 062 996 6 6071 942 
1955 28.7* 5 383 1 449 4 514 1 436 9 8962 885 
1956 27.8* 6 385 1 732 3 229 1 065 9 6142 797 
*=Estimates. 
The biggest growth in output, however, came from the production 
of import substitutes by the new pelagic industry. In 1955 the 
FDC reported that twenty brands of local canned fish "now compete 
for the South African housewife's favour", compared to five or 
six a few years previously 62 • Competition and the easing of price 
control prevented canned fish imports, which averaged 12 million 
lbs per annum prior to the war, from regaining a hold on the 
Union market~. Fish meal and oil also secured a sizable share of 
61 Union of South Africa Department of Customs & Excise Foreign Trade 
Statistics, 1945-1956; Union of South Africa Bureau of Census & Statistics 
Census of Industrial Establishments, 1939-1950 and State Archives; HEN 1556, 
180\29\13(11-12), Meroc,randum HKreefuitvoerkwotasw, n.d. [1959], attached Table 
1. 
62 FDC 11th Annual Report, 1955, p.2. 
~ Union of South Africa Report of the Select Committee on the subject of 
the Fishing Industry Development Bill 1944, Evidence of A. Ovenstone, p.356. 
With the exception of 1947-1948, canned fish imports only once topped the 2 
million pound mark until the early 1950s. After 1952 they inched back up to 
half their pre-war level of 12 million lbs for the remainder of the decade. 
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the l .ocal market, even without tariff protectionM. High protein 
pelagic fish meal was used in the preparation of balanced 
livestock feeds for agriculture, while hydrogenation and 
fractionation converted pelagic fish oil into a cheap substitute 
for vegetable oils in the local food, soap and paint industries~. 





















































































The price of fish meal and oil was controlled and the industry 
had to supply local demand before exporting. By the 1950s South 
African agriculture and industry accounted for between 40% and 
70% of the inshore industry's meal output and virtually all of 
M Board of Trade and Industries Report No.337: The Marine Oils Industry . 
of the Union 1953, pp.95-101. 
65 Ibid., pp.5-10 & pp. 42-43. 
66 Union of South Africa Bureau of Census & Statistics Census of 
Industrial Establishments, 1939-1950; C.G. du Plessis Trends in the Pilchard 
Fishery of the Union of South Africa, 1943-1958, 1959, p.23, Table I and 
R.J.M. Crawford Catch per Standard-Boat-Day and Deploynent of Effort in the 
South African Purse-Seine Fishery, 1964-1976 (Sea Fisheries Institute, 
Investigational Report No.122, 1981), p.6, Table V. 
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its oil production 67 • The local market, however, was incapable of 
absorbing the massive surge in inshore production after 1950. 
Table 7. 4 : Pelagic Fish Exports 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 5 6 68. 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Year Canned Meal Oil Total 
Tons ( £. ] * Tons ( £. ] * Tons ( £. ] * Tons [ £. J * 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
1946 348 52 2 418 37 347 221 3 113 319 
1947 3 301 442 2 789 43 643 533 6 733 1 018 
1948 6 589 787 12 528 202 1 767 834 20 884 1 823 
1949 7 171 815 11 999 201 3 633 941 22 803 1 957 
1950 6 941 840 9 822 249 3 582 367 20 345 1 456 
1951 9 387 1 116 18 272 702 1 296 173 28 955 1 990 
1952 12 174 1 584 17 230 625 5 214 623 34 618 2 832 
1953 19 765 2 480 16 672 683 12 804 975 49 241 4 138 
1954 24 874 2 794 21 322 870 7 638 571 53 834 4 23 5 
1955 32 372 3 550 56 419 2 516 10 112 750 98 903 6 815 
1956 33 363 3 780 53 542 2 383 3 838 402 90 743 6 565 
* = lOOO's of£.. 
As early as 1944 the SAFCC warned that the Union's "relatively 
small and poor population" was a severe re~triction on the 
canning industry's future growth69 • Sustained efforts to expand 
consumption after the war, particularly among the African 
population, failed, and by 1950, the pelagic canning industry 
exported more than 14 million pounds of canned fish, increasing 
more than five-fold to 72 million (73% of total production) by 
67 Ibid., pp.57-58. Also DF 23rd Annual Report, 1951, pp.83-84 and DF 
24th Annual Report, 1952-1953, p.35 
68 Union of South Africa, Department of Customs & Excise Foreign Trade 
Statistics, 1945-1956. 
69 Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Fishing Industry 
Development Bill 1944, Evidence of A. Ovenstone, p.356 and F.W. Fox 
HAgricultural Foundations of Nutrition: IX Sea Foods• in South African Medical 
Journal, 28, 41, 9 October 1954, p.899. 
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1955ro. The destruction of the Japanese fishing industry dur i ng 
the war and the post-war collapse of the Californian sard i ne 
fishery created a "very favourable world market constellation" 
enabling Union producers to capture a share of the Asian market 
and even start exports to the United States 71 • By 1954, however, 
only 20% of the Union's pelagic catch was canned, the rest be i ng 
reduced to meal and o i l, which also found a burgeoning market i n 
Europe and the United States in the wake of the Californ i an 
7') 
collapse " . Thus by 1951, pelagic fish had overtaken c rayf i sh as 
the industry's chief export earner, worth more than ~6 mi ll io n in 
foreign exchange in 1955 (three times as much as crayfish) n . The 
production boom in the inshore fisheries made the South Afri c an 
?O Editorial "The Land and the SeaH in SASNFIR, February 1946, pp.14-15; 
HFish Flour for Human Consumption: Dramatic Possibilities in Cape Town 
Research" in SASNFIR, February 1946, pp.8-10; Editorial "Gold and FishH in 
SASNFIR, May 1946, pp.16-17; HBasutos Eager to get Sardines: No Taboos Against 
Fish and Proteins Needed" in SASNFIR, September 1946, pp.30-31; Editori al 
HMeat-A Luxury-The AnswerH in SASNFIR, May 1949, p.43; Editorial HThe Union's 
Consumption of FishH in SASNFIR, June 1949, p.51; Editorial HEat More Fish" in 
SASNFIR, August 1949, p.47; HEat More Fish CampaignH in SASNFIR, November 
1949, p.67; Editorial HFish for the PeopleH in SASNFIR, August 1951, p.51; 
HFish Flour Will Help to Conquer Malnutrition in the Union: National Feeding 
Scheme to Use Fishing Industry in Battle Against Diet Deficiency" in SASNFIR, 
August 1951, pp.59-63; Editorial "The Market for FishH in SASNFIR, October 
1952, p.65; Editorial "Selling FishH in SASNFIR, February 1954, p.57; 
Editorial HFish Against Malnutrition" in SASNFIR, April 1955, p.49 and 
Edito~ial "Disguising FishH in SASNFIR, September 1955, p.51. 
71 Board of Trade & Industries Report No.337: The Marine Oil Industries 
of the Union, p.45 & p.81. Also HCape Canned Fish .to Replace Jap Salroon: Sign 
of Pelican Heralds New Trade BidH in SASNFIR, March 1946, p.27; "SA Ousts 
Yank Canned Fish in Malaya" in SASNFIR, November 1948, p.43; Editori al HThe 
Export of FishH in SASNFIR, February 1949, p.43; Editorial HFishing: An Export 
Industry• in SASNFIR, April 1949, p.41; ,..Ikan Burum' - the Pelican - is 
Household Word in Malaya,. in SASNFIR, May 1950, p.51; HSouth Africa-Britain-
Holland-Japan Compete for Big Fish Market in West AfricaH in SASNFIR, March 
1953, pp.69-87; HUnion Fish Canners React Well to Tighter Overseas MarketsH in 
SASNFIR, July 1953, pp.65-67 and HCanned Fish Deal Opens Huge Market for South 
African MaasbankerH in SASNFIR, July 1954, pp.55-75. 
n "Four-fifths of the Union's Catch becomes Fishmeal or OilH in SASNFIR, 
March 1954, p.64. 
73 Compare TABLES 7.2 and 7.4 above. 
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